Paul
Goble
Staunton, July 31 – Vladimir Putin’s
appointment of an admiral in place of a general as his plenipotentiary
representative in the North Caucasus may make things in that region still worse
but reflects Moscow’s concerns less about the situation there than the one in the
three countries to the South, according
to Maksim Shevchenko.
Shevchenko, an expert on the
Caucasus who is a member of the Presidential Commission on Human Rights, says
that what the Kremlin has done reflects its awareness that the situation in the
southern Caucasus is deteriorating and that Moscow must strength “the immediate
rear of the army” (flnka.ru/osoboe_mneniye/14117-rossiya-ukreplyaet-severnyy-kavkaz-v-kachestve-blizhayshego-tyla-armii-ponimaya-chto-v-zakavkaze-gryadut-sereznye-sobytiya.html).
Putin’s decision to install Vice
Admiral Oleg Belaventsev in place of MVD Lt. Gen. Sergey Melikov as his man in the
North Caucasus is “symbolic” of Putin’s latest cadre decisions, which reflect
that it is traditionally easier for the Kremlin to establish relations with
military personnel rather than non-military officials, including those of the police.
Given Belaventsev’s success in
organizing the seizure of Ukraine’s Crimea, Shevchenko continues, it is clear
that he will be able to strengthen command and control in Russian forces in the
North Caucasus to deal with any challenges in the south. What is less clear from his past career is
whether he can make a positive difference in the North Caucasus itself.
In Crimea, he has shown himself “unable
to deal with local elites” or manage to jointly rule the peninsula with the civilian
authorities. Instead, his conflicts with them over the treatment of the Crimean
Tatars have become legendary as a mark of Moscow’s failure to integrate the
population there.
Of course, it is true, Shevchenko
says, that “the positions of presidential plenipotentiaries are quite weak.”
They do not have any real power, “not in terms of force structures, finances or
cadres. Instead, they are PR managers who present this or that region to the
rest of the country” as they assume Moscow wants it presented.
Under Melikhov, the required image
was of the North Caucasus as a tourist destination, one that was incompletely
achieved by the plenipotentiary and his staff seeking to “block any information
they deemed negative about what has really been going on in the Caucasus,”
including about ethnic conflicts, human rights violations, attacks on
journalists, and so on.
Journalists and editors were told to
write “only about the beauties of nature, the interesting traditions and
customs.” That not only obscured what in fact is occurring but ensured that
Moscow, by becoming a prisoner of its own propaganda, would not be aware of
just how bad things are, Shevchenko continues.
If this struggle with independent
journalists, experts and rights activists continues, he says, the situation
will only worsen as the gap between what is true on the ground and what is said
in the media and in government reports continues to grow. That is sustainable
for only so long.
Everyone knows how successful “the
special operation in the Crimea” was, Shevchenko says, but “here in the North
Caucasus are entirely different realities.” Unless the new plenipotentiary is
prepared to look them in the face and work with journalists and experts, he
will not know what is going on or what to do.
Worse perhaps, he will not know what
to tell Moscow which is now being misled by security people who want more money
for counterterrorism, by local oligarchs with their own agendas, and by his own
representative who is telling him that everything is wonderful and that
tourists should come to the unstable region.
Shevchenko is a frequent critic of
Moscow’s policies in the North Caucasus, but other experts see the situation
and the impact of Putin’s latest appointment in almost exactly the same
way. For examples, see kavpolit.com/articles/admiral_vmesto_generala-27286/ and kavpolit.com/articles/zamena_polpreda_silovika_polpredom_silovikom_svide-27266/.
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