Moscow Courts Ban Ads Saying Owners will Rent or Sell Only to Certain Ethnic or Religious Groups

Paul Gofble

            Staunton, Aug. 30 – Earlier this summer, a Moscow court prohibited advertisements limiting rentals or sales to Muslims (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/08/moscow-court-prohibits-landlords-from.html). Now, another Moscow court has banned similar advertisements saying that properties will be rented or sold only to Slavs (tass.ru/nedvizhimost/24914489).

            Since the end of Soviet times, Russian landlords have routinely said in their advertisements that they won’t rent or sell to Roma, Muslims or non-Russians; and Russian officials have sought to ban the practice. More recently, Muslim landlords in Russian cities have followed suit and declared they will only rent or sell to other Muslims.

            Not surprisingly, Russian law enforcement moved more quickly to root out the first than the second; but it has now decided that failure to ban both types, at least on paper, will exacerbate ethnic and religious tensions and has brought these twin bans into line with one another.

            The courts have focused on advertising and especially advertising on the internet. That will help limit this form of racism. But realtors and those interested in renting or buying are likely to find that many owners continue to discriminate even if now they are no longer legally allowed to advertise what they are doing.

            For background on this form of racism, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/03/racism-on-rise-in-russia-as-moscow.html and the sources cited therein.

Teachers in 90 Percent of Russia’s Federal Subjects Earn on Average Less than the Country’s Minimum Wage – and in Some Less than a Quarter of that Amount

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 30 – One needed look far for the reason that the Russian Federation has a severe shortage of public-school teachers: the answer is that teachers in 90 percent of its federal subjects earn on average less than half the country’s minimum wage and in some cases, less than a quarter of that amount, according to Russia’s independent Teachers Union.

            In only three of Russia’s more than 80 federal subjects do teachers make on average more than the 22,440 rubles (250 US dollars) a month that Moscow has set as the minimum wage. These are Moscow, Tatarstan and Primorsky Kray (iz.ru/1944780/valeria-misina/unizaemaa-professia-v-90-regionov-oklady-ucitelei-nize-mrot and regionvoice.ru/uchitelya-pashut-za-groshi-oklady-pedagog/).

            In most, teachers are paid close to the minimum wage; but in some, salaries are pathetically much smaller: In Karachayevo-Cherkessia, for example, teachers are paid on average less than 3900 rubles (42 US dollars) a month, less than a fifth of the state-mandated minimum.

            As a result of these low salaries, which are paid by cash-strapped regions who are forced to turn over their tax money to Moscow and then receive a portion of it back, few are attracted to teaching; and those who are now typically leave quickly, a pattern that creates a permanent crisis at the lower levels of education in the Russian Federation.

Kremlin Playing Down Its Failures across Post-Soviet Space, Chernikov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 30 – In recent months, the Kremlin has adopted a new approach to dealing with former Soviet republics which are increasingly distancing themselves from Moscow, Roman Chernikov says. Instead of aggression as in Ukraine, it is ignoring or downplaying these challenges and “signaling that the situation is supposedly under control.”

            According to the Russian political scientist, those around Putin “likely believe that this approach helps to maintain Russia’s influence not only on a tactical level but also on a strategic one.” But he continues, “it’s hard to point to anywhere where this approach has led to success” in these countries and their relations with Moscow (ridl.io/ru/fantomnoe-prisutstvie/).

            Instead, if anything, Moscow’s failure to react as it did in the past, perhaps because it is distracted by is focus on Putin’s war in Ukraine, has led these countries to adopt ever more independent lines, perhaps confident that as long as the war in Ukraine goes one, Moscow will lack the interest or even resources to try to rein them in.

            But there is one place at least where Moscow’s new approach is having major success, although it is not one that Chernikov discusses and that is in Western coverage of the weakening of Russian influence in the former Soviet space. Without a Russian reaction, Westerners who depend on Moscow and on Russian media have nothing to cover.

            And as a result, moves by the non-Russian countries that are putting ever greater distance between them and Moscow are ignored, something that would not be the case if it Moscow responded with its earlier outspokenness.  And it may very well be that the Kremlin views this as a significant victory as it will likely prevent the West from taking advantage of its weakness.

Russian Experts Outraged by Azerbaijan President’s Programmatic ‘Al-Arabiya’ Interview, a Turning Point in Baku’s Relations with Moscow

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 27 – Moscow experts have reacted with outrage to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s interview with the Al-Arabiya television channel, declaring that it contains “not one good word” about Russia, presages a further deterioration of relations between Baku and Moscow and could even lead to a military clash.

            (For the text of Aliyev’s 7000-word interview, see president.az/ru/articles/view/69968. For a survey of initial reaction by Russian experts and political figures on the Caucasus and the Middle East, see vpoanalytics.com/sobytiya-i-kommentarii/ilkham-aliev-o-rossii-ni-odnogo-dobrogo-slova/.)

            In his interview, the Azerbaijani president blamed Moscow not only for the recent cooling of relations following the downing of an Azerbaijani plane and the deaths of Azerbaijani activists in the Russian Federation but also for his country’s problems dating back to the 1920s when the Soviet Red Army occupied Azerbaijan and made it part of the Soviet state.

            In words that recall those of the Azerbaijani democratic opposition far more than those of his father, Haidar Aliyev, Ilham Aliyev blamed Moscow for suppressing Azerbaijani democracy and redrawing the borders to separate Azerbaijan proper from its exclave Nakhichevan, thereby creating a problem for Baku ever since.

            Almost equally horrific for Russian commentators were Aliyev’s warm words for US President Donald Trump, including the Azerbaijani president’s belief that Trump deserves a Nobel Peace Prize, would have remained in office after 2020 had “the deep state” not stolen the election, and is a model for how other countries should deal with Azerbaijan.

            Such language is not only obviously music to the ears of the American leader but represents the sharpest turn yet by Azerbaijan away from Russia toward the West, something that Moscow commentators are alarmed by but have not yet figured out a way to reverse given Baku’s support for Ukraine and its growing ties with the West in general and the US in particular.

            In the course of his interview, Aliyev made two other points to which Russian writers have paid less attention to but that may prove equally important in the future. He said that he had good relations with the current Iranian president, an ethnic Azerbaijani, and would deal with him rather than with Iran’s religious hierarchy given that the Tehran leader was elected by the people.

            And in addition, he reaffirmed Azerbaijan’s close ties with Turkey, arguing that those relations were creating a new power center to the south of Russia, one that would include all the Turkic countries of the region and put it rather than anyone else at the center of discussions about the future of that region and the Middle East. 

            For all of these reason, Aliyev’s Al-Arabiya interview represents a major turning point in relations not only between Azerbaijan and Moscow but among the other non-Russian countries which emerged when the Soviet system collapsed and between them and the Russian Federation as well.

            As such, it deserves far more attention than the shooting down of the aircraft or the killing of activists which many have focused far more on that this programmatic outline of where Aliyev sees his country heading.

 

Russian Government and Business Behind Transforming an Entire Federal Subject into an Ethnic Enclave, Kabanov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 29 – Russian officials and Russian businesses by their irresponsible approach to immigration have transformed an entire federal subject, the oil-rich Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous District, into an enormous “ethnic enclave,” euphemism Russians use for ghetto, Kirill Kabanov says.

            The member of the Presidential Human Rights Council who has long spoken out against immigration and in recent months has been at the center of what looks like a campaign to expel current immigrants and prevent new ones from arriving with this statement has raised the stakes in two ways (iarex.ru/news/150317.html).

            On the one hand, Kabanov says that the Russian government authorities and big businesses share responsibility for the influx of migrants that has alarmed many in that country. And on the other, he has raised the specter of the transformation of predominantly ethnic Russian areas into non-Russian ones.

            The Khanty-Mansiysk AD is still overwhelmingly Russian in population, according to the 2020-2021 census. But the possibility that the influx of immigrants from Central Asia will change that is certain to lead more Russians to accept the “replacement” theories circulating there and elsewhere and, if they accept Kabanov’s argument, to blame government and business for that.

Russia’s Pro-War Volunteers Say ‘Nobody Wants to Help the Army Anymore’

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 26 – When Putin launched his expanded war in Ukraine in February 2022, many Russians volunteered to help Russian forces there by sending money and supplies. But with each passing month, their number and the amount they have sent has declined as Russians weary of the war and are ever less sure their own actions are useful or appropriate.

            Valentina Matrenina, a journalist with The Insider, reached those conclusions after talking with those who volunteered earlier but have cut back or stopped entirely. The behavior of the latter, she says, is evidence of both war weariness and even opposition to Putin’s conflict (theins.ru/confession/283938).

            She reports that the decline in volunteer activity became “especially notable” earlier this year when “talk about a truce” began. “Trump came alone and started humiliating Zelensky while praising Putin; and from that moment one, both fundraising and volunteer activity in Russai fell sharply.”

            Donations and activity have fallen precipitously, Matrenina continues, something especially serious in the Russian case given that Moscow has relied on volunteer work to provide its soldiers with clothing and a variety of other goods. The government isn’t making up the gap and that is sending morale at the front down as well.

            Other factors are leading to the decline in volunteer activity in support of the Russian military. One is that there are increasing reports that money collected for the soldiers isn’t being used as intentioned. One Bryansk activist who collected 100,000 rubles (1,000 US dollars) says that instead of being used for uniforms, the soldiers “blew it all on prostitutes the same day.”

            It is unlikely he will be collecting more.

            But another is a problem of the Putin regime’s own making. As talk about peace has dragged on and ever more Russians have decided that there isn’t going to be a settlement anytime soon, they have also decided that they have done enough and aren’t prepared to continue to sacrifice for the soldiers who are likely to be fighting long into the future.

            And yet another problem, also of the Kremlin’s policies, is that Russian media are giving less and less coverage to the war and that is leading ever more Russians to ignore what is going on, something that has led to a drying up of the pool of those willing to send more aid to the army. They feel they have done enough, Matrenina says. 

1.5 Million Russians Members of ‘Traditional’ Religious Sects, and Many Times More are in New Non-Religious Ones, Experts Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 28 – Russia is experiencing a new wave of sectarianism, one that isn’t limited to traditional religious sects – about 1.5 million Russians are members of these – but includes other non-religious groups – who have attracted many times that number – Elena Rychkova says.

            These new groups, specialists on them tell the Nakanune journalist, take the form of business training sessions, occult practices and psychological groups and threaten the health and wellbeing of many Russians and the national security of the Russian Federation (nakanune.ru/articles/123859/).

            Often, she reports, the government is “powerless” to do anything about them. There are no laws which define precisely what constitutes a sect and the leaders of these groups typically “cleverly mask themselves under legal organizations,” including on occasion state structures, in addition to underground ones.

            The latest government effort, a ban on a non-existent international satanist movement (https://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/07/banning-groups-that-dont-exist.html), is a case in point. It may give some people the impression that the Kremlin is actually doing something, but in fact, it highlights the inability of the Putin regime to act effectively in this area.

            But the government is really worried about the sects, in the first instance because those who join them typically have fewer children than their coevals who don’t. According to one estimate, sect membership is keeping as many as 50,000 new babies from being born in the Russian Federation.

            The government is also alarmed and perhaps even more so, Rychkova continues, by the rapid spread of these new sectarians beyond Moscow and the other biggest cities into smaller population centers. Linked together by the internet, these groups form a potential opposition network that could challenge the regime.

Extraordinarily Harsh Sentences in Makhachkala Airport Cases Send a Message Dagestani Regime Won’t Tolerate Any Protests, Republic Journalist Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 25 – The last of the 136 Dagestanis charged for their roles in the Makhachkala airport protests in October 2023 against the arrival of people from Israel have resulted in sentences of up to 15 years in prison, an extraordinary figure for public protests even in Putin’s Russia.

            According to Magdi Kamalov, founder of the independent Chernovik portal, the republic government has imposed such sentences in order to prevent any repetition of mass actions in that restive republic (kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/414112). That suggests that many in the republic government and in Moscow fear that equally large and violent protests may be ahead there.

            Indeed, the length of sentences the authorities hand out elsewhere in response to protests may be a useful measure of just how fearful the powers that be are about more demonstrations in the future and how much they are counting on draconian sentences to prevent more people from going into the streets. 

Russian Government has ‘Buried’ Plan to Rely on Megalopolis Strategy, Delyagin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 26 – For more than a decade, a debate has been taking place in the Russian Federation between those who believe that country’s future should be based on developing a political system based on a network of large cities and those who favor the existing system of federal subjects.

            Within each group, there has been an enormous range of opinions, with advocates of the megalopolis approach sometimes viewing it as a kind of regional amalgamation lite that will allow Moscow to destroy the non-Russian republics and those supporting the existing system as the only way to protect both democracy and ethnic rights.

            But now, Moscow commentator Mikhail Delyagin argues, the Russian government has finally “buried” what he calls “a liberal strategy of driving Russia into megalopolises” by announcing that it will focus instead on developing smaller cities, many of which are increasingly hard pressed to survive (izborsk-club.ru/27258).

            The Izborsky Club member is certainly correct that the Russian government has announced a large-scale project to save Russia’s mid-sized cities; but it remains unclear whether that project will be carried out or even if it will be sufficient to reverse the predicted demise of these urban centers. (On their problems, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/08/nearly-130-mid-sized-russian-cities.html.)

            Thus, while the Russian government plan to save small and mid-sized cities will be popular with local elites and especially with non-Russians who feared the agglomeration program would result in the elimination of their republics, there are real doubts that this program will slow the growth of larger cities and thus end calls for relying on them instead. 

To Develop North, Moscow has No Choice but to Rely on Water Routes, Pastrushev Says; But Doing So Won’t Be Easy

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 26 – Given the lack of rail and road networks in the Russian North, Nikolay Patrushev says, Moscow has no choice but to rely on and develop riverine transportation links if it is to achieve its goals not only in the Russian North but in the Arctic basin beyond.

            The Putin aide who heads the Naval Collegium made those remarks this week during a meeting devoted to the development of the Ob-Irtysh basin of internal waterways and the modernization of the Salekhard port in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District (arctic.ru/infrastructure/20250826/1043194.html).

            Patrushev is likely right that only the development of river transport will allow Russia to achieve its goals in the north. The obstacles to building rail and highway networks there are just too enormous. But he faces enormous obstacles in developing river trade given falling water levels, cutbacks in dredging and problems with the construction of new ships.

            On those issues, see in particular https://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/04/russia-now-has-only-50000-km-of-fully.html, https://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/03/length-of-russias-navigable-riverways.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/08/moscow-to-slash-funding-for.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/06/falling-water-levels-forcing-moscow-to.html and the sources cited therein.)

Veterans Returning from Ukraine May Want to Change the Russian Elite but Won’t Be Able to Do So, Zhuravlyev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 25 – Veterans of Putin’s war in Ukraine are accustomed to making decisions on their own in response to the situations they find themselves in and thus those who enter by one means or another the Putin-era Russian elite will try to act in the same way; but I they do, they will be expelled from the elite which will not change, Dmitry Zhuravlyev says.

            The senior researcher at the Moscow Institute of Regional Problems argues that the reason for that is that the current Russian elite grew out of the Soviet elite and like its predecessor is defined by the relationship of its members to the state (realtribune.ru/specifika-rossijskoj-elity-proshloe-nastoyashhee-i-budushhee/).

            The Soviet elite was dissatisfied with its position in which the state defined everything because that precluded the possibility of their handing down to their children their wealth and position. Its members hoped that the creation of a market economy would solve their problem in that regard. That did lead to the collapse of the USSR but not to a fundamental change at the top.

            Because even after 1991, the state remained “sacred,” sharing of power and wealth with it was impossible; and once again, the state shared out wealth in order to protect itself. Yeltsin began that process and Putin has continued it to its completion.  Under Yeltsin, the state apparatus became paramount; but under Putin, it has been destroyed as an independent actor.

            Putin didn’t fear the state apparatus because he understood that the latter didn’t want a return to the USSR; and thus the current “configuration of the elite” emerged – “at the center, the president and his closest comrades in arms, thn he state apparatus, and on the periphery, business.  

            According to Zhuravlyev, “this system has proven effective and corresponds to the structure of the economy; but it didn’t solve the key problem of the inheritance of power.” Putin has tried to solve that by isolating all but the largest corporations from any political power, and they remain totally dependent on his good will.

            Under Putin, decisions are made according to a definite system; and anyone who ; violates that by going beyond its limits is “excluded” from having any influence. That of course means that it is “almost impossible” for the state to take any move in a new direction.

Some have suggested that the inclusion of veterans into the elite will change that, the analyst says; but they are wrong because the power of the current occupants of the senior elite will quickly move against the veterans seeking entrance lest the entire system come crashing down as it did three decades ago.   

Moscow Patriarchate Directs Russian Orthodox Bishoprics to Work Closely with Odious Russian Community

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 25 – The Moscow Patriarchate has sent a circular letter to all of its bishoprics ordering them to work closely with the Russian Community, the extremist Russian nationalist group that has attacked protesters, immigrants and non-Russian minorities, another sign that the Community increasingly resembles the Black Hundreds of the end of tsarist times.

            The letter said that each bishopric should appoint a priest to be responsible for maintaining and developing relations with the Russian Community and work to involve it more fully in church life (t.me/tsargradtv/115041 // and sova-center.ru/religion/news/authorities/elections/2025/08/d52135/).

            Not all Russian Orthodox faithful or clergy are comfortable with the often pagan-themed actions of the Russian Community, and it is likely that the ROC MP has sent out this letter in order to ensure that all its bishoprics work with the Community and try to wean it away from the Aryan paganism that sometimes has informed its statements.

            For background on the Russian Community and its increasing resemblance to the Black Hundreds in tsarist times, see jamestown.org/program/russian-community-extremists-becoming-the-black-hundreds-of-today/, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/07/failure-of-russian-police-to-rein-in.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/06/russian-community-now-country-wide.html.

Altai Republic Opponents of Kremlin’s Abolishing of District Governments have Lost that Battle but have Become a Political Force, Kuznetsov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 25 – All summer activists from rural areas of the Altai Republic opposed to the Kremlin’s decision to abolish local district governments have staged demonstrations and gone to court to try to block it. They have failed, but their actions have “enlivened local political life” and made the Altai a symbol of resistance to Moscow, Pavel Kuznetsov says.

            After carefully surveying what the opponents of the Kremlin decision did and how they have now lost in all venues where they hoped to derail it, the Russian journalist now living in Germany says that the protests should not be dismissed as irrelevant as they have given people in the Altai real political experience (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2025/08/25/zaregistrirovali-chtoby-on-ne-budorazhil-vsiu-respubliku).

            Perhaps the most important outcome, Kuznetsov says, is that a new class of popular leaders have emerged, people without direct connection to the increasingly gelded KPRF which has opposed the republic head in the past. Among them the three most important are lawyer Dmitry Todoshev, activist Aruna Arna, and protest organizer Vasily Kudirmekov. 

            Todoshev, who led the failed effort to get the republic supreme court to delay the implementation of the reform, gained popular recognition and support when he exited the court, declared that it was “too early to surrender,” and urged local district officials whose positions are to be abolished to remain at their posts.

            If Todoshev is a genuinely new figure, Aruna Arna is not but she has assumed a new and broader role. More than a decade ago, she became active as a defender of localities in the Altai, for which she was convicted of spreading “unreliable” information via her telegram channel. Now, she has stepped up her actions and declared the republic head illegitimate.

            The third new leader, Vasily Kudirmekov, is “a much more serious figure” than the other two, Kuznetsov argues. He created and heads the Kurultay of the Altai People and has long been an active defender of the Altai language.  When the KPRF was more genuinely an opposition party, he worked with them; but now he is using the Kurultay as his base.

            He was behind the largest opposition demonstration in the Altai which attracted some 4,000 people; and the incumbent regime is currently worried about his activities, especially given that there will be elections to the republic parliament next month – and despite official pressure, such opponents of the regime may do better than expected, Kuznetsov suggests.

Russian Officer Corps Unlikely to Be Happy about Reduction in Its Role after Putin’s War in Ukraine Ends, Pastukhov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 25 – Russia’s recent history has alternated between periods when the military has been dominant, usually during wars, and periods when the security services have been, usually when at least nominally Moscow is at peace with its neighbors, Vladimir Pastukhov suggests.

            Since 2013, the London-based Russian analyst says, the military has been dominant as Putin has pursued his war in Ukraine; but recently, the military has lost some of its standing because of the enormous resources it has used compared to gains and because the Prigozhin revolt showed it was less then grateful and obedience (t.me/v_pastukhov/1632 reposted at echofm.online/opinions/novyj-chekistskij-czikl).

            That suggests, Pastukhov continues, that when the war in Ukraine finally ends, the security services will gain in relative importance and the military will correspondingly lose. And that may prove a far greater threat to stability in Russia than the much-discussed impact of returning veterans on Russian society.

“It is very difficult to imagine,” he argues, “that the Russian officer corps will be psychologically prepared for the fact that with the onset of a pause in the war it will have to “roll back” to the same second-rate political positions in public and state life that it occupied before the war.”

“And this is not even taking into account the fact that ‘the man with the gun’ may have -- and most likely will have -- his own special view on the results of the war, on the balance between losses and gains, on the effectiveness of military-political management and on the fairness of the distribution of ‘rewards.’”

As a result, Pastukhov concludes, “the strengthening of the FSB as an institution influencing the political course of the Kremlin is practically the inevitable result of the completion of even simply the stopping of the war.” But exactly what this will mean is unclear, besides an unhappy officer corps.

Sometimes, the return of the security services to dominance has led to an increase in repression; and sometimes, as was the case in the 1980s, it led to Gorbachev and perestroika. What will happen this time around, Pastukhov says, is something he won’t at least for now even hazard a guess.

Sobyanin’s Talk about How Many Muscovites are Fighting in Ukraine Only Highlights How Few Are

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 25 – In an interview with Komsomolskaya Pravda, Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin said that “about 90,000” residents of the Russian capital are taking part in Putin’s war in Ukraine, a statistic he and the Kremlin clearly hope will quiet charges that Muscovites are not doing so at anything like the share of non-Russians and ethnic Russians from poorer regions.

            But that figure (kp.ru/daily/27742/5133043/) almost certainly will have exactly the opposite effect. Because Moscow’s population is so much larger than any other federal subject, the 90,000 Sobyanin says are serving in Ukraine is less than two percent of the draft-age male residents of the capital.

            That compares with as many as half of the male residents of some non-Russian  republics and almost that large a share of males in poorer but primarily ethnic Russian oblasts and krays – yet another indication that Moscow, which benefits more from the Putin system than any other federal subject is not paying its way in this way either.

 

Officials Say Mordvin School Closed for Safety Reasons but Local People Blame This Move on Kremlin’s Need to Find Money for Putin’s War

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 24 – Russian authorities have closed the only school in a region within Moldova where Shoksha is used as the language of instruction. Officials say the school had to be closed because it was unsafe, but local residents think that it was shuttered as part of Moscow’s effort to find more money for Putin’s war and that officials will steal any savings anyway.

            Parents say that the school is quite safe ad that they view it as a place where their children can go without risk, and they thus suspect that it has been closed to find money for Putin’s war, to line the pockets of corrupt officials, or as part of an effort to destroy their small language community (okno.group/school-mordovia/).

            Russian officials group the three nationalities of the republic, the Moksha, the Erzya, and the Shoksha, who speak a mixture of the other two and number only about 10,000, into a single Mordvin nation. But the Moksha and Erzya have become increasingly active, and now the Shoksha are doing so as well, at least in part due to Russian plans to close this schools.

            (On the ethnic mix in Mordvinia and the ways in which this has changed both as a result of local activism and Moscow calculations in recent years as the population balance between the Mordvins and Russians has changed, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/04/moscow-increases-repression-of-erzya.html and the sources cited therein.)

            The Shoksha apparently thought they had protected the school by renaming it for one of their number who fought and died in Putin’s war in Ukraine; but the decision to close the school and forces pupils now there to travel to a neighboring district center shows they miscalculated, something that has further fueled their anger and their fears about the future.

            Anger because this small non-Russian nationality sent its sons to fight for Moscow in Ukraine and is being rewarded with this slap in the face; and fears about the future because without such a native language school, the prospects for the survival of this numerically small nationality are anything but good. 

Hundreds of Streets in Russian Cities and Villages Being Renamed for Soldiers who Died Fighting in Ukraine

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 23 – Hundreds of streets in Russian cities and villages are being renamed for soldiers who died fighting in Putin’s war in Ukraine, but while Moscow is playing up some of these changes in toponomy, it hasn’t compiled a list of heroes to be remembered in this way or published a list of how much renaming there has been, Aleksandr Leonidovich says.

            In most cases as far as can be determined, the initiative for such renaming comes from regional or local officials rather than from the Kremlin, even though Putin has twice called for such actions, the Novaya Gazeta journalist says (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2025/08/23/ulitsy-mertvykh-zakhvatchikov).

            Almost in every case, the man honored  was from the place where the street has been renamed, was between 20 and 40 years of age, was a professional soldier or was drafted, and was killed in the course of military operations, Leonidovich reports. Only rarely have men from the Wagnerites or other irregular forces been so honored.

            In one way, this pattern continues Soviet practice – many streets in the Russian Federation were named for such heroes from World War II. But there are two major differences, the journalist says. On the one hand, few of these re-namings took place so soon after the deaths of the soldiers involved. Most came only years later.

            And on the other, the ideological treatment of such Russian heroes now is very different from in the Soviet past. Then, the entire message was that such losses must be avoided in the future. Now, the message is that such losses while regrettable are necessary to defend Russia, a far more aggressive position.

After Text of Peace Accord Agreed Upon, Baku Says It will Increase Defense Spending while Yerevan Signals It Won’t

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 24 – In the wake of the agreement on the text of a peace treaty, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliiyev says that his country will increase defense spending because of continuing uncertainty in the region while Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan says his country views the future with greater optimism and will not boost such spending.

            Their divergent positions on defense spending, Armenian security analyst Aik Khalatyan says, reflect their differing views on the consequences of the peace treaty which is as yet to be signed. But economic conditions in the two countries are also driving this divergence (ng.ru/cis/2025-08-24/1_9322_armenia.html).

            Azerbaijan is larger and wealthier thanks to its export of oil and gas, has a variety of challenges including from Iran and Russia, and thus is committed to spending more on defense in order to be in a position to defend itself against any challenges. Armenia, smaller and poorer, is in a very different position.

            Yerevan boosted defense spending by 20 percent between 2021 and 2025, faces serious budgetary stringencies and hopes to get a peace dividend from its accord with Azerbaijan. As a result, senior Armenian officials have indicated that there won’t be any growth in defense spending in the coming year.

            That could change, however, if Azerbaijan’s defense buildup alarms Armenians or if there is any change in the status of the Russian military base at Gyumri, something that is already a subject of controversy in Armenia (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/08/armenians-demonstrate-to-demand-moscow.html).

            At a minimum, Azerbaijan’s moves in this direction will likely prompt Armenia to seek additional help from Iran, Russia or Western countries. How these countries respond will likely play a key role in the direction Armenia takes in the future.

Moscow Dropping ‘Native Language’ and ‘Native Literature’ from Required Course List of School Programs as of 2026-2027 School Year

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 25 – The Russian Ministry of Enlightenment which oversees primary and secondary education in the Russian Federation has dropped “native language” and “native literature” from its required course list as of the 2026-2027 school year and thus eliminated the option of federal subjects to make these courses obligatory for students.

            Now, pupils can take these courses only if their parents ask for them to be allowed to do so and if the government of the federal subject has sufficient funds available to pay for such instruction (nazaccent.ru/content/44424-shkolnye-predmety-rodnoj-yazyk-i-rodnaya-literatura-stanut-neobyazatelnymi/).

            This move is the latest step in the realization of Putin’s declaration in 2018 that study of non-Russian languages must be voluntary and likely presages a further decline in the number of non-Russians who will be studying their native languages in schools and thus a falloff in the number of non-Russians who will know and use their languages.

            The enlightenment ministry also made the study of a second foreign language voluntary in order to free up time for additional and compulsory hours of classes on Russian history and Russian national traditions.

Armenians Demonstrate to Demand Moscow Close Russian Base at Gyumri, But Others Do So Because They Want It to Remain

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 24 – On August 23, a group led by Armenia’s In the Name of the Republic Party staged a demonstration outside the gate of the Moscow military base at Gyumri to demand that Yerevan insist that that base be closed. A day later, another group of Armenians held a meeting there to demand the base be kept in place.

            The 4,000-man Russian base near Armenia’s second largest city has been in place since the 1990s and currently operates under an agreement that gives Moscow the right to maintain it until 2044. Many Armenians have viewed it as a defender of their country; but Moscow’s failure to back Yerevan over Karabakh and the souring of relations with Russia has changed that.

            (On these protests, the first since Yerevan agreed to allow a US company to supervise a corridor between Azerbaijan and Nakhichivan via Armenia’s Syunik Oblast, see z-truda.ru/articles/raznoe/_v_armenii_nachalas_aktsiya_protesta_protiv_voennoy_bazy_rf_v_gyumri/ and anna-news.info/v-armyanskom-gyumri-proshel-pro-rossijskij-miting/.)

            The Gyumri base has long been controversial in Armenia largely because of the arrogance of Russian commanders regarding relations with Armenian civilians. But until recently, Yerevan remained supportive, viewing it as a useful balance to expanding Azerbaijani and Turkish power in the region.

            (For background on the Gyumri base and the back and forth in Armenia over its future, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/12/russian-militarys-arrest-in-armenia-of.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/02/armenian-defense-minister-says-yerevan.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/01/russian-army-get-out-of-armenia-gyumri.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2018/12/armenians-call-for-russian-base-at.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/01/moscow-agrees-to-try-gyumri-killer-in.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/01/gyumri-events-could-spark-new-war-over.html.)

            As Yerevan and Baku edged toward a settlement and as Yerevan turned away from Moscow toward the West, including a rapprochement with Turkey, Moscow has become alarmed and earlier this summer beefed up the Gyumri base with more men and weapons (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/07/moscow-beefing-up-russian-base-in.html).

            These two protests suggest that the survival of the Russian base at Gyumri is likely to move toward the center of Armenian politics. Moscow and some Armenians will certainly defend it; but an increasing number of Armenians appear to have decided that under new conditions, they have had enough and the base must go.