Paul
Goble
Staunton, January 1 –President
Vladimir Putin’s “conservatism” is a combination of the ideas of the Russian
radical right of the early 20th century and Stalin’s notions of “traditional
values” which the dictator used to cover repression and fool the west, according
to a Moscow commentator.
In short, Pavel Protsenko argues in “Yezhednevny
zhurnal” this week, it is “a parody” of the real thing and conceals a political
agenda which will destroy any possibility for the future development of Russia
as what it once was, part of rather than opposed to European civilization (ej.ru/?a=note&id=24116).
Few political terms have been abused
as much in recent years as conservatism, and so it is perhaps not surprising
that many people have been prepared to accept Putin’s recent efforts to define
himself as a follower and promoter of that set of ideas, but Protsenko suggests
that to do so is to fundamentally misunderstand what the Kremlin leader is
about.
In two recent addresses, one to the
country’s literary establishment and another to the Federal Assembly, the
commentator says, Putin invoked conservatism not only in his capacity as the
most important leader in Russia but as “an expression of the official ideology”
he wishes to define and make use of.
Putin’s understanding of
conservatism, Protsenko says, can be summarized in the following way: “Russia
is the guardian of traditional values. More than that, it is the defender of
these values from ‘the so-called tolerance, sexless and fruitless,’ which has
triumphed in the Western world.”
“Liberal tolerance there,” Putin
suggests, “has passed all limits and been transformed into a dictatorship which
has destroyed morality, equated good and evil, and thus become a threat for the
existence of humanity. Moscow, having
become the defender of ‘the moral foundations of civilization,’ has become an
outpost of the struggle for ‘genuine human live,’ including for religious life
and the values of humanism.”
Putin’s statements and his claim
that “the policy of the Russian government” is one that reflects this “’conservative
position’” has attracted support around the world. “But,” Protsenko points out, as Nikolay
Berdyayev pointed out, “’the meaning of conservatism is not that it blocks
movement forward and upward but that it prevents movement backward and down.”
Before accepting Putin’s assertion
at face value, the Moscow writer says, it is worth enquiring just what his “conservatism”
consist of. It is clearly not the
conservatism of tsarist Russia which was “close to the conservatives of Europe
and the so-called civilized world.” Indeed, until the Bolshevik revolution in
1917, “Russia was an organic part, albeit on the borders of the Euro-Atlantic
world.”
After seizing power, Protsenko
continues, “the communists immediately began a war against national traditions
and against the foundations of civilization.”
Not surprisingly, this approach led “very quickly to the moral
degradation of society” and even forced the Soviet regime to pull back.
“In the intervals between the waves
of terror, under conditions of a growing demographic catastrophe called forth
by mass repressions, Stalin prohibited” much that the Bolsheviks had allowed
earlier, such as abortions. But Protsenko points out, “this return to ‘traditional
values’ was not a rehabilitation of the values of Christian culture.”
Instead, Stalin
exploited the imagery of “the former empire and the former culture” to stupefy
people and cover his repression. The Soviet dictator, with some success, “used
the dead forms of Christian ethical norms for the radicalization of
totalitarian repression of the personality” inside the USSR and “with the goal
of blinding Western society.”
But one penetrating observer at that
time, Bishop Varnava, who was in a Soviet concentration camp, noted that what Stalin
was doing was “a Soviet playing with traditional values” and nothing more than
a deception,” a kind of “Trojan horse dragged into the camp of [the communist
regime’s] ideological opponent.”
Conservatism in both the Eastern and
Western Christian traditions while drawn to conservatism is “at one and the same
time the basis for creativity,” according to Protsenko who draws on the
writings of Berdyayev, who noted that those who call themselves conservatives
but seek to block this creativity are “a parody on genuine conservatism” and
will be responsible for “future revolutions.”
Even though he cited Berdyayev,
Protsenko points out, Putin, “by linking the struggle for tradition with the army
and fleet involuntarily, according to Berdyayev, reveals the anti-Christian
roots” of its ideas.
But that is not the worst part of
Putin’s misuse of conservatism. Despite
his use of that term, Putin made use of “the terminology of the radical right
publicists of the beginning of the 20th century” who were anything
but conservative and talked about combatting what they and he called “the
amoral international” by “mobilizing the masses” against unnamed enemies.
Not only did he take a leaf from
those who helped inspire the Black Hundreds, Protsenko argues, but the current
Kremlin leader “followed Stalin in exploiting the traditional values of Russian
society for its enslavement and for the deception of the world outside” as a
means to dividing and weakening it.
“Stalinism will not return,” however
much some “current bureaucrats who came from the KGB” would like to see that
happen, the Moscow commentator says. But
Putin’s false “conservatism” is nonetheless “extremely dangerous and does not allow
contemporary Russian society to have a worthy future.”
Russia does need “a return to the
great experience of Euro-Atlantic civilization, part of which it is,” Protsenko
says. But that return is highly problematic when the “goal of the ruling
nomenklatura has become the destruction in the country of the atmosphere of
freedom which for European culture is the chief virtue and motor of
development.”
Putin’s “conservatism” instead of promoting
a return to European values simply is a pastiche of worn-out Soviet ideological
clichés which are “cut off from the main paths of the development of humanity.”
But “the errors and sins of the West” to which Putin refers “cannot be the
basis for a return” to the Soviet past.
In his speeches, Putin says that
Russia and other countries must “return” to traditional values and then “move
forward.” But “forward to what?”
Protsenko asks. “The dreams of the veterans of the security agencies? From Lenin
Street to Stalin Square past the monument of Dzerzhinsky under church banner
holders with icons singing Mikhalkov’s hymn?”
Such a path, the Moscow commentator
concludes, one “where by definition there are no values at all,” conservative or
otherwise.
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