Paul
Goble
Staunton, September 1 – Most commentaries
on Belarus and Ukraine suggest that the relatively large Russian-speaking
populations in these two countries are a threat to their survival because they
make it easier for Moscow to manipulate the domestic situation of the two and
that the growth of Belarusian and Ukrainian speakers thus benefits these
countries and harms Russia.
While those may be reasonable
conclusions for Belarusians and Ukrainians under certain circumstances, they
ignore the way Russian-speaking Belarusian and Ukrainian patriots, people who
identify with Belarus and Ukraine, represent a serious threat to Moscow and to Vladimir
Putin’s largely linguistically defined “Russian world.”
Indeed, the existence of Russian-speaking
countries besides Russia represents a threat to the maintenance of the territorial
integrity of the Russian Federation itself because they serve notice that just
as there are many English-speaking countries in the world, there could be many
Russian speaking ones as well, including Siberians, Far Easterners and so on.
The case of Belarus is especially
instructive on these points. A new analysis on the Deutsche Welle portal notes
that “although the majority of Belarusians speak Russian, they not only do not
associate themselves with Russia but call themselves citizens of their own
country” (dw.com/ru/особенности-белорусской-национальной-идентичности/a-37674267).
Indeed, Belarusian scholars say that it is
quite possible to be a Belarusian without knowing a word of Belarusian and that
such an approach reflects a phenomenon more widely recognized among the Irish
who speak English or Austrians who speak German but are nonetheless committed
Irish or Austrian patriots, writer Valentina Akudovich says.
Andrey Vardomatsky, a Belarusian
sociologist, comes to the same point with the rhetorical question: “Do you know
the Brazilian language or the Venezuelan one?”
Language is “a strong but far from the only indicator of national
identity.” Other factors can sometimes play a much larger role.
“An individual can live wherever he wants,
speak whatever language he wants, and grow up in whatever cultural tradition,
but at the same time consider himself subjectively a representative of a
different nation,” the sociologist continues, who argues that language is only
one of the five traditional criteria of such identities.
(The others are a shared history, a shared
culture, a shared territory, and common socio-psychological dispositions.)
As far as Belarusian identity is
concerned, Vardomatsky says, at the present time, Belarusian national identity
is more involved with territory and statehood than with anything else. Language issues are important and will remain
a source of discord but they are not the determining factor many think.
One of the reasons culture and language
play less of a role, cultural specialist Maksim Zhdankov says, is that before
World War II, the Soviets largely destroyed the Belarusian intelligentsia and
after the war promoted in-migration and out-migration to dilute the
Belarusianness of the people.
Since 1991, Belarusians have felt
themselves separate and distinct because they now have a state, and as a
result, he continues, “even people who speak Russian 100 percent of the time
while living on Belarusian territory do not associate themselves with Russia
and have a very clear attachment to ‘here and now’” and that “here and now” is “the
Belarusian Republic.
Many Belarusians hope that their national
language will become more commonly used and that Russian as a result will be
less so, but language alone, they argue, is not going to determine identities,
something they can feel good about and that Moscow at least under Putin can
only fear.
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