Paul
Goble
Staunton, October 3 – Even though the
Russian military is not able to fill one in every five of its authorized slots
and Moscow has boosted its draft quota this fall by 10,000, the Russian
authorities are not drafting anything like the percentage of the large
draft-age cohort in the North Caucasus even as they take higher percentages in
predominantly Russian areas.
This pattern reflects the
preferences of the Russian command not to have North Caucasians in the military
lest they cause command and control problems.
But it produces two other far larger problems in addition to making it
far more difficult for the military to meet its draft quotas, a problem that
experts say will only grow in the out years.
On the one hand, not drafting
significant numbers of North Caucasians sends a message to that region that
Moscow does not consider its people reliable or fully part of the Russian
Federation. And on the other, it offends
many ethnic Russians who have to pay a higher tax of this kind by sending a
disproportionate share of their young people into the military.
In an article in “Nezavisimaya
gazeta” yesterday, Vladimir Mukhin says that Moscow plans to draft more than
150,000 in the fall cycle that began October 1, 10,000 more than it took in a
year ago. But despite that increase, the military will still be able to fill
only 82 percent of its slots (ng.ru/armies/2013-10-02/1_genshtab.html).
Nor Mukhin continues is there any
chance that this deficit will be made up by professionals as some had hoped.
The economic crisis and the sequester of government funds even for defense
means that the planned expansion of the army by 50,000 professional soldiers
will not happen.
The draft situation was recently
made worse by a decision not to draft young men from the regions of the Russian
Far East which have suffered from some of the worst flooding in history, but
the biggest constraint, the “Nezavisimaya gazeta” journalist says, is that the
Russian general staff is not exploiting the large draft pools in the North
Caucasus.
In Chechnya, the republic military
commissariat says, there are more than 80,000 in that pool, many of whom are
ready and anxious to serve because military service is a path toward a career
in the police. But as of now, the
Chechen authorities have not been given a plan for the draft, although they may
get one and take some more Chechens than they have in the past.
A similar situation exists in
Daghestan. There, the republic military
commissar Daytbeg Mustfayev say, he is ready “at a moment’s notice to send up
to 30,000 draftees” for service. But
this fall, he has been asked to send only 1500 – a number that is twice the one
taken last spring but still very small.
“A simple calculation shows,” Mukhin
continues, “that drawing only on draftees from Chechnya and Daghestan, Moscow
could significantly increase the percentage of slots in the Russian army it
could fill.” But Russian commanders don’t want to do this, and the Russian
political authorities are not insisting.
Eduard Rodyukov, a colonel who works
at the Academy of Military Sciences, says that “in the Russian army as in
Russian society many are afraid of people from the Caucasus. This Caucasophobia is a sign of the weakness
of our state and of its leadership,” who should be glad to use the willing
North Caucasians given rising draft resistance elsewhere.
“The leadership of the country knows
about this but somehow has not decided to make a decision. This is a crisis of administration. The current approach is decomposing Russian society,
making it amorphous and divided.”
An officer in the defense ministry
who spoke on conditions of anonymity added that “in the country and the army,
the word ‘internationalism’ has become a curse. And the formation of
multi-national military collectives where those from the central regions of the
country serve on an equal basis with those born in the North Caucasus is not
welcomed.”
Such attitudes affect not only the
composition of the lower ranks but also those t the top. “At the level of the
central apparatus … there are almost no officers who are from Daghestan and
Chechnya.” In Soviet times, there were, and such people were effective. “No one
then feared that some one of our soldiers or officers would go over to the side
of the mujahidin” in Afghanistan.
And he concluded: “Mono-ethnic and
basically Slavic military units is a path to nowhere. This is a reason for the
Caucasians themselves to consider such units in their homeland as
occupiers. Such [policies and feelings]
in the multi-national Russian state should not be.”
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