Saturday, June 27, 2020

Pyatigorsk Appeals Court Rejects Harsher Sentence for Ingush Protester


Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 25 – An appeals court in Pyatigorsk has overruled a lower court which imposed at the request of prosecutors a tougher sentence on Ruslan Dzeytov, an Ingush activist still in detention for his role in the March 2019 protests. But it refused to release him as his lawyers had sought because of fears he might contract the coronavirus while in jail.

            Dzeytov was arrested in May 2019 and in February, he was convicted of using force against siloviki and sentenced to 21 months in a settlement. Then in April, at the request of prosecutors, he was ordered to be put in a more restrictive general regime colony . The appeals court’s decision voids that (fortanga.org/2020/06/uchastniku-ingushskogo-protesta-ruslanu-dzejtovu-otmenili-uzhestochenie-nakazaniya/).

            His attorney, Visit Tsoroyev, welcomed the decision but noted that his request that Dzeytov be released while he appeals his minor conviction so that he won’t be infected with the coronavirus. It is unclear whether the change in this sentence represents a change in policy or is a one-off event in Stavropol’s courts.

            Today, voting on the proposed constitutional amendments began in Ingushetia. Nine  Ingush teips have called on their members to boycott the referendum, and interviews by the Fortanga agency suggest that many Ingush plan to follow their advice (fortanga.org/2020/06/golosovat-po-popravkam-v-konstitutsiyu-ne-budu-rezultaty-videooprosa-na-ulitsah-ingushetii/).

            Others with whom the agency spoke said they would vote, but many said they would vote against the amendments. 

Putin has Lost the Young but Workers Will Join Them Only for Local Protests, Levinson Says


Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 24 – Vladimir Putin has lost the younger generation, and ever more of them expect protests and are ready to participate in them. But the larger stratum of workers will join them only for targeted protests about very specific issues, and these are unlikely to grow into a mass political action, Aleksey Levinson says.

            The head of the Levada Center’s analytic department says that Russians are more inclined to say they expect protests and would participate in them than at any time in the last 18 months. Putin still has his base among older, less educated, and rural Russians; but he has lost his “immunity” to protest (reforum.io/2020/06/24/pochemu-dazhe-uspeshnyj-protest-ne-dobetsya-svoego/).

            The first big question, Levinson continues, is whether the working class will join the students as happened in Paris in 1968.  That is “possible,” he argues, but almost exclusively when the issue is a local one rather than an all-Russian matter.  The Kremlin may view these as political but they are less threatening to it than many assume. 

            “History shows that targeted protests in 99 percent of all cases remain targeted and local;” they do not grow into a massive country-wide action. And the sociologist says that might not be a bad thing because the powers that be know only how to be repressive – and in response to a mass protest, they might use force, with the nightmare of bloodshed following.

            Many Russians see the current situation as keeping that possibility low, and that goes a long way to explain why they will vote for rather than against the constitutional amendments which promise to keep things as they are rather than think about going into the streets to protest against the changes.

            Russians are angry about the pandemic and about the government’s failure to come to their aid, but right now, there are no individuals or organizations capable of mobilizing them. “We don’t want Putin but then whom do we want? Navalny isn’t serious;” and there is as yet no one else.

            Another reason why anger and the willingness to protest are unlikely to lead to major demonstrations is that with rare exceptions, such mass protests haven’t been successful – or worse, after they take place, the government adopts even more repressive laws rather than make the concessions the protesters wanted.

            At the same time, the analyst continues, participation in meetings changes people. Those who came to the White House in October 1993 were ordinary people but they saw around them and, in many cases, became heroes. Those who take part in future demonstrations will experience many of the same things, seeing in other Russians leaders and partners.

            Levinson says he was among them and saw “a different side of reality, one that revealed that around us are golden people full of nobility and courage. Personalities like those we encounter in books.”  And that experience taught something else as well: the people did not have any specific democratic program. They simply wanted to organize themselves without outside interference.

            Since that time, many who were there have sought to realize this “program” and display the capacity for self-organization that Russian thinkers like Kropotkin and Bakunin were sure were part of Russian life and that can strengthen the horizontal ties that exist among Russians. The internet shows this is still true, the sociologist says.

            That means, he concludes, that “everything is possible but perhaps not just as we now imagine it.” 

Pace Putin, Ukraine and Belarus Gave Russia Territory Not the Other Way Around, Khokhlov Says


Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 24 – Vladimir Putin has declared that “certain former republics of the USSR received territorial gifts from Russia” and that these “ungrateful subjects of the union” should have returned them when they exercised their right to leave. (On the Kremlin leader’s statement, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2020/06/putin-says-russia-gave-land-to.html.)

            But the reality was just the opposite: Ukraine and Belarus had far more of the territories on which their titular nationalities lived handed over to the RSFSR than they received in return, a fact that raises the question as to who gave what to whom and who today is the ungrateful participant in such swaps.

            That becomes obvious, Ukrainian commentator Valentin Khokhlov says, if one compares the map of the dialects of the Russian Empire that was prepared by the Imperial General Staff in 1914. (At that time, Ukrainian and Belarusian were considered dialects of Russian, an error only later corrected.) (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=5EF33B7A1AB49).

If one compares the areals of Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian speakers – and language in this case can stand as a surrogate for identity – with the borders of the three union republics as established at the start of Soviet times, the commentator says, one can see that Russia was the recipient of territorial gifts not the source of them.

Indeed, one can say that “present-day Russia (then the RSFSR) did not give anyone anything, at least in its European part. On the contrary, it received from Ukraine truly tsar-like gifts – Taganrog, Rostov-on-Don, the Kuban and part of Stavropol, Belgorod, and Voronezh oblasts.”

“From Belarus, Russia received by the most modest accounts, a large part of Smolensk and half of Bryansk Oblasts; and if one is less modest, then it received all the lands to Kaluga and Bryansk plust as a bonus in the form of Pskov Oblast.” At the same time, Belarus received territory that was Ukrainian from Ukraine but not Belarusian from Russia.

That makes Putin’s claim truly absurd. “The country which did not give anyone anything –the Russian Federation -- shouts more loudly and aggressively than anyone else. It pays the republic which gave it most of all – Ukraine – with black ingratitude.” And now Belarus another gift giver to Russia is at risk as well.

Russia contrary to Putin thus turns out to be not the chief gift giver to the other two but the most ungrateful of the three despite receiving the most, Khokhlov concludes.