Russian Firms Using Moscow Homeless to Perform Jobs Immigrants Did Before Pandemic

Paul Goble

            Staunton, November 29 – Russian firms have been hard hit by the departure of immigrant workers from Central Asia and the Caucasus, people they have found difficult to replace because the wages they offer such people are far lower than most Russians are prepared to take. But now the firms have found an alternative source: the homeless (bomzhi).

            Not only are such people increasingly numerous because many Russians have lost their homes as a result of the economic crisis, but many who have been living on the streets for an extended period of time lack the skills or experience that would allow them to apply for better paying positions.

            According to Yekaterina Sazhneva of Moskovsky komsomolets, businesses see the homeless as the perfect substitute for the departed immigrant workers. They accept the lowest of wages, speak Russian well, and won’t make demands other better-placed workers do (mk.ru/social/2020/11/29/rabotodateli-v-otsutstvie-migrantov-nachali-formirovat-brigady-bomzhey.html).

            The number of homeless is large and growing – one estimate suggests there were more than five million before the pandemic and other say many more Russians have fallen into this category since – but there probably aren’t enough to make up for the loss of immigrants (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/02/russia-now-has-as-many-as-five-million.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2020/05/pandemic-radically-increasing.html).

            If Russian firms do turn to this group for new employees, that will involve both pluses and minuses. On the plus side, it will likely reduce disease and hunger among this group at the bottom of the Russian income scale (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2020/07/hidden-hunger-now-widespread-in-russia.html).

            But on the negative, it may create more cases of virtual slavery in Russia given that the homeless have even fewer protection arrangements than immigrants do (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/09/russia-now-has-more-slaves-than-china.html). And it may heighten tensions if the homeless seek the opening of more shelters in large Russian cities (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/09/russians-opposition-to-homeless.html).

            In the longer term, the employment of homeless Russians likely sets the stage for new conflicts over immigrants when they begin to return. Many Russians who don’t like immigrants will point to the homeless as a reason not to allow immigrants back, and many immigrants will see the homeless as threats to them, possibly touching off conflicts in the streets.

            Consequently, what may seem a program involving the most marginal of the marginal may grow into a problem at the center of major Russian cities, one that will help some but sets the stage for far more problems for others.

Flags of Non-Russian Republics Increasingly Important Mobilizing Tools, Garifullin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, November 29 – More than coats of arms or national hymns, flags of the non-Russian republics are easy for people to remember and helps them to identify both with their own republic and their own nation, something that suggests both activists and officials should do more to promote their display, Ilnar Garifullin says.

            The IdelReal commentator makes those points in considering the flag of the Republic of Tatarstan (idelreal.org/a/30973798.html). But his point extends the arguments of others like regionalist Pavel Luzin who has argued that what is true for republics is also true for regions (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/07/flags-increasingly-important-symbols-of.html).

            The first Tatars to appreciate the power of the republic flag, Garifullin says, were activists in the Azatlyk yough organization who pushed for the celebration of a republic Day of the Flag and beginning in 2013 handed out flags of various sizes including lapel pins. Some in the republic government but far from all took up their cause.

            But what has not happened and needs to, Gariffullin says, is to expand the use of the republic flag not only as a symbol of the statehood of Tatarstan but also of the identity of Tatars regardless of where they live. Thus, Tatars who live beyond the borders of Tatarstan, must be encouraged to view the flag as their symbol too and thus boost the power of the nation.

            That is especially important now, the commentator continues, when the remnants of federalism at the state level are under such concerted attack and when nations must become more important to the extent that state institutions named for them become less so. Wearing a flag is a way to make that happen.

            Efforts in regions and republics during the 1990s and 2000s to promote civic identities at these levels and at the all-Russian level have failed, and ethno-national identities must fill the gap if those who bear them are to enjoy any collective survival, Gariffullin argues.  And those who engage in protests must feel free to use their national flags at those times as well.

            That is already happening in Krasnoyarsk, Kushtay and Shiyes. The Tatars must ensure that their national symbol, the Tatarstan flag, is there as well.

Brezhnev Regime Contributed to Rise of Russian Nationalism with Its Efforts to Counter Religion, Smolkin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, November 29 – In a book newly translated into Russian, Viktoriya Smolkin of Wesleyan University in the United States argues that the Brezhnev regime, faced with increased interest in religion among the population adopted two strategies that unintentionally contributed to the rise of Russian nationalism.

            Having seen that Khrushchev’s direct attack on religion had not worked and that interest in religion was growing, especially among the intelligentsia, the CPSU leadership decided to try something new, the historian argues in an excerpt of her book published today by the Polit.ru portal (polit.ru/article/2020/11/29/ps_smolkin/).

            Its first approach was to try to coopt those who were interested in religion and get them involved in historical preservation, Smolkin says. Yury Andropov wanted to involve Russian nationalist artist Ilya Glazunov in official activities, and the Kremlin created the All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments.

            And its second tactic was to “nationalize” religion, making it part of the national culture in the hopes that this would promote patriotism and undermine unwelcome “’idealization’ of religion.  But both the one and the other backfired, leading more people to pay attention to religion and also to become religious.

            The CPSU recognized it was fighting a losing battle – one of its ideological stalwarts warned that the higher the standard of living in the USSR became, the more people would want to explore other values, including religious ones, with some who did so deciding to turn to religion and away from the party.

            The Kremlin hoped it could mobilize the intelligentsia against this trend. But religion had become fashionable among Russian intelligents, and even those who had worked to promote communist atheism under Khrushchev left the ranks of government and party propagandists under Brezhnev, giving the regime’s ideology another black eye. 

Results of Qarabagh War More Mixed for All Sides than Many Think, Vorobyev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, November 29 – In the wake of the latest outbreak of the Qarabagh war, most analysts have viewed Azerbaijan as the big winner, Russia and Turkey as having gained as well, and Armenia as the big loser, Aleksandr Vorobyev says. While this view is not wrong, the reality for all four of the participants is in fact far more mixed.

            In a commentary for the “Diplomatic Courier” supplement to Nezavisimaya gazeta, the director of the Moscow Center for Investment and Integration Cooperation argues that each of them faces a complex mix of pluses and minuses that are going to matter ever more with the passage of time (ng.ru/dipkurer/2020-11-29/11_8026_karabakh.html).

            There is no question that Azerbaijan won more than anyone else. It recovered most of the seven Azerbaijani districts Armenian forces had been occupying as well as “a significant part of the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh including the city of Shusha.” And it obtained transit rights across Armenia’s Zengezur district to connect it with Nakhchivan and Turkey.

            All these achievements, the Moscow commentator suggests, are likely to be sufficient to guarantee political stability and consensus in Azerbaijan “for the next several years.” But Azerbaijan suffered many casualties, likely even more than Armenia did, because it was the attacking force.

            Moreover, he continues, Azerbaijan must face a situation in which it stopped before recovering control over all its territory and now is confronted by the fact that there are foreign forces, Russian and Turkish, on its land. That opens the way for conflicts both over the terms of their presence and if Moscow and Ankara come into conflict.

            “The authorities in Azerbaijan thus risk finding themselves between two fires,” between those who want an even more aggressive and pro-Turkish position, and those who fear that such a development would lead to conflicts with Russia and reduce Azerbaijan to the status of “Ankara’s satellite.”

            Armenia clearly suffered loss of control over territory and loss of influence because of the poor showing of its military. Both have sparked a political crisis in Yerevan that shows no sign of ending anytime soon. But if one considers the situation more closely, Armenia did not suffer “a complete catastrophe.”

            On the one hand, “Armenia preserved control over Armenian territory, retains a zone of influence in Nagorno-Karabakh, and maintains its economic potential.” Indeed, the defeat may lead to more economic reforms sooner than would otherwise have been the case. And the war may allow Yerevan to recover its ties with both the West and with Moscow.

            For Russia, the conflict presented the most serious challenge: It did not want either side to win a total victory, but it did not want to take any step that would alienate one or the other from Russia. It suffered both political and image problems in Yerevan and it raised questions in Azerbaijan too.

            But its cautious approach allowed it to gain something Moscow very much wanted: the reinsertion of Russian forces as peacekeepers in the region. That gives Russia new leverage, but it also involves Moscow in the conflict more deeply and in the larger geopolitics of the region involving Turkey and Iran as well.

            And finally, Vorobyev says, Turkey benefited from the fighting and its outcome, strengthened its position in the South Caucasus and especially in Azerbaijan, and even won new sympathy from Turkic states in Central Asia. But in doing so, it came close to a confrontation with Russia and more immediately it alienated many of its Western partners.

            The latter shift is already hurting the Turkish economy and the standard of living of the Turkish people, while the former may if the situation develops in an unfortunate direction mean that Ankara’s ties with Moscow are perhaps even more likely to fray than they were before the November 10 agreement.

            Vorobyev argues that these economic problems and the need for constructive relations with other powers, along with growing unhappiness with the situation among the Turkish people, will perhaps force Ankara to be more cooperative, although that is only one way in which the situation may develop.

‘Pandemic of Silence’ Descends as Moscow Censorship Keeps Doctors from Talking

Paul Goble

            Staunton, November 29 – Many journalists expected that covering the coronavirus pandemic would be easy because it was a story everyone was interested in and because so many medical personnel were involved and could talk about it, MBC journalists say (mbk-news.appspot.com/sences/pandemiya-molchaniya/).

            But things haven’t worked out that way because officials using threats of dismissal or worse or engaging in direct censorship have spread “a pandemic of silence” over the rapidly spreading disease, limiting coverage and giving rise to rumors few are in a position to counter effectively.

            As a result of this second “pandemic,” many journalists who had wanted to cover the coronavirus are turning to other things, yet another way in which official pressure on doctors and nurses not to talk to the media is leading to fewer and less intriguing stories about the coronavirus.

            One story that nonetheless appears every day is the government’s report of how many new cases and deaths from the coronavirus have occurred over the previous 24 hours. Today, the authorities reported registering 26,683 new cases of infection and 459 new deaths, bringing those tolls to 2,269,316 and 39,527 respectively (t.me/COVID2019_official/2078).

            Officials in the regions continue to release updates on the pandemic in their areas. These permit the conclusion that the pandemic is still getting worse in far more places than it is getting better and that restrictions on the population are increasing rather than being lifted (regnum.ru/news/society/3122025.html).

            Russian medical experts say that between 20 and 45 percent of the Russian population has been exposed to the virus, although the percentage who have actually become ill and developed antibodies is lower. Only the vaccine will boost the share of the population truly immune, they suggest (rbc.ru/society/29/11/2020/5fc3db789a7947b0f812dbc3 and ura.news/news/1052460822).

            Only 19 percent of Russian companies say they will organize vaccination programs for their workers. Most of these are firms which already have flu immunization programs in place. But this pattern is likely to slow any vaccination program the government sets up (newsru.com/russia/29nov2020/tovaccinate.html).

            Commentators are pointing out both that the current medicine distribution system is inadequate and that the government’s recommendations on how to stay well are in many cases misleading or simply wrong (echo.msk.ru/blog/moniava/2749892-echo/ and theins.ru/opinions/vasilii-vlasov/237249).

            On the economic front, while overall inflation remains relatively low, prices for basic goods in greatest supply are rising fast, the result of supply difficulties and price gouging (ria.ru/20201127/bakaleya-1586548747.html).

            Meanwhile, in other pandemic-related developments in Russia today,

·         A new word has entered the Russian language – khamkovid – to refer to those irresponsible citizens who cast doubt on the recommended means of health security during the pandemic (echo.msk.ru/blog/govorimporusski/2749896-echo/).

·         Academician Vladimir Fortov, the former president of the Russian Academy of Sciences, has died from the coronavirus (interfax.ru/russia/739128).

·         The pandemic has led urban Russians to take a new interest in city parks and green spaces and prompted city planners to call for adding more space for these amenities as cities expand (vtimes.io/2020/11/29/pereustroistvo-goroda-a1690).

Russia Launches New Icebreaker Dedicated to Ensuring Supplies Reach Arctic Bases

Paul Goble

            Staunton, November 28 – Reflecting the Kremlin’s increasing focus on security rather than trade and development in the Arctic, Moscow has decided to develop and launch a new fleet of icebreakers devoted solely to military tasks rather than committed as most now are to keeping the way open along the Northern Sea Route or in major harbors.

            Ten days ago, shipbuilders in St. Petersburg released from its covered construction dock the Yevpatory Kolovrat, the first of these military-dedicated icebreakers. That is a milestone but the ship will now undergo what are likely to be months of fittings and then trials before it joins the military fleet (topwar.ru/177290-strojaschijsja-dlja-minoborony-ledokol-evpatij-kolovrat-vyveden-iz-jellinga.html).

            The keel of the new diesel-electric ship, which is a modification of the Ilya Murosmets was laid in December 2018. It is smaller – 4800 tons as against 6,000 tons – and has a smaller draft – 4.6 meters as against 7 meters – and thus can go into rivers or approach the shore where Russian military facilities in the north are located.

            Despite being a military vessel, there are now plans for it to be fitted with guns or other weapons, although the designers say that it can be rapidly outfitted with relatively small guns in the event of a crisis. They also say that the ship, named in honor of a Russian knight who defeated Baty Khan in the 13^th century will join the fleet two years from now.

            That the new ship is committed to military use alone restores a Soviet-era practice. Between 1960 and 1979, the Soviet Union built 32 icebreakers of which 12 were devoted solely to supporting the military. All but one of the 12 was scrapped in the 1990s (svpressa.ru/war21/article/282315/).

            One detail Russian commentators have made much of is that the Yevpatory Kolovrat is basically unarmed while many of the civilian icebreakers including the largest ones which are nuclear powered have significant heavy weapons systems on them. This suggests that the military icebreakers are intended to help supplies reach bases rather than for force projection.

Putin, Kalimatov Warned Ingush Trust in Powers Collapsing

Paul Goble

            Staunton, November 28 – Three days before the seven leaders of the Ingush protest movement are scheduled to go on trial, Magomed Mutsolgov, the chairman of the Coordinating Council of NGOs of the Republic of Ingushetia, warned that unless Moscow and Magas intervene to stop this farce, trust in the authorities will collapse with unpredictable consequences.

            In open letters to Vladimir Putin (kavkaz-uzel.eu/blogs/342/posts/46085) and republic head Makhmud-Ali Kalimatov (kavkaz-uzel.eu/blogs/342/posts/46086), the human rights activist laid most of the blame on Kalimatov’s predecessor, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, praised Putin for removing him and for saying republic borders can’t be changed without referenda.

            But Mutsolgov continued in both letters, the authorities in Moscow and Magas had not changed direction with the ouster of Yevkurov and continue to act in ways that have reduced the trust of the Ingush people in both governments to the breaking point. If the trial of the seven leaders on trumped up charges goes ahead, he warned, this will break down entirely.

            These two letters are the clearest indication yet that the fears of both the authorities and the population that the trial of the seven leaders will spark a new wave of mass protests in the republic are not without foundation. While Mutsolgov’s tone is respectful, his words carry a clear warning that if this trial does go ahead, there will be consequences.

            The most important will be a complete loss of trust in the authorities and an increasing willingness of the Ingush people to look to traditional leaders like the teips, muftis and mullahs, something that will change the nature of politics in that North Caucasus republic and will have unpredictable consequences.

            Once such  a genie is released from the bottle by the actions of the powers that be, those powers will find it far more difficult to put it back in than they would be showing better judgment and avoiding the steps that will surely lead to an explosion.