Paul
Goble
Staunton, January 16 –President
Vladimir Putin’s problems in the North Caucasus are typically examined on a
republic-by-republic basis, but according to two experts, the Russian leader in
fact faces six crises, none of which can be solved by force and many of which
will be made worse if he continues to apply even more force.
This week, Irina Starodubrovskaya
and Konstantin Kazenin of the Gaidar Institute of Economic Policy presented a
report in Mosco entitled “The North Caucasus: Quo Vadis?” in which they laid
out these crises, discussed the myths that surround them, and suggested what
approaches might work and which ones certainly won’t (kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/236666/).
Their report described the six
different crises Moscow faces in the region: the crisis of modernization from
above, the land crisis, the crisis of politics and elites, the crisis of
counter-terorrism, the crisis of policy on religion, and the crisis of the
image of the North Caucasus beyond its borders.
According to Starodubrovskaya, most
Russian policy makers mistakenly think that the North Caucasus is a place with “a
stagnating, depressed, and archaic society.” Not only is that untrue, she continued,
but it leads to bad actions when policies are defined and to worse approaches when
no policy is.
She argued that public policies
about the Caucasus are exacerbating the conflict in the region, but still
worse, “in a very large number of sectors” such as land relations and
counter-terrorism “we do not see a clearly defined strategic line.” And that opens the way to still more
contradictory and ineffective actions.
In his remarks, Kazenin addressed
the harm Moscow’s “mythology” about the North Caucasus has inflicted. One common
myths Russians hold is that “the North Caucasus elites are made up of clans.” “Ethnic
and family solidarity do play a role in the structure of elites, but the situation
in the Caucasus is not radically different from other regions in that regard.
Patron-client relations matter there
just as they do elsewhere; assuming they are different leads Moscow to act in
ways that undermine the situation in the region and its own interests as well,
Kazenin said.
Another myth in Moscow about the
North Caucasus which gets in the way of good policy is the idea that “the
current elite [in the region] is the only guarantee of a pro-Russian orientation
of the regions.” That flows from an
assumption that the population is overwhelmingly interested in separatism. Perhaps
it was in the 1990s, Kazenin says, but it isn’t now.
Acting on the contrary assumption as
Moscow is doing now could prove a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The two scholars suggested that
there are three general approaches to the North Caucasus. One is to carry on as
now, a second is to use more force, and a third is to seek the integration of
society into the political system. The first
two have proven to be failures; only the third, however, difficult, holds out
any real hope for progress.
The last involves a complex of
policies including state support for economic modernization “from below,” an
end to the moratorium on land transfers, elections for all key offices, the
re-integration of militants into society, improved access to education for
North Caucasus young people, and the subordination of the force structures to
civilian control.
All those policies would represent a
clear departure from Putin’s approach. Moreover, Starodubrovskaya and Kazenin
warn, the introduction of such policies would initially make the situation
worse and more unstable. But “one must
go through thiss crisis and only then will there appear light at the end of the
tunnel.”
The report sparked a lively
discussion. Yekaterina Sokiryanskaya of the
International Crisis Group praised the authors for their frank discussion of the
problems. All too often, she said, such discussions are to be found only among
human rights activists. This report pushes these issues “into Russia’s expert
mainstream.”
She added that the report was
especially valuable because it demonstrated that Moscow’s “neo-colonial” rule
in the North Caucasus, one apparently chosen to minimize costs, “has led to a
low level of state administration” in the region and made many of the current
problems there worse than they would otherwise be.
But Sokiryanskaya disagreed with the
report’s suggestion that “ethnicity had ceased to be an important factor in the
North Caucasus.” Many conflicts there, however they are described and over what
they are nominally about, in fact either have ethnic roots or take on ethnic coloration.
Ignoring that is dangerous
Suleyan Udaliyev, the co-chairman of
the public organization, “Daghestan—a Territory of Peace and Accord,” agreed
with her “Until the problem of the clan
organization of the authorities and society is resolved in Daghestan, it will
be impossible to solve the problems which are correctly identified in the
report.”
The last speaker, Natalya
Zubarevich, director of regional programs at Moscow’s Independent Institute for
Social Policy, praised the authors for their work and especially for pointing
out that addressing the problems of the North Caucasus is something that will
decades if not generations.
Even if Moscow does choose the right
policies, she said, at first, the situation in the North Caucasus will
deteriorate. That will make it hard for
policy makers to choose correctly and even more difficult for them to stay the
course, given that the Kremlin and the Russian people both want quick solutions.
Those aren’t on offer: anyone who thinks so is only fooling himself.
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