Non-Russians Read Russian Attacks on Their Countries; Russians don’t Read the Non-Russian Responses

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 26 – Debates about the status of ethnic Russians in the former Soviet republics often recall a dialogue of the deaf, with Russian attacks on these countries being read by those in the countries they are about but the responses of the titular nationalities of these countries largely ignored by Russian speakers there or in the Russian Federation.

            This problem has become especially serious in Russian-Kazakh relations where Russian attacks are typically read by the overwhelmingly bilingual Kazakhs but Kazakh responses are not ready by Russians either in Kazakhstan or in Russia because Russians do not know Kazakh, Mikhail Rozov says.

            The Russian commentator observes in a discussion of the current debates on Kazakhstan’s nationality policy that “if in Kazakhstan, claims against Russia are sounded mostly in Kazakh-language media, then in Russia, claims against Kazakhstan are made in Russian, which Kazakhs being overwhelmingly bilingual,” know as well (ritmeurasia.org/news--2021-10-26--kontury-obnovlennoj-nacionalnoj-politiki-kazahstana-57054).

            That leads to a situation in which Russian attacks may have a very different impact than many Russians, Kazakhs, or outside observers expect and in which Kazakh responses have much less of a response than any of these groups think, even though those responses in fact often drive state policy.

            According to Rozov, the Kazakhstan authorities have “embarked on an experiment involving the Russian community in their country not as a silent minority which is in ‘deep internal emigration’ but as brand ambassadors” for Kazakhstan who can articulate what Kazakhs are thinking and saying to a Russian audience.

            Whether this tactic will bear fruit remains to be seen, but it already has two consequences. On the one hand, it is highlighting the fact that far from all ethnic Russians are happy about Moscow’s criticism of Kazakhstan’s policies, seeing such criticism as a threat to their own status in the country they want to live in.

            And on the other, it suggests that the voices of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan may be increasingly important in the conflicts between Moscow and Nur Sultan, not just as many expect as cat’s paws for the Russian side but as part of Kazakhstan’s defense against any further Russian encroachment.