Putin Popular Abroad for Same Reasons Hitler was Before World War II, Ikhlov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, February 28 – Many Russians are surprised by how popular Vladimir Putin is in the West given all his anti-Western statements and actions, but they shouldn’t be, Yevgeny Igkhlov says, because as “the Hitler of today,” he pleases many in the West for the same reasons Adolf Hitler pleased many outside of Germany in the years before World War II.

            “Putin pleases Western businessman by the absence in Russia of a class struggle and an ecological movement. He pleases Western authoritarians by the absence of dreary parliamentary procedures. [And] he pleases Western anti-globalist leftists by his anti-Americanism and ‘cultural nationalism’” (forum-msk.org/material/society/11501013.html).

            That Russian propaganda plays to such themes is not surprising, but it is important to recognize that it is exploiting attitudes which already exist rather than creating something new – and it is almost always the case that building on something that already is in place is much easier than creating something from scratch. 

Russianization Doesn’t Equal Russification, Russian-Speaking Tatars Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, February 28 – Many Russians assume that if a non-Russian stops speaking his own language and uses only Russian that such an individual is well on his way to re-identifying as a Russian. But that is not the case, and many Russian-speaking members of non-Russian nationalities remain closely attached to their non-Russian ethnic identity.

            Indeed, just as the Irish did not become Irish nationalists until they stopped speaking Gaelic and just as Indian nationalism took off when the leaders of its many ethnic groups began speaking English, many non-Russians who no longer speak their own language are among the most passionately interested in their nations and their national history.

            And thus it may even be the case that some members of a nationality who lose their native language and speak only Russian may be in a better position to defend their nations against Russian imperialism and the threat of national extinction than are those who speak only the national languages.

            Consequently, it is a mistake for either Moscow officials or Western observers to think that the Russian language is so powerful that it can by itself transform the identities of non-Russians who go over to speaking it. In fact, it may have just the opposite effect and lead to more nationalism rather than less.

            Rabit Batulla, a Kazan Tatar commentator, even goes so far as to declare that “the fate of the Tatar nation is not in the hands [of those who speak only Tatar and loudly proclaim today their Tatarness] but rather in the hands of Russian-speaking Tatars” (tatar-tribun.ru/kultur-multur/obrusevshie-ili-zhe-russkoyazychnye.html).

            “Among Russian-speaking Tatars, there are many who are vitally interested in the past, present and future of the Tatar people. Typically such Tatars have European or Russian first names and Tatar family names.” But in almost all cases, they are proud of their Tatar background and consider themselves Tatars.

            One of them told him, Batulla continues, that while he may speak Russian, he is “not Russified,” but instead “a Russian-language Tatar.” And he insists that “language is not the main component of the definition of the nation, and not religion forms the basis of the nation. Instead, knowledge, science and national character form the history and face of the Tatar people.”

            “If knowledge is absent, then history disappears,” Batulla’s interlocutor continues; and “those who have [only] Tatar, often are illiterate” and thus not capable of preserving and promoting their national identity.

            But Russian-speaking Tatars like himself, he says, “are saving the history of the Tatars by sacrificing their native language and Islam.  At the foundation of a bright future of the Tatar nation lies its national character.”  Anyone who doubts that should look at the history of the Jews since ancient times.

            “For centuries,” he says, “Jews were forced to move around the world, they were driven out from everywhere, they were persecuted, they were killed in large numbers and finally they settled in Russia. They forgot their native language and were transformed into Russian-speaking Jews. They even in fact began to forget the religion of their forefathers.”

            “But,” he continues, “the Jews preserved their national character” despite that. Those Tatar nationalists who denounce Russian-speaking Tatars should remember this and remember as well that Russian-speaking Tatars are often more effective defenders of the Tatar nation than are Tatar-speaking Tatars.

            To be sure, “overt and covert assimilation of Tatars is taking place. Many of them are being russified. But [Russian-speaking Tatars] are not.” Instead, they “love and study Tatar history.” No one is going to be able to stop the spread of Russian. “That train has left the station. And there is no way back.”

            Insstead, “there remains only one single path, the path of the Russian-speaking Tatars.” And because that is so, all Tatars must view Russian-speaking Tatars not as the enemy but as a key component in the formation of a new Tatar nation. In some ways, it might be better if this were not the case; but this is the best strategy for the future.

            Failing to remain united regardless of language only pours “water on the mill of anti-Tatar forces” and allows them to successfully pursue their “divide and conquer” strategy. And to promote such unity, he calls for establishing in each region “a society of young Russian-speaking Tatar intellectuals and to invite to join it successful Tatar businessmen."

Lustration Reemerging as Serious Political Issue in Russia, Ikhlov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, February 27 – As the Soviet nature of the Putin regime becomes ever more obvious – Dmitry Medvedev this week said United Russia should learn from the CPSU (rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/56d069119a79477ce872506f) – and as more people think about a post-Putin future, the issue of lustration has reemerged as a serious subject for discussion.

            In the 1990s and as a result both of euphoria about the end of the Soviet system and the opposition both in the country and abroad to any “witch hunts,” efforts to promote lustration – such as those of Galina Starovoitova – were ignored; but now it is clear, Yevgeny Ikhlov says, that this is an idea whose time has come (http://vestnikcivitas.ru/pbls/3932).

            The reasons for that, he suggests, are two-fold: the continued dominance of people whose values were formed by the Soviet regime is blocking Russia’s progress toward democracy and freedom, and the alternative to lustration in the event of radical change is in the Russian context uncontrolled “lynch law” in which the population will take law into their own hands.

            Lustration – the imposition of restrictions on holding office by people from a regime that has been displaced by revolutionary change – has a long history both abroad – going back to early modern Spain – and in Russia where the Soviet imposition of restrictions on members of the former ruling class in the 1920s and 1930s were a clear case of it, Ikhlov says.

            It is important to distinguish it from other things with which it is sometimes confused, he continues.  It is not revenge and, unlike de-Nazification in Germany after World War II, it “doesn’t threaten anyone with any deprivation of freedom.” The only thing it does is impose restrictions on holding definite positions “in politics, administration, the media and education.”

            Because that is the case, Ikhlov says, he is “an unreserved supporter of lustration according to clear and transparent rules.” He called for it in December 2011 and says he was “very proud” that his ideas on this point were reflected in decisions and declarations take by the united opposition at that time.

            Lustration is becoming ever more important also because the old nomenklatura has recruited new members to its ranks and socialized these people to behave in the ways that the older generation did, by restoring a kind of nomenklatura as a way of blocking the institutionalization of political life, Ikhlov says. 

         Under these conditions, he continues, “lustration is the only bloodless means of destroying the nomenklatura as asocial stratum because it deprives those who received the chance for a career at the price of participation in the violation of the law and the rights of others of the right to a political and administrative career” in the future.

            “Here are example of such beneficiaries of illegality,” Ikhlov says. “Someone became a deputy of a party as a result of falsified elecitons. Another made an administrative career asaresult of suppressing the opposition and freedom of speech. A third made a media career by becoming a mouthpiece for propaganda, slander and xenophobia.” And yet another “made a career in the system of culture and ecuation” by using illegitimate means.

            “None of these violated the law personally: he is simply the beneficiary of the usurpation of power by the ruling stratum to which he has attached himself.” But for Russia to move forward, Ikhlov says, they need to be kept out of politics and the media; and it is better to do that by law than by lynch law.

            In order to promote that process, Ikhlov recommends that Russians read the draft legislation that Starovoitova proposedin 1992 and again in 1997 without success. And he provides a copy and a link of what he calls “that legendary document” (politics-80-90.livejournal.com/115682.html).