Russia Likely has Greatest Gender Pay Gap of Any Country in the World, 'NeMoskva' Suggests

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 23 – Using official government figures, Russia ranks third among the countries of the world in the pay gap between men and women, with Russian men earning 30.4 percent more than Russian women, only slightly behind the figures in South Korea and India where the gap is 32.5 percent and 30.4 percent respectively.

            In 2023, the last year for which there were comparable data, Russian men earned on average 87,757 rubles a month while Russian women earned only 61,113. But in reporting these official numbers, the NeMoskva portal noted that these were “only official numbers” (nemoskva.net/2025/09/23/huzhe-situacziya-tolko-v-indii-i-yuzhnoj-koree/).

            According to various people with whom the portal spoke, the actual numbers are different and the gap between genders is far greater. If that is the case, then it is almost certain that the Russian Federation has the greatest gender pay gap of any country in the world at the present time.

Russians Say Income Inequality Far Too Great and Now a Societal Problem, Moscow Sociologist Reports

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 22 – The overwhelming majority of Russians now say that inequality in incomes, ownership of property, and access to medical care is far too large in their country and that these things are now societal problems that should be addressed to correct such injustice, according to Svetlana Mareyeva.

            The scholar at the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences says that her polling shows that Russians believe such problems must be addressed even in cases when they are not seriously affected personally (ng.ru/economics/2025-09-21/1_4_9342_inequality.html).

            Mareyeva says her surveys have found that 72 percent of Russians agree with the statement that “differences in incomes in Russia are now too great,” and 20.3 percent more say they agree with that statement at least in part. Only 7.8 percent say that they disagree with that assertion.

            Here findings suggest that there is a large portion of the Russian population that is concerned about inequality and wants to see it limited, something that the Kremlin cannot afford to ignore lest opposition parties take up the theme in the upcoming round of Duma elections next year. 

Russia’s Current Demographic Crisis ‘Far More Dangerous’ than One in 1990s, Abylkalikov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 24 – The demographic crisis Russia now faces is “far more dangerous” and will be far more difficult to solve than was the one in the 1990s many are inclined to compare it with and assume it will be solved in much the same way, according to Salavat Abylkalikov, a demographer who fled Moscow when Putin began his expanded war in Ukraine..

            Now teaching in Great Britain, he argues that “the key difference” between the current crisis and the earlier one involves migration In the 1990s, many ethnic Russian returned from the newly independent former Soviet republics; but that resource has exhausted itself carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/09/russia-new-demographic-crisis).

            That resource is no longer available, Abylkalikov says. There are far fewer ethnic Russians living abroad and even fewer of them are prepared to move to Putin’s Russia. Moreover, and this adds to the problem the Kremlin faces, fertility rates have declined as well, reducing the chance that Russia can recover demographically in the way Putin promises.

            The demographer’s point is critically important because Putin and most of those who write in Kremlin-controlled media argue that what Russia is facing now is a demographic downturn that will be replaced by an upsurge as Russia goes through the cycles of boom and bust demographics like the ones it has passed since World War II.

            But in fact, the downturn of the 1990s was limited statistically by the return of ethnic Russians from abroad; and the current downturn hasn’t been and won’t be. Combined with the falling fertility rate, that means that the cyclical approach Putin suggests and many others accept about Russian demographic development will not lead to the amount of growth they suggest.

            Putin’s Russia is no longer the attractive destination for some in the former Soviet republics who might want to leave their homelands. But even if the Kremlin leader were to improve things in Russia, those who are available to come would be predominantly non-Russians rather than the Slavs he wants.

            The in-migration of non-Russians could reduce Russia’s demographic decline, but it would do so only by fundamentally changing the ethnic mix of the population, something that is already beginning because many non-Russians inside the Russian Federation have higher birthrates than ethnic Russians do (stav.aif.ru/society/po-dannym-za-2024-god-chechnya-stala-liderom-po-rozhdaemosti-v-rossii https://tass.ru/obschestvo/25165991).

Astrakhan after Three Years of Putin’s Expanded War in Ukraine

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 24 – The last few months have seen a spate of articles about the state of this or that region three years into Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine. (For a review and the reasons these are so important, see jamestown.org/program/reports-from-regions-show-the-cost-of-putins-war-outside-moscow/).

            The latest is about Astrakhan. Written by Oleg Shein, a native of that region and a prominent opposition politician, it highlights both the many problems that Astrakhan shares with other Russian regions and perhaps especially important how different it is from other predominantly ethnic Russian regions (posle.media/article/astrakhan-region-during-the-war).

            Shein draws five conclusions about the state of Astrakhan today that will be familiar to those who follow what has been taking place in other predominantly ethnic Russian regions in particular since the start of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine:

1.     Although extremely rich in natural resources, its population is extremely poor; and that disconnect is increasing. Worker’s incomes have fallen “by at least a quarter” over the last decades, “investment has collapsed,” and “one in every 15 families has left the region.

2.     While less inclined to state patriotism or nationalism than other federal subjects, its residents are empathetic about the country and its population, something that Kremlin propaganda has exploited to generate support for the war.

3.     Bonuses to get men to join the army are “dramatically disproportionate to the income of workers,” but “even these payments have had to be increased 22 times in two years to ensure a relatively small influx of contract soldiers.”

4.     “The regional budget has shrunk by a seventh,” and as a result, spending on basic needs and infrastructure has cratered.

5.     But, Shein says, “there are no direct military hardships, and the population simply live in a state of permanent crisis.”

At the same time, the politician and commentator calls attention to the ways in which Astrakhan may be different from other predominantly ethnic Russian regions:

1.     It is multinational, with nearly a third of its population consisting of Muslim nationalities; but Astrakhan Russians and these peoples coexist with “no interethnic tension” and few problems.

2.     Only seven percent of Astrakhan residents display state patriotism, an idea which “equates the state with the country. That is far lower than in most other regions, and considerably behind the figure in Moscow where 43 percent of the residents make that equation.

3.     Astrakhan residents are more likely to express their views online than in face-to-face conversations, something that makes their attitudes appear to a casual observer more conformist.

4.     Facing serious inflation and thus a decline in living standards, Astrakhan residents say they have lived through such things before and can survive – and expect to.

5.      But the war is hitting them harder in another way. Some 2,000 Astrakhan residents have died in Putin’s Ukrainian war, an enormous figure compared to the only 37 of them who died in the course of the ten years of the Soviet war in Afghanistan.

United Russia Party Increases Its Overwhelming Majorities in Regional and City Assemblies

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 20 – Many observers are treating the just-completed elections in 11 federal subjects and 24 regional capitals as a test run for the 2026 Duma elections. If that is the case, United Russia, usually identified as the Party of Power, has little to fear; and the prospects of all other parties are becoming ever less good.

            Not only did all of the Kremlin-selected governors win terms, but in the legislative assemblies at the regional and urban levels, the Kremlin’s United Russia Party increased its control from 72.5 percent of the seats in 2020 to 80.4 percent this time around. All other parties, except the new New Peoples Party, saw their shares of the remainder drop.

            In one case, in fact, that of the Magadan city council, United Russia now controls all of the seats; and everywhere else saw its majority increase, leaving the remaining parties with little hope that they will be in a position to use their seats in these councils to boost them next year in the Duma elections (semnasem.org/articles/2025/09/19/oedinorossivanie).

            The only reason for thinking that these other parties have any chance at all of a reasonable showing next year is that participation in this year’s vote was low, likely reflecting the ability of officials to get their United Russia constituents to the polls in disproportionate numbers. They may not be equally dominant in the all-Russia Duma elections (versia.ru/lyudi-teryayut-interes-k-vyboram).

Circassians have ‘Nothing to Celebrate’ on Russian-Created ‘Day of the Adyg,’ Activists Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 20 – To counter the national feelings of ethnic minorities, Moscow and its agents in the non-Russian republics have often created holidays nominally boosting those groups but in fact intended to undermine commemorations that are important for them, an approach that sometimes succeeds but more often backfires.

            The latest example of this concerns the creation by Moscow-appointed officials in Kabardino-Balkaria to celebrate on September 20 the Day of the Adyg [the self-designator of Circassian] in place of the traditional Circassian commemoration on May 21 of the anniversary of the Russian expulsion of the Circassians at the end of the Russian advance into their land.

            KBR officials poured enormous sums into marking the September 20 holiday after using their police powers to largely suppression Circassian efforts to mark the May 21 anniversary. But the hopes of Moscow and the KBR that they would change Circassian attitudes have been dashed (kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/415587 and kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/415655).

            Independent Circassian activists both in the North Caucasus homeland where some 700,000 Circassians live and in the diaspora where more than seven million do were nearly unanimous in their declarations that the new holiday was fraudulent because Moscow has left the Circassians with “nothing to celebrate.”

            The Russian authorities have not been willing to meet Circassian demands even half way, they said; and they called for Circassians at home and abroad to consolidate into a single organization capable of standing up to and forcing the Russian authorities and their minions to change course.

            Consequently what Moscow and Nalchik hoped would win Circassians over has further alienated them and radicalized national feelings, something both the Russian authorities and their hand-picked agents in place will be hard-pressed to counter given how transparent their anti-Circassian policies are. 

More than 50,000 Russian Soldiers have Deserted since Start of Putin’s Expanded War in Ukraine in February 2022, UN Expert Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 22 – More than 50,000 soldiers have deserted from the Russia military since the start of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine in February 2022, according to Mariana Katasrova, the UN’s special rapporteur on the status of human rights in the Russian Federation, roughly one in ten of the number Moscow has sent to fight there.

            That figure casts doubt on Kremlin claims regarding popular and military support for Putin’s policies and puts additional pressure on Moscow to replace those who have deserted (ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session60/advance-version/a-hrc-60-59-aev.pdf and novayagazeta.eu/articles/2025/09/22/spetsdokladchik-oon-po-rossii-okolo-10-rossiian-uchastvuiushchikh-v-voine-s-ukrainy-dezertirovali-s-fronta-news).

            The Russian government and its supporters can be counted on to dispute these findings, but they are likely to be close to the truth given that there is now an entire literature in the independent Russian media about desertions and even how soldiers can leave the ranks in this way. (For a discussion of that, see zona.media/article/2025/09/17/run.)

More than 300 Russian Schools on Brink of Collapse, and in the Last Five Years, More than 30 Have

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 20 – One of the most obvious signs that the Russian government doesn’t care about the Russian people is the state of its schools: At present, more than 300 of them are so poorly maintained that they are at risk of collapse, something that over the last five year, more than 30 have done.

            What makes this situation especially unfortunate is that in addition to these figures, there are many more schools without indoor plumbing or even running water and that aren’t on these government lists because officials judge that although they are in bad condition, they aren’t at risk of falling down on the heads of the children.

            Vladimir Putin has announced a program to improve the situation, but so far, the money doesn’t appear to be going for its intended purpose but into the hands of the bureaucracy (svpressa.ru/accidents/article/483069/ and semnasem.org/articles/2025/09/24/v-31-rossijskoj-shkole-proizoshli-obrusheniya-pochemu).

            These problems and the fact that they disproportionately affect schools in non-Russian areas and poorer Russian ones are seldom discussed except when a school actually collapses as one did a few days ago in Tatarsk (sibreal.org/a/zdes-normalnogo-nichego-net-v-tatarske-obrushilas-shkola/33537109.html).

            Only then do officials feel compelled to acknowledge that there is a problem and promise to do something, although history suggests that these promises at a time when the Kremlin needs money for Putin’s war in Ukraine are unlikely to be fulfilled and that more schools will collapse, a fitting metanym for the Putin regime. 

Russia has Built Only One Icebreaker Since Putin Began His Expanded War in Ukraine

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 22 – In the more than three years since Putin began his expanded war in Ukraine, Russian yards have built only one new icebreaker far fewer than the one a year they had been building prior to that time and far less than Moscow needs to ensure the Northern Sea Route carries the amount of freight Putin has called for.

            And that reduction in new construction compounds Russia’s problems in this sector because three of its existing icebreakers are so old that they are slated to go out of service in the next two years, according to a survey of the situation conducted by the BBC’s Russian Service (bbc.com/russian/articles/c5yjg68yv1vo).

            While Russia has more icebreakers than any other country, its lead is threatened by its reduction in the building of new ones and the fact that 19 of the 45 icebreakers it now has are more than 40 years old and need frequent maintenance which means they cannot perform their duties.

            These problems reflect longstanding problems in the Russian shipbuilding industry ranging from corruption to a shortage of drydocks and other facities, all of which have been intensified by sanctions that mean Moscow can’t acquire all the electronics it needs to ensure that its vessels are truly up to date.

            Such difficulties are not immediately fatal to Russian aspirations, but they should be kept in mind given Putin’s claims about Russian progress in building new icebreakers and achieving his goals in the still-ice bound Arctic and especially in the eastern portion of the Northern Sea Route where icebreakers are still required for almost all shipping. 

Estonia Must Proactively Help Nearby Russian Regions Overcome Moscow-Imposed Consciousness, Shtepa Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 22 – The Forum of Free Peoples of Post-Russia has succeeded in calling attention to the fact that the Muscovite empire is doomed to collapse because the peoples within its current borders are not the monolithic unity the Kremlin claims but rather enormously diverse, Vadim Shtepa says.

            But the editor of the Tallinn-based Region.Expert portal says those taking part in the Forum and others who share their views have not done is talk much about how the empire will fall apart (epl.delfi.ee/artikkel/120405252/vadim-stepa-alustagem-venemaa-teadlikku-lagundamist-pihta-saab-hakata-vastupropagandaga-eesti-naabruses in Estonian; and region.expert/media-project/ in Russian).

            Instead, they have engaged in wishful thinking in much the same way as did many in the first Russian emigration after 1917. They, “sitting on their suitcases,” Russians who had fled the Bolsheviks believed that the Soviet state would simply collapse; now, Russians in emigration assume a similar fate awaits the Russian empire once Putin leaves the scene.

            But both the one and the other largely ignored “the main question – how is this to be achieved in practice,” Shtepa says.  Many seem to believe that the future will be much like the past of 1991 with the republic and regional parliaments moving to claim sovereignty. “But today, it is impossible to imagine” that any body will take such a step.

            What happened at the end of the 1980s was that under Gorbachev there was a fundamental change in civic consciousness among the peoples of the USSR and as a result, they “began to demand freedom and self-administration,” the Russian regionalist says. The question that must be asked is can an analogous change in consciousness happen now?

            It certainly won’t happen on its own, and it is unlikely to happen without outside assistance given the totalitarian powers of the Putin state.  But there is at least one promising possibility that countries living around the edge of the Russian Federation should continue if they want to help its peoples.

            Estonia, for example, could create “a new media project directed at neighboring Russian regions – Ingria, St. Petersburg, Karelia and Pskov, Shtepa suggests. Instead of being reactive as are most such projects, this could be “proactive” and point out to the peoples of these regions the realities of their situation and what they must do to change them.

            “Of course,” he continues, “the Russian authorities would block such an ‘extremist’ website, but local residents all the same would read it via VPN.” That would promote the kind of change in consciousness that is necessary for all the other steps needed to achieve what many now assume will somehow happen even if they do nothing to bring it about. 

Numerically Small Peoples in Russian Federation More Likely to Be Overwhelmed and Replaced by Immigrants than are Larger Nations, KPRF Duma Deputy Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 22 – The fiercest opponents of immigration into the Russian Federation should be “not the Russians but the numerically small peoples” because they are more likely to be overwhelmed and replaced by immigrants, according to Mikhail Matveyev, an KPRF Duma deputy.

            “There are still more than 100 million ethnic Russians,” he says, and so those who want to see them ruled by ‘a great caliphate’ are going to have to wait for some time.” But it is entirely possible that immigrants could easily overwhelm the smaller peoples of the Russian Federation and form new Kosovos (iarex.ru/news/150639.html).

            Matveyev cites Sakha (Yakutia) as one place where this could happen especially since the republic’s leadership is promoting immigration from Central Asian and South Caucasus countries. If republic leaders succeed, it is not hard to imagine that the Yakuts will be overwhelmed.

            That is something people in that republic should think about instead of being anti-Russian.

Udmurts Issue New Declaration of Sovereignty, 35 Years after Moscow Suppressed the First

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 20 – On this, the 25^th anniversary of the Declaration of the Sovereignty of the Udmurt Republic in 1990, which Izhevsk denounced and Moscow suppressed, the Udmurtia Against Corruption organization has issued an updated version, one that calls for the restoration of democratic institutions in an Udmurt Republic within a future democratic Russian Federation.

            Because of its potential importance not only for Udmurtia, a Christian Finno-Ugric republic in the Middle Volga, but also for other republics within the Russian Federation who took part in the so-called parade of sovereignties in 1990, an informal translation of the new declaration (available at telegra.ph/DEKLARACIYA-09-20) is offered here:

On the 35^th anniversary of the Declaration of 1990, the Udmurtia Against Corruption movement declares its respect for the expression of the will of the people of Udmurtia then and on the basis of the principles laid down in the document and the voting of residents of the republic in 2025 proposes a renewed declaration as the basis for the restoration of the democratic institutions of the Udmurt Republic within the Russian Federation in the future.

1.     The Udmurt Republic is a democratic legal state within the RF. The development of the Udmurt Republic in the future must be carried out by the equal participation of all nations and nationalities of the republic in all spheres of state conduction. The relationship of the Udmurt Republic to the RF in the future must be defined by a Federative Treat or other forms of agreement. Treaties and agreements with the RF which affect the interests of the Udmurt Republic must be concluded with its participation and with its agreement.

2.     Residents of the republic of all nationalities form the people of Udmurtia. The people of Udmurtia is the only source of power in the republic. Popular power must be realized both directly and via peoples’ deputies elected to the Parliament of the Republic and assemblies at local levels. In Udmurtia, no political party, social organization and formations or individuals must speak in the name of the entire people of the republic. Only the Parliament of the Republic has that right.

3.     The Udmurt Republic must have independence regarding decisions about all questions of state, economic and social life with the exception of those which it voluntarily gives to the RF. At the same time, the principle of the supremacy of laws of the RF, accepted within the limits of the authority voluntarily given by the republics of the RF, on the basis of a Federative Treaty or other agreements, must be recognized. The action of legislative and other acts of the RF, which contradict the sovereignty rights of the republic must stop. Disagreements must be resolved on the basis of rules set by the Federative Treaty and other agreements. The right of the republic to the ownership, use and distribution of land (property) and all natural resources on the territory of Udmurtia remains the property of the Republic, and the economic and scientific potential of institutions established in Udmurtia belong to the republic.

4.     The Udmurt Republic must independently conduct its own financial, credit and investment policies, form its onw state budget, establish the rules for the formation of financial and other funds of the republic. Enterprises, institutions, organizations and the objects of other states and their citizens as well as international organizations can be situated on the territory of the Udmurt Republic and such instituitons can be used only according ot the legislation of the Udmurt Republic. In the Udmurt Republic must be guaranteed the defense of all forms of property as established by law.

5.     The territory of the Udmurt Republic in its existing borders is indivisible and cannot be changed without the agreement of the people living on it as expressed by means of a referendum. The Udmurt Republic must decide all question of the administrative-territorial arrangements in it independently.

6.     All citizens living on the territory of the Udmurt Republic are guaranteed the rights and freedoms as established by the generally recognized norma of international law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Udmurt Republic must guarantee all political parties, public organizations, mass movements, and religious organizations equal opportunities to take part in social life and the administration of government affairs.

7.     In the Udmurt Republic must be guaranteed the equality of the functioning of Russian and Udmurt languages as state languages as well as the right to the preservation and development of the languages of other nationalities. The Russian language is the language of inter-ethnic communication. The free choice of the language of education and use is an inalienable right of each resident of the republic.

8.     In the Udmurt Republic must be secured the fulfillment of the legal political, economic, ethnic and cultural rights of nations and nationalities living in the Republic. The Udmurt Republic must provide humanitarian help to Udmurts living beyond the borders of the republic toward the satisfaction of their national, cultural and linguistic needs.

9.     This declaration, based on the Declaration of Sovereignty of the Udmurt Republic – 1990 will be offered for broad discussion among residents of Udmurtia in the future as the basis for the development by the Parliament of the Republic of a renewed Constitution of the Udmurt Republic.”

 

Ivan Fedoseyev, one of the founders of the Udmurtia against Corruption movement, says that the new declaration reflects “the enormous desire for normality” among the people of Udmurtia (nemoskva.net/2025/09/20/est-ogromnyj-zapros-na-normalnost-aktivisty-iz-udmurtii-opublikovali-obnovlennuyu-deklaracziyu-o-suverenitete-respubliki/).

Lukashenka Tightening Control over Belarusians, Belarusian Helsinki Committee Warns

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 17 – At a time when Minsk is winning plaudits from some Western governments for its release of a few political prisoners, Lukashenka is tightening government control over the lives of Belarusians as a whole through the introduction of increasingly totalitarian laws, the Belarusian Helsinki Committee warns.

            Yekaterina Deykalo, a lawyer for that group, tells RFI’s Russian service that the Belarusian dictator is not only moving in the same directions Putin is in Russia but in some regards is even exceeding him in repression (rfi.fr/ru/европа/20250918-белорусский-хельсинкский-комитет-государство-усиливает-контроль-за-личной-жизнью-белорусов).

            Among the measures that Lukashenka has introduced are laws restricting the rights of sexual minorities, the right of those living in Belarus to take online courses from foreign educational institutions, and the right of Belarusians to choose their own professions rather than have the government make such decisions.

            And at the same time, Deykalo continues, Lukashenka has militarized the country’s educational system and opened the way for even more government monitoring of the private lives of Belarusians, all things that should be kept in mind by those who view his release of a few prisoners as a genuine turning point. 

Moscow Ramps Up Spending Abroad to Promote Russian Language and Win Russian Loyalists There

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 17 – At a time when the US is cutting back or even eliminating programs directed at foreign audiences and the Russian government is slashing programs for Russians at home to pay for Putin’s war, Moscow is dramatically increasing its funding for the promotion of the Russian language and for cultivating loyalty to Moscow among foreigners. 

            A year ago, Putin called for such moves (interfax.ru/russia/964384); and they have now happened (istories.media/stories/2025/09/16/novoye-pokolenie-2025/). The Kremlin is now spending 3.5 times for to promote the Russian language abroad and more than 50 percent more to bring young people to Russia in hopes of winning them over as sympathizers to Moscow.

            How successful either of these programs will be remains to be seen. Russian language use continues to decline internationally, and foreigners who get free trips to the Russian Federation may be put off rather than won over. But the money Moscow is spending shows that the Kremlin considers them as key to its expansion of Russian influence abroad. 

In Russian Stores, Prices are Not Only Going Up but Mix of Goods Available is Going Down

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 17 – Russians now face not just rising prices in stores but a decline in the mix of products available for purchase, Kommersant reports. Over the last year, this decline has hit alcoholic beverages, children’s goods and face creams hardest, and likely affects the judgment of Russians about the state of the economy even more than widely reported inflation rates.

            The Moscow newspaper cites studies which have found the assortment of goods in Russian stores has fallen 15 to 20 percent overall since the beginning of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine in February 2022 and points to a variety of factors at work (kommersant.ru/doc/8039527 and ehorussia.com/new/node/33376).

            A major one is that rents are rising and stores are on average reduce their size and thus have less room for variety, but other factors undoubtedly include the impact of sanctions and the decline in the ruble exchange rate against other currencies.  But whatever the cause, Russians now have less choice and face higher prices than when Putin began his war. 

If Moscow Doesn’t Admit More Immigrants, Russia’s Population will Fall More than Half by 2100, ‘To Be Precise’ Portal Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 18 – If Russia admits and retains as many immigrants as it currently does for the rest of this century, its population will decline by 44 percent to 81 million people; but if it blocks immigration, then the Russian population will decline by 54 percent to 68 million, according to the calculations of the To Be Precise portal.

            The growth or decline of a country’s population depends on three factors: the birthrate, the deathrate reflecting both public health and the aging of the population, and migration as people enter or leave the country, the portal’s Slava Matveyev says (tochno.st/materials/esli-demograficeskaia-situaciia-ne-izmenitsia-k-2100-godu-naselenie-rossii-sokratitsia-do-81-milliona-celovek).

            The Putin regime has tried to boost the birthrate so far without much success, thus making the other two factors more significant in terms of outcomes. It has also cut back on public health, something that means deathrates if current trends continue will continue to rise, pressing down population growth more dramatically.

            That leaves migration flows as the key factor; and To Be Precise decided to compare expert projections of how large the population of the Russian Federation in its current borders will be if immigration continues or if the government seeks to block new immigrants and even expel those already there.

            Unless immigration continues or even expands, predominantly ethnic Russians will suffer far greater declines than the all-country trend than will the predominantly Muslim areas of the North Caucasus where birthrates while falling from what they were earlier are still much higher than in ethnic Russian ones.

            Thus, the choice about how many immigrants should be allowed in will affect not only how large the population of the country will be in 2100 but also what the ethnic and religious mix of that population will be. In the increasingly nationalistic atmosphere of Russia today, that will not be welcome news. 

As Their Own Needs Go Unmet, Russians Increasingly Angry about How Putin’s War has Unjustly Enriched Soldiers But Not Brought Victory, Gallyamov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 17 – Since Putin launched his expanded war in Ukraine three years ago, the Russian government has given enormous bonuses to get Russians to sign up to fight there. Initially, Russians accepted that as something in the nature of things; but now they are beginning to view this arrangement as fundamentally unjust, according to Abbas Gallyamov.

            As their own needs go unmet, the commentator says, Russians are increasingly resentful about such payments, especially as the regime keeps talking about what it is doing in that regard and as those being paid by the government to fight haven’t yet brought home the convincing victory the Kremlin has repeatedly promised (pointmedia.io/story/68cd1a33e25aea416748a8bf).

            Such feelings are an important step toward the delegitimization of the war in the eyes of the Russian people, with anger about the newly rich veterans growing into anger at the government that made their rise possible, especially as Russians view wealth largely as a zero-sum game in which any group’s gains lead to the losses of the benefits others have had.

Association of Siberian and Far Eastern Cities Now Unites Areas with Nearly 10 Percent of Russian Population

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 17 – One of the last remnants of the golden age of regional associations in the Russian Federation in the 1990s is the Association of Siberian and Far Eastern Cities whose members will meet this week in Ulan-Ude, the capital of the Buryat Republic, to discuss city planning and energy issues (asiarussia.ru/news/47675/).

            Except for such meetings, the group rarely gets much media attention beyond that provided by its own web page (asdg.ru) and telegram channel (t.me/s/asdgmsu/971). But because of the role its members played in the past and could play in the future, it deserves more attention than it has been receiving.

            The group, founded in 1986, now has 53 member cities whose population total some 12 million people, almost ten percent of the population of the Russian Federation as a whole. In the course of its history, the ASFEC has organized more than 860 conferences and serves as a communication network for mayors and administrators.

            It was out of this group that many of the then-powerful regional associations arose in the 1990s when Moscow was weak, and it is quite likely that it will be from groups like ASFEC that regional challenges to the capital will emerge again during leadership translation once Putin leaves the scene. 

Moscow Destroying Russia’s Forests Ever More Rapidly, Environmentalists Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 15 – Because Russia still has more forested land than any other country, Moscow has felt free to pursue policies that are destroying that land far faster than officials are acknowledging, experts say, destroying old growth forests rather than cultivating new growths for harvest and responding to fires rather than preventing them.

            Last year alone, Russia lost 5.6 million hectares of forested land, according to official statistics; but the real loss was higher because it hit old forests more heavily than new ones and fires spread even more rapidly than in earlier years, Kedr journalist Anna Sadovina says (kedr.media/explain/mestorozhdenie-breven/).

            She says that Moscow officials have sought to hide these losses by speaking only about the area Russian forests still occupy, thus ignoring the critical difference between old growth and new growth trees and concealing as much as possible Moscow’s failure to prevent rather than only react and often poorly to forest fires.

            These denials and the extensive approach to this natural resource it highlights mean that Russia is losing its forests at such a rate that in the coming decades it won’t have the trees that it needs for construction and paper and will lose one of the most important natural means of fighting global warming.