Friday, June 28, 2024

Since Crocus City, Russia’s Federal Subjects have Increasingly Diverged on the Handling of Immigrant Workers

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 22 – Russian law specifies that the federal subjects rather than Moscow have the right to regulate how many migrant workers they take in and how many restrictions such workers face. As a result, there is a growing divergence among the federal subjects on such measures.

            Even before the Crocus City attack, a small number of federal subjects had begun to introduce restrictions on migrant workers; but after that, the number increased dramatically; and now approximately a third of the more than 80 federal subjects restrict such workers one way or another.

            But what is striking, Moscow analyst Aleksandr Shustov says, is that two categories of these subjects have not done so: the megalopolises like Moscow and Petersburg where migrant workers are most common and the Muslim republics in the North Caucasus and the Middle Volga (ritmeurasia.ru/news--2024-06-22--raznye-podhody-regionov-k-trudu-migrantov-chrevaty-etnokulturnym-raskolom-74063).

            On the one hand, he says, that means the migrant workers are increasingly concentrated in the capitals, exacerbating ethnic tensions in these two big urban agglomerations. And on the other, it means that there is a growing divide between other Russian federal subjects that don’t want immigrants to increase in number and Muslim republics which are happy to receive them.

            That in turn means that the ethnic structure of the populations of the capitals and the ethnic and religious balance of the country as a whole are rapidly changing, something Shustov says will cause problems. And he urges that the central government take control of this issue lest it undermine the country’s national security. 

Moscow’s Rejection of New International Classification of Diseases Hurts Not Only Homosexuals but Russian Veterans and Others as Well, Aronov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 20 – Earlier this year, the Kremlin forced the Russian health ministry to reverse its decision to recognize the new International Classification of Diseases because that document asserts that homosexuality is not a disease, a position at odds with Putin’s ideas about traditional values.

            That decision sparked outrage among the gay community and its defenders both in Russia and abroad, with many concluding that this move seriously harmed the rights of homosexuals and further distanced Russia from the West (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/02/moscow-further-distances-itself-from.html).

            But now, Russian journalist Nikita Aronov who specializes on health issues says that it is important to recognize that many other groups of Russians, including most immediately Russian veterans suffering from PTSD, will he hurt as well as a result of this Kremlin move against homosexuals (theins.ru/obshestvo/272478).

            As many as 20 percent of Russian soldiers returning from Ukraine suffer from PTSD, the Russian government has admitted (vedomosti.ru/politics/characters/2024/06/18/1044406-vazhno-chtobi-veterani-voennoi-operatsii-videli-perspektivi-v-mirnoi-zhizni); and their fate depends in large measure on which classification of that illness the authorities will use.

            Under the old ICD, Aronov points out, those suffering from PTSD are “at risk of being misdiagnosed as ‘schizophrenics’ instead of receiving proper treatment,” while under the new ICD that Moscow has rejected, they would be far more likely to be accurately classified and given the treatment they need.

            The same thing is true for those suffering from a variety of other diseases, including ADHD which is not listed in the former ICD manual, he continues; but it is striking that by refusing to recognize the new ICD as authoritative, Moscow has almost certainly guaranteed that none of these people, including those Putin calls “heroes,” will get the help they need.

Fliers Telling Russian Women Not to Have Children with Central Asian Men Circulating in Tyumen

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 20 – The NeMoskva news agency posts a picture of a flier now circulating in the Siberian city of Tyumen telling ethnic Russian women there that they must not have children with Central Asian men but give birth only to “real ethnic Russians,” the latest example of racist messaging in Russia.

            The flier appears to be more professionally done than most such messages are, but perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this situation is not the flier itself but the reaction of interior ministry officials when asked what they were going to do about it (nemoskva.net/2024/06/18/plodite-tolko-nastoyashhih-russkih-v-tyumeni-nachali-rasprostranyat-ksenofobnye-listovki/).

            A press spokesman for the Tyumen office of the interior ministry, the NeMoskva agency reports, said his agency would check whether the report was true and then decide how to react. But he added that if reports about the leaflet turn out to be false, “measures of a legal character will be taken.”

            In short, the police have decided to adopt a wait and see attitude about the leaflets but they are ready to file charges against those who have brought these leaflets to their attention if the authorities conclude that is fake news, exactly the opposite of the balance in concerns about such things should be. 

Siberians will Be Independent but Whether as One State or Many is Unclear, Activist Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 20 – Stanislav Suslov, a member of the Movement for the Independence of Siberia who now lives in Serbia, says that independence for Siberians is inevitable but what remains unclear is whether they will eventually form one county or a number of them after what he hopes will be a peaceful “divorce” from Moscow.

            In Lithuania for a meeting of regional and ethnic activists from the Russian Federation, he argues that this process will complete the demise of the Muscovite empire that began in 1991 (lrt.lt/ru/novosti/17/2299848/rossiiskii-aktivist-boretsia-za-soedinennye-shtaty-sibiri-raspad-rossii-neizbezhen).

            What remains uncertain, Suslov continues, is whether the peoples of the enormous region east of the Urals will form one country or many. Clearly, many of the non-Russians will want independence, but others may be quite willing to work with ethnic Russians there and form a federal or confederal state.

            He says that if the peoples of the region divide up Siberia into a large number of relatively small countries, there is a great danger that they will fall under Chinese domination, thus echoing at the regional level an argument often heard in Moscow against any independence for the lands east of the Urals. 

            How compelling his argument for a Siberian federation will be remains to be seen, but it is an intriguing indication that activists there are thinking about what might happen after independence is achieved and beginning to think about how they will defend their interests in that event.

            Suslov also makes another point that may matter enormously in the future. He says that all too many people, including many in Moscow, view Siberia only as a source of raw materials for the development of the rest of Russia or for sale abroad. Instead, he says, Siberia like any other modern country must focus on non-extractive industries if it is to have a future.

Returning Veterans with Criminal Pasts Such a Threat to Russia that New Laws about Them are Needed, KPRF Duma Deputy Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 20 – Many Russian commentators have expressed fears that veterans returning from Putin’s war in Ukraine will resemble but be even more numerous than the Afgantsy were in the 1990s, especially because the Kremlin has recruited criminals to serve there (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/01/history-of-afghantsy-being-replicated.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/01/kremlin-unwittingly-creating-veterans.html).

            Up to now, however, the Russian authorities have treated these veterans with kid gloves, presented them as the new elite, and even sought to make it easier for former convicts to own guns (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/11/duma-deputies-seek-to-loosen-russian.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/11/russian-courts-giving-lighter-sentences.html).

            But now, after a series of gruesome crimes including murder and rape, some officials are expressing alarm; and the KPRF’s Nina Ostanina, who chairs the Duma’s Committee on Defense of the Family, is calling for action because “these people represent a danger to society” (gazeta.ru/social/news/2024/06/19/23279755.shtml and meduza.io/news/2024/06/19/eti-lyudi-predstavlyayut-opasnost-dlya-obschestva-deputat-gosdumy-nina-ostanina-prizvala-zaschitit-rossiyan-ot-byvshih-zaklyuchennyh-kotorye-vozvraschayutsya-s-voyny).

            She says that officials must take special measures to defend Russia against former convicts who are now being feted as heroes but who a coming back to their former homes and committing new crimes and has called for the adoption of special laws to prevent them from wreaking a wave of terror on Russian society.  

             Because Putin has presented such veterans as important components of the new elite that he sees the war creating, Ostanina's proposal for new legislation is unlikely to go anywhere. But the fact that she has raised this issue in the way that she has may make even Kremlin loyalists more concerned about ensuring that such veterans will be harshly punished if they do commit new crimes.  

 

Putin Set to Allow China Direct River Access to Sea of Japan

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 20 – China has long sought to get Russia to agree to allow its ships to pass through a 15-kilometer stretch of the Tumanna River, which flows along the border of China and North Korea and then forms the border between the Russian Federation and North Korea, to allow its ships to reach the Sea of Japan via that route.

            But Russia as resisted, fearful that allowing China that access would allow Beijing to increase its influence in the region. Now, however, after Vladimir Putin’s visit to China, it appears that Moscow is prepared to begin serious negotiations over this route, which Beijing has already said it will seek to widen and to demolish a bridge that might block its ships.

            Japan is alarmed (asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/China-eyes-Sea-of-Japan-access-via-Russia-North-Korea-border-river), and independent Russian and Ukrainian outlets are treating such moves as yet another example of Putin’s deference to China at Russia’s expense (moscowtimes.ru/2024/06/17/rossiya-peredast-kitayu-reku-dlya-vihoda-vyaponskoe-more-a134173 and tsn.ua/svit/rf-prodast-kitayu-richku-schob-pekin-otrimav-dostup-do-yaponskogo-morya-reakciya-cpd-rnbo-2602773.html).

            The reasons Russians are concerned lies in the history of Putin’s dealings with Chinese claims in the region. Fifteen years ago, he agreed to meet Beijing’s demands and hand over four islands and half of a fifth in the Amur border region. That led China to produce maps last year showing much of this area as again Chinese, maps that Moscow was slow to object to.

On that case, see moscowtimes.io/2023/08/29/kitai-na-novoi-ofitsialnoi-karte-obyavil-svoei-territoriei-chast-rossii-a53376, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/09/moscow-finally-reacts-to-new-chinese.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/05/under-guise-of-joint-development-putin.html).

Wednesday, June 26, 2024

Lukashenka’s Remark about Jews Echoes State Anti-Semitism of Late Soviet Period

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 20 – Speaking to a conference on corruption in Belarus, Alyaksandr Lukashenka pointed out that “more than half” of those accused of this crime are Jews while insisting that he personally is “not an anti-Semite,” precisely the kind of remarks typical of state anti-Semitism in in Khrushchev’s times and more generally, Khaim Ben Yakov says.

            The general director of the Euro-Asian Jewish Congress gives five examples from the 1960s to show how similar the Belarusian leader’s comments are to the ones Soviet officials and commentators made then (moscowtimes.ru/2024/06/18/aleksandr-lukashenko-i-istoriya-gosudarstvennogo-antisemitizma-a134279).

            At that time, such comments preceded and accompanied discrimination against and repression of Jews, Ben Yakov says; and that means that the international community must protest against the possibility that Lukashenka and then perhaps Putin will follow the same path Khrushchev and other Soviet officials did.

            If Lukashenka’s remarks pass without such protests, there every chance that he and other leaders in the region will conclude that they can get away with using anti-Semitism in order to divert the attention of their populations from the problems they are now facing. The Jews will be the first victims if that happens, but they won’t be the last. 

Russia Needs Fewer People if It Remains a Petrostate and Far More if It Becomes an Expansionist One, Kulbaka Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 20 – If Russia remains a petrostate whose oil and gas exports provide enormous wealth for its elites, that country needs no more than 40 million people. 100 million fewer than now; but if it becomes an expansionist one, then it will need vastly more than it now has to guard its lengthy borders and enormous territory, Nikolay Kulbaka says.

            That sets the stage for a fundamental conflict in Moscow between wealthy elites and Putin, one the two sides are unlikely to be able to resolve, the independent economist says. That will create the kind of uncertainties that threaten the existing system and the country (moscowtimes.ru/2024/06/20/buduschee-rossii-petrokratiya-ili-ekspansionizm-a134491).

            Over the last two decades, Russia has become a petrostate, whose exports of petroleum have given the elite enormous wealth, even though most of the population has become poorer. Indeed, to function as a state of this kind, something the elites very much like given the high level of consumption it guarantees, Russia needs only about 40 million people.

Thus, such elites are quite happy to see Russia’s population decline toward that number because besides everything else that will mean that there will be fewer unhappy people and thus fewer protests and challenges to an arrangement that could continue to work for their benefit long into the future, Kulbaka continues.

            But Vladimir Putin has put the country on a different track, one focused on expansionism. And for that, the economist says, Russia needs far more people, both to control and develop its economy and territory and to guard its borders which after all remain the longest of any country in the world.

            For that policy to have any chance to succeed, Putin needs more people not fewer, including immigrant workers from Central Asia, exactly the opposite of what the supporters of petrostate arrangements want. The latter will have to give up some of their consumption as higher wages and salaries will be required to attract immigrants and boost the birthrate.

Russian Environmental Activists Won 73 Victories in 2023 Against Government and Business

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 20 – The Putin regime and its business allies have won victory after victory against Russian civil society, but there are exceptions. Last year, according to the Ecology Crisis Group, Russian environmental activists across the country won full or partial victories in 73 cases.

            In 40 of these cases, the government or business simply abandoned projects that the environmentalists opposed; and in 33 more, the former have been forced to change their plans or are still fighting with the environmentalists in court (semnasem.org/articles/2024/06/17/kakuyu-rossiyu-my-sohranili-regionalnye-ekopobedy-2023-v-illyustraciyah-nejrosetej).

            This doesn’t mean that the depradation of the Russian environment has stopped or that the Russian government has changed its approach, but it does show that in at least this area, concerned Russian citizens can act and act effectively even against what sometimes seems to be an increasingly all-powerful state.

            And these victories, typically small-scale and far from Moscow as the Horizontal Russia portal suggests in its coverage of the Ecology Crisis Group report, should inspire other Russians to seek to defend their rights and interests rather than continuing to fall into apathy and assuming nothing can be done.

 

Russia’s Disintegration Could Well Begin in Far East, Romanov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 19 – The disintegration of the Russian Federation could well begin in the Far East where ever more people are talking about how different that region is from European Russia, looking abroad for allies and even positing the existence of something they call “a coastal civilization,” Igor Romanov says.

            The director of the Bereg Rus Center on Church-State Relations whose portal covers and promotes an Orthodox Christian version of Russian nationalism says that supporters of “coastal civilization” have as their main but concealed goal the presentation of such a civilization as “non-ethnic Russian, non-civic Russian and non-Orthodox” as well (beregrus.ru/?p=15039).

            The object of Romanov’s anger in this case is a series of articles on a Vladivostok portal that describe unique features of the life and history of the region and argue that these are sufficient to justify calling the people there are constituting a unique “coastal civilization” (primamedia.ru/news/1763356/).

            On the one hand, such articles could easily appear to be nothing more than an example of the focus on local news that is typical of many regions of the Russian Federation. But on the other, describing the situation in the Far East as a separate “civilization” goes far beyond what is normally the case of such coverage elsewhere.

            It is clear, Romanov says, that “’the Non-Russia’ project, which has been taking shape for many years in the spiritual and cultural space of the Far East is a long-term undertaking and has support not only from a broad but also from some ‘foreign agents’ in the federal government of the Russian Federation” who fail to see that this could convert the region into a new Ukraine.

            According to the commentator, that includes some who are supporters of the BRICS alliance who are prepared to sacrifice Russia and its historical culture in the pursuit of a larger union. Russia needs good relations with China but not at the price of the loss of its unified culture and territory.

            If this danger is not recognized, Romanov says, and those pushing for a separate “coastal civilization” are not blocked, then “the threat of the collapse of our country may begin to take place on the territories of the Far East,” something that will hurt Russians living in that enormous region first of all.

            “Those who today are actively promoting the strengthening of ‘Non-Russia’ there, all these small corrupt journalists and short-sighted businessmen and politicians with a limited point of view should remember that if a negative scenario for the Far East and Russia comes to pass, they are unlikely to be needed by the new owners and will be instantly erased.”

            “Just as dust is wiped off from an old cabinet,” Romanov concludes.

Gas Deal with China Becoming Ever Less Favorable to Russia, Morokhin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 18 – Moscow and Beijing have been discussing a pipeline to carry Russian gas to China since 2006; but they haven’t been able to reach an agreement. Worse, from Moscow’s point of view, China has continued to increase its demands on the Russian side, something it feels free to do because of Russia’s loss of other gas markets abroad.

            That trend is likely to continue unless and until Moscow can begin to sell more gas to others and thus not be forced as now to grudgingly accept Beijing’s ever more extreme demands, Denis Morokhin, the economics observer for Novaya Gazeta Evropa, says (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2024/06/18/poslednee-kitaiskoe-trebovanie).

            He suggests that China is now making demands that Moscow can hardly afford to meet including selling gas to China at domestic Russian prices, credit arrangements unfavorable to Gazprom, Chinese involvement in gas exploration inside Russia, the routing of pipelines, the amount of gas to be delivered and the formula for setting prices.

            According to Morokhin, Moscow does not want to meet any of these demands because they would effectively give China enormous power over Russia’s internal economic arrangements; but at the same time, he suggests, the Kremlin may not be able to resist much longer given the absence of other sources of money it needs for its war in Ukraine.

Moscow Now Targeting Federalists as well as Nationalists in Non-Russian Republics

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 18 – Under Putin, Moscow has long targeted nationalists in non-Russian republics because it sees them as a threat to the territorial integrity of the country while leaving those who advocate federalism largely alone, viewing them as a lesser evil or even allies in it fight with the nationalists, a view about the federalists that many nationalists share.

            Now, however, the situation has changed, Buryat activist Marina Khakhalayeva says. Moscow is still going after the nationalists, even though most of the prominent ones have been imprisoned or have left the country. But central authorities are increasingly attacking federalists in the republics as well (idelreal.org/a/vazhno-preodolet-v-sebe-travmu-i-chuvstvo-viny-aktivisty-o-tom-kak-vystraivat-federalizm-v-buduschey-rossii/32996111.html).

            The consequence has not been to intimidate the federalists into silence but rather to drive them into the hands of the nationalists because the former have increasingly concluded that no Moscow promises can be trusted because the center opposes recognizing the rights of the republics and regions.

            The development Khakhalayeva points is less about the non-Russians than about Moscow’s concerns about developments in the regions and its decision taken earlier this year to attack federalist ideas wherever they appear (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/04/russian-justice-ministry-calls-for.html).

            What remains to be seen is whether these expanded attacks on those in predominantly Russian regions who advocate real federalism for Russia will lead such people to draw similar conclusions to their counterparts in the non-Russian republics, become radicalized, and decide that only an exit from under Moscow’s control will give them the futures they want. 

Monday, June 24, 2024

Fragging Appears in Russian Units in Ukraine, ‘Novaya Gazeta’ Suggests

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 17 – Fragging -- attacks on officers by soldiers under their command and a phenomenon that was notorious in the US military in Vietnam as well as in Soviet forces in Afghanistan as well -- is now taking place in Russian units in Ukraine, data collected by Novaya Gazeta suggest.

            The independent paper examined military court records in the occupied territories between February and October 2023. It identified more than 135 cases in which Russian soldiers were charged with killing either civilians or other Russian military personnel (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2024/06/14/ruzhe-streliaet-po-svoim).

            These figures are necessarily incomplete both because of the limited time and territory they covered, the paper acknowledges, and because not all crimes of this type are brought to the courts or correctly categorized. Consequently, the real numbers may be far higher, the paper suggests.

            But even these numbers are indicative of breakdowns in command and control and unit cohesion that threaten the ability of the Russian military to carry out its mission, prompting officers to avoid giving orders that might lead to their own deaths at the hands of their own soldiers.

            And to the extent that such cases become more widely known, fragging of this kind will certainly prompt discussions among Russians in general and those in the political elite about the potentially dangerous consequences of continuing to pursue the Kremlin’s military goals and could even lead to demands for changes in both tactics and strategy.

Putin’s Recent Personnel Moves Threaten to Spark Conspiracies Against Him, Eidman Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 18 – Over the course of the last month, Vladimir Putin has offended large swaths of his entourage by firing or demoting officials but leaving them or their supporters in position of real power where there is a growing possibility that at least some of them may engage in conspiracies to oust him from power, Igor Eidman says.

            Indeed, the Russian commentator argues, “never before in the Putin leadership have their been so many people who have been offended by the dictator” (censoru.net/2024/06/18/nikogda-v-putinskom-rukovodstve-ne-bylo-stolko-ljudej-obizhennyh-diktatorom-kadrovye-reshenija-nesut-dlja-putina-riski-zagovora.html).

By his actions, Eidman says, Putin has seriously offended influential “clans” headed by Patrushev, Shoygu, and generals from the defense ministry as well as senior officials in the Presidential Administration and the wealthy partners of all these people in business and elsewhere.

“None of this would have been a problem for Putin if he had acted in a Stalinist manner and had the offended been sent to the camps. But they haven’t been dealt with in this way and preserve their positions in power.” And as a result, the commentator continues, Putin himself “has created a seedbed” for a revolt by those nominally closest to him.

Almost all of the officials who have been demoted or seen their positions weakened, including Patrushev, Shoygu, Gerasimov, and Kiryenko, still retain real power and influence; and having been “mortally offended” by Putin, they may decide to act against him before he can take even more steps against themselves.

 

Putin Must Avoid Kolchak’s Mistakes on National Question, ‘Soveshenno Sekretno’ Historian Suggests

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 17 – The Russian past offers many lessons for the present and not just those the current powers that be want people to draw. Among those unlearned lessons, Sergey Lozenko of Sovershenno Sekretno says, is one that comes from the disasters that followed from Aleksandr Kolchak’s failure to take the nationality question seriously.

            In a 2,000-word article entitled “Kolchak’s Nationality Question,” the historian says what the leaders of the White Movement routinely underestimated the importance of ethnic issues and believed that any problems in that area could be solved by force alone. The result was disaster (sovsekretno.ru/articles/istoriya/natsionalnyy-vopros-kolchaka100624/).

            Lozenko devotes particular attention to the ways in which Kolchak ignored and then sought to repress Ukrainian nationalism in the Russian Far East. His intelligence operatives told him that ethnic Ukrainians there wanted to split off that region from Russia and that he had no choice but to use force against them.

            That is precisely what he did, alienating many Ukrainians there and driving some of them into the hands of the Bolsheviks. But at the same time, Kolchak chose to rely on units raised by Ukrainian military leaders, only to see these forces later change sides and fight against him including at the Volga, thus preventing a link up with Denikin that might have led to victory.

            The details Lozenko provides are fascinating and convincing. But it is his conclusion about Kolchak’s failure and the lessons it has for today that are especially noteworthy. He writes that the inability of the White Russian leaders to “realize the significance of nationality policy and provide a unifying idea for the representatives of the peoples in Russia led to disaster.”

            And he ends by asserting that “it is necessary to draw lessons from this history in order to promptly identify and forestall challenges that are emerging today.” Few who read his article will fail to see the parallels he is drawing between Ukrainians then and now and between Admiral Kolchak and Russian President Vladimir Putin. 

 

Wednesday, June 19, 2024

Russian Victims of Natural Disasters Send Record Number of Complaints to Putin, Kremlin Admits

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 14 – Russian victims of flooding and fires sent more than 2500 complaints to Vladimir Putin during April and May complaining about the failure of the authorities to help them, a number far in excess of the figures registered in 2019 before the pandemic and the war in Ukraine occurred, the Kremlin has acknowledged.

            According to the Kremlin, almost a third of these complaints came from Orenburg Oblast alone, the hardest hit region in the Russian Federation situated between Bashkortostan and Kazakhstan (letters.kremlin.ru/digests/year/2024/308, letters.kremlin.ru/digests/year/2024/309 and istories.media/news/2024/06/14/zhalobi-na-problemi-s-viplatami/).

            While the Putin regime may be pleased that Russians choose to write to Putin about their problems rather than to any one else, its officials can hardly welcome the fact that these data suggest that Russians are ever more ready to complain in a public and entirely identifiable way about things that hit their lives directly.

Russian Opposition Paralyzed by Fear of Choice Between Centralization and Disintegration, Guseynov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 16 – One of the most serious weaknesses of the Russian opposition, Gasan Guseynov says, is a lack of a vocabulary which could allow it to overcome its paralyzing fear “before the choice between a centralized Russian state and a multiplicity of new states which could arise on the territory of the present-day Russian Federation.”

            The Paris-based Russian philologist says that the words leaders of the opposition use not only prevent them from seeing just how far Russia has moved to becoming a Russian nation state but also prevent them from being able to navigate between centralizers now in power and those who advocate disintegration as the only way forward (rfi.fr/ru/россия/20240616-с-чего-начинается-освобождение-языка).

            The word “disintegration” frightens them to the point that they cannot respond adequately when it is mentioned. As a result, they don’t recognize how small that threat is now that Russia is becoming a nation state and thus find themselves in an alliance with the centralizing imperialists and thus make the possibility of disintegration far greater.

            Is it really better for Russian people today living in the vastness of Eurasia to have a single aggressive and unjust state rather than several additional compact and peace-loving states named for example after large Russian cities or regions?”  the philologist asks rhetorically. But the vocabulary the Russian opposition uses prevents this from even being discussed.

            Instead, Guseynov says, those in the opposition who dream of “a beautiful Russia of the future … forbid representatives of the Russian minorities from even mentioning the possibility of ‘the collapse of Russia.” And still worse, they tell the latter to “’know their place’” lest in saying anything about changing relations between center and periphery they frighten people.

Muslims Moving Beyond the Umma into Russian Establishment

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 14 – Kazan’s Business Online has offered its list of the 100 most influential Muslims in the Russian Federation. The most striking thing about the list is that these influentials are now in the Russian establishment government or business rather than at the top of the Muslim Spiritual Directorates (MSDs) which oversee the umma in that country.

            Among the top 10 of these influential Muslims, only three are leaders of the Muslim community as usually understood: Ravil Gainutdin, head of the MSD of Russia, Talgat Tajuddin, head of the Central MSD in Ufa, and Albir Krganov, head of the Spiritual Assembly of Russia (business-gazeta.ru/article/636876).

            The others are government officials, Duma members and business leaders, a pattern that holds for the other 90 Muslims on the list, and clear testimony to the fact that Muslims now have multiple ways of rising to the top of Russian society and are not nearly as ghettoized as some would like and many more continue to believe is the case. 


Navalny Team’s ‘Traitors’ Affecting Russian Opposition Much as Khrushchev’s 1956 Secret Speech Affected Communists, Zharkov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 14 – The new film, Traitors, prepared by Navalny’s Foundation for the Struggle with Corruption, is having an impact on the Russian opposition comparable to that which Khrushchev’s secret speech in 1956 had on communists both in the USSR and around the world, according to Vasily Zharkov.

            In both cases, the Russian activist who is now at the European University of the Humanities in Vilnius says, they attacked an earlier leader, Yeltsin in the film and Stalin in the speech, for betraying the principles in which he supposedly acted and opened the way for the recovery of those principles (moscowtimes.ru/2024/06/14/dvadtsatii-sezd-v-emigratsii-a134023).

            Just as Khrushchev’s attack on Stalin gave “the children of the 20th congress” the opportunity to seek to restore Leninism so now the film is giving “a new generation of Russian politicians, the generation of the children of Aleksey Navalny” the opportunity to propose “their version of a democratic future and a path to a more just, equal and free society.”

            “In the eyes of most Russians, the terms ‘democracy’ and ‘liberalism’ were seriously discredited by the policy of Yeltsin and his team.” If they are to be revived, they must be freed of that burden, something that requires “an analysis of the mistakes of previous political generations” and a rejection of their discredited approaches.

            Comparing the new film with the 1956 congress is “of course, a metaphor.” There are many differences, but these two events are “turning points for the history of ideologies and the political history of Russia.” The 20th congress began “the long process of revising ideas of socialism;” the new film, the ideology of liberalism and democracy.

            “In criticizing Stalin, Khrushchev called for returning to ‘Leninist principles’ but not to tsarist times.” In criticizing Yeltsin, the new film is doing something similar, not calling for a return to Soviet times but to fulfilling the promises of democracy and freedom that Yeltsin failed to keep.

            That demolishes what had been a long-standing consensus in the liberal opposition: say nothing about Yeltsin or speak only good about him.” Now what the first Russian president did to subvert democracy and freedom can be openly discussed by a new generation of opposition figures without any suggestion that the alternative is a return to Sovietism a la Putin.

            For the opposition, criticism of Yeltsin has been “finally legalized,” and that has triggered a fight between the older generation of opposition figures who backed his “good tsar” approach to introducing the ideology but not the substance of freedom and democracy and those who want those values in forms that allow them to be pursued.

            What happened under Yeltsin was the establishment of “freedom exclusively in a negative sense, freedom from government oversight but not freedom for participation in the affairs of the state and society. The state and the people for a time turned out to be free from one another, but a decade later, the state retook what it had lost,” Zharkov says.

            Most of the earlier opposition leaders have fled abroad but there they lost social capital and “committed a fatal mistake,” he continues. That mistake, which consists of “a fear of the people alongside the absolutization of the role of the market,” remains for them what it was for Russian liberal dogmatists of the 1990s, the only way forward.

            Their attitude can be summed up in the following way: In addressing the people, they say “you are rabble so you don’t deserve anything good in your life. You will never have democracy but must instead recognize our privileges and power over you in Russia because we are your intellectual elite.”

            “Such a message,” Zharkov points out, “does not make democratic ideas more popular across society.” Instead, by taking that position, “Russian liberals have driven themselves into a ghetto from they can escape only by returning to empathy for their fellow citizens,” something a younger generation of the opposition is willing to do.

            “Unlike the heirs of the old Soviet pop nobility who flourished in the 1990s,” the commentator says, “these people do not consider themselves ‘an elite’ and are much closer to understanding the needs and aspirations of the mass population.” They don’t view their fellow countrymen “as a rabble but rather as people worthy of living in an equal and free society.”

            The new film will speed this process as it is “high time” for “the Russian opposition to leave the pseudo-elite ghetto” it has been in and instead “learn to speak with the people in a respectful way and in clearly understandable language,” Zharkov concludes.

 

Monday, June 17, 2024

Putin Arose Because Russian Reformers of 1990s Focused on Privatizing Economy Rather than on Creating a New Political System, Chernova Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 11 – Russian liberal reformers in the 1990s laid the groundwork for the rise of a ruler like Putin by using despotic means to achieve the liberal goal of privatizing the economy rather than seeking to create a new political system that would institutionalize conflicts, Elena Chernova says.

            The St. Petersburg sociologist who specializes in the study of conflict says that by acting in this way, the reformers allowed those like Putin who favored a despotic approach to all things to rise to power because they set the precedent and failed to create countervailing institutions (reforum.io/blog/2024/06/11/kak-ne-predat-sleduyushhuyu-popytku-demokratizaczii/).

            “The reformers have entered history as liberals because they freed the economy from the rule of the CPSU and proclaimed a free market,” she argues; “but on the political level, they acted in the typical despotic approach to the country as an economic system.” That subverted their own goals and made the return of authoritarianism inevitable.

            The Russian economy “beyond doubt” needed to be restructured, “but the political system needed to be created from scratch.” Instead of focusing on that, the reformers argued that “democracy would have to be developed after the introduction of ‘elements’ of capitalism.” And as is not always appreciated, that departed from what Gorbachev was trying to do.

            “Gorbachev’s reforms,” Chernova continues, “were directed above all at the development of ‘glasnost and pluralism,’ that is on the creation of a republic political milieu. But after 1991, Boris Yeltsin led a team of reformers for whom politics was equated with economics and pluralism was an afterthought.” The clash of October 1993 highlighted this change.

            The Yeltsin government, “armed with the only true economic doctrine of the free market, sought to quickly get into a bright future” [stress supplied, just as the Soviet government had]. The conflict was acute and was fundamentally different than anything that had occurred in public in Soviet times.

            But instead of viewing this as progress to a new Russia, “Yeltsin labelled it a destructive vicious cycle he had to break” to ensure that his position won and resistance was destroyed. As a result, “the liquidation of the ‘retrograde’ parliament was not the beginning of the end of democracy but the restoration of the traditional despotic type of government” Russia has had.

            As a result, a Putin figure became almost inevitable.

Chernova does not say but very much could have that the approach of the Russian liberals in the 1990s was in fact supported by Western governments who were quite prepared to declare Russia a democracy even though it wasn’t as long as the regime dismantled the state-controlled economy and blocked the return of the communism.

 

Sunday, June 16, 2024

Patriotic Education in Russia Both Broadly Similar and Very Different from Its Soviet Predecessor, Vinogradov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 11 – Mikhail Vinogradov, head of the Petersburg Politics Foundation, says that the content of patriotic education in Russia under Vladimir Putin shows 10 important continuities with that of Soviet times but varies in 20 equally important ways by what it leaves out and what it includes.

            The continuities (t.me/Vinogradov74/3994) include:

1.     Positive assessment of country’s past rulers except for immediate predecessors,

2.     Identification of the country, state and people with the current regime,

3.     Emphasis on country’s exceptionalism,

4.     Ideological loyalty based on birth or citizenship,

5.     Presenting West as main threat to the country,

6.     Emphasizing weakness, injustice and approaching collapse of opposing countries,

7.     Support for countries in the third world who are opposed to the colonial and imperial west,

8.     Glorification of military service,

9.     Government pressure on family to promote these values, and

10.  Avoidance of any reflection of social stratification or divisions within one’s own country.

The 10 features of Putin-era propaganda that were not found in its Soviet predecessor.

1.     Promotion of patriotism as the key ideological element,

2.     Promotion of traditionalism and emphasis on threats from minorities of various kinds,

3.     Promotion of cultural homogenization as an ideological goal,

4.     Backing for geopolitical rivalry and the creation of a multi-polar world,

5.     Emphasis on and unconditional priority for national interests that remain undefined,

6.     Appeals to the use of nuclear weapons as the argument of last resort.

7.     Playing down of the value of international partnerships,

8.     Presentation of China as the primary ally,

9.     Moral sympathy for those who engage in violence, and

10.  Support for the idea that the previous century was “golden.” 

And the 10 principles found in Soviet patriotic propaganda that are not found in the Putin-era variant:

1.     Internationalism,

2.     Atheism,

3.     Humanism,

4.     Progressivism,

5.     Anti-Capitalism,

6.     Criticism of consumption,

7.     Collectivism and egalitarianism,

8.     Any talk about the obligation of the state to the citizenry

9.     Encouragement of social mobility, and

10.  The struggle for peace and disarmament.