‘Religious Roots of Serbian Ethno-Fascism’ have Parallels in Russian Nationalism of Putin Era

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 24 – A major reason many Western governments opposed the disintegration of the USSR is that they feared that that enormous space would become “a Yugoslavia with nukes.” When the Soviet Union fell apart remarkably peacefully, such fears were dispelled, and parallels between the Yugoslav and Soviet experiences were ignored.

            That is unfortunate because the demise of Yugoslavia and the rise of Serbian nationalism have much to say about what has happened as far as the ideology and practice of Russian nationalism in post-Soviet Russia is concerned, parallels that have not all worked out but that continue to affect the situation there and in Russia’s relations with its neighbors.

            Perhaps without intending to do so, Grigory Mavrov, a Russian Islamicist, has called attention to these parallels in an article on “the religious roots of Serbian ethno-fascism,” an essay where with only slight modifications one could replace Serbia and Serbian Orthodoxy with ones to Russia and Russian Orthodoxy  (trtrussian.com/mnenie/religioznye-korni-serbskogo-etnofashizma-6963123).

            Below is a translation of Mavrov’s main points where that is self-evident:

“The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the armed conflicts which followed that among different peoples of the federation demonstrated the danger of unresolved ethno-national contradictions. In the course of this war, the Bosnian Muslims suffered maximum losses, having suffered genocide and mass deportation. Their infrastructure, especially religious, suffered in particular.

“At the same time, the conflict in the former Yugoslvia must not be called a religious war. All the peoples of Yugoslavia had undergone secularization and the expulsion of religion from the public sphere. Communist education should to minimize the religious factor and according to Yugoslav socialist leaders to education a new man. But it was too soon to bury religion.

“Under conditions of the disintegration of the state and the collapse of communist values, it was religion which began to be used as a marker of identity, which allowed everyone to define ‘us’ and ‘them.’ At a time when Yugoslav supra-religious identity proved incapable of being a cementing factor, religion began to play into the hands of the Serbian nationalist project.

“Undoubtedly, ethnic purges and the destruction of mosques did not have a direct religious motive and Serbian priests did not call for killing Muslims or Catholics. Orthodoxy, like Islam over the course of many centuries developed various means of interaction and coexistence with those of different faiths. Despite this, the leaders of the Belgrad and Bosnian Serbs constantly appealed to religious meanings and symbols for justifying aggression against the Bosnians, Croations and Kosovar Albanians.

“At the base of Serbian nationalist ideology and later of Serbian national identity lay the so-called Kosovo myth, based on legends about real events connected with a battle on Kosovo field in 1389 …  After the fall of the Serbian state, in the opinion of Serbian nationalists, began a lengthy and shameful period of ‘Ottoman-Muslim occupation and slavery.’

“The Kosovo myth acquired particular importance in the 19^th century when the need arose among Serbian nationalists for mobilizing the popular masses for the struggle with the Ottoman administration … [It] lay at the basis of revanchist strivings of the Serbian nationalists and for an entire century defined the fate of Serbian and other peoples.

“One of the attempts at realizing the goals of the Serbian ethno-fascists became the ideology of Yugoslavism which dominated in Yugoslavia which was formed after the end of World War I. Yugoslavism sought ot unite the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, viewing them as a three-in-one people and Yugoslavia for the Serbian nationalists was an instrument for the creation of Greater Serbia.

“After World War II, Yugoslavia came under the power of the communist party which significantly weakened the influence of the Serbian nationalists on Yugoslavism. Communists under the leadership of the Croation Iosip Broz Tito conducted a policy of decentralization, transforming Yugoslavia into a federation, something which particularly infuriated Serbian radicals.

“After the death of Tito in 1980, the Serbs gradually took under control the government apparatus and the army, and in 1989, when marking the anniversary of the battle on Kosovo field, Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian who became the head of Yugoslavia, declared that ‘Serbia always was a bastion which defended European culture, religion, and European society.’

“Following Milosevic’s example, many social and religious leaders of Serbia revived the Kosovo myth and the leading role of the Serbs in the assembly of peoples of Yugoslavia … And later, in 1994, Radovan Karadic, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs in explaining the motivation of the Serbian militants, declared that … ‘Today even God is a Serb!’

“The church always denied the genocide of the Bosnian Muslims … it is not surprising that during the war, the Serbian Orthodox Church provided all-sided assistance to the leaders of the Bosnian and Croatian Serbs.

“Thus, conceiving itself to be the preserver of Serbian identity, the Orthodox church actively took part and continues to take part in the formation of the religious-nationalistic myth. The church has not found strength in itself to critically revise its relations to Muslims and representatives of other religions because it considers the multiplicity of Yugoslavia and Serbia to be a challenge rather than an advantage.”