Five Years after 2020 Protests, Lukashenko Using ‘Quiet Terror’ to Deceive Belarusians and Others about How Unpopular and Repressive He is, ‘Vyasna’ Lawyer Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 30 – Five years ago in the wake of the stolen election, Lukashenka used force to repress his people, actions that send a signal to all Belarusians and many in the international community that he remains a repressive dictator, according to Vyasna Center lawyer Pavel Sapelko.

            But now, in an effort to deceive both the Belarusian ruler has adopted a policy that can be described as “quiet terror,” with many of his most repressive moves hidden by his regime’s concealment (rfi.fr/ru/европа/20250730-правозащитный-центр-вясна-через-пять-лет-после-протестов-2020-го-в-беларуси-наступила-фаза-тихого-террора).

            Because his repression is not nearly as often the subject of coverage in the media not only in Belarus but internationally, many in both places assume that things have somehow improved, Sapelko continued. But in fact, as he has “normalized” repression, Lukashenka has expanded its scope.

            And that has given the Belarusian dictator undeserved victories. Many in Belarus know things are bad but not how bad they are, and many in Western countries, including the United States, assume that the situation is no worse than it was and may in fact be improving and that concessions to Lukashenka’s regime are entirely justified.

            That is a horrific mistake, Sapelko says; and it is one that human rights activists like those in his organization are working hard to try to correct. But their ability even to document the extent of Lukashenka’s “quiet terror” is limited as ever less information about courts and jails is available.

In Russia Today, Protests about the Environment, Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples Increasingly Overlap and Re-Enforce One Another, Kirill Medvedev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 30 – In the final decades of Soviet power, environmental protests were often the first stage toward more radical political movements. Because protecting the environment was superficially apolitical and attracted a wide variety of people, such protests allowed activists to acquire skills they later deployed in other, more political ways.

            Many have wondered whether environmental protests in Russia now like those in Shiyes against the Moscow trash dump plan and in Bashkortostan in opposition to the despoiling of a symbolically important monument could play a similar role. (See Mari-Ann Kelam’s comments on what happened in Estonia in region.expert/mari-ann/).

            Because of that possibility and the fact that the Internet works as an accelerator of this transformation, Tatyana Chestina, head of the EKA Environmental Movement, says, Moscow has been taking steps to prevent it (7x7-journal.ru/articles/2020/11/02/ekologicheskaya-povestka-obedinyaet-lyudej-s-raznymi-vzglyadami-lider-ekodvizheniya-eka-tatyana-chestina-o-politizacii-protesta-pobedah-na-shiese-i-kushtau-i-trende-na-ekopotreblenie).

            But in an essay for the Posle.Media portal, Russian commentator and activist Kirill Medvedev says Moscow has largely failed and that environmental protests are often the seedbed for other broader political actions given the centrality of defending land for many outside of Moscow (posle.media/article/protestuya-my-zashchishchaem-zakon).

            Last year, approximately 300 protest campaigns took place in 40 federal subjects of the Russian Federation, he points out. Most were about environmental or urban planning issues, nominally non-political issues. But in many cases, they became political especially when non-Russian ethnic groups are involved.

            Medvedev drew that conclusion on the basis of a close study of the Shiyes protest which took place at the border of a Russian and a non-Russian federal subject, the Bashkortostan environmental actions, and a campaign launched by a Chechen woman who was living in St. Petersburg but returned to her native republic.

            The activist says that this trend reflects the growing number of environmental disasters across the RF, the over-centralization of political power, and the lack of meaningful regional autonomy; and consequently, it is natural that when people protest one thing, they link up with others who are concerned not only about that but about other political issues as well.

            “When protest options are becoming ever fewer, when old protest structures are gone, and when post-Soviet resistance traditions are broken, those who want to speak up have only a few tools left,” especially given that “almost everyone tries to act within the narrowing framework of the law and almost everyone insists their actions are ‘apolitical.’”

            But “no matter how much one distances oneself from politics,” Medvedev says, “the need to create a broader framework for discussion local issues remains.” And now “instead of competition between major political programs … we see the reinvention or creation of collective and sometime personal rituals, a struggle for the interpretation of official symbols.”

            One of the most important of these is the defense of land, in various senses of the work including as the state salutes the defense of the RF’s newly-expanded borders, its actions are perceived by many in the regions as an attack on their land, whether it be their private plots, their protected forest and mountain areas, or the administrative borders of their minority republics.”

            According to Medvedev, “engaged citizens from various regions of Russia are re-learning how to do politics under the new conditions. They are being forced to forge new connections across barriers erected by the authorities and to take state-supported rituals and then re-code them” be they about historical issues, environmental concerns or their own borders.

            “Is it possible to create a political space in which the struggle for land against federal officials and corporations becomes a common front and outdated patriarchal traditions ceased to be a means of terrorizing, dividing and paralyzing society?” the activist and commentator asks rhetorically.

            “Perhaps, but that will require not only that local activists display courage and ingenuity but that they also receive non-dogmatic attention, support and solidarity across all kinds of borders” and not just those that Moscow has imposed in the first place or is playing with under Putin’s rule.

Rostov Plan to Compensate Officials for Bribes They Don’t Take Already Being Dismissed as Unworkable PR Stunt

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 29 – Earlier this month, the interior ministry office in Rostov Oblast announced that it would pay officials the amount involved in every bribe they turned out. But the program isn’t working, and now close observers on the scene are dismissing it as a public relations stunt that was only meant to highlight how much corruption there is in that region.

            The program was launched with a great deal of media fanfare and immediately attracted media outlets across Russia (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/07/russian-region-fights-corruption-by.html). But it quickly became obvious that it was more a stunt than a considered program and lacked both the funding and procedures that would have allowed it to work.

            As a result, close observers in the region and experts elsewhere say it will soon pass into oblivion, yet another policy announcement in Putin’s Russia that in fact goes no further than the press release and then is consigned to the files or even the wastebasket (kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/413407).

China Sending More Water into Kazakhstan via Transborder Rivers, Helping to Overcome Water Shortages There and Winning Friends in the Process

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 31 – After more than a decade of controversy about China’s use of water from transborder rivers, Beijing is now supplying vastly more water to that Central Asian country on the basis of an agreement reached last spring.

            Since the beginning of 2025, Beijing has allowed 5.6 billion cubic meters of water to flow via the Ili into Kazakhstan and 4.6 billion cubic meters of water to come into that country via the Ertis. As a result, reservoirs are filling back up, and the water level of Lake Balkhash has risen 32 centimeters since last year (rivers.help/n/5230).

            Kazakhs are jubilant, especially after all the complaints about Chinese behavior regarding water they have lodged over more than a decade and their fears Lake Balkhash was about to share the fate of the Aral Sea (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/12/water-dispute-between-kazakhstan-and.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/08/china-taking-ever-more-water-from-ili.html).

            This influx of water from China will have a positive impact on relations between the two countries, especially since Moscow is as yet unwilling to launch a program of Siberian river diversion on which Kazakhs and other Central Asians have long counted on (https://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/07/only-revival-of-siberian-river.html and    windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/03/astanas-plans-for-river-flowing-into.html).

In Seeking to Reduce Alcoholism in Russia, Moscow Repeating Mistakes of Soviet Predecessors and Causing Russians to Turn to Moonshine and Dangerous Surrogates

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 28 – Faced with a rising tide of alcoholism, the Russian government is behaving in the same way its Soviet predecessors did, imposing new restrictions on the sale of alcohol rather than addressing the causes of alcoholism, Russian commentators say. As a result, Russian drinkers are increasingly consuming moonshine and dangerous surrogates.

            Among those offering that conclusion are Ilya Grashchenkov, a specialist on regional issues, and Nikolay Yarmenko, the editor-in-chief of the Rosbalt news agency (rosbalt.ru/news/2025-07-28/ilya-graschenkov-rossiya-snova-nastupaet-na-antialkogolnye-grabli-5445033 and rosbalt.ru/news/2025-07-28/protiv-zdravogo-smysla-i-statistiki-komu-vygoden-alkogolnyy-samostrel-5444964).

            Their words come in response to a Moscow plan to ban the sale of alcohol except between the hours of 1100 am and 700 pm during the week as well as during weekends and on holidays and calls to raise the legal drinking age to 21. Such actions will return Russia to where it was in the 1970s if not the 1990s.

            Available data suggest that these restrictions will do little or nothing, except perhaps enrich both the siloviki who will pocket bribes and the producers of samogon as moonshine is known in Russia and the taxi drivers who will sell it when sales of official alcohol are not allowed (svpressa.ru/society/article/474916/).

            By reviving the failed approach of the Soviets, Moscow will do little to reduce drinking but will boost the number of deaths among Russians as a result of their consumption of samogon, as moonshine is known in Russia, and even more dangerous surrogates like perfume and cleaning products Russian drinkers turn to when they can’t get regular alcohol. 

          

RF Residents Most Likely to Become Victims of Crime in Siberia and Far East and Least Likely in Moscow and North Caucasus, ‘To Be Precise’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 30 – Again in 2024 as in recent years, the federal subjects where residents are most likely to become victims of crime ae in Siberia and the Russian Far East and those where they are least likely to are the city of Moscow and the republics of the North Caucasus, according to an investigation by the To Be Precise portal.

            This pattern reflects the number of victims of violent crime per 100,000 residents, and a major reason for this pattern is that such crimes are more likely to be reported in places with relatively small populations like east of the Urals or in those like the North Caucasus where many people do not report such crimes, the portal says (tochno.st/materials/gde-v-rossii-bezopasnee-vsego-zit-reiting-prestupnosti-ot-esli-byt-tocnym).

            But they also reflect differences in the level of alcohol consumption and in the amount of poverty. Where those are both high, as in Tyva, the numbers of violent crimes are high; where they are both low, as in Moscow, these figures are typically much lower, the investigative portal continues.

            There are some anomalies, the portal says. The city of St. Petersburg which is relatively well off and where alcohol consumption is not as high as in many other places, violent crime last year was four times more per capita than in Dagestan, an impoverished republic in the North Caucasus.

Moscow Wants to Establish International Day for the Struggle against Russophobia

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 27 – Mariya Zakharova, the official spokesperson of the Russian Foreign Ministry says that Moscow considers that it is necessary to establish an International Day for the Struggle against Russophobia on the model of the International Day of Memory of Holocaust Victims because anti-Russian propaganda has led to so many tragedies.

            She says she has become increasingly convinced an International Day for the Struggle against Russophobia is essential because “Russophobia is the very same extremist, Nazi and today already neo-Nazi ideology which kills people both directly and indirectly” (nazaccent.ru/content/44292-mariya-zaharova-predlozhila-sozdat-mezhdunarodnyj-den-borby-s-rusofobiej/).

            Zakharova’s proposal follows calls by Kremlin human rights ombudsman Tatyana Moskalkova to increase the penalties set by Russian law for any manifestation of Russophobia inside the Russian Federation (nazaccent.ru/content/42364-tatyana-moskalkova-predlozhila-uzhestochit-nakazanie-za/).

            And it is the latest example of Moscow which has attacked so many others seeking to present itself as the victim so as to distract attention from what Russians under Putin have done in Ukraine and against so many other peoples inside and beyond the current borders of the Russian Federation. 

United Russia More Flexible than CPSU and More Sensitive to Threats to Its Position, Yaroshenko Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 28 – There is a widespread notion that today’s United Russia Party is like the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and thus like its predecessor won’t be able to anticipate threats to its power and even to the Russian Federation, according to Aleksey Yaroshenko. But that is a serious misconception and leads to serious mistakes in the conclusions analysts draw.

            In the latest issue of the Russian Journal of Political Research, the Moscow political scientist argues that it is a fundamental mistake to view United Russia as some kind of updated version of the CPSU or that it won’t be able to anticipate and respond to threats. That is simply wrong (naukaru.ru/ru/nauka/article/98110/view and club-rf.ru/interview/548).

            “Russia today,” Yaroshenko writes, “today is encountering unprecedented foreign and domestic challenges and this has given rise to numerous predictions about the further development of the situation and the country as a whole,” including speculation that United Russia and its country will go the same way the CPSU and the USSR did a generation ago.

            But both such comparisons and such predictions fail to take into account the very different institutional arrangements the CPSU and United Russia operate within, the political scientist argues. In Soviet times, the CPSU was defined by the constitution as the chief decision maker and source of ideological guidance for the country.

            Today, however, “there is none of that.” Consequently, United Russia has had to pay far closer attention to what the population wants and has learned to be flexible in how it responds, a flexibility that is all the greater because there is no obligatory ideology like the one that kept the CPSU from seeing where the Soviet Union was heading.

            Unlike the CPSU which “didn’t have to struggle for power, interact with people, compete or adapt” to the society around it, United Russia has to and thus not only is “more adaptive” but “has a greater reserve of firmness which makes it the dominating party under conditions of competition.” There is every reason to think that will continue, Yaroshenko suggests.

            He points out that Putin defined United Russia as “the system-forming party which is at the core of the system” and fulfills two basic functions – “the organization of the political infrastructure of the president” and “the consolidation of representatives of the elite around the President’s strategic course via cooptation.”

            Thus, it is obvious that United Russia is not the CPSU of today and will not respond to challenges in the same way. “Nobody predicted the collapse of the CPSU,” Yaroshenko says; and the misperception of what was happening then is being continued by those who act as if United Russia is imply an updated CPSU.

            That isn’t the case; and as a result, United Russia gives every sign of being able to cope with even the most serious challenges better than was the CPSU, the Moscow political scientist concludes. 

Russian Interior Ministry Stops Publishing Data on Deaths as the Result of Criminal Acts, as Moscow Restricts Release of Data from the Regions and Republics

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 28 – The Russian government continues to cut back in the amount of data it publishes on sensitive issues. The latest move was by the interior ministry which has stopped publishing data on those who have died as a result of criminal acts including homicides and accidents for which someone was legally liable, the To Be Precise portal says.

            No such data have been published since April, and none arrayed according to regions and republics this year at all, it reports (t.me/tochno_st/582 reposted at meduza.io/news/2025/07/29/mvd-rossii-perestalo-publikovat-dannye-o-kolichestve-pogibshih-v-rezultate-prestupleniy).

            Other Russian government outlets also have stopped publishing data, especially about regions, on a monthly or quarterly basis or even totally. One data source on which many had relied, for example, the Unified Inter-Departmental Information-Statistical System appears to have stopped releasing such information (zona.media/news/2025/07/29/mvd).

            According to independent Russian demographer Aleksey Raksha, Moscow has imposed restrictions on the release of data by the regions so that analysts will not be able to compensate for an end to the release of all-Russia data by means of adding up reports from the regions and then projecting a total for the country (t.me/RakshaDemography/4989).

            To the extent Raksha is right, analysts in Russia and in the West will find themselves in a more difficult position than even their predecessors did in the Brezhnev era. 

‘Liberalism Much More Dangerous and Harmful than Satanism,’ Dugin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 28 – Aleksandr Dugin, the influential advocate of neo-Eurasianism, says that liberalism is “much more dangerous and harmful than satanism,” a remark that suggests at least some in Moscow would like to ban some invented “International Liberalism Movement much as it recently banned a non-existent “International Satanist Movement.

            Doing so, precisely because these groups don’t exist and so the powers that be can define what constitutes “liberalism,” there is a danger that Dugin’s words are the opening salvo of an attack on liberalism in Russia, one that could result in increased persecution. (On such bans and their use, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/07/banning-groups-that-dont-exist.html.)

            Dugin made his comments in the course of a roundtable discussion of “Russia as the Center of Orthodox Civilization.” He specifically contrasted Western civilization based on liberalism and Russian civilization based on Orthodox Christianity and the traditions of Russian statehood (business-gazeta.ru/article/678746).

            “A distinctive characteristic of Western civilization,” he says, “consists in the fact that it seeks to escape from its roots and constantly distances itself from them … “Our civilization in contrast constantly returns to its origins … That is, “the West proceeds by the denial of its roots while we do not.”

            That makes Russian culture a model for emulation by others and thus a universal civilization while the West is not universal despite its pretensions to being on because it keeps rejecting its past in the name of a future that its past does not define, the Russian neo-Eurasianist says. 

Moscow Beefing Up Russian Base in Armenia and Expects to Win Armenia Back into Its Fold

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 27 –Moscow is strengthening its military base in Armenia both by adding advanced weapons and more personnel in order to counter Yerevan’s drift to the West and expects to win Armenia back into the Russian fold, according to Aleksandr Perendzhiyev, a political analyst at Moscow’s Russian Economics University.

            He argues that if Moscow does not take such steps, there is the possibility that “a battle between the US and China will take place on the territory of Armenia,” although Perendzhiyev insists that Armenia’s drift away from Russia can be reversed once Yerevan recognizes the dangers ahead (svpressa.ru/politic/article/474472/).

            And consequently, despite the fears of some in Moscow, “we have still Armenia although [the country’s leader] Pashinyan at times in his actions reminds one of [former Ukrainian leader] Yanukovich by trying to sit on two stools in order to conduct a so-called multi-vector policy,” Perendzhiyev says.

            The Russian analyst says that “the strengthening of the base” is only the most visible part of a much larger Russian effort to ensure that there won’t be NATO bases in Armenia and that “the health forces” in Armenia will be able to work wit Russia so that there couldn’t “won’t be swallowed up by someone.”

            One of the encouraging signs that Armenia will soon turn back to Moscow is that Russia’s relations will Azerbaijan have cooled, a trend that is usually accompanied by a warming of relations between Moscow and Yerevan. And another is that Baku is working with the US to dominate the Zengezur corridor, something that is already being called “the Trump bridge.”

            This worries China and puts it at odds with the US in the South Caucasus, Perendzhiyev continues; and Armenia won’t want to be driven into any regional arrangement that puts it at odds not only with Moscow but with China. If it doesn’t avoid that, Armenia will face a difficult future.   

Russia ‘for First Time in History’ is Fighting a War without a Single Ally in the West, Lavrov Concedes

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 28 – Russia’s senior diplomat, long-serving Sergey Lavrov, has conceded that Russia finds itself in an unprecedented situation: it is fighting a war “alone against the entire West” and thus, in contrast to the situation in the two world wars of the 20^th century, must rely on itself alone

            Europe, “historically Russia’s main trading partner,” has become hostile, he says; and “the US has lost ‘respect for the Kremlin,” something that was not the case “even in the era of the Cold War” when “there was mutual respect” and continuing contacts. Now, there is neither (aif.ru/politics/lavrov-rossiya-vpervye-v-istorii-odna-voyuet-protiv-vsego-zapada).

Moscow is open for dialogue with Western countries, Lavrov says; but it wil continue to insist on what it considers is “legitimate demands” as far as security is concerned, including a commitment by Ukraine not to join NATO, the expansion of that alliance to the east and the recognition of “realities on the ground” as far as the annexation of Ukrainian land is concerned.

European leaders have lost a sense of reality, the Russian foreign minister continues; but US President Donald Trump who has “offered the Kremlin a generous deal that includes easing sanctions and recognizing the Russian annexation of Crimea is ‘acting on common sense.” The American leader is “a pragmatist who doesn’t want any wars” – unlike the Europeans.

Orthodox Church of Kazakhstan Says Moscow’s Insistence It Refer to Its Being Part of Moscow Patriarchate in All Declarations Unnecessary

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 28 – In yet another sign of the weakening of the Moscow Patriarchate across the former Soviet space, the Orthodox Church of Kazakhstan has dismissed the ROC MP’s insistence that the Kazakh church refer to its being part of and thus subordinate to the Moscow one.

            Following a meeting of the Holy Synod of the ROC MP last week at which the Moscow church called for all Orthodox churches in the former Soviet space to refer to their being part of and thus in principle subordinate to Moscow, Kazakh commentators and now the Orthodox Church of Kazakhstan has reacted in a way that highlights the weakening of Moscow’s position.

            Yevgeny Ivanov, the press secretary of the Astana and Almaaty hierarchy of the Orthodox Church, responded to query from the Orda.kaz news agency about how his church would respond to Moscow’s demarche (orda.kz/pravoslavnuju-cerkov-v-rk-objazali-upominat-v-nazvanii-moskovskij-patriarhat-chto-otvetili-v-mitropolichem-okruge-404756/).

            Ivanov said “We have a statue of the Orthodox church of Kazakhstan, a document which regulates our church life here in Kazakhstan … In it are indicated tow different names for the church: the Orthodox church of Kazakhstan and the Metropolitan district of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Republic of Kazakhstan.”

            “In addition,” he continued, “we can use abbreviations of these names. For example, the Kazakhstan metropolitan district, the Metropolitan District in the Republic of Kazakhstan and so on. All these names are of equal value.” Because that is the case, the recent statement of the Moscow church’s Holy Synod “in fact changes nothing.”

            “The Russian Orthodox Church has a Belarusian exarchate, an African exarchate, and a Central Asian Metropolitan District,” Ivanov said. And he reminded Orda.kaz that “one should not confuse the Metropolitan District with the Astana and Almaaty bishprics, since these are among the 12 subdivisions of the district on the territory of Kazakhstan.”

            What Ivanov did not do was rush to assert that his church would follow Moscow’s call or felt any need to do so, an indication that even the official hierarchy of Orthodoxy in that Central Asian country no longer feels that it has to behave so slavishly even if it has not yet moved to seek complete independence from Moscow and autocephaly for itself. 

Russian Empire Won’t Collapse from Weakness of Center but when Moscow’s Logic and that of the Borderlands Come into Conflict, Siberian Regionalist Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 24 – Almost every discussion of the future disintegration of the Russian Federation begins with the assumption that this will happen when the central powers in Moscow weaken and can no longer impose their will on the rest of the empire. But that view is wrong, according to a Siberian regionalist.

            In an anonymous comment to the Tallinn-based regionalist portal Region.Expert, she argues that the Russian empire will fall apart for the same reason other empires have, not because of the weakness of the center but “when the logic of ‘the center’ comes into conflict with the logic of ‘the borderlands’” (region.expert/trans-urals/).

            She says that in the case of “Moscovia-Russia, this conflict is already occurring,” a conflict that is “not about ‘separatism but about a functional lack of correspondence” between the way in which people in Siberia and the Russian Far East think and view the world, leading ever more of them to decide that they need to go their own way.

            Indeed, “behind the façade of imperial discourse are concealed regions which have attempted and possibly still are trying to live in their own way. These are not simply ‘provinces’ (in fact colonies of Moscow) suffering from centralization but territories with their own logic, historical memory, and what is more important experience with statehood.”

            “Siberia, the Urals and the Far East are not ‘outskirts,’ not ‘peripheries,’ and not ‘hinterlands,’ but three regions where at different dimes separate republics existed or were planned,” the regionalist says; and those experiences have left a mark on “the psychological memory” of people there.

            “For a century, Moscow has attempted to wipe out the memory of regional statehood, but it hasn’t been able to do so completely,” the regionalist says. “Memory is not only about documents and monuments; it is also about infrastructure, the rhythm of life and cultural distinctions. They remain; and they are increasing.”

            According to her, “Siberia, the Urals and the Far East are not simply territories. They are the future outlines of a new Northern Eurasia. Possibly, of a federation; possibly, of a confederation, and possibly of independent states. But whatever may be the case, they will not be Moscow’s provinces.”

            Indeed, “the history of the so-called ‘Russian Federation’ is the forgotten history of the regions which again and again have tried to be true to themselves. They have lost but they have not disappeared because the logic of empire is finite and the logic of diversity is not.” And that diversity will win out.

            “When the Russian empire in its current form falls – and it is falling – this will not be a catastrophe. Rather it will be a chance” for these regions to take their place in the sun. “Khabarovsk, Novosibirsk, and Yekaterinburg today are simply cities; but tomorrow quite possibly, they will be the capitals of new states.”

Russia Unlikely to Liberalize when Putin’s War in Ukraine Ends, Arkhipova Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 24 – Aleksandr Arkhipova, an independent Russian social anthropologist, says that it is unlikely that Russia will liberalize when Putin’s war in Ukraine ends because the mobilization of the population has been so thorough that the rituals and attitudes it has produced will have to be directed somewhere.

            “In order to continue the development of the country along the lines of an information autocracy,” she continues, “it will be necessary to strengthen all these rituals of loyalty and thus to maintain some kind of fear with random repressions” against old and new targets (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2025/07/24/spektakl-punktirnoi-loialnosti).

            Arkhipova, who posts regularly on her telegram channel, “(Un)entertaining Anthropology,” thus delivers a message many will not be happy to hear but which is completely consistent with at least one period in Russian history, the years after 1945, when Russian expected liberalization but Stalin imposed even more brutal repression.

 

Caspian Sea Level has Fallen So Far that Russia and Kazakhstan are Going to Dredge a Channel to Offshore Wells between Them

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 24 – The water level of the Caspian Sea has fallen to its lowest level in recorded history, restricting the ability of ships to pass through former channels, especially in the sea’s northern portions. In response, Russia and Kazakhstan have announced plans to dredge a channel through increasingly shallow waters to allow their ships to pass.

            Russia’s LUKOIL and Kazakhstan’s KazMunayGaz say they will dig a channel deep enough to allow ships from the two countries in the first instance to reach offshore wells but the water levels are falling so fast that they may have to dredge approaches to their respective ports (casp-geo.ru/rossiya-i-kazahstan-planiruyut-postroit-sudohodnyj-kanal-na-kaspii/).

            If the two companies do not dredge quickly enough, neither will be able to continue to extract oil and at current levels from existing wells let alone develop more offshore sites in the northern part of the Caspian; and so they suggest that the entire project is slated to be completed before the end of this decades.

            The dredging project is estimated to cost 6.4 billion US dollars, although that figure may rise if the sea continues to fall at current rates or if there is any delay in completing this project.

Nearly 350,000 Fewer Pupils will be in First Four Years of Russian Schools This Year than Last

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 24 – Russia’s demographic decline is now hitting public education, with officials reporting that there will be 346,700 fewer pupils in the first four grades of the country’s public schools this year than last and that their number will continue to fall for the next several years at least.

            Russian officials insist that this decline reflects only the falloff of births in the 1990s and that it has a silver lining in that it will reduce the country’s teacher shortage given that approximately 17,000 teachers will be needed (iz.ru/1925422/valeriia-mishina/shkolnye-kody-desiatki-tysiach-uchitelei-mogut-ostatsia-bez-raboty).

            In fact, the decline in children reflects the economic difficulties and social and political uncertainties which have depressed the birthrate in the last decade of the Putin era and the consequences of the decline in the number of pupils will likely prompt Moscow to close more schools and displaced teachers won’t find other jobs (nakanune.ru/articles/123765/).

            The response of the Putin elite to this situation and other evidence of demographic decline is symptomatic of the Kremlin’s approach, one that may sound good but is unlikely to have any positive impact even though it will suggest to many that Putin and his regime are finally paying attention to a problem they have played down.

            Valentina Matviyenko, the speaker of the Federation Council says that the Russian government has created “a demographic spetsnaz” to address a broad range of demographic problems including low birthrates while preserving “the traditional values” the Kremlin and the population want (kommersant.ru/doc/7909473).

            She provides no details but it seems likely that this “special assignment force” will not put more money into the hands of the population or improve their views about what the future is likely to bring – and that the chief beneficiaries of this effort will be the officials who take part rather than the Russians the Kremlin would like to see having more children.

New Law Allows Moscow to Shutter Any Group in Which There is Even a Single Extremist

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 24 – Vladimir Putin has signed into law a measure that will allow the Russian authorities to list any public organization as extremist and then likely move to close it if the authorities determine that even one member of the group has been convicted on charges of being an extremist.

            Given the expansive nature of extremism charges in Russia today and the likelihood that the Russian authorities may use this new law ex post facto, insisting that someone who had been convicted of extremism was at some point a member, this opens the way to the closing down of all groups the Kremlin doesn’t like.

            Although the measure has not attracted a great deal of attention, human rights experts warn that it opens the way to far more repression than the Kremlin has used up to now (echofm.online/news/vladimir-putin-podpisal-zakon-kotoryj-pozvolyaet-obyavit-ekstremistskim-soobshhestvom-lyubuyu-gruppu-lyudej-esli-v-nej-najdyotsya-hotya-by-odin-ekstremist).

            At the very least, this measure will have a chilling effect on all organizations in the Russian Federation as they will have to work to ensure that there are no "extremists" planted in their membership rolls as a prelude to actions by Russian officials against them.   

Minsk Now Dominates Belarus Demographically and Economically Even More than Moscow Does the Russian Federation

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 24 – The extent to which Moscow now dominates the rest of the Russian Federation, pulling resources from the rest and attracting more people, has long been the subject of attention. But what is less often noticed is that a similar process is taking place in Belarus where Minsk has assumed an even more dominant position in that regard.

            After surveying recent economic and demographic data, the Think Tanks portal says that the regions are “weakening” while Minsk is “strengthening” and that this trend is so advanced that “soon ‘Belarus’ will mean only ‘Minsk’” (thinktanks.pro/publication/2025/07/24/kak-slabeyut-regiony-i-krepchaet-minsk.html).

            One of the reasons that this development has attracted less attention than the analogous one in Russia is that Belarus gets less notice than does its eastern neighbor; but another and perhaps equally important one has to do with the way in which Minsk presents economic and demographic data.

            Minsk treats the city itself and its neighboring oblast separately when in fact like Moscow’s urban agglomeration of the two analogous regions in the Russian Federation are typically treated together. As a result, the portal says that the role of this Belarusian urban agglomeration is often understated.

            Over the last generation, the city of Minsk has seen its population grow from 16 percent of the population of the country to 22 percent; but Minsk Oblast has seen its population almost double (by 87 percent). As a result, “the capital agglomeration” which includes both units, now has “almost 40 percent of all Belarusian residents.”

            That reflects the fact that all Belarusian oblasts except the Minsk Oblast have lost population over the last 30 years, given outmigration both within the country and abroad and death rates that exceed birthrates. Within oblasts, a similar pattern obtains with some truly depressed regions suffering strikingly large losses.

 

Moscow Patriarchate Losing Ground in Belarus and Kazakhstan

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 25 – The Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is losing ground in Belarus and Kazakhstan, the two post-Soviet states which after Ukraine have the largest number of parishes and believers of that church outside of Russia, further indication that the ROC MP is on its way to being reduced to a national Orthodox church rather than the international one it aspires to be.

            The Moscow Patriarchate has lashed out at the Belarusian Orthodox Church for failing to include references to the Moscow Patriarchate or the Russian Orthodox Church of which it is a part in all documents, a move that appears to many to be a step toward future autocephaly (charter97.org/ru/news/2025/7/25/649552/ and t.me/christianvision/4546).

            That some in Belarus are not making those references is clearly a sign that hierarchs and congregants among the Orthodox there want to set themselves apart from Moscow; and Moscow’s reaction shows how concerned the Moscow Patriarchate and presumably the Kremlin as well are about any move in that direction.

            (On Belarusian interest in autocephaly and Moscow’s strong opposition to it, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/04/moscows-greatest-fear-about-orthodox.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/03/kirills-description-of-ukraine-and.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/08/moscow-increasingly-worried-about.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/06/orthodoxy-in-belarus-moving-toward.html.)

            Meanwhile, developments in Kazakhstan have prompted one Moscow commentator to ask whether they indicate that Kazakhstan is moving along the Estonian and Ukrainian direction as far as the future of the Russian Orthodox Church there is concerned (vpoanalytics.com/informatsionnoe-protivoborstvo/goneniya-na-pravoslavnuyu-tserkov-poydut-li-v-kazakhstane-po-estonskomu-i-ukrainskomu-puti/).

            “Judging by everything that has happened,” Polina Bekker says, “everything [in Kazakhstan] is developing along a very similar scenario,” with officials in that country under the influence of the West seeking to promote both a schism in the ROC there and then the distancing of that church from Moscow.

            She says it “only remains to be hoped that Russian spiritual and secular structures who are interested in this will not allow the further fragmentation of Orthodox communities in neighboring countries.” Otherwise the West will achieve its goal of “dividing and ruling” the Russian church’s spiritual space.

            (On the state of Orthodoxy in Kazakhstan and possible moves in that direction, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/07/dissident-orthodox-priest-in-kazakhstan.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/01/uniate-churches-in-kazakhstan-help.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/11/war-of-missionaries-and-migrantophobes.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/07/orthodox-leaders-in-kazakhstan-now-say.html.)  

Banning Groups that don’t Exist Extremely Useful Tactic for Moscow, ‘Department One’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 24 – Two years ago, a Russian court banned what it called the International LGBT Movement. Last year, one canned the Anti-Russian Separatist Movement. Now, Russia’s Supreme Court has outlawed the International Satanism Movement. None of these groups exists, but despite that, such bans are extremely useful for the Kremlin, the Department One human rights organization says. 

            Most obviously, because there is no real defendant, there is almost no chance of appealing the decision given that Russian courts rarely allow anyone but the original defendant in a case to dispute it in court, the human rights organization’s lawyers say. But there are many other all-too-real consequences of banning a non-existent group (dept.one/memo/satanizm/).

            “Once a group is banned as extremist in Russia, the impact is far-reaching,” Department One says. “Its activities are outlawed entirely; [and] any involvement in or facilitation of its work becomes a criminal offense, as does organizing or participating in public events on its behalf.” Moreover, “anyone linked to an extremist group is barred from running for office at any level.”

            The Department One analysts say that in addition, “the Russian authorities could not begin targeting public figures, artists and musicians, especially those critical of the government or the war in Ukraine in an effort to create an atmosphere of fear.” Such charges could be laid one month from now when the court ruling goes into effect.

            Maksim Olenichev, a lawyer for the rights group, points to an even larger consequence of this latest ruling: It marks yet another erosion of legal clarity around what the state considers forbidden. By law, the symbols of an ‘extremist’ organization must be specified in its charge rather than in a court ruling.”

            “But because no such organization as ‘the International Satanism Movement’ actually exists, there are no founding documents. That allows the courts to specify what these are even though such an action violates Russian law, the lawyer continues. And until the decision is published – it hasn’t been as yet – “there’s no way to know what’s actually prohibited.”

            That means that the police and the FSB can decide on their own what is extremist, a pattern that suggests the Kremlin may have Russian courts ban ever more non-existent extremist groups to give Russian officials virtually unlimited power to act as they and their Kremlin masters see fit, regardless of the law.

‘Chauvinism in a Half-Collapsed Empire is like a Match in a Powder Keg,’ Pastukhov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 22 – Nationalism includes a broad spectrum of views; but when a regime turns to chauvinism as Putin is increasingly doing in the Russian Federation, that kind of nationalism threatens the survival not only of his own rule but the territorial integrity of his country, Vladimir Pastukhov says.

            “Chauvinism,” the London-based Russian analyst says, “in a half-collapsed empire [like Russia] is like a match in a powder keg.” And “it is easier to cross a grass snake with a hedgehog than to get some Bashkir youth form to sing ‘I am a Russian’” (t.me/v_pastukhov/1575 reposted at echofm.online/opinions/ne-bylo-by-bolshoj-bedy-esli-by-rezhim-byl-naczionalisticheskim).

            The longer and more intensively Putin follows a chauvinist course, Pastukhov continues, the worse things will get. It would be well for Putin to remember that a century ago, Lenin focused on the national liberation movements – “the fight against ‘Russia as the prison house of nations’” – to come to power.

            The Bolshevik leader considered chauvinism as “a universal fuse for empires” and he used it with success. Putin should remember that, the Russian analyst says; and he should remember as well that “dynamite in the form of leftist ideas is always to be found in abundance in Russia.”

Following Objections from North Caucasus, Russian Government Comes Out Against Draft Bill that Would have Required All Compatriots Seeking to Return to Know Russian

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 22 – Four days ago, after widespread protests from activists in the North Caucasus, the Russian government said it opposed the adoption of a bill proposed by Konstantin Zatulin earlier this year that would have required anyone seeking to return to Russia under the compatriots program to know Russian fluently.

            The government statement declared that the proposed law duplicated provisions of a 2006 action and thus should not be adopted. That declaration makes it unlikely that the bill will even be taken up by the full Duma anytime soon (memorialcenter.org/news/pravitelstvo-rossii-ne-podderzhalo-zakonoproekt-o-repatriaczii).

            Circassian activists are taking credit for the Russian government’s decision not to support Zatulin’s measure, although they concede that this is only one skirmish in a long war (zapravakbr.com/index.php/30-uncategorised/1981-pravitelstvo-rf-v-ocherednoj-raz-ne-podderzhalo-zakonoproekt-konstantina-zatulina-o-repatriatsii).

            They have long insisted that a knowledge of Russian, something rare among the seven million Circassians living abroad, isn’t necessary if some of them want to come to the Circassian republics of the North Caucasus where Circassian is a state language according to the republic constitutions.

            They also point to the fact that some of the Circassian republics in the North Caucasus have programs to promote repatriation although they note that these programs are small and involve only microscopically small numbers, “a drop in the bucket” compared to the size of the diaspora.

            Moscow has long opposed the return of massive numbers of Circassians not only because such a development would change the ethnic map of the North Caucasus and re-energize Circassian efforts for international condemnation of the 1864 expulsion of their ancestors as a genocide and for the creation of an independent Circassian state.

            The Russian government has used a variety of measures to limit the return of the Circassians. Most recently, it has focused on language, given the centrality of Russian in Putin’s thinking. But now, the center will likely use other measures to achieve the same effect, something Circassians are very much aware of and will have to have to fight against.

            But a victory is a victory, and the Kremlin could have gone the other way. That it didn’t will certainly add new energy to the Circassian national movement at home and abroad to gain recognition for the genocide and to create a single Circassian republic in the North Caucasus in place of the divisions Moscow has imposed. 

Following Protests from Tatarstan and North Caucasus, Moscow Retreats from Plan to Stop Calling Languages of Non-Russians ‘Native’

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 22 – The non-Russian peoples of the Russian Federation got a rare victory in their conflict with Moscow over how they are be treated. Following protests from Tatarstan and the North Caucasus republics, Moscow has dropped plans to stop calling their languages “native” and instead to call them with the nebulous term “languages of the peoples of Russia.”

            The conflict arose when Yelena Yampolskaya, cultural affairs advisor to Putin, insisted that calling the non-Russian languages “native” is impermissible because “if Russian isn’t native, then Russia is not the motherland.” But non-Russians were outraged by the idea that they would be forced to call their native languages something else.

            The Tatars of the Middle Volga were the most vocal in their dissent, and their anger rose to their republic’s State Council which demanded that that Moscow not make this change. They were supported by many non-Russians in the North Caucasus who planned a petition drive but dropped that initiative after Moscow backed down following Kazan’s dissent.

            On this back and forth, see realnoevremya.ru/news/345198-deputaty-ot-rt-dobilis-u-minprosvescheniya-sohraneniya-nazvaniya-rodnogo-yazyka, business-gazeta.ru/article/671860, tatar-inform.ru/news/rodnoi-on-odin-ne-vybiraetsya-ne-menyaetsya-pocemu-eksperty-protiv-izmenenii-fgos-5991367, echofm.online/stories/v-tatarstane-razgoraetsya-konflikt-s-moskvoj-iz-za-novogo-obrazovatelnogo-standarta-dlya-shkolnikov, tatar-inform.ru/news/rodnoi-on-odin-ne-vybiraetsya-ne-menyaetsya-pocemu-eksperty-protiv-izmenenii-fgos-5991367 and zapravakbr.ru/index.php/30-uncategorised/1985-valerij-khatazhukov-blagodarya-printsipialnoj-i-posledovatelnoj-pozitsii-deputatov-respubliki-tatarstan-proekt-minprosveshcheniya-rf-ne-proshel.

            Despite victory in this battle, many non-Russians fear that Moscow still plans to win the war by pursuing a campaign of “total Russification” despite making this concession. On their views, see idelreal.org/a/tsel-totalnaya-rusifikatsiya-moskva-sokraschaet-chasy-prepodavaniya-rodnyh-yazykov-teper-s-dvuh-do-odnogo/33480638.html.

            They are likely right, but there are three reasons why this victory matters. First, those taking part in the protest against Moscow’s proposal argued that the center shouldn’t be making decisions about them without their participation, a view that ever more people in the federal subjects share.

            Second, defeating this Moscow policy position became possible when one republic was prepared to take a principled and consistent stand and then gained support elsewhere, leading the center to conclude that this battle over nomenclature was one not worth fighting as long as it could do what it wanted on the ground as it were.

            And third, there is one group that may benefit more from this non-Russian victory than any other. That is the Circassians who want their diaspora population to be allowed to return as compatriots who speak Circassian, a native language of several republics in the North Caucasus but not Russia and will use this nomenclature victory to press their case.

Three Distinct Blocs among Caspian Littoral States Said Turning It into ‘a Sea of Discord’

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 22 – Each of the countries on the Caspian littoral has been expanding their navies and all have been entering into bilateral relations as far as exercises go. Now, Andrey Matveyev says, three distinct multi-country blocs are emerging and turning that body of water into “a sea of discord.”

            The Kazakhstan journalist says that as a result, the sea, sometimes referred to in the past as “a Russian lake” is becoming “a contested strategic zone” with these three groupings and their “competing security visions” making “the risk of escalation real” (timesca.com/opinion-a-sea-of-discord-intensifying-military-drills-threaten-stability-in-the-caspian-region/).

            “The first bloc,” Matveyev says, consists of Russia, Iran and the non-littoral state of China. They’ve been conducting annual “security belt” exercises since 2019 and the first two, with the third in support, are now holding on this month (eurasiatoday.ru/voenno-morskoj-posyl-irana-i-rossii-k-ssha-ucheniya-v-kaspijskom-more/).

            The second includes Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and the other members of the Organization of Turkic States which is led by Turkey itself. And the third is grouped around cooperation between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. These groups are both fluid and changing, but the trend toward formalization is obvious, the Kazakhstan journalist suggests.

            And to the extent he is correct, that will add to the complexity of conflicts on the Caspian and its littoral states and present new challenges to Russia which would like to restore its dominance over that region and to other countries which want to use the Caspian region as a transit zone or as a place to expand their influence.

 

GUAM Becoming More Active as Union of Post-Soviet States Opposed to Russia, ‘Nezavisimaya Gazeta’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 22 – When GUAM, the political grouping of Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia and Moldova, emerged two decades ago, it was intended as an alternative to the CIS and other Russian dominated organizations on the post-Soviet space; but after an initial spurt of activity, little has been heard from it.

            Indeed, for most of its existence, GUAM has been reduced to little more than a talk shop for the leaders of these countries with annual meetings and occasional declarations. But now, Moscow’s Nezavisimaya Gazeta says, it is becoming more active as an organization whose members oppose what Russia is doing in Ukraine (ng.ru/editorial/2025-07-22/2_9299_red.html).

            In an editorial, the paper explains that GUAM did not live up to expectations because until recently its members had not yet fully defined their “preferences” as far as Russia was concerned. But today, because of Putin’s  expanded war in Ukraine, they are doing so and raising the possibility that GUAM will become what its creators hoped, the anti-Russian organization.

            All four of its members have “left or are leaving structures” led and dominated by Moscow, the paper points out, adding that “if Moscow doesn’t figure out how to get out of the current situation with the least losses, then GUAM will become what it hoped to be earlier – a community of countries opposing one of the sides of the conflict in Ukraine.”

            And that side, “of course,” will be Russia, a development that will affect not only how that conflict plays out but much else besides now and in the future.

‘Firm Hand’ Didn’t Totally Unite Soviet Society and Wouldn’t Do So in Russia Today, Moscow Social Chamber Member Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 22 – One of the most widespread myths spreading among Russians today is that Soviet society was totally united by “the firm hand” of the leaders and that the rise of another firm hand now would have the same result for Russia today, according to Dmitry Krasnov, a Moscow lawyer.

            Writing in Moskovsky Komsomolets, the member of the Social Chamber of the Russian capital, says that there were always workers who took part in strikes  (for a better life and soldiers who deserted (mk.ru/social/2025/07/22/mif-o-krepkoy-ruke-i-soznatelnykh-grazhdanakh-kakoy-byla-realnaya-zhizn-v-sovetskom-soyuze.html).

            That is in the nature of all societies, including Soviet and Russian, and creating a myth that such “contradictions” had been overcome in Soviet times is dangerous because no country can return to a past however much it wants to especially if the past that it imagines in fact never existed.

“There have always been dissatisfied, ignorant, cunning, criminal people in society,” Krasnov points out, including in Soviet times. Then, “there was a lot of them, a lot of disorder, confusion, disorder. And there have always been contradictions that reached the level of open demonstrations, protests, strikes.”

“And punitive measures of a "firm hand" did not cure society of these ailments,” he continues. “If you know the facts and honestly compare our current Russian society with the Soviet one, but not with the myth about it, you will have to admit that now there is much more civic responsibility and order.”

The appearance of such an article in Moscow’s largest newspaper is remarkable given that Putin and his Kremlin media have promoted the idea that the strong hand of the Soviet state completely united the population and that a similar strong hand is needed in the future if Russia is to do the same. 

Obviously, there are many in the Russian Federation who understand that such arguments are based on a myth and that if their country is to make progress, it will have to make an honest assessment about the nature of their country’s past and equally important about the nature of societies and the way they inevitably generate protests within them. 

 

Worst Road in Russia May Well be in Tomsk Oblast

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 22 – There are many terrible roads in the Russian Federation, but a strong candidate for the worst of all is one between the city of Kedrovy and Tomsk, a road that is so bad that it takes up to 36 hours to go the 143 kilometers separating the one place for the other – at an average speed of just four km/hour.

            Residents have complained about the road for years if not decades, but it didn’t come to all-Russian attention until it was reported that the authorities had to transport the body of a soldier who lost his life fighting in Ukraine back to Kedrovy on the back of an all-terrain vehicle (okno.group/telo-umershego-vezli-na-kryshe-vezdehoda-gde-hudshaya-doroga-v-rossii/).

            That attracted the attention of Moscow officials, although there is no indication yet that they have done anything to transform what is little more than an unpaved track into a genuine road, even unpaved. As a result, residents will continue to flee lest they be left in what state highway policies have made a dying backwater.

More Buryats have Become Heroes of Russia in Putin’s War than Men from Any Other Federal Subject

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 22 – It was perhaps inevitable given Moscow’s efforts to recruit men disproportionally from non-Russian republics as well as poor but predominantly ethnic Russian oblasts and krays to fight in Putin’s war in Ukraine that a high percentage of those who distinguished themselves in battle would be non-Russians.

            Since the expanded war began in February 2022, Moscow has awarded this honor to 480 men. Of these, soldiers from the Buryat republic have received the most of any federal subject – 19 – with two other non-Russian republics Dagestan and Sakha with 15 being in third and fourth place. The ethnically mixed Transbaikal Kray is in second place with 16 (vostok.today/53724-burjatija-lider-strany-po-kolichestvu-geroev-rossii-za-period-svo.html).

            Moscow may be pleased at this demonstration that non-Russians have displayed such courage in the fighting, but it can’t be entirely happy with the fact that a large share of these Heroes of Russia have not an ethnically Russian face but a non-Russian one. That may be why Moscow media have not played this up while non-Russian republics have.

Lack of Accessible Hospitals and Spread of HIV Infections Rather than Cold Climate Behind Increase in Tuberculosis Cases in Siberia and the Russian Far East, ‘To Be Precise’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 20 – Having achieved some real success in reducing the number of cases of tuberculosis in the first two decades of this century, the Russian Federation now faces an upsurge in their numbers especially east of the Urals. Moscow officials have blamed this on that region’s cold climate, but the real reasons lie elsewhere, a To Be Precise study says.

            It identifies three main culprits: the rise of strains of tuberculosis resistant to treatment, the spread of HIV across Siberia and the Russian Far East, and especially the lack of easily accessible hospitals which mean that people don’t get or continue the treatment they need (tochno.st/materials/zabolevaemost-tuberkulezom-v-rossii-za-10-let-snizilas-v-dva-raza-no-epidemiia-vic-i-rezistentnost-k-lekarstvam-tormoziat-progress).

            The increasing number of people who have strains of tuberculosis not easily treated by anti-biotic treatment is a worldwide phenomenon; but it is most common in countries, like the Russian Federation where the number of TB infections are higher and where many people remain undiagnosed or untreated.

            But the other two factors involved are the direct result of Putin government policies. Moscow has cutback on its earlier and more aggressive treatment of HIV infections; and in the case of Siberia, it has closed, under Putin’s “healthcare optimization program,” many hospitals and medical points in smaller population centers.

            It has done so to save money so that Putin will have it to spend on his war; but the consequences for the Russian population are dire: East of the Urals, the number of medical points has declined precipitously over the last three years; and the absence of decent roads mean that those who need treatment often can’t get to places where they might receive it.

            As a result, many infected with tuberculosis either never get care or break it off when the difficulties of reaching hospitals are too great. They remain ill and both become breeding grounds of strains that are far more difficult to treat and a growth in the numbers of TB infected people in the region, yet more collateral damage in Russia of Putin’s war in Ukraine.