Putin’s Decision to Move Capital of Far Eastern FD May Matter More than Many Imagine

Paul Goble

            Staunton, December 14 – Vladimir Putin’s decision yesterday to move the capital of the Far Eastern Federal District from Khabarovsk to Vladivostok has been dismissed by most commentators as either a vote of confidence in his candidate for governor in the latter where the Kremlin suffered a loss in September, or as something that won’t change the Far East at all.

            (For examples of analyses offering such conclusions, see afterempire.info/2018/12/13/vladivostok/ and novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/12/13/78929-nastali-vremena-pochische.)

            That Putin wants to show his support for Oleg Kozhemako is undoubtedly true, although it is far from clear that shifting the federal district capital to his city will do the trick. And it is also true that taking the capital away from Khabarovsk won’t solve the underlying problems of the Russian Far East including population flight, economic decay, and a rising Chinese presence.

            But there are three reasons why this latest action, under discussion for some months, should not be reduced to immediate political gains or dismissed entirely.  First and most important, this change shows that for Putin and his regime, the federal districts remain important transmission belts from Moscow to the regions.

            On the one hand, they help the Kremlin control the regions and republics within their purview; and on the other hand, they ensure that regional development is not contradicted by the actions of any single federal subject head.  If they were as irrelevant as many often say, Putin wouldn’t have had any reason to take this action.

            By shifting the capital from Khabarovsk to Vladivostok, Putin is sending clear signal to the FDs across the country that he intends to use them well into the future, that they far more than the federal subjects are his preferred method of ruling the country. Indeed, they may even become the basis of a radical amalgamation effort.

            Second, because Vladivostok is a port city and Khabarovsk is not, the former is better positioned to play an expanded role in Russia’s efforts to recover and expand its role as a Pacific power.  It is far easier for Pacific rim countries to reach Vladivostok and for people in Vladivostok to reach them.  And that is increasingly important for Moscow as well.

            And third, even if Putin isn’t prepared to accept at least for public consumption Aleksey Kudrin’s arguments for a Russia of urban agglomerations, the Kremlin leader’s policies have long pointed in that direction. To the extent that Putin want to continue moving that way, Vladivostok is a far better candidate as a major regional center than Khabarovsk.

            The move, a major disappointment for Khabarovsk, is not going to be a large boon for Vladivostok anytime soon. As Dmitry Oreshkin told Novaya gazeta, “this is bad for Khabarovsk but not good for Vladivostok.”  But what is says about Putin’s thinking of how to run Russia beyond the ring road is critical and should not be dismissed out of hand.