Paul
Goble
Staunton, April 11 – Despite Moscow’s
protestations that it wants a resolution in Ukraine, Yevgeny Kiselyev says, Vladimir
Putin in fact doesn’t need or want “stabilization” there anytime soon and that
is in fact pursuing a policy based on the Leninist principle that “the worse
things are [in Ukraine], the better [for the Kremlin]” (ej.ru/?a=note&id=24883).
The Moscow commentator’s observation
on this point is important because many, especially in the West, assume that because
an unstable Ukraine on Russia’s doorstep would ultimately create problems for Russia
itself and that because Moscow says it wants a resolution, the Kremlin would in
fact like the instability in Ukraine to end quickly albeit on its own terms.
But there are at least three
compelling reasons to think that is not the case, as Kiselyev’s essay
effectively calls attention to. First of all, as is becoming clearer with each
passing day, the share of ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine who actuallywant
to join the Russian Federation is much smaller than Moscow claims
Not only do many of the ethnic
Russians in that region fully identify as Ukrainian citizens and believe that
they benefit from being in Ukraine rather than in Russia, Moscow’s own actions
in Crimea since the occupation have cost Russia support among ethnic Russians
elsewhere. By promoting unrest, Moscow
buys itself time to change that.
Second, continuing instability in
Ukraine keeps Kyiv off balance and casts doubt on Ukraine’s ability to hold its
May 25 election on time. If the unrest
continues, the Ukrainian authorities might be forced to postpone it because they
could not guarantee its operation in portions of the country.
That would undercut the authority of
the government in Kyiv and thus open the way for Moscow to expand its
beachheads in eastern Ukraine, possibly to the point of sparking more violence
not only there but elsewhere in that country, a development that could
contribute to the idea already promoted by the Kremlin that Ukraine is not an
effective state.
And third – and for Putin, this may
be the most important reason for continuing to promote unrest even as Western
governments try to negotiate with Moscow on a settlement – if the violence
continues, ever more voices will be raised in Western countries that Ukraine is
somehow a hopeless case that the West should not get involved in trying to
help.
The spread of such views gives Putin
two critical advantages. On the one hand, if the West does not help Ukraine in
a massive way, it will be even harder for Kyiv to address the situation and
even easier for Putin to promote instability and ultimately a broader Russian
Anschluss of Ukrainian territory.
And on the other, it will mean that
Putin will become increasingly confident that he can use the methods he has applied
in Ukraine elsewhere in what many Russians still call “the near abroad,” thus
extending his aggression and making it more likely that he will at some point
cross a red line that the West will actually feel compelled to enforce.
That is why no one in the West
should be trapped by Russia’s diplomatic strategy of saying one thing while the
Russian authorities are doing something else. Crimea and Ukraine have never
been just about Crimea and Ukraine. They are part of Putin’s general offensive
against the international rules of the game.
Opposing his moves now, rather than
being taken in by his diplomacy, can be done in large measure by using the “soft”
power influences of basic principles in which the West enjoys a comparative
advantage even in the interior of Eurasia.
Opposing later moves, if this one is not blocked, will require the use
of “hard” power.
Not only will that be more costly
and difficult, but – and this needs to be understood as well – on the territory
of what was the former Soviet Union, the West does not have a similar advantage
in “hard” power assets and thus will, if Putin gets away with the promotion of
continuing instability, be far harder and more difficult than stopping him now.
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