Paul
Goble
Staunton, December 21 – Vladimir
Putin, in his continuing attacks on Lenin, gets things exactly backwards,
Aleksey Miler says. For the Bolshevik leader, “the main enemy” was not Ukrainian
or any other non-Russian nationalism but rather Russian nationalism as embodied
in the White Movement.
In Lenin’s view, that movement could
destroy Bolshevism then while non-Russian nationalisms could not. And that
explains his policies however much some like Putin project back on them an
entirely different understanding.
In a Delovaya stolitsa interview
devoted to the complexities of the rise of Ukrainian national identity a
century ago, the professor of Budapest’s Central European University offers an
important corrective to the views Putin and many others on Lenin and
nationalism (dsnews.ua/politics/aleksey-miller-skoropadskiy-pytalsya-sdelat-to-chto-poluchilos-18112019220000).
Miller points out that the
Austro-Hungarian and German empires against which the Russian Empire was
fighting promoted Ukrainian and other nationalisms in the Russian Empire
convinced that that would weaken the latter. But when the Russian Empire
collapsed, the Provisional Government promoted non-Russian nationalism even
more, Miller says.
In 1917, understanding that it was
losing influence in the military, the Provisional Government “sought levers to
strengthen its control in the forces. And it decided to nationalize army
units. There was a significant episode
when Kornilov asked Skoropadsky to Ukrainianize his corps.” The latter refused but
the die was cast.
Most parties in Soviet Russia
including the majority of Bolsheviks believedthat “nationalism was a hostile
force.” After all, the Bolsheviks as Marxists were about classes not nations.
But Lenin disagreed. He argued that the Bolsheviks must embrace the non-Russian
nationalists in order to weaken what he saw as “the main enemy” – Russian nationalism.
“Ukrainian historians often explain
this by suggesting that the Ukrainian national movement was so strong that he
had to make concessions to it,” Miller says. But “this is not precisely the case.”
The Bolsheviks around Lenin were committed to defeating nationalism by using
nationalist rhetoric. They also believed their united party could block any
nationalist threat.
The main opponent of Lenin’s
position was Stalin, the Bolsheviks’ specialist on the nationality question. He
called for the creation of ethnic autonomies but not republics “with the formal
right of exit” because he said, over time, “young party members will be
inclined ot take the norms of the Constitution seriously.”
“Therefore,” Stalin said, “after
five to ten years, if we establish formally sovereign republics, we will have a
problem maintaining the unity of the party.”
The 1930s show how Stalin solved this problem, by periodic and massive
purges to ensure that unity, the historian continues.
“It is also necessary to remember,”
Miller points out, “that when the Bolsheviks took these decisions in 1922, they
still hoped for a world revolution. And one of het motives for the creation of the
USSRR was that then it would be possible to take in other union republics,” including
Polish and German.
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