Paul
Goble
Staunton, June 30 – Polls showing
that Vladimir Putin has lost the support of a majority of Russians means that
while he is still president, he is not the national leader he once was and
could return himself to that status only by taking steps that would contract
the method of rule he has developed over
20 years in office, Konstantin Gaaze says.
While on can be president and not a
national leader regardless of one’s standing in the polls, the Moscow
commentator says in an essay for the Moscow Carnegie Center, Putin faces the
task of trying to recover the status of
national leader while remaining president, one difficult because of how and
how long he has ruled (carnegie.ru/commentary/79343).
Russia is “still
not ‘a country against Putin,’” Gaaze continues; “but it is definitely a
country which is little interested in the president and ever more frequently
talks with the authorities at various levels in a demanding tone.”
“One must not say that Russia is already on
fire, but one can say with precision that it is headed in that direction and
one of the causes is the lack of Kremlin
hegemony in the direct sense of
the word, in the sense of the absence of strategic leadership, and the absence
of an ability to somehow organize things over the next five years.”
According to Gaaze, “leadership
presupposes a multitude of things, but the most important of them are the
ability too set the agenda and not follow someone else’s, the effectiveness of
one’s apparatus which transforms instrumental advantages into the political
status of the leader, and a motivated and regularly renewed coalition of
support.”
All three things are compromised in
Putin’s case at present.
Since 2014, Putin has watched the
rise and fall of the Crimean majority but also has gradually lost any “strategic
initiative.” Others are setting the
agenda and Putin is responding, or he approves some agenda and then it
disappears like water in sand. And he
gets blamed and so retreats from the issue at hand.
And this is compounded by something
else: Putin’s subordinates are increasingly afraid to show initiative on
domestic issues even though it is precisely there that the president needs them
given his continuing focus on foreign affairs. As a result, he and his team
appear to be reactive rather than leaders.
But underlying all this is what one
can call the third repartition of property in the country (the first two being
in the 1990s and the second at the start of Putin’s reign). Now all near the
top are focusing almost exclusively not on his standing but rather on how much
the pie they will get after 2024. That too keeps them from coming up with inspiring
new ideas.
All of this is giving rise to more
protests by the population which now calculates not just how much repression
the regime may use but also how likely it is that the regime will back down.
There are “dozens” of these feedback loops, all encouraged by the regime’s uncertain
and varied reaction.
Could Putin regain the status of
national leader? Yes, because he has a certain “’dark matter’” of support
against certain kinds of things like the Roma case in Chemodanovka; but it isn’t
infinite and it too is dissipating, Gaaze suggests.
The alternative, of course, is to
start to “reform the siloviki themselves.” Today, that is “the only scenario of
an all-national campaign which society and part of the elite would support.”
And there may even be within the FSB and other force structures people who would
also like a different Russia after 2024.
There is a trade off for the
president. “He has one chance for a great report which would return him the
status of national leader for a certain time. But the problem is that after 20
years of rule, he must propose to society something more solid than the national projects” he thinks
will work.
“Crudely speaking, the following
reform must in a certain sense liquidate that means of rule which the president
has practiced” while in office. He could
do nothing, Gaaze says. “But then we will very quickly find out whether
citizens now are prepared to put up with the excesses of the ruling class which
is no longer protected by the authority of a national leader.”
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