Paul
Goble
Staunton, December 8 – The truck
drivers’ strike and the seriousness with which the Kremlin has reacted to it
show that “the Putin majority, the Putin consensus and Putin stability are all
beginning to break down, Valery Solovey says; but that does not mean that more
mass protests are likely to occur in the immediate future.
The MGIMO professor says that “really
serious mass protests will begin significantly later, somewhere in a year to
eighteen months. For the time being, the system has a sufficiently great
reserve of strength and in society there is still too great a fear of social
cataclysms” to expect otherwise (obzor.press/intervyu/12719).
Some Russian defense officials are
indeed talking about taking measures to defend government buildings in Moscow,
but this is because “fear has big eyes and certain paranoid aspects in the
behavior of the Russian authorities have been obvious for a long time: the
authorities are afraid, but they still do not understand specifically what they
are afraid of.”
With regard to the Russian-Turkish
crisis, Solovey says that Putin took the downing of the Russian plane as a
personal affront and has responded accordingly. Some close to him have tried to
“restrain” him because they think that “Putin overrates Russia’s possibilities
which are not so great and that the geopolitical ambitions of the country
clearly don’t correspond to its economic position.”
“These people see,” Solovey
continues, “that things are not very good, that Russia should reduce its
ambitions and that Putin should recognize the need to do so. But one must understand that the powers that
be in Russia are organized in such a way that all key political decisions are
taken exclusively by the president.”
The elite’s ability to influence him
is limited, and it cannot force him to take positions significantly at odds
with what the Kremlin leader wants to do.
Some people speak about a split in
the Russian elite, but “there is no such split in the country, and it will not
appear in the foreseeable future. There is an obvious fear among the elite and
growing concerns on its about its future,” given “the unpredictability and
irrationality” of Putin’s actions.
At the same time, Solovey argues, “the
elite feels itself to be the president’s hostage, a typical example of ‘the
Stockholm syndrome.’” As a result, “hopes that it will come out against him are
at the very least naïve.”
Any split in the elites, he
suggests, “will come only when mass demonstrations of society begin and when
pressure comes from outside. Without this fundamental condition,” Solovey
stresses, “no split in Russian elites will occur.”
No comments:
Post a Comment