Paul
Goble
Staunton, April 20 – New polls
showing more than half of Russians regret the demise of the USSR (vestikavkaza.ru/news/Bolee-poloviny-rossiyan-sozhaleyut-o-raspade-SSSR-opros.html) and that 40
percent of Russians do not believe the state is meeting its obligations to them
(kasparov.ru/material.php?id=57172AB41357E) have attracted a
great deal of attention.
But a third survey conducted by
Irina Vorobyova of the Russian State Humanities University may be the most
important because it focuses on the paradoxes and internal inconsistences of
the approach of Russians to politics, political self-identification, and
expectations.
Her study, “Contradictions and
Paradoxes of Political Orientations in the Structure of the World of Russians,”
Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya, no.
1 (2016), is available online at socis.isras.ru/files/File/2016/2016_1/17_26_Vorobieva.pdf and has just presented in detail on the
Tolkovatel portal at http://ttolk.ru/?p=26642.
According to the sociologist, “only
20 percent of Russians take an active interest in politics,” but much larger
shares identify as patriots, nationalists or liberalist. The usual explanation
for this divide, she says, is that Russians “delegate” politics to the government;
but she reports that only 20 percent believe the authorities are honest.
Russians’ interest in politics has
been falling for a generation, Vorobyov reports. In 1987, 54.4 percent of
Russians said they were actively interested in political life. But by 2013,
that figure had fallen to 27.1 and now it is even lower. And over the same period, the share of those
with no interest in politics has risen almost 1200 percent.
The sociologist points to another
paradox in Russian views as expressed to survey researchers. On the one hand,
Russian value the democratic rights and freedoms they have acquired; but on the
other, “they are quite skeptical about the institutions called to transform
democracy into life” and believe that they need a strong state with a tough
leader.
Another paradox Vorobyov points to
is that “the political identification of Russians” with this or that trend “does
not always directly correspond to their electoral choices.” She argues that this reflects an increasing
desire of Russians to support a center as in the central power and the center
of the spectrum.
Yet another paradox among Russians
about politics is that “the high level of support for the powers that be” is
combined with an equally high level of alienation from the state, “a lack of
trust in the majority of government institutions,” and the conviction of the
majority that the state does not serve their interests.
Vorobyov concludes that this leads
to a situation in which “the population supports the authorities” not because the latter meet their needs but
because the population is afraid of changes and the possibility that however
bad things are, they could as a result of any change get worse.
The sociologist concludes that “in
Russian society there exists massive support for the authorities alongside a
low level of trust in specific government institutions and a sense that the
authorities do not support ordinary people” and that “the desire to have
democratic rights and freedoms exists in parallel with support for a strong
state, a firm hand, and paternalism.”
It is likely that these paradoxes,
which reflect a specific national set of experiences, explain many of the other
poll results often citied, including those which appear to represent radical
breaks with earlier positions but in fact simply mirror the divisions and
contradictions within Russian minds.
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