Paul
Goble
Staunton, May 12 – To save itself,
Russia must end its excessive centralization, seek membership in both the
European Union and NATO, and sign confederal treaties with the five non-Russian
republics within its borders “which are really seeking a high level of autonomy
and independence,” according to a leading Tatarstan editor.
In a lead article in “Zvezda
Povolzhya,” that paper’s editor, Rashit Akhmetov argues that the current level
of “hyper-centralization” in the Russian Federation is “possibly only in states
of an imperial type” and that its modernization will be impossible without a
more equitable distribution of money and power (zvezdapovolzhya.ru/obshestvo/partiya-09-05-2013.html).
The need to decentralize, he says,
involves not only the non-Russian republics which are demanding it but also
many of the predominantly ethnic Russian regions in the central and northern
portions of the country, whose increasing impoverishment is leading to radicalism
and votes for Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s LDPR.
Just how much Moscow’s approach has
hurt these Russian regions, Akhmetov continues, can be seen if one compares the
decaying Russian oblasts along the borders with the Baltic states and the
flourishing situation in those countries who are in the same climatic zone but
are divided by a state border and very different policies.
Thus, these Russian regions should
support a new Confederalist Party every bit as enthusiastically as the non-Russian
republics can be expected to, the “Zvezda Povolzhya” editor suggests.
Moscow’s latest round of flirtation
with “great powerness” is “destroying Russia” by pushing it into “a dead end,”
one that the USSR with its much greater wealth and power could not manage a way
out. What is needed, Akhmedov argues, is a radical change of direction by the
central government.
Moscow must stop opposing itself to
the West as if it could and should again play the role of “the gendarme of
Europe.” That is achieving nothing except driving all of Russia’s neighbors
into NATO. Instead, a new Confederalist Party will call for having Russia join
the European Union.
That should not be an insuperable
problem: “already now millions of despairing [Russian] citizens believe only in
the Strasbourg court but do not believe in Russian courts.” Moreover, it is time
for Russians to begin to think about the possibility of having their country
become a member of NATO.
That organization is not, as some
Russians think, “an anti-Russia bloc.” Its current goals are ones that Russia
should share. Unfortunately, that may
not yet be the case: “The entire tragedy of Russia is that it is trying to
conduct a policy in the 21st century based on feudal myths.”
Whatever some may believe, “Russia
is not the Byzantium of the 21st century.” Acting as if it were can end in only one way,
and consequently, “Tatarstan must soberly prepare itself for a repetition of
the process of a new Russian ‘global catastrophe’” in which existing
arrangements are completely overthrown.
That is not an outcome sought by
either the American or Chinese special services. Instead, it is one the country
is being driven toward by internal forces.
It is time for Russians to recognize that “Moscow in essence has only
one real enemy – the reactionary strata of its [own] population” which advances
the slogan “Russia for the [ethnic] Russians.”
The Russian Federation must come up
with a better way of dealing with the non-Russian Republics or it will go the
way of the USSR, Akhmedov suggests. And “attempts to drive the national
movements into the framework of a cosmetic cultural autonomy, the so-called ‘sabantui
policy,’ cannot deceive anyone” as being a real solution.”
“Politics,” the Kazan editor says, “is
a concentrated form of culture. More than that, as we see, economics is based
on culture and not the other way around.
A people develops if it creates ‘a high culture,’ but if it doesn’t do
so, it becomes degraded and is assimilated” by another.
The Tatars have such a high culture, and
consequently, they are appalled by calls to “liquidate” their republic. Republics have an objective existence,
Akhmedov argues; they were not “the result of voluntarism or the subject of
constructivist manipulations” as some Russian commentators appear to believe.
Lenin set up the republics because “otherwise
the Bolsheviks would have lost the Civil War.” In that conflict, the editor
notes, “the slogan ‘a single and indivisible Russia’ lost to the slogan of the
equality of peoples.” And that remains true despite the ways in which the
Bolsheviks themselves then subverted the status of the republics.
Everyone involved in this issue needs to
recognize both that “a state is not an accidental invention” but rather “objectively
an organ of the development of the culture of peoples” and that “nothing is
eternal under the moon – states are created and destroyed; they like people
have a spirit” that maintains them or not.
The open pursuit of an
imperialist agenda by the center against the republics will lead to “tragedies,”
Akhmedov says, and he urges that Moscow change course before it is too late.
Specifically, Moscow needs to conclude EU-style treaties with the five republics
within its borders that seek greater autonomy: Tatarstan, Bashkortostan,
Chechnya, Chuvashia, and Saka.
“In an ideal case,” he writes, “the
relations of Russia and these republics should be at the same level as among
the countries of the European Union,” an arrangement that would give the
greatest possible guarantees to human and ethnic rights. And it is “possible”
that the membership of these republics in the UN should become the subject of
discussion.
Moscow’s current policy of “diktat” toward
the republics” is “intolerable and does not have a future.” To save itself, Russia “must be transformed into
a Eurasian Union,” something that will help hold things together and equally
important allow Russia to escape from the vicious cycle of “time of troubles
and dictatorship.”
“The peoples of the republics are
not interested in the degradation of Russian culture. On the contrary,”
Akhmedov suggests, “the development of Russian culture will help the
development of other peoples as well” as long as Moscow refuses to play the
role of a tsarist policeman returned to the 21st century.
“Without a political party”
committed to confederalism, the editor concludes, modernization in Russia will
be “impossible.” That will be a tragedy not only for the non-Russians there but
also for the Russians themselves. Today, more than ever, “Russia needs not a
strong hand but strong brains.”
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