Paul
Goble
Staunton, January 27 – One of the
central stories of the Soviet and Russian narrative about World War II is that
hundreds of thousands of people in the northern capital died from starvation when
the city was surrounded by Nazi forces and that further disasters were
prevented only when Soviet forces broke that blockade after 900 days.
There have always been problems with
that story, but few have been willing or able to challenge it in a serious way.
Now, Mark Solonin, a Russian historian who specializes on World War I but since
2016 has lived in Estonia because his views do not correspond to the official
version, has done do.
Solonin argues that “the cause of the
famine which carried off hundreds of thousands of human lives was not ‘the blockade’
and the absence of transport communications, but the absence of supplies which
could have been brought to the city which was dying from hunger” (mnews.world/ru/ne-blokada-a-leningradskij-golodomor-istorik-mark-solonin-o-tom-pochemu-umirali-zhiteli-leningrada/).
Soviet and Russian writers who
insist the city was cut off from the rest of the USSR, Solonin says, ignore the
fact that 60 kilometers of the Western shore of Lake Ladoga was never occupied
by the Germans and that German air attacks which might have blocked shipping
effectively ended when Hitler shifted his main axis of attack to Moscow.
As a result, “for the supply of Leningrad
by water transport, it was necessary to cross no more than 25 to 40 kilometers
from the western to the southern shore of Lake Ladoga,” something that could
have been arranged.
But there are other problems with the
Soviet narrative, Solonin continues. Had the blockade remained in place 900
days as Moscow historians insist, no one would have been alive at the end with
the famous bread ration of 125 grams of bread. That means that it wasn’t nearly
as total or as long as the Russian story has it.
“The only explanation of this ‘miracle’
is that there was no ‘blockade and that the city was supplied by waterways
across Lake Ladoga and by automobiles when the lake was frozen in winter.”
There was sufficient shipping capacity for that to have occurred, the
Estonia-based Russian historian says.
Overwhelmingly, “the deaths of
hundreds of thousands of people (an exact figure hardly will ever be
established) was the result of extremely low norms of providing food in the
course of three months, November and December 1941 and January 1942,” and not
the far longer period Moscow historians speak of.
If the blockade had been the cause
of the deaths as they insist, the greatest food shortages and the greatest
number of deaths would not have come at the beginning of the German attack but toward
the end of “the blockade.” But in fact, Solonin says, the available record suggests
that exactly the reverse was true.
The historian says he has come up
with four hypotheses on why more food did not reach Leningraders and thus why
so many of them died. Unfortunately, “in today’s Russia,” there is little or no
chance that anyone will be allowed to do the kind of archival research that would
allow for a final determination.
The first possibility is that this
was the result of “criminal negligence” by Stalin and his regime which in the
fall of 1941 was focused entirely on the battle of Moscow and thus ignored what
was happening in Leningrad. The second is that Stalin simply made a mistake in
his assessment of what was occurring there.
The third possibility, Solonin
suggests, is that “Stalin (not without basis) considered Leningrad to be a
concentration of people disloyal to Soviet power” and decided to use the
military situation to destroy those people lest them become a threat to him.
And the fourth possibility is that “the
Leningrad ‘Holodomor’ (an artificially organized famine) was organized by the local
authorities (the leadership of the Leningrad obkom) in order to confiscate gold
and other values from the population,” just as Soviet officials had done during
the Holodomor in the course of collectivization.
Having gold or other valuables gave
officials the opportunity to buy in special stores goods not available to the
Soviet population at large. Officials did so throughout the 1930s in areas
where the terror famine had allowed them to take possession of such valuables
from those the Holodomor killed. Leningrad party officials may have wanted to do
the same.
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