Paul Goble
Staunton,
March 24 – Fifty percent of the most entrepreneurial and successful young
Russians were thinking about emigration in the years running up to the Crimean
Anschluss because they did not see any future for themselves in Vladimir
Putin’s Russia or any chance that they would be able to change the country’s
course, according to Lev Gudkov.
That
represents a major change from the pre-2008 situation when those most wanting
to leave were both fewer in number and less successful, but it has been at
least in part reversed by the patriotic wave that swept the country following
the annexation of Crimea, the Levada Center head tells “Nezavisimaya gazeta” (ng.ru/ng_politics/2015-03-24/9_migration.html).
If as the
euphoria about Crimea wears off and that decline is again reversed – something that
appears to be happening -- it will mean that Russia risks losing “its most
successful and creative citizens” and the Russian opposition is losing many in
the “middle class” cadres it has been counting on to mount a challenge to the
increasingly harsh Putin regime.
Indeed,
while the sociologist did not speculate on this point, it may even be possible
that the looming loss of these highly skilled people was one of the reasons
that led Putin to act as he did in Ukraine.
Only a
relatively small share of the population, of course, has ever been really
interested in emigration, the Levada Center head points out. After 1991, the
first wave included mostly ethnic minorities; and the second, those who had
lost their jobs as a result of reforms. Together, these amounted to some 3.5
million people.
But the
crisis of 2008 and its economic and political fallout have changed the
situation, the sociologist says, and now it is the members of what may be
called “the middle class” who are ready to leave, precisely “the most
successful, entrepreneurial, and well-placed groups who have achieved success
here in Russia.”
“The growth
of such attitudes became especially marked as spring 2011 approached,” he
continues, “when it became clear that Putin was returning and that the
political system would become ever harsher, that no innovative reforms could be
expected, and all the reforms announced by Medvedev about a legal state and
innovations were empty promises and hot air.”
Even for the
population as a whole, the percentage of Russians saying they were thinking
seriously about emigration rose from 11 percent in the early 2000s to 22 to 23
percent at that time, but among the educated and successful under-35-year-olds,
that measure rose to nearly half, an unprecedented and dangerous trend, the
Levada Center head says.
Gudkov
insists that these people were not interested in emigrating primarily as a form
of protest but rather felt that way because they considered their
“civilizational” understandings in compatible “with the norms of the current
regime.” They “did not see themselves in Russia or believe in their own future
in it.”
Crimea
changed everything almost overnight, Gudkov says. “The approval of the
annexation of Crimea and the approval of Vladimir Putin and his activity in
connection with it eliminated a very large part of the complaints people had
about the authorities.” They still viewed it as corrupt and self-interested,
but most Russians felt it had acted “’correctly.’”
That had
an impact on how people thought about emigration. During the entire spring and
first half of last summer, interest in it fell. But as a result of impact of sanctions
and even more of counter-sanctions, which the educated young in the cities felt
even more than others, the successful young again began thinking about leaving.
Gudkov
also addresses other aspects of emigration and immigration. He notes that the
top elite is too small to measure such shifts although its members “understand
that their position, status and property are not guaranteed here” and that “at
any moment,” they could lose everything. Consequently, many of them send money
or children abroad. People at the very top of the scholarly community maintain
homes in both Russia and the West.
The
sociologist says that economic problems in Europe have also limited emigration
as there are fewer opportunities there. At the same time, he says, there is a “certain
outflow of young people connected with protests and the opposition” who are
threatened by the security services.
Most of
the people in that category are going to nearby countries, including the Baltic
states, Ukraine and even Georgia, and they now “have begun to form something
like diasporas of new political emigres from Russia.” There are similar groups
even in the Czech Republic and “in part” in Germany.
Russians
leaving their country for whatever reason are moving in new directions.
Earlier, they went to Israel, Europe, Canada and the US. Now, Gudkov says, “to
an ever greater degree, people are leaving for Asia, including China, South
Korea and Australia.”
As far
as Russians returning to Russia, that resource is “close to exhaustion.” Those
who wanted to come have, those remaining abroad are low skilled, and the
Russian government program for resettlement is largely a bureaucratic failure.
Russia
today, the sociologist says, “is becoming attractive only for those workers
with low qualifications. And in a civilizational, cultural and professional
sense, this is ever greater testimony of the demands for such workers and of
the degradation of Russia itself as a center of attraction, despite all the
talk about it as ‘a special civilization.’”
Gudkov
concludes by saying that while “everything is possible with [Russia’s] government,”
re-erecting the iron curtain and keeping people from departing doesn’t seem
likely. If it did happen, he says, it would not end the desire of many to leave
and it would be time to include it in the list of countries without a future.
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