Lithuania’s Recognition of Paganism as Official Religion ‘a Hidden Threat’ to Russia

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 30 – Historically, Russians have viewed the Roman Catholicism of the Lithuanians as a threat to Orthodox civilization just as they do that faith in the case of Poland. But now some Russians are worried that Lithuania may constitute another religious “threat” to Russia because Vilnius appears set to declare paganism an officially recognized denomination.

            The Lithuanian parliament’s national security committee has given its blessing to the recognition of the Romuva community of the faith of the ancient Balts despite its “spiritual and organizational ties” with Russian pagans. Indeed, Sergey Orlov of Moscow’s Svobodnaya pressa implies, the influence could run the other way (svpressa.ru/world/article/203980/).

            Some Lithuanians have opposed recognizing the old belief because of its links with Russia, he continues; but leaders of the Romuva say that their organization “does not have special ties with the Russian Federation.” Instead, it “maintains relations with analogous organizations from various countries.”

            Lithuanian historian Arvidas Anuskauskas says that links between the pagans of Lithuania and those of Russia go back into the depths of time given their common focus on nature and their remarkably similar sets of divinities. He says that no one in Vilnius is going to be able to break the two apart.

            “In June 1998,” Orlov says, “the first world pagan forum took place in Vilnius.” Why there? According to its organizers, Lithuania was chosen because it was “the last country in Europe which was Christianized” and because the old faith continues to live under the surface for many Lithuanians. Many Russian pagans took part in that meeting.

            The Soviet government persecuted pagans, but the post-Soviet Russian one has generally ignored them, while in Lithuania, there is now a chance that the old faith will be allowed to conduct marriages and to provide religious instruction in the schools if parents and pupils ask for that.

            “Lithuanian pagans played an important role in the struggle for the independence of the republic,” Orlov continues; and their representatives soon populated leading intellectual centers like the Vilnius Institute of Philosophy and Sociology” where they often promoted the idea of links with pagans in other countries, including Russia.

            There has been significant popular support for this because Lithuanian and Russian pagans worship the same pagan gods. The thunder god in Lithuania is Perkunas, while in Russia, he is identified as Perun, obviously a closely related term.  Other deities and practices are also common.

            But the way in which paganism has penetrated public life in Lithuania and the way in which that penetration could extend to Russia is reflected in the name of the recent and largest ever military exercises conducted in that Baltic country. Called “Perkunas’ thunder,” they were organized together with NATO to defend against “’a Russian invasion.’”

            Orlov does not discuss the possibility that Lithuania’s pagans will become an offensive weapon in the hands of the West, but the title he gives to his article, “The Hidden Threat of the Lithuanian Pagans,” certainly indicates that such a possibility is very much on his mind – and probably on the minds of others in Moscow as well.

Mormons May Become Kremlin’s Next Target among Religious Groups

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 30 – Although few in the West appear to be paying attention, the Russian government continues its attacks on the Jehovah’s Witnesses and other non-Orthodox faiths almost unabated. But many apparently assumed that the Mormons were going to escape this wave of anti-religious persecution.

            The reason for their hopes is that the US ambassador to the Russian Federation, John Huntsman, is a Mormon; and so any attacks on the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints in Russia would not only be noticed by the US but would represent a direct slap in the face at Washington’s representative in Moscow.

            Unfortunately, there are no indications that elements in the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian regime are getting ready to attack the Mormons not in spite of Huntsman’s position but because of it, blaming him for the rise in Mormon activism in Russia and thus portraying this group as they have portrayed other believers as foreign “agents.”

            An indication of this danger is offered by an article on the Russkaya liniya portal, a site with close ties to many conservative elements within the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian government (rusk.ru/newsdata.php?idar=81107).

            The Missionary Department of the Chelyabinsk Bishopric of the Russian Orthodox Church, it says, has announced that the Mormons have in fact acquired a building there that they are converting into a Mormon church, the second such facility on the former Soviet space (the first is in Kyiv), and will use it for missionary and other less religious purposes.

            The Department continues that the Mormons have long sought such a facility and became more active in their successful pursuit of it after the US named a Mormon to be ambassador in Moscow.  It adds that Mormonism is “pseudo-Christian and in essence pagan” and thus entirely alien to Russian traditions.

            Despite all that, however, Russkaya liniya notes, “representatives of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints has become part of the US establishment” and “many of its members have occupied and occupy now responsible posts in the leadership of the American special services.”

            “In Russia,” it continues, “Mormons have often been detained near closed defense sites,” an indication that they are “not only an instrument of ‘soft power’ directed at the reforming of the public consciousness of Russians but as a specific branch of strategic intelligence.” And the Mormons in Russia expand on this by organizing English language courses and sports events.

            “The Missionary Department of the Chelyabinsk Bishopric,” the portal continues, “directs the attention of residents of the Southern Urals to the fact that many destructive cults, especially of foreign origin, at present are in a ‘sleeping’ or ‘semi-sleeping’ state” in which they observe the law but create the basis for undermining the government.

            That is very much the case with the Mormons today, the Missionary Department says; and Russians need to learn “to say ‘no’ to recruiters” from that cult. Given the way the Russian Orthodox Church operates and cooperates with the Russian state, it is unfortunately unlikely that this attack on the Mormons will be limited to that alone.

What Might Putin Do to Stop the Plummeting of His Popularity? Three Disturbing Possibilities

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 30 – In ten days after the announcement of the government’s plans to raise the pension age for both men and women, Vladimir Putin’s approval rating fell from 78 percent to 64 percent, a decline that as likely increased by the Kremlin’s insistence that he has nothing to do with it even when it is obvious to all that he controls everything he wants to.

            In a democratic country, such a decline almost certainly would lead to policy or personnel changes; but Putin’s Russia is not a democracy, not even a hybrid one; and he has shown little willingness to change course, especially if it appears he is under pressure to do so, and even less to change key officials as a signal to society that the government will shift.

            Putin and his cronies obviously thought that Russians would be so entranced by the World Cup that they could get away with this unpopular move; but the Russian people as deferential as they may be to power proved that they were quite capable of rationally assessing what is going on and that their much-ballyhooed support for Putin is broad but paper thin.

            In the past, Putin’s popularity has risen with the price of oil or as the result of his Anschluss of Ukraine’s Crimea. But oil prices are nowhere near where they were a decade ago and Russian incomes are suffering, with little prospect that they are going to improve anytime soon. Indeed, the government seems to be driving them down by taking more money from them.

           

            That suggests the Kremlin leader almost certainly will launch some new aggression. Some may believe that the upcoming summit with Donald Trump in Helsinki will hold him back, arguing that Putin won’t want to do anything to undermine improved ties with the West. But unfortunately, Trump’s willingness to defer to Putin now seems greater than that of the Russians.

            Consequently, given that Putin like almost all Russian rulers behaves according to type – that is, does the same thing again and again and again – it is unfortunately likely that he will try to get some foreign policy “victory” to win back his popularity which given how much he manipulates the media and polls he clearly cares about.

            There are many possibilities, of course.  But three should be on anyone’s watch list. They are:

·         First, a further land grab in Ukraine to secure a land bridge to Crimea and total control of the Sea of Azov.  Putin has been building up forces for both, although it remains unclear whether he could take such a step without sparking outrage in much of the West if not with Trump or would win as much support as seizing Crimea in the first place did.

·         Second, a military-political move to break or absorb a former Soviet republic. The two most likely candidates are Belarus which Putin has always wanted to become part of the Russian Federation and Georgia which he invaded once before and which he has been pursuing a proxy war via South Ossetia recently because of Tbilisi’s drive to become part of the West. Such steps would disturb much of the West but might not given him the boost at home he seeks.

·         And thus third, a move in the Middle East designed to destabilize one or more countries in order to drive up oil prices, weaken Israel and the United States, and win support at home by returning Russia to the “fat” years of high oil prices.  That certainly would boost his approval rating at home, and it might not hurt him that in the West especially if he did it in a proxy fashion.

Thus, while one can only be pleased with the decline in expressed support for Putin among Russians shows that they are not forever linked to him no matter what he does, unlike apparently the supporters of some Western politicians, one must be worried, as the The Bell’s Artem Gubenko says, because of what Putin may do in response (thebell.io/uroven-odobreniya-putina-upal-na-14-za-10-dnej-iz-za-pensionnoj-reformy/).

The only certainties are that he will do something and that it will further threaten the international order.