Paul Goble
Staunton,
February 12 – Vladislav Surkov argues that Russians have no choice but to
remain in their current state more or less forever, but the notion that
Russians do not have the possibility of making choices about their future is
wrong, Vladimir Pastukhov says. It is superficially convincing but not in fact
true.
In
fact, the London-based analyst says, “times of reaction” such as the current
period are the perfect occasion to reflect on what kind of a future Russians
want and how they may achieve it rather than assuming that things will always
be what they are now, the conclusion Surkhov and his associates hope they will
draw (mbk-news.appspot.com/sences/o-politicheskoj-forme/).
“Despite the
widely held conviction,” Pastukhov says, “the issue about the choice of a
political form in general and for Russia in particular does nothave a direct
relationship to the question of freedom and democracy.” History shows that
under certain conditions, monarchy, parliamentarianism, and presidentialism can
all have divisions of powers and a legal state.
History also shows that “any
political form can degrade and be transformed into a shell for a despotic
regime.” Consequently, Russians must not assume that any one form will produce
what they want or prevent the emergence of what they don’t but at the same time
consider which forms are most likely to produce changes in their current
situation.
To a great extent, the possibility
of survival or degradation is the result of existing political traditions.
Where there is a strong tradition of authoritarianism, it will inform all forms
of governance, albeit some more than others. When a society wants to make a
change from authoritarianism, some forms are more likely to be useful than others.
Rejecting any tradition, including
authoritarianism, Pastukhov continues, is always fraught with risks. That means
that those who hope to see that occur must explain what will be achieved by
such a move and offer proposals for structures that will minimize rather than
ignore the risks of disaster or a return to the status quo ante.
“The primary cause of the failure of
all previous liberal and democratic projects in Russia can be considered the
absence in that country of the subject of political action needed for the
achievement of success – that is, a nation.” The process of creating “a Russian
nation” has been going on for more than 300 years but is “still extremely far
from completion.”
Instead, Russians remain a narodnost, a people which has not yet
been able to articulate a state of its own. Its members do not yet all view
themselves as “citizens of their own national state (more precisely a nation
state) sharing its basic constitutional principles and values” and thus being
truly its citizens.
“Without a dominating consensus in
social consciousness regarding a minimum selection of fundamental principles
and values … a nation does not exist,” however much it is declared on paper or
proclaimed by leaders. Paradoxically, the
Soviets made the biggest contribution toward that end; but they failed because
their ideology was internally inconsistent and false.
According to Pastukhov, “the final formation of the Russian nation
and the establishment on its basis of an effectively functioning civil society
and contemporary political state is the most important historical task of the Russian
people” (emphasis added); and its final resolution will require “the next several
generations.”
For many Russians today, a
presidentialist system may seem the best one to prevent the collapse of the state;
but such a system will retard rather than promote the development of such a
nation and thus mean that Russians will not be able to form a nation state.
Instead, they will remain a narodnost
run by others rather than a nation which governs itself.
A parliamentary system which
encourages political participation and discussion is a better means to achieve
that end, the London-based Russian analyst continues, because “a presidential
republic is a political inhibitor of mass changes, while a parliamentary
republic is a political catalyzer.”
Any move toward a parliamentary
system in Russia faces some significant obstacles: for decades if not
centuries, Russians have been accustomed to “super-centralized power,
concentrated in the hands of a ruler who is assumed to have super-natural and
almost sacred qualities. A large part of the population simply can’t imagine”
an alternative.
Maintaining a presidential republic
keeps Russians in this state and thus prevents their maturation into a nation.
It gives them a kind of security blanket, and many are afraid of what might
happen if they give that up, Pastukhov says. Surkov is playing on such fears in
the expectation that nothing will change.
Those who want to see Russians grow
up and become a nation with freedoms and democracy can’t simply call for a
parliamentary republic but instead must propose “a specific model of this republic”
and explain how it will operate so that Russia does not fall apart and how the
Russian nation will become “a new subject of historical development.”
“The moment of truth” in this
process, Pastukhov argues, is when its advocates shift from the abstract to the
concrete and when the advocates of this change address the specifics of “’constitutional
engineering’” that will be necessary to make that happen. Coming up with those
specifics may take some time, he acknowledges.
Consequently, the current period of reaction
is the perfect time to do so, especially because that era may end unexpectedly quickly;
and when it does, there won’t be time to develop them then. In their absence,
there will be a risk that once again Russia will repeat the vicious cycle of
the past rather than move forward.
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