Paul Goble
Staunton, Jan. 5 – Up to a year ago, the governments of many of Russia’s federal subjects competed with each other as to the size of the payments they were prepared to make to those who signed contracts to serve in the Russian military, but then these governments cut back because they didn’t have the money for this and for other unfunded liabilities.
For an outline of this history of the rise and fall in the size of such payments by regional and republic governments, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/10/russian-regions-offering-ever-higher.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/06/short-of-cash-russias-federal-subjects.html.
Moscow pushed the regions to increase the sign-up bonuses they offered in order to fill the rapidly depleting ranks of the Russian army without having to take any public steps in the capital that might have led more people to ask questions about what was happening in Ukraine and just how large Russian losses there have been.
Then, as the war went into its third year, regions began reducing the size of the bonuses they offered; and Moscow chose not to intervene even behind the scene. But now that appears to be changing, raising new questions about Russian losses and about the ability of regions to offer larger bonuses again and to compete with bonus tourism as men travel to those with the largest.
Those questions are prompted by a decision by Tatarstan to increase the sign-up bonuses it offers by six times to 2.5 million rubles (30,000 US dollars), something it can afford to do as a relatively well off federal subject but that most others can’t unless they cut budgets significantly in other areas (idelreal.org/a/v-tatarstane-v-shest-s-lishnim-raz-do-2-5-mln-rubley-uvelichili-razmer-edinovremennoy-vyplaty-za-podpisanie-kontrakta-na-voynu-s-ukrainoy-/33640262.html).
Because Putin in recent weeks has held up Tatarstan as a model federal subject, most other federal subjects will likely feel under pressure to duplicate what Kazan has done. But if they try to do so, they will have to cut spending on things local people rely on or press Moscow to give them more money to be able to help.
Both of these things risk triggering a political crisis, one that many regional officials apparently had felt had passed when they were able last year to cut back on such subsidies. But the Kremlin’s need for cannon fodder is so large that Putin appears less worried about such an outcome than he does about not having enough troops to continue to fight his war as he wants.
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