Paul
Goble
Staunton, May 16 – In the wake of
the political changes in Yerevan, Belarusian analysts are saying that Moscow would
not react as calmly to similar changes in Minsk because unlike Armenia, which
is constrained by its geography, Minsk could in fact change sides in the conflict
between Russia and the West (nmnby.eu/news/express/6612.html).
Consequently, they argue, Moscow is
now likely to step up efforts to ensure Russian control of Belarus lest the
situation deteriorate there as far as Russia is concerned. Already, the Kremlin
has decided not to shore up the Belarusian military and has deployed Russian oligarchs
to elbow out Belarusian businesses for state contracts there.
Writing for the Nashe mneniye site, independent Belarusian commentator Andrey
Fedorov says that given deteriorating east-west relations, “Moscow will try to
consolidate as much as possible its extremely few remaining allies,” including
in the first instance Belarus (nmnby.eu/news/express/6612.html).
In his view, geography will keep
Armenia in line whatever Yerevan may say; but for Moscow, Belarus is a far more
important ally for the same reason – and geography in its case works against
Russia, he says. Under the right circumstances, it could turn away from Moscow
and to the West.
According to Fedorov, Moscow in the
first instance will use its economic leverage to keep Minsk in line, a strategy
that has worked so far but that Moscow may find it ever more difficult to continue
given its own economic problems and the growing needs of the Belarusian
authorities.
One sector where these contrasting
vectors come together is Minsk’s call for Moscow to provide more assistance to
strengthen its military. The Belarusian army is rapidly degrading, at least in
part because Minsk lacks the money to maintain a modern force and assumes that
Moscow will always back it up (jamestown.org/program/belarusian-military-rapidly-degrading/).
On the one hand, Moscow does not
want to offend its ally by not providing any assistance to Minsk; but on the
other, both budgetary stringencies at home and fears about what a really strong
Belarusian force might mean either in the event of a Maidan-like development or
an east-west clash has caused Moscow to be slow in providing military aid.
That is unlikely to change,
Belarusian military commentators say, unless it appears that Minsk is about to
find financial support from one or another Western country. Then Moscow would
have no choice but to pony up (thinktanks.by/publication/2018/05/16/rossiya-ne-namerena-suschestvenno-ukreplyat-belorusskuyu-armiyu.html).
Such a pattern makes something else
Moscow is doing more important: indeed, it may be the most serious challenge
the Kremlin has posed to the Belarusian leadership ever. According to new data, Russian oligarchs, not
Belarusian businessmen, are winning 60 percent of the state contracts now let
in Minsk (news.tut.by/economics/591204.html).
As Yaroslav
Romanchuk, the head of the Solidarnastsi Research Center, points out, this
reflects the endemic corruption of the Belarusian state apparatus; but it also
is something else, “a Trojan horse through which the erosion of the
independence of Belarus” is taking place and against which Alyaksandr Lukashenka
up to now seems powerless to combat.
Thus, the Russian oligarchs are
acting on behalf of the Kremlin in many ways like the infamous “little green
men” in Ukraine that Moscow used to prepare the way for its Anschluss of Crimea
and its intervention in the Donbass, an action below the radar screens of both
Kyiv and the West. It is important that Moscow not gain another such victory in
Belarus.
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