In Unprecedented Move, Putin Puts Ethnic Russians at Center of Moscow’s Nationality Policy

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 25 –In the past, Moscow’s nationality policy has always been about how the center treats the non-Russian living in that country rather than about how it treats the ethnic Russian majority. But now, Vladimir Putin has changed that, putting ethnic Russians at the center of nationality policy and demanding that the non-Russians defer to them.

            Even when Moscow pursued intensive Russianization and Russification campaigns, the official doctrine about ethnic issues focused on the non-Russians rather on the ethnic Russians; and so Putin’s doctrinal change is likely to represent a sea change in Moscow’s approach to what are historically called “nationality” issues, pleasing Russians and frightening non-Russians.

            This week, Putin signed a new nationality doctrine paper setting out his plans for the next decade (publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202511250024). The 41-page document replaces the current doctrinal paper that was issued in 2012 and has been updated twice since that time. The provisions of the new paper will go into effect on January 1.

            Among the key provisions of the new strategy document are the following:

·       The share of the population identifying as non-ethnic Russians is to rise to “more than 95 percent” by 2036.

·       This identity is to reflect “the common cultural code based on the preservation and development of ethnic Russian culture and the Russian language.”

·       The realization of the strategy is intended to “reduce the number of conflicts on an ethno-national basis” and unite all the country’s peoples around the ethnic Russian nation.

·       Moscow will devote a minimum of 50 percent of its spending on the survival and development of nations to efforts intended to help the ethnic Russian nation.

·       The Russian government will develop new programs to counter Russophobic propaganda among non-Russians emanating from hostile forces abroad, but it recognizes that the primary source of non-Russian challenges to Moscow come from domestic non-Russian elites and populations.

·       Moscow will also increase its efforts to reverse the formation of ethnic enclaves in Russian cities that have arisen as a result of immigration.

·       And it will work to integrate the newly acquired regions of the Russian Federation in the Donbass and Crimea on the basis of Russian values and seek to unify the Russian emigration to help Russia at home.

Not surprisingly, Russian commentators are celebrating these changes, with one suggesting they will prevent any repetition of the collapse of 1991 (vz.ru/news/2025/11/26/1376668.html) and another saying that finally the Kremlin has put an end to “the non-Russian Russia” that the Soviets imposed on the country (vz.ru/opinions/2025/11/26/1376788.html).

Undoubtedly many non-Russians are unhappy with this major shift in Moscow’s thinking, a change that goes far beyond what Putin has sought before, including making reference to ethnic Russians as the “state-forming nation,” something that he did not seek in the end during the last revisions of the constitution.

What these changes will mean, both in terms of specific policies and institutions, very much remains to be seen; but it is likely that it will intensify debates about a variety of issues – and very well may exacerbate ethnic tensions with ethnic Russians confident they will be supported and non-Russians fearing they are about to be subject to greater repression.