Paul
Goble
Staunton, October 14 – Opinion leaders
in Belarus whether they support Alyaksandr Lukashenka or oppose him are overwhelmingly
against the closer integration or union of their country and the Russian
Federation, and it is their opinions that are picked up by sociologists in that
repressive country, Mikhail Petrovsky says.
But the Rosbalt commentator continues,
the so-called “deep people” of that country, and especially those in the
eastern portions of Belarus, are overwhelmingly in favor of having the two
countries re-combined even though their views at odds with the regime and the
opinion leaders are rarely recorded by pollsters (rosbalt.ru/world/2019/10/14/1807243.html).
Anyone who has a chance to listen to
these “most simple people who are simply afraid to discuss politics openly,”
Petrovsky argues, will quickly come to see that “a significant mass associate
themselves with the position that ‘unless we are with Russia, no one needs us.’”
The Rosbalt commentator says he recently
had the chance to overhear a conversation of two such people right in the
center of Minsk. One asked when all the talk will end and Belarus become part
of Russia, to which the other responded: “It’s long past time. We should be
like Tatarstan and live much better. In Russia, wages are twice as high.”
Belarusian politicians who keep
their ears to the ground confirm this: Alena Anisim, a deputy of the Belarusian
parliament, said recently that “global problems like the threat of losing
independence don’t agitate them a great deal. They want to know about inflation
or talk about their children. What will be between Minsk and Moscow is a matter
of indifference.”
And Grigory
Kostusev, a member of the Belarusian Popular Front says, that ever more
Belarusians are placing their hopes in Putin, “especially in the eastern regions.
People hope that Putin will come and save them and impose order. And such opinions are to be found not only
among the ordinary people but among the regional bureaucrats and siloviki.”
“People hope that with the coming of
Russia, their wages will go up,” Kostushev adds. They watch Russian television
and they want to be within Russia “in order to be proud of the greatness of that
country with its nuclear weapons,” he says; and they approve that he “took Crimea
away from the Yukes.”
To be sure, Petrovsky continues, “not
everyone” even among “the deep people” think that way. Some continue to hope to
be part of Europe and certainly don’t view Moscow as the center of the universe. But the number who don’t care about
geopolitics and only want higher wages and the basis for pride is larger than
polls report.
That is because of the nature of
sociological polling in authoritarian Belarus, the commentator continues. If
opinion leaders for and against Lukashenka are ready to denounce any union with
Russia, that is because supporting unity with Moscow is “not comme il faut”
and they are ready to talk. But “the deep people” are in a different situation.
“Just try to take an interview with
the man on the streets of Minsk if you are not a journalist with state media,”
Petrovsky says. “You will be lucky if one in ten people will agree to speak on
issues connected with politics. And you may not even get a chance to ask this ‘tenth’
because before you can, a militiaman will approach and ask who gave you
permission to ask?”
What this means is that those who
want to engage in independent polling are in fact driven back to using focus
groups, and in those, the Rosbalt commentator says, the opinion leader types,
the intelligentsia dominate, even though in the society as a whole, they are a
tiny minority.
Petrovsky may be overstating the
situation from the opposite side most commentators focus on, but his words are
important for two reasons: On the one hand, there is a tendency among those who
want to hear that Belarusians support the independence of their country to
accept polls without asking about the nature of the society in which they have
been taken.
And on the other, what he says about
regional divisions within Belarus as far as ordinary people are concerned suggest
that Moscow might be tempted to use a Donbass strategy either as a threat to
get Minsk to cave in on its resistance to Russian dominance or as a policy
option to be seriously deployed if Lukashenka continues to oppose unification.
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