Paul
Goble
Staunton, July 17 – Russians do not
view the opposition as an alternative to those in power but rather as “an
additional” but very weak “channel of communication” between themselves and the
authorities, according to a new study prepared by the Institute of Sociology of
the Russian Academy of Sciences.
The basic conclusions of the
185-page report, entitled “The Differentiation of Civic and Political Practices
in Russia” (isras.ru/files/File/Doklad/Civil&Political_DCPS_2013_1.pdf), are presented by Sergey Patrushev,
its principle investigator, in an interview conducted by Marina Vishnyakova in
today’s “Novaya gazeta” (novayagazeta.ru/politics/59081.html).
The
sociologist says that the study found that Russians “poorly distinguish”
between political, social and civic spheres of activity,” something that has
“practical consequences.” People who
seek to build a kindergarten find their demands labeled as political, while “people
who make political demands are called foreign agents.”
As
a result of such confusions, Patrushev continues, “Russians often themselves do
not understand” either the nature of the demands they are making or whom they
are addressing when they make them “the authorities, themselves or someone
else.” And that helps to explain some of the deeper patterns the new study
found.
“The
most obvious indicator of the level of social dissatisfaction is the approval
of the authorities by the population,” Vishnyakova summarizes. According to
polls, popular approval of the top leaders of the countries has remained high
even during periods of the greatest protest activity although that of
lower-ranking leaders has in fact fallen.
“The
obvious motivation” behind this pattern, she suggests on the basis of the
study, resides “in the institutional function of the federal leaders – ‘if it
won’t be them leading, then who else is there?’”
Another
one of the study’s findings is that dissatisfaction with the situation in the
country is growing “in the first instance” in villages and small cities on the
periphery, places which “at one and the same time form the foundation of mass
support for the existing authorities.” Consequently, much of this
dissatisfaction is displaced on other groups rather than the state.
In
major cities, on the other hand, those who are unhappy with the situation in
Russia are more inclined to be critical of the government, likely because “they
have access to a comparably greater number of sources of information” and thus
are in a better position to connect the dots between the problems they face and
the regime they live under.
Few
opposition leaders are widely known or approved of, the study continues.
According to Patrushev, “it isn’t very important whether there are outstanding
leaders in the Russian opposition or not.” What is “more important,” he
continues, “is in which sphere these leaders operate” and what their activities
promote. Initiatives from below need to be promoted; then real leaders will
emerge.
“Despite
the fact that half of those polled” for the study, “recognize the existence of
the opposition a necessary attribute of ‘real democracy,’” Vishnyakova says, “a
third of those who are dissatisfied consider it possible to do without it if
comfortable conditions of life are established in the country.”
According
to the study, half of the electorate of opposition figures consists of people
who want to make a protest, while “up to half” of the voters for the ruling
United Russia party are motivated by “a lack of alternatives.” Moreover, it
found that those who chose not to vote at all divide in about the same ways and
for much the same reasons.
The
sociologists found, Vishnyakova continues, that “if those citizens inclined to
opposite in the first instance voted in order to influence the situation in the
country, those loyal [to the ruling party] did so in order that no one would
steal their vote and out of a feeling of duty,” one more indication of the low
level of institutionalization of democracy in Russia.
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