With Archives Move, Putin Makes an Unforced Error

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 4 – Vladimir Putin has committed many crimes, but his political tactics at least from his own point of view have been brilliant, keeping his opponents off balance and ensuring that he will retain the support of the Russian population.  But now he has made what can only be described as an unforced error, one that is likely to come back to haunt him.

            Yesterday, the Kremlin leader announced that he was taking personal control of Russia’s Federal Archives Agency (Rosarkhiv), declaring that he is doing so because of the “special value” of documents contained there (interfax.ru/russia/501908).

            That Soviet and Russian politics has often been about controlling the past in the name of controlling the future is no news, and it is certainly the case that the chief current defender of that country’s security services and their checkered history should want to ensure that he has absolute control over documents that might be embarrassing or worse.

            But that was true of his predecessors as well, and none of them chose to take direct control of the archives, not only because they viewed this as a technical issue but also because they were confident that they had subordinates who would do their bidding in that regard.  By taking direct personal control, Putin has raised two serious questions:

            On the one hand and most immediately, are there things in the archives that are so threatening to him and his regime that he cannot risk having anyone else be in charge? And on the other and more ominously, is the circle of people on whom he can totally rely now narrowing to the point that he has no choice but to assume personal control?

            That such questions will now be asked is beyond question, and the answers, even if they are speculative or uninformed will harm Putin. Consequently, the Kremlin leader in this regard has done something even worse than a crime: he  has committed a serious political mistake – and it is certain to haunt him in the future.

           

Only Beneficiary of Karabakh Fighting is Putin, Piontkovsky Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 4 – Vladimir Putin is the only beneficiary of the renewed fighting in Karabakh, Andrey Piontkovsky says; and to the extent that is so, Azerbaijan, Armenia and especially Georgia are likely to be the greatest victims of this policy, with all three finding themselves subject to ever greater Russian control and ever greater isolation from the West.

            In a commentary today for Kasparov.ru, the Russian commentator says that a close analyst of the situation shows that “for purely military reasons, neither Azerbaijan, nor Armenia are interested in the escalation of military actions.” Both had clear defensive advantages prior to the new hostilities (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=57023C83F3E30).

            That situation in turn means that one must consider whether some “third” outside force is behind the new events. Many in Moscow blame Turkey, but there are no good reasons to assuming that Ankara has any interest in isolating itself further as a result of some kind of military action in the Caucasus, Piontkovsky says.

            And thus, the Russian analyst says, the party most interested in escalation almost certainly is Moscow itself.  “Vladimir Putin as the greatest peacemaker has ALREADY offered his services for the establishment of peace in this region,” and it is clear what he expects to get out of this in addition to a propaganda boost.

            “Not simply control over Azerbaijan and Armenia which to a significant degree Moscow has had already for a long time but also over Georgia,” especially if Moscow dispatches “peacemakers” to the region. To supply them it will need “a corridor to the Russian base in Gyumri in Armenia, and this corridor lies through the territory of Georgia.”

            Moscow has been sending signals in recent weeks that it is running out of patience with Georgia, Piontkovsky says. Offering himself as a peacekeeper in this case could allow him to put even more pressure on Tbilisi, especially given the rapidity with which the West has called for ending the fighting over Karabakh.

            As the Russian analyst puts it, “one of Putin’s goals is to keep the West in the position of constant concern and to remind that without him no problem of world politics can be resolved, especially if it is one that he has created.”

           

Should Ethnic Russians have the Right to Act Like a National Minority in Russia?

Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 4 – No one doubts that for the Russian Federation as a whole, ethnic Russians for the present constitute a majority of the population; but in various parts of the country, including in many of the non-Russian republics, they now form a minority and one that is moreover rapidly declining in size.

            Because Russian law and practice allows ethnic minorities certain rights and privileges, that situation has provoked what may be the most unexpected and potentially dangerous question: should ethnic Russians in these situations have the right to act like a national minority, demanding support from the state to ensure their national survival?

            In a commentary entitled “Questions without Answers” on Nazaccent.ru devoted to the All-Russian Forum on State Support for National Minorities that recently concluded in Cheboksary, Igor Volkov observes that it is far from clear what the organizers had in mind when they spoke about “national minorities” (nazaccent.ru/content/20085-voprosy-bez-otvetov.html).

            The Cheboksary commentator points out that “in Russian law, there is a norm according to which a people numbering less than 50,000 is numerically small and falls under the particular attention of the state which provides it with a multitude of preferences.”  But these were not the peoples represented at this meeting.

            Instead, Volkov says, the participants were “representatives of the republics and oblasts of the Volga Federal District.”  And thus it would be interesting to find out “who then in that district is a minority: the five million Tatars, the 1.5 million Chuvash, or the 600,000 Maris.” And that raises the question: just who or what is “’a national majority’”?

            Of course, “the majority is the most numerous ethnos of Russia the ethnic Russians.” But that is true “only if you take the country as a whole.”  In many republics, “where thanks to various circumstances including the policy of the local ethnocracy, ethnic Russians are becoming ever fewer; and they already are not a majority.”

            Should that mean that “Russians in this situation” should receive support as a minority nationality?  Or is the goal of “the preservation and development of the unique culture of the peoples of Russia” something that “in principle” is not something they can have access to?  According to Volkov, the forum didn’t provide an answer.

            But the issue isn’t trivial, he argues.  One thing the Cheboksary session did focus on was the efforts by republic governments, including Chuvashia’s, to promote ethnic survival of their co-ethnics living outside of the borders of the republics by organizing summer camps and other measures at government expense.

            Such measures, Volkov says, are fine but what should be the limits especially given that tax money is involved. Should multi-national republics support only the titular nationality as is the case now? Or should they support all the nationalities? And should nationalities like Russians who don’t have a national republic nonetheless support co-ethnics elsewhere?

            “The majority of peoples of Russia live dispersed across the enormous spaces of [the country].”  How are they to act, as “the ethnic self-consciousness of citizens” intensifies? Why shouldn’t ethnic Russians have the same right to promote their co-ethnics as do those groups classified as “ethnic minorities” given that in many places Russians are in that status?

            If Chuvashia or Tatarstan finances support for Chuvash or Tatar groups beyond their republics, why shouldn’t Vladimir and Yaroslavl oblasts do the same for ethnic Russians “beyond the borders of their regions?”  That is something the Cheboksary meeting could usefully have discussed, Volkov says.

            There are at least three consequences of such discussions. First of all, demands by Russians that they should have the same rights as ethnic minorities because they are one almost certainly will be used by some in Moscow and elsewhere to insist that non-Russians shouldn’t have these rights, thus eliminating some of the protections minorities now have.

            Second, if Russians are successful in advancing such demands, that they be allowed to act like an ethnic minority, that will not only intensify Russian nationalist attitudes but give aid and comfort to those who want to see the formation of federal subjects explicitly identified as ethnically Russian, a development that would intensify ethnic tensions in the country.

            And third, even the discussion of this issue will exacerbate tensions between Russians and non-Russians with each deciding that the other is getting something they don’t have.  Many focus on the fact that non-Russians, for good reasons, feel that way; now, as Volkov suggests, many Russians are feeling the same way.