Paul
Goble
Staunton, May 4 – In yet another
manifestation of what Guillermo O’Donnell described as “the powerlessness of
the all-powerful,” Lilya Shevtsova argues, Vladimir Putin and his entourage are
making a repetition of the events of 1991 ever more likely precisely because of
their fears that something like that could occur.
Indeed, she says, the increasing “dysfunctionality”
of the Putin regime is clearly evident not only to an increasing number of
Russians as can be seen in their reactions to the Moscow “’renovation’” plans
and the long-haul truckers’ protests against the Plato fee system but also to
many within the regime itself (svoboda.org/a/28459893.html).
In ever more areas, Shevtsova
argues, the Putin regime has undermined itself even as it has attempted to
defend itself against any change. She
provides a list of 14 such self-defeating measure that the Kremlin has taken:
·
“The
absence of legal channels of self-expression … is making street protests the
single means of articulating the interests of society.”
·
“The
transformation of elections into an imitation makes social protest the only
means of renewal of the powers that be.”
·
“De-institutionalization,
that is the transformation of all political institutes into petty simulacras,
destroys the system of administration and responsibility.”
·
“The
mantra about ‘the absence of any alternative’ to Vladimir Putin … does not
allow for the replacement of the regime” in any but irregular ways.
·
“The
transformation of individual representatives of the ruling elite … into petty
personages discredits not only individual branches of power … but testifies to
the weakness of the leadership” more generally.
·
“The
inter-mixing of repressive structures and property undermines the effectiveness
of the siloviki bloc as a defender both of the state and of the interests of the
establishment.”
·
The
replacement of governors and siloviki leaders in the name of increasing their loyalty
to the Kremlin only “makes this loyalty fake.”
·
“The
formation of ‘the Ramzan Kadyrov resource’ and allowing him to play by his own
rules transforms the Chechen leader into an anti-systemic phenomenon.”
·
The
use of elections to ensure continuity of rule only undermines the sense that
elections have legitimated those in power.
·
The
failure of reform efforts “confirm not only the absence of a potential for the
renewal of the system” but also shows that “technocrats in Russia have become
the main force supporting” the rotting regime.
·
“The
monopoly privatization of state instruments and the budget into the hands of ‘friends’
of the president split the unity of the establishment” and makes many of its
members ever less willing to sacrifice anything for Putin.
·
“The
president, having become the guarantor of the interests of ‘a close circle’ is
losing his role as an expression of all-national interests.”
·
By
its aggressive actions abroad, the Kremlin has “given birth to a generation of
those who don’t accept that and who can legitimize themselves only via the revolutionary
slogan of ‘Enough!’”
·
The
Kremlin’s effort to use foreign policy actions to compensate for domestic policy
failures means that Russia is now surrounded by hostility and that “an
anti-Russian consensus” has been formed abroad.
Because of all this, Shevtsova says, Putin is losing his
ability to play the arbiter among groups and instead has become only the expression
of one against the others and that he “has become the hostage of his own ‘vertical’”
rather than its directing force.
Indeed, “the ‘vertical’ itself as a means
of rule” has lost its value because it is beginning to devour itself. Putin thought he could get away with this
because society would sit still for it because “Crimea is ours” but now he is
finding that society still has “the drive” to advance its interests.
How long until the next 1991 remains an
open question, but that Putin is promoting exactly that outcome for his regime
is no longer one.
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