Paul
Goble
Staunton, December 16 – The Russian
government’s pro-natalist policies, designed to boost the birthrate in order to
eventually have enough workers to support the growing army of pensioners, may
backfire by adding to the burden Russians of working age now and for the next
two decades have to carry by increasing the number of children as well, Maksim
Blant says.
And that possibility may “at any
moment” transform the Russian Federation from “the island of stability” the
Kremlin likes to talk about into “the eye of a hurricane,” especially if
Russians have children not because they want to have offspring but in order to
collect money from the state (svoboda.org/a/30328241.html).
Nothing good will come from
decisions made on that basis, the economist says, and in particular it will do
nothing to improve “’the quality of human capital’” that Moscow officials like
to talk about. Instead, when it turns out the regime can’t support the new larger
generation it has brought into being, the social and political consequences
will be “extremely sad.”
As the Russian government seems to
have forgotten, people including Russians give birth to more children when
families are poor than when they are well off; and thus using cash incentives
to get people to have more children will work only for a short term if at all,
Blant continues.
He adds that he doesn’t entirely
understand why the current Russian government is so obsessed with the birthrate,
given that its economic and military plans require fewer people not more. The
only rational explanation is that the regime is doing so in order to be in a
position to support the increasing number of pensioners.
But if that is the explanation, the
government has had plenty of warning of the problems it is now facing. This demographic
outcome was “well known already 20 years ago” and might have been addressed by
the radical means of forcing people to save for their retirement rather than
having the government continue to assume full responsibility.
Taking such a decision then given
default and other economic problems would have been difficult, the economist
admits. “But now when the numerically small ‘post-default’ generation is coming
on line and the government has put aside significant reserves, it would be
possible” to make such a decision rather than try to boost the birthrate.
If Moscow were to take this
decision, it would not lose anything. The money working age Russians would put
aside would be available via the banking system. And the interest the
government would have to pay to use it would have the effect of boosting the
amount available for these future retirees.
But that isn’t what the Kremlin has
decided to do. As a result, “the burden on workers will grow and children born
today will begin to have a positive influence on the situation in the best case
only in 20 years.” And the more successful the government is in boosting the birthrate,
the faster and greater the burden on workers will be.
Because it is they and no one else
who will have to pay for all these maternal capital schemes, benefits and aid
programs the government is talking about.
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