Paul Goble
Staunton, April 23 – In the last few
weeks, a large number of commentators have suggested that the Putin regime will
be challenged or even overthrown. Many may simply be engaging in wishful
thinking; but they highlight an important development: ever more Russians now
recognize that the Putin regime is not eternal and could end sooner than anyone
imagines.
That does not mean they are right:
Vladimir Putin even more than his Chinese comrades is quite prepared to engage
in what used to be called “big blood” to maintain himself in power; and he is
even more prepared to engage in risky foreign policy actions to shore up his
increasingly shaky position with the Russian population.
Indeed, those two possibilities may
be the most important reason for paying attention to those who argue that his
regime is coming to an end because the way that happens and its immediate
aftermath may be extremely dangerous not only for Russia and Russians but for
the international community.
Perhaps the most sophisticated and
convincing of commentaries predicting the imminent demise of Putin and his
regime is offered by Nikolay Petrov, currently a visiting senior fellow at the
European Council on Foreign Relations, in a new paper entitled simply “Putin’s
Downfall” (ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR_166_PUTINS_DOWNFALL.pdf).
Petrov offers five key judgments:
·
“Russia’s
political regime is unsustainable. It has no capacity to reform, and faces
growing economic woes, crumbling infrastructure, and warring elites.”
·
“After
widespread protests and ebbing of support, the government began in 2014 to base
its legitimacy on winning wars. Putin centralised all power in the presidency,
suppressing dissent and weakening institutions in the process.”
·
“Now,
the regime needs to keep delivering military victories or face a loss of
support. Excessive centralisation makes the system unstable and inefficient,
focused on survival rather than strategy. As sanctions bite and funds run
short, the elites are growing impatient, and the chance of conflict is rising
in regions such as the Caucasus.”
·
“There
are two ways out for the Russian regime: improve its finances by reconciling
with the West, or regain legitimacy by replacing the president. Even these will
only buy it time, and may not prevent a total collapse.”
·
“There
is no clear heir to Putin, and collapse could be followed by the redistribution
of power to various government bodies, companies, and regions, including
Chechnya.”
“Russia’s current regime will not last
long,” Petrov writes, because of Putin’s actions in Ukraine. Prior to his
Anschluss of Crimea, Putin derived his legitimacy from the ballot box but now
he does so only from military actions. Putin is today “more like a tsar than
the chair of a board” and his regime “has moved from a hybrid system” to one
exclusively dependent on him.
For Putin to remain in power, he must win
ever greater and more frequent military victories, Petrov continues, but “this
position is unsustainable given shrinking financial resources, the waning
patience of elites who don’t want to live in a military camp forever, and
Russia’s fast-deteriorating administrative and political systems.”
According to the Russian analyst, there
are three scenarios: Russia may undergo regime change with both Putin and his
regime disappearing. Putin may survive by changing his regime and reconciling
with the West or benefitting from a rise in oil prices. Or Putin may be pushed
out and replaced by someone who tries to manage that kind of change.
Petrov argues that “the regime has less
than a year: the existential threat it faces is made up of several dynamics,
each of which, taken alone, is likely to destroy the regime in less than two
years.” But taken together, they are likely to constitute an even more
immediate threat to its and his survival.
According to the analyst, there are three “dynamics”
in this regard: the over-concentration of power in Putin’s hands, an
ever-shortening time horizon in decision making, and the costs of military
mobilization, all of which make the taking of necessary decisions more
difficult and more dangerous.
After considering the various
possibilities, Petrov focuses on the last and perhaps most frightening: the
collapse of the Russian state as such. “What
would this collapse look like?” he asks. “The decay of the state may be
invisible on the surface, but it weakens the state’s immune system: the onset
of even a minor ‘infection’ – for instance, the December 2015 protests by truck
drivers against a new road tax – could have deadly consequences for the regime.”
“Whatever new regime emerges in the
immediate aftermath of a collapse is unlikely to be an improvement, given the
lack of strong institutions and the poor conditions of both the elites and Russian
society as a whole.” Consequently, Petrov says, “a year from now, the country
will look different in many ways,” something that poses “many questions.”
But he concludes by noting that “as the old
saying goes, Russia is a country where everything can change in five years, and
nothing in 100.”
No comments:
Post a Comment