Paul
Goble
Staunton, March 25 – On March 18,
Vladimir Putin “won something more than elections: he won the battle for ‘the collective
unconsciousness’ of the Russian people; and because he did so, Vladimir
Pastukhov argues, the Kremlin leader would have won even if the vote had been
fully free and fair
And that constitutes “a serious
warning” for those who think otherwise: “By itself, the UK-based Russian
historian says, “Putin’s departure from politics … will not lead automatically
to a change of the political regime if the common format or relations between the
leader and masses remain as they are” (novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/03/24/75929-tri-prezidentskie-karty).
Putin’s opponents and their
supporters, who back “the so-called ‘European choice’ stubbornly do not want to
recognize that they have suffered in Russia a political and no some
inexplicable mythical defeat.” The
elections featured falsifications, of course, but that does not explain why
Putin won and they did not. Those who think otherwise “are deeply mistaken.”
And even when Putin’s opponents
blame his victory on his control of the media, they fail to recognize that the
regime could “effectively deceive only those who are glad to be deceived.” The Soviet propaganda machine was much
stronger than Putin’s, Pastukhov says, and it couldn’t save the situation when
people ceased to believe it.
“The unvarnished truth,” he
continues, “is that Putin’s political course enjoys real support from his people.” And he would have won even
if he had allowed Navalny to run and the opponents full access to the media:
his percentage might have been smaller than it was, but participation would
have been larger.
“I am prepared,” the historian
continues, “even to go further and suggest that if in the course of the campaign
it suddenly came out that Putin personally had given all the most illegal
orders on earth, that would not have significantly affected the results of the
voting: attitudes toward Putin have for a long time been a question of faith
and not of knowledge.”
Pastukhov says that there is the story,
now impossible to check, that Boris Nemtsov asked Putin not to restore the
Soviet anthem as the Russian hymn. Putin
asked if the opposition figure liked the music. Nemtsov said no. Putin
responded that he didn’t either but “the people like it” and thus it must be
restored.
Putin won the election then “not
with the assistance of political technology tricks as many would lie to believe
but politically by offering the country not in words but indeed a course” which
the people wanted. In this, he showed himself to be a genuine politician,
someone capable of “singing the songs which the people liked.” His opponents
didn’t.
Since the unrest of 2011-2012, Putin
has carefully developed “a real program,” one consisting of three “cards” – and
he thereby “won ‘the Jackpot’ of the Russian counter-revolution.” His opponents,
in contrast, did not and do not have a single trump card in their hands.
Putin’s first card, of course, is
playing on Russians’ Versailles syndrome, on the politics of grievance for all
the losses Russians believe they have taken and want to strike back at the
world for. His second card is the
passionate Russian desire for stability over everything else, a desire rooted
in the notion that any changes will make things work.
And
his third card, which he has played just as masterfully as the first
two, is his willingness to defer to the “traditional rejection by the main part
of Russian society of vapitalism, bourgeois values in general and private
property in particular, that is, a rejection of everything included in the term
‘European choice.’”
A small minority pursued that choice
at the end of the 20th century, Pastukhov argues; but “the main mass
of the population remained as it had been a prisoner of traditional values.” Putin, he continues, “long ago seized the
left agenda from the marginal Russian communists and exploited it with success.”
One must carefully distinguish
between the leitmotif of Putin’s policies and the ways he has carried them out,
Pastukhov says. “Repressions, propaganda and falsificaitons are all secondary.
The primary factors are a combination of three things” he and the people agree
on – “militarism, the archaic and leftist populism.”
Because of this, Russians would have
voted for Putin even in democratic elections.” And he won’t suffer if his
actions are “unmasked” in the near future.
“All this became possible,” the
historian says, “only because Putin already in 2014, that is, before the
counter-revolutionary coup, was able to reform the people ‘under himself.” He
divided and subordinated to himself the elites.” As a result, even before “’the
Russian spring,’ the elites ceased to play any independent political role in
Russia.”
That gave Putin the opportunity to bypass
the elites entirely and root his power in the masses. Theoretically, Pastukhov says, there are “two
global scenarios for the development of the situation after the elections.” On the one hand, sooner or later, something
will be able to reach out and captivate the masses but as of now, Russians don’t
want to listen to anyone else.
Or on the other, the elites may be
able to break out of their chains and “recover their place as a mediator
between the power and the masses.” If that happens – and it would be “the
optimal scenario for Russia,” Pastukhov argues – society will reacquire space
for maneuver and the chance to escape from the current impasse.
“Only the elites can impose limiting
frameworks on the powers; the masses cannot do this,” the historican says. Now, the masses are in Putin’s corner; and
the elites aren’t able to act as mediators. Unless than relationship between
the Kremlin leader, the elites and the masses changes, Russia won’t change even
if Putin leaves the scene.
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