Paul
Goble
Staunton, July 10 – Russian
officials have long sought to dismiss ethnic conflicts as being product of the
everyday disputes people have rather than clashes between two nationalities,
but today the editors of “Vedomosti” offer another and more disturbing
diagnosis by suggesting that such conflicts “above all” are a reflection of
“the continuing erosion of the state” itself.
According to “Vedomosti,” “popular
uprisings like those which are taking place in Pugachev in Saratov oblast risk
becoming typical for all the cities of south Russia.” While most people
identify them as “ethnic,” they “above all” reflect the decay of state
institutions (vedomosti.ru/opinion/news/14011741/tipovoj-konflikt?fb_action_ids=477537922336591).
In recent months, there have been
conflicts like the one in Pugachev in Stavropol kray, Kirov oblast, Sagra in
Sverdlovsk oblast, and Moscow; indeed, such conflict between members of
different ethnic groups who take things into their own hands rather than rely
on the government have been going on since at least Kondopoga in 2006.
The “Vedomosti” editors say that the
reasons that in considering all these events, “it is worth remembering that the
sides of the conflict have different relations with the state.”
“The typical Chechen or Daghestani
as a result of the special social-economic situation of the Caucasus in
contemporary Russia is accustomed to resolve any issue informally outside of
the institutions of the state.” But “the typical Russia, although he suspects
that he mustn’t count on the state for help, all the same by habit keeps that
hope.”
When life, economic or criminal
conflicts between them take place, the approach of the Caucasians often turns
out to be more effective – because the corrupt and ineffective state cannot
resolve the conflict within the framework of the laws that have been adopted,”
the “Vedomosti” editors say.
“The difference between the sides of
the conflict in fact is social-economic, but the conflict very quickly
becomes identified as ethnic because an
ethnic conflict has mobilizing potential for both sides,” each of which can use
that description to win support from the population because it can’t count on
the state to protect its interests.
Moreover, the editors say, “it is no
secret that the level of everyday xenophobia in Russia is very high” and that
in the current “political and economic crisis,” the authorities are relying on the
rapid “re-traditionalization of the electoral majority” by talking about the
central role of the ethnic Russians and supporting the image of alien “enemies.”
“In the absence of physical contact
with ‘the cursed Americans, Russian patriots have increasingly angry at ‘the
aliens’ nearby – above all the Caucasians,” the paper says. “Such conflicts must not become ‘typical,’
and they won’t if there is an improvement in “the quality of state
institutions.”
A
related take on the relationship of state power and Russian nationalism was
provided yesterday by Lev Pirogov in a commentary on the “Svobodnaya pressa”
portal in which he suggested that Russian nationalism has not developed because
in a certain sense Russians already have a state that is identifiably their own
(svpressa.ru/society/article/70650/).
Russians need what all nations need,
he suggests, but they cannot mobilize as a nation because such mobilization occurs
most easily when the people involved do not have a state. Indeed, he suggests
that “the main problem of the Russian nationalist [today] is that Russians are
not Yakuts.”
“For the Russian people to feel
itself a nationalist people,” Pirogov argues, “it must feel itself a people
without a state.” That explains the
attractiveness of Russian nationalists who support regionalist projects such as
Siberia or Ingermanland. But he asks rhetorically whether without a state,
Russians will continue to feel themselves a people?
The answer to that may not be long
in coming, the Russian commentator says, because the state Russians do live in “will
do everything depending on it” to create a situation where ethnic Russians will
feel themselves a nation without a state and then the Russians can become
nationalists of the ordinary kind.
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