Paul
Goble
Staunton, October 23 – The failures
of Russia today are connected with the fact that everyone in it – including the
authorities, the population, the church and those separate from the church – remain
in a cultural sense “Soviet people” with all “the complexes” that entails,
according to Academician Yury Pivovarov
Pivovarov, director of the Moscow
Institute for Scientific Information on the Social Sciences (INION), tells
“Pravoslaviye i mir” that he is not talking about the soviets as a form of
governance – they “never worked and did not define the essence of the Soviet
order.” Instead, he is referring to something “much deeper and more vital” (pravmir.ru/my-po-prezhnemu-zhivem-v-sovetskoj-rossii-video-1/).
Although
communism is leaving, the academician says, “the soviet remains,” something that
is “not politics, not economic and not even ideology.” It involved and involves
“the rejection of all fundamental values which humanity had developed,”
including religion, state and law, the family, and property.
The
Bolsheviks proclaimed this rejection and sought to impose it. They did not
completely succeed, Pivovarov argues, but they affected everyone who lived
under their power and continue to affect those who now live after the communist
party and the Soviet Union has collapsed.
Such
soviet values as the rejection of all fundamental ideas from the past in the
name of building something completely new ultimately reflected the Bolshevik
rejection of original sin, the idea which underlies Christian civilization. All
totalitarians reject that idea and put in its place something else.
In
the Soviet case, “the capitalists, the landowners, the priests, the white
guards, the western imperialists, the Zionists, the loafers, and the criminals
are guilty. Under Stalin, “even entire peoples were declared enemies.” But by doing so, the Bolsheviks had removed
from themselves “fundamental personal responsibility.” And that opened the door
to horrors.
“The
western imperialists or wreckers were always guilty but never [the individual]
himself,” Pivovarov writes. “This was
the foundation of force and terror” and meant that the idea that “he who is not
against us is with us” was replaced by the false notion that “he who is not
with us is against us.”
“A
new type of man was thus created, homo soveticus. The individual could be
Russian, Uzbek, Ukrainian, Jewish or whatever but in essence this was a Soviet
man … who did not know his roots and history” or did so only selectively and in
a distorted manner and who “had lost his link with the religious world even if
he went to church in Soviet times.”
Pivovarov
notes that he observed such people in East Germany. The GDRers, for example,
were “barbarians, people without a Christian attitude to the world and without
cultural-spiritual traditions” and were thus “cut off from worldwide
developments in culture, science and education.
Soviet
people thus have “a utopian consciousness, an unspiritual attitude toward time”
and are victims of “an absolute futurism.” That in turn leads “to a nihilistic
attitude not only to the past but what is still more horrible to their own
present” because it eliminates any sense of responsibility for what is going
on.
Joseph
Brodsky once said that “an anthropological catastrophe took place in Russia in
the 20th century,” not just in terms of the destruction of millions
of lives but also and at the same time “the lowering of the quality” of human
beings. Others, like Father Aleksandr Shmeman agreed noting that Soviet
diplomats were not Russians “but a new” kind of man altogether.
Tragically,
that is the truth, Pivovarov says, even if it is one that “Russian Soviet
people” to this day do not like to hear.
As he acknowledges, he himself “unfortunately is a Soviet man and a
product of the system.” And “cowardice, an inability to keep his word,
hypocrisy, the search for the guilty” in others rather than himself” all are
part of this.
Of course, the academician continues, “the Soviet
man is not the final sense on the ethnic or civic Russian but rather a task
with which he must deal.” That is
possible finally because “’the soviet’ is only one of the dimensions of the
social and human” that has been preserved from the past into the present but
“must be overcome.”
Even in someone like Solzhenitsyn,
Pivovarov says, there are “elements of the Soviet” because the great writer
defined himself as “the anti-Lenin.”
That approach defines itself by its relationship to the Soviet. What is needed, however, is “not the
anti-Soviet but the non-Soviet, the [ethnic] Russian, the Orthodox, the [civic]
Russian, the all-European, and the Eurasian.”
This is possible because the
Russians retained some of the past even in the worst Soviet times, being
willing to declare themselves religious in the worst years of Stalin’s terror
and saving the country during World War II. Such things show that sovietism was
not able to entirely consume either the society or Russia itself.
But despite this, the academician
concludes, “the soviet exists [to this day] in various ways.” For example, in
relations between those who have power and those who don’t and among people who
might otherwise cooperate; and in the fact that a few are getting fat while the
great majority are suffering.
“All this,” Pivovarov says,
“undoubtedly is a manifestation of the Soviet complex of a lack of feeling for
the misfortunes of others and a lack of understanding of one’s own
sinfulness. All this must be overcome.
The Soviet must be overcome in order for Russia to recover.”
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