Putin Wants to Get Out of Ukraine with Enough of a Victory to Convince Russians at Home What He has Done was Worth It, Pastukhov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 15 – The real cost of Ukraine for Vladimir Putin is that he no longer has any real hopes to achieve the complete defeat of that country and its absorption into a new Russian world but that he wants to get out of the debacle with enough gains to convince Russians back home that what he has asked them to do was worth it, Vladimir Pastukhov says.

            That likely involves the Russian absorption of the land bridge to Russian-occupied Crimea so that Moscow will be able to ensure that it can easily supply that region and so that it will have a reliable supply of water, the London-based Russian analyst says (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=634AFC8ABAE4B).

            The Kremlin leader likely would be able to convince enough Russians  both among the elites and in the population that such gains would constitute a victory sufficient to prevent any challenge to his rule, Pastukhov says. But the big question now is whether the Ukrainian army and people will accept that or will be able to prevent Putin from achieving even that.

            If Putin is unable to do so, then it is not impossible that he will decide to use nuclear weapons, possibly triggering a nuclear war that will destroy far more than just Ukraine given that the Kremlin leader would rather pull down the entire world than face the consequences to his rule of admitting he has lost.

            According to Pastukhov, the dangers ahead are all the greater because “Putin does not have any clear and consistent picture in his head of what is in fact happening on the ground.” Instead, he feels the West has mistreated him and Russia and that the only and correct way for him to act is to respond with violence.

            But at the same time, the analyst continues, “Putin needs peace, not just any peace but one that will allow him to explain to the people precisely what has happened. For such a peace, he needs at a minimum, Crimea and a path to it through the Donbass, Mariupol, Zaporozhe, and Kherson.”

            Putin at least “no longer is obsessed with occupying Ukraine” more generally. But at the same time, he “doesn’t understand” what has happened. He thinks he will be gaining a victory when in fact all he will be doing is covering a loss given his original goals in launching his aggression against Ukraine.

            That “cognitive dissonance,” Pastukhov argues, is what raises the stakes and makes the situation more dangerous. The Kremlin leader isn’t going to accept anything less than something that looks like a victory and the Ukrainians may not allow him that. If that is he case, then the worst of all possible scenarios is possible.

            Many observers are likely to view this as an argument directed more at Western leaders than at anyone else, an argument that they should force Kyiv to accept what Putin wants lest something worse happens. But Ukrainians are unlikely to be willing to accept that for two reasons.

            On the one hand, Ukraine is winning on the field of battle now and promises to do even better in the future. And on the other, Ukrainians and everyone else knows that if Putin gets part of what he wants now, that will not end the conflict but simply allow Putin time to regroup and relaunch aggression for his larger goals later.