Russian Chauvinism, at ‘Core’ of Putin’s Policies, Costing Moscow Its Influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus and Its Support at Home, Pastukhov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 1 – Russian chauvinism “has become the core of Russian domestic and foreign policy” under Putin is costing Moscow its positions in Central Asia and the Caucasus and even threatening the Kremlin’s position at home because the xenophobia Russia’s leaders have promoted is leading to demands from the Russian people that the Kremlin can’t afford to meet.

            Indeed, as serious as Russia’s losses in Central Asia and the Caucasus are, its self-inflicted losses at home may prove to be even more consequential, the London-based Russian analyst says, leaving Moscow at risk of being overrun by demands from the population that it can meet only at its peril (charter97.org/ru/news/2025/8/1/650403/).

            At a time when the Russian economy is heading into a period of stagnation, expelling most of the migrant workers from Central Asia and the Caucasus will only make the situation worse, Pastukhov says. But Moscow may find itself forced to at least appear willing to support that potentially fatal step because of the attitudes its policies have produced.

            Both of these developments which are approaching the level of crises are not the result of some specific errors by senior officials but rather arise as a result of “the ideology of Putinism, the basis of which is Russian chauvinism …. An emotional and exulted cult of one’s own ethnic exclusivity and superiority.”

            This chauvinism, Pastukhov argues, “which for years has contributed to Putin’s stability,” is now threatening that stability and more because the regime “has finally discovered that it is not running ahead of the locomotive but ahead of an asphalt paver and must move very quickly lest the propaganda-infused masses do not overtake and crush it.

            The Kremlin’s chauvinism and xenophobia not only is leading ordinary Russians to demand more than Putin can deliver if he hopes to get the economy restarted, the analyst says. It means that the countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus view slights they might otherwise play down as attacks on them and distance themselves further from the Russian Federation.

            According to Pastukhov, there is no chance that Putin will change course; and consequently, these two vectors will intensify even though the Kremlin would be far better off without them. Change will become possible only when a new ruler is in charge – and even then will require a wholesale revision of the Kremlin’s approach.