Paul
Goble
Staunton, October 28 – Two senior
Russian government officials have called for imposing restrictions on how the
media covers ethnic conflicts, but any such move, the editors of Nezavisimaya gazeta say in a lead
article will not only undermine the authority of the media but allow extremism
to grow (ng.ru/editorial/2013-10-25/2_red.html).
Moreover, as new research by the
Levada Center shows, most of the mistaken ideas Russians now have about the
North Caucasus come from government-controlled television whose reports about
that region and its people mean that many Russians often do not consider North Caucasians to be
citizens of the same country.
On the one hand, Russian officials in
the Putin era have blamed the media after every major terrorist incident or
ethnic clash. But on the other, this latest campaign is particularly worrisome
because, as experts note, the Kremlin is reaping the whirlwind of its decision
in 2011 to restrict the use of its police powers to limit the growth of Russian
nationalism.
Last week, Russian Procurator
General Yury Chayka called for imposing administrative punishment on media
which report unreliable information about the causes of conflicts and thereby
intensify them into inter-ethnic ones. Meanwhile, Vice Prime Minisster Dmitry
Kozak announced a specifical code of professional ethnic for journalists to
prevent such errors.
Such statements by senior officials
are inevitably chilling precisely because they lack clarity and specificity,
the editors of Nezavisimaya gazeta
say. They fail to distinguish between reporting specific facts and interpreting
them in a tendentious way; indeed, they act as if it is the facts themselves
that are the problem and that silence is preferable.
When interpreting facts, the editors
say, journalists can be mistaken or tendentious, but “in a competitive and free
meia sphere, theinfllunece of one subjective point of view is limited by the
presence of other subjective points of view.” If the authorities are worried
that one view has too much influence, they should suggest alternatives, not
close down the first.
“Nationalist discourse in Russian
society is influential if not dominating,” Nezavisimaya
gazeta continues. But it”in practice is in no way connected with what the
press writes. Rather, just the reverse. The media would cease to be viewed as a
reliable source of information and would lose their audience if they ignored
problems agitating society or use language and categories which society doesn’t
find acceptable.”
Banning any reference to the
nationality of suspects, for example, will exacerbate xenophobia not overcome
it. On the one hand, that will lead nationalists to rely more heavily on their
own websites almost entirely, sites that are typically far more tendentious
than any of the mainstream media.
And on the other, because
nationalists will, as they have already, view such bans as a reflection of the
power of minorities, the xenophobically inclined will see that action of the
state as confirmation of what they believe and become as aresult even more
radical in their attitudes online and in their actions.
Attempts to blame the media for
Kondopoga, Pugachev or Biryulevo will backfire. Not only will they not be
believed, but they will be seen as an effort “to conceal the real inability [of
the authorities] to change the situation.” Consequently, whatever the powers
that be think they will gain by such steps, the paper suggests, they will lose
far more.
Indeed, the Kremlin’s efforts to
control the media have already cost the regime a lot because, according to the
Levada Center, it is the coverage offered on state-controlled Russian
television that has shaped most of the current attitudes of Russians toward the
North Caucasus and North Caucasians.
According to the Center’s
director, Lev Gudkov, “the basic massof the population does not imagine what is
really taking place in the North Caucasus and is guided [instead] by the news
reports which are carried on television” (nazaccent.ru/content/9509-levada-centr-rossiyane-chasto-ne-vosprinimayut-vyhodcev.html
and kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/232217/).
On the basis of these programs, he
says, Russians conclude that the war there has gone into “a dead end” and that
it is now spilling over into the rest of the country. As a result, many want to
“stop feeding the Caucasus” and “do not view the North Caucasians as citizens”
of the same country.
Natalya Zorkaya, who heads the
social-political research department at the Levada Center, says that a more
thoughtful consideration of recent developments would show that there is not “a
direct connection” between violence like that in Birylevo and what is going on
in the North Caucasus. TV coverage implying otherwise exacerbates both
problems.
But the Russian government seems
less concerned about that than it does about lashing out at media reports that
accurately reflect the fact that inter-ethnic relations in the country are
getting worse and getting worse fast, at least in part because of what the
Russian government itself has been doing.
Natalya Yudina, a specialist at the
SOVA Analytic Center which monitors
xenophobia, said last week that xenophobia had been growing in Russia up to
2008 but then it had been reduced somewhat by the decision of the authorities
to arrest major nationalist leaders and use repression against extremist
nationalist groups (altapress.ru/story/118674).
“But in the last two years, the
authorities unfortunately have let up on thi police of force toward the
nationalists,” and that has allowed such extremist groups to re-energize,Yudina
added. She suggested that now that authorities are resuming the earlier
crackdown but against a broader spectrum of people, including “migrants, nationalists,
and ordinary citizens.”
And that shift, while she did not
say so, carries with it the risk of pushing the country into a vicious cycle in
which the nationalists will provoke the state and the state the nationalists, a
dangerous situation which will be in no way improved by efforts to prevent the
mainstream media from reporting about it.
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