Paul
Goble
Staunton, October 28 – There are two
kinds of imperialists, Igor Yakovenko says, the clever ones and the foolish
ones. The clever ones know that they will find it easier to maintain their
empires if they show themselves willing to make at least some concessions to
the populations they want to control.
The foolish ones, in contrast, the
Russian commentator says, assume that they can hold things together by being
brutal and nasty, forgetting that such policies not only breed hatred and
resentment among the subject populations but plant the seeds of demands for
ultimate independence (7days.us/igor-akovenko-fontan-druzby-narodov).
Lenin was a clever imperialist who
restored Moscow’s control over the borderlands precisely by making concessions
to the non-Russian peoples through the provision of state structures and deference
to their languages. Putin, however, is, like Stalin, a foolish one who thinks
he can hold everything together by force alone.
The current Kremlin leader is wrong,
and his repressive anti-non-Russian policies almost certainly mean that his
empire will not last nearly as long as did Lenin’s Soviet one. Indeed, events
taking place in Tatarstan, Putin’s primary target in his current campaign,
suggest that the end may come far sooner than anyone expects.
Two articles in Kazan’s
Business-Gazeta show why this is so, with the first showing how Putin’s shift
from “smart” imperialism to its “stupid” variant is costing him support there
and elsewhere and the second underscoring how that process is giving rise to
new and much more radical Tatar organizations than those he seems to think are
a threat now.
In the first, Ismagil Shangareyev, a
Kazan activist and television personality, offers his reflections about the
language fight by taking as his point of departure, Rasul Gamzatov’s 1968 book,
My Daghestan, in which the Avar
writer underscored the importance of his native language alongside Russian (business-gazeta.ru/article/361948).
Bilingualism,
Shangareyev says, as Gamzatov understood is becoming the norm, especially in
multi-national and federal states. It is something that must be encouraged not
feared because it serves a powerfully integrative function especially for
members of the numerically smaller peoples who interact with others.
“When so-called small peoples
encounter respect for their culture and especially their language, a powerful process
of real integration arises. They open their hearts and are full of a desire to
share all that they have with those who show this respect to them, the Kazan
activist continues.
“I have seen,” he says, “how, in an
Uzbek bazaar, a Russian youth when choosing an apple talked to the seller in
good Uzbek. The entire bazaar was ready to give him their apples without taking
any money. Yes, for them, this was a priceless gift!”
And I recall, Shingareyev continues,
“how gladdened were the people in Tatarstan when Vladimir Putin, when speaking
in Kazan, began his speech in Tatar. Only a few sentences, of course, but what
a warm response these found in the souls of his listeners, what a wave of
simply and popular gratitude.”
Now, however,
Tatars are concerned by Putin’s insistence that no Russian be required to learn
Tatar if he or she doesn’t want to. At one level, that is entirely reasonable.
But the implementation of his proposal is leading to serious problems because
Russian officials are racing to show themselves more Orthodox than the
patriarch.
Or better, as the Turkish saying has
it, “’Tell him to bring a tyubeteika and he will bring a head along with it.”
Take away the Tatar language from the
Tatars would mean that “no such nation would remain on earth.” And today there
is a sense that “the current language policy is an attack on the national
existence of the Tatars similar to that which occurred with the sacking of
Kazan” in 1552 by Ivan the Terrible.
“Only now,” Shingareyev says, “they
are cutting off not heads but tongues.”
Shingareyev’s words underscore the
reasons why Putin’s policies as they are being implemented are radicalizing
Tatar opinion. In the second Business-Gazeta article, commentator
Ruslan Aysin suggests that this radicalization is leading to the rise of new and
dynamic groups beyond the reach of the authorities (business-gazeta.ru/article/362184).
These groups are
convinced, he says, that the attack on the Tatar language is only the first
step of a stratagem being orchestrated by Igor Sechin and the oil lobby to
undermine first the leadership of Tatarstan by provoking ethnic conflicts that
Moscow will then insist only it can solve and by force and then move to
eliminate the republic entirely.
That will drive official and
semi-official Tatar groups into the hands of the regime, Aysin says; but it
will have a very different impact on the new outsider groups. He suggests that Tatarstan and Russia have
seen all this once before – at the end of the 1980s – and everyone knows how
that turned out for the Soviet system.
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