Paul
Goble
Staunton, December 29 – Most of the
non-Russian republics of the Russian Federation are recapitulating the pattern
of the non-Russian union republics at the end of Soviet times: the share of the
titular nationalities in their populations is growing as is their
representation in key positions as a result of higher birthrates and Russian
flight.
That pattern helps to explain why
Vladimir Putin has launched his attacks on the republics and especially on
their power to require residents to study the local languages in schools, one
of the major reasons Russians point to in explaining why they want to leave and
a major contributing factor to the growth of non-Russian power in these places.
Indeed, and again just like at the
end of Soviet times when Mikhail Gorbachev ordered an ethnicity blind approach
to filling top jobs, the non-Russians may take losses in the short term but win
over the latter, achieving their victories as some Central Asians said at the
time not in open politics but in closed bedrooms.
This possibility is suggested by an
article by Oleg Polishchuk from earlier this year that Kyiv’s Delovaya stolitsa portal has reissued
now as one of the most widely discussed from its pages during 2017 (dsnews.ua/world/nezametnyy-etnotsid-gde-v-rossii-ischezayushchim-vidom-stali-13022017220000).
Entitled “The Unnoticed Ethnocide.
Where the Russians are Disappearing in Russa,” the article points out that
while ethnic Russians may dominate the population of the country as a whole,
they increasingly are again declining as a share of the population and of the
occupants of key positions in the non-Russian republics – just as they did at
the end of Soviet times.
In the North Caucasus, these trends
have been especially stark, Polishchuk says.
“Over the past 25 years, the number of ethnic Russians living in
Chechnya has fallen approximately 250,000 while the number of Chechens in the
republic has increased by half a million. The same pattern holds elsewhere, and
“’the Russian question’” as a result has disappeared as it were.
In Daghestan, those few cities with
ethnic Russian majorities now are dominated by non-Russians, and the Russians
in the republic as a whole now constitute at 3.6 percent of the population only
the eighth largest nationality there.
Elsewhere in the North Caucasus, the same pattern holds.
If in Soviet times, ethnic Russians
formed “almost half” of the population of Karachayevo-Cherkessia, now they form
less than a third; and the Russian third in Kabardino-Balkaria and North
Ossetia over the last two decades has been reduced to only one-fifth of the
total.”
Among Mongol groups, the Kalmyks
have risen from minority status to majority and now fill “practically all” the
key positions in that republic. Although the Buryats form just under a third of
the population now, that is an improvement on the less than a quarter they did
when the Soviet Union came apart.
As far as the Siberian Turkic
peoples are concerned, the situation resembles that of the North Caucasus.
Since the 1990s, there has been a mass emigration of ethnic Russians from Tuva,
and their numbers there, Polishchuk says, have fallen by half. The Tuvins
control all the key posts in the republic.
The Sakha, who as the Ukrainian
writer points out were “never distinguished by particular tolerance toward
Russians, have also improved their position. When they protested against
“Russian conquerors” for three days in 1986, they formed 33 percent of the
population while Russians formed 50 percent. Now, the Sakha form 50 percent,
and the Russians only 38.
In the Middle Volga, the embattled
Tatars nonetheless form more than 50 percent of the population of the republic
and control the overwhelming majority of key positions. In Bashkortostan, the Bashkirs are still a
minority but when they can cooperate with the Tatars, the two together
outnumber the Russians 54 percent to 35 percent.
The titular nationality is also
gaining in Chuvashia, where this demographic develop has quietly inspired the
members of that nation to expand their demands for linguistic and regional
rights.
The situation among the Finno-Ugrics
in this regard is less bright, Polishchuk says. “The only republic where there
has been a positive dynamic in favor of the indigenous people is Mordvinia.
There the titular nation has increased slightly in numbers – by 20,000 – but
its share of the total has risen dramatically because 130,000 Russians have
left.
In Mari El, the share of Russians
has fallen slightly from 48 to 42 percent, but “in the remaining Finno-Ugric
republics, the titular nations are dying out m ore rapidly than the local
Russians.” As a result, only 28 percent of the people in Udmurtia are Udmurts;
only 24 percent Komi Zyryans in Komi, and only seven percent Karels in Karelia.
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