To Avoid Problems and Keep Their Jobs, Russian Officials Frequently Go Well Beyond Putin’s Specific Orders, Bondaryov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Nov. 3 – Many believe that Putin gives the orders for each and every repressive move in the Russian Federation or at least defines their scope, Boris Bondaryov says; but in fact, many officials go well beyond even what the Kremlin ruler intends because they know that being pro-active is less threatening to their careers than simply doing what he specifies.

            As a result, it a serious mistake to place Putin for each and every act of repression in Russia today, the former Russian diplomat who resigned in 2022 to protest Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. The culture of the bureaucracy plays a major role in expanding what is done beyond what Putin may plan (themoscowtimes.com/2025/11/03/dont-blame-putin-alone-for-russias-misdeeds-its-the-system-a91024).

            That is not to say that Putin is not responsible for many horrific actions or that he doesn’t set the tone, Bondaryov continues; but it suggests that the system he has molded includes bureaucrats who have learned that they won’t be blamed for being too repressive but may lose their jobs after the fact if they are not.

            And consequently, these bureaucrats rather than Putin bear primary responsibility for some of the more absurd and hyperbolic applications of Putin’s statements and actions. That means something else as well: for Russia to change, more will be required than just the departure of Putin from the scene. This bureaucratic culture will have to be changed too.

            For Russian bureaucrats, he continues, “passivity is a risk. The only way to protect yourself is to act. Or better – to overreact. Excessive zeal might earn you a scolding, but inaction leads to questions or even dismissal. It is not the fear of repression [that is behind such moves] but of losing one’s comfort and position.”

            According to Bondaryov, “this fear of becoming the one who failed to act, the one who didn’t notice or stayed silent, is one of the key psychological springs of the Russian state apparatus. It focuses people at the lower and middle levels of power to act on their own initiative without waiting for orders.”

            And they do not, “not out of ideological hatred or because Putin personally instructed them. They act preemptively to avoid blame as the weak link that would attract attention from above … This is how most repressive mechanisms actually operate: not only from the top downward, but from the bottom upward as well.”

Despite this, “the myth that all repressions come from the Kremlin is a convenient way to explain everything and swerve personal responsibility. It is easier to believe that a single villain gave an order than to accept that the system functions in such a way that thousands of individuals every day act as they do because it is safer and more advantageous for them.”

“But if we are honest, this system is upheld not by one person, but by countless individuals who make decisions locally. Their fears, careers, instincts for self-preservation and desire to demonstrate loyalty create the very environment we call repressive.’ And as long as we see only Putin in this, we will not understand how it truly works.”