Paul
Goble
Staunton, October 16 – The new
regionalism, Vadim Shtepa argues, is “in essence the geographic projection of
the networked society” made possible by the rise of the Internet, poses more
fundamental challenges to the centralized state than did separatism or irredentism
in the past, and is currently being actively opposed by centralized states both
on line and otherwise.
As part of a discussion of regionalism
launched by Moscow’s Liberal Russian Foundation, the editor of the Tallinn-based
Region.Expert portal develops these ideas concerning what he calls “the
regional revolution” that the rise of “networked” society has made possible (liberal.ru/articles/7412 reposted at region.expert/network_regionalism/).
Regionalism, “as a phenomenon of
networked society,” Shtepa says, in principle “strives to be as transparent and
democratic” as possible, but “the smaller size of many regions in comparison
with major states does not by itself guarantee a higher level of democracy.” It
does, however, create “the preconditions” for this by making government closer
to the people.
It is thus very much part of the
phenomenon of globalization and its corollary, globalization, he continues. “Globalization
often is viewed as a process of worldwide universalization, although geographic
differentiation in ‘the globalized world’ not only is being preserved but
increasing.”
In fact, Shtepa argues, it is the
spatial manifestation of the process of glocalization described by Roland Robertson,
the adaption of universal principles of political order just like the adaption
of products for the market to local conditions, something that has profound consequences
for larger political units.
He points out that “regionalists
(for example, Scots and Catalonian) are active supporters of the unity of the EU,”
in contrast to main countries “with an imperial history” where Eurosceptic
attitudes often win out.” Regionalists typically
accept the values of the larger, “global” unit, while those of older nation
states sometimes don’t.
With regard to Russia, many analysts
still “treat the protest movements in the republics as ‘nationalist’ rather
than ‘regionalist. This is a manifestation
of a lack of understanding of the phenomenon of regionalism as such” and a
failure to see that the pursuit of self-administration and cultural identity “do
not contradict one another but are organically combined.”
Further, Shtepa points out that “supporters
of the imperial doctrine of ‘the Russian world’” as well as many of their
opponents “are united by the propagandistic myth that the Russians themselves
form ‘a single people.’ In reality, despite a common language, Russians rather
are a multitude of ‘region-nations,’” to use Daniil Kotsybinsky’s term.
Related to this, “representatives of
non-Russian peoples in Russia often and justly speak about the russification of
their republics. Howeveer, it is a very serious mistake to suppose that the
Russians themselves gain something from this russification. In reality,
russification is an instrument of empire, intended for the convenience of rule
over ‘the provinces.’”
Instead, the various components of
the Russian-speaking community are harmed just as much as the non-Russians,
forced to give up their languages and culture to the Moscow standard.
Another common misperception many
have is the idea that Russia was a federation before Vladimir Putin began his construction
of the authoritarian and centralist power vertical. That isn’t the case, the
1992 Federal Treaty had the center as the key actor who delegated powers to the
former colonies, rather than being an agreement among them.
What many see as the worldwide “’restoration
of verticals’” and the growth of authoritarian centralism is almost certain to
be short-lived because it is far more “rickety” than networked systems. They are flexible and future oriented in a
way that authoritarian centralized systems are not even when the latter seek to
use the Internet for their own purposes.
Yet another widespread
misconception, Shtepa continues, is that irredentism is “’a form of regionalism,’”
a view that allows people to equate the annexation of Crimea by Russia with the
pursuit of independence by Catalonia and others. In fact, the two are antithetical
and the failure to recognize this promotes the double standards the Kremlin routinely
displays.
According to Shtepa, “regionalism involves
not Russian but post-Russian consciousness, one based on the direct mutual
interests of various regions. This is not ‘anti-centrism’ but rather
polycentrism, constructed on the basis of the interaction of a multitude of
autonomous and sovereign subjects.”
Properly understood, he says, “regionalism
is more ‘anti-periphery’ and ‘anti-provincial’ in the sense that inspires all
regions to become ‘centers’ of force with equal rights.”
“In today’s Russia,” Shetpa
concludes, “it is not accident that there is a cult of the past because the
empire recognizes it has not future. But
at the same time, in various regionalist movements, a discourse focused on the past
is also popular,” with many focusing on their pre-imperial histories.
And sometimes it even seems, he
says, that “history has already ended if even ideological opponents are only focused
on arguments about the past.”
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