Buddhist Cossacks Appear to Be Making a Comeback in Buryatia, with Ulan Ude's Support

Paul Goble
    Staunton, Nov. 30 – Many in Moscow and the West assume to this day that all Cossacks are Russian Orthodox in religion and Russian-speaking as far as language is conerned, but in fact, many have been and some remain followers of Islam, Judaism and Buddhism and speak other languages (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/10/not-all-of-russias-cossacks-are.html).
    In trying to mobilize the Cossacks for its own purposes, the Putin regime has sometimes tried to wipe out these attachments and at other times has made concessions to them because most Cossacks regardless of faith and language are quite prepared to fight for Russia against enemies foreign and domestic.
    Moscow has been relatively tolerant of Buddhist Cossacks in Kalmykia, a republic that adjoins the North Caucasus (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/09/kalmyk-cossack-leaders-must-now-receive.html); but it has been less so to Buddhist Cossacks in Buryatia in the Russian Far East.
    Now that may be about to change, as Moscow needs more soldiers for its war in Ukraine, the Russian authorities appear to be ready to look to those who are ready to serve regardless of their religion and even language. That is giving both “registered” Cossacks who are part of Putin’s regime and genuine, unregistered ones a chance.
    Not surprisingly, reporting about this is scarce. But the Buryat government is proudly reporting that its Cossack community has been named the second best among those regions with a smaller number of Cossacks relative to population (egov-buryatia.ru/press_center/news/detail.php?ID=185817 and asiarussia.ru/news/43680/).
    Ulan Ude reports that there are now 21 Cossack stanitsas in the republic, 14 of which are part of the Transbaikal Cossack host that is recognized by and supported by Moscow and seven of which are not part of that body and presumably more traditional and likely, in this case,  more Buddhist.
    Significantly, Buryat officials say they are supporting both, an indication that Moscow’s manpower demands related to Putin’s war in Ukraine are giving Cossacks less affected by the center’s procrustean approach to the Cossack tradition. And what that means is this: in the short term, Moscow benefits; but in the longer term, it may find itself the loser.