Putin’s Much-Ballyhooed Pledge to Set Up Office to Help Russians Find MIAs Doesn’t have a Website, an Address or a Telephone Number, Soldiers’ Rights Activists Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 29 – Groups of Russians searching for relatives who are MIAs in Putin’s war in Ukraine have existed since that conflict exploded in 2022. Putin has responded by ordering the creation of a defense ministry office to help them, but that office, the Veter portal says, doesn’t have a website, a physical address or a telephone number.

            As such, it is so much “eyewash,” activists say that doesn’t help and relatives of MIAs who push for information are not given real help but instead often denounced as pro-Ukrainian disidents rather than genuinely patriotic Russians (veter.info/posts/p8LIsdJDgJbB and  novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/07/29/nagnetanie-chuvstva-zabroshennosti-i-bessiliia).

            As the war has continued and the Putin regime has adopted this stonewall approach, a new and large class of Russian citizens whose relatives have gone missing in action are increasingly alienated from the regime and speaking out in ever more radical ways.

            Russians are especially exercised by the failure of the Russian authorities to do more especially since Russian law and defense ministry regulations are very specific about the responsibilities of commanders and other authorities to go to extraordinary lengths to find those listed as MIAs.

            The powers that be aren’t doing so; and Putin’s promises, combined with the failure of the military to live up to its responsibilities and of the defense ministry to at least establish a website and phone number for those seeking information about such cases, are only adding insult to injury. 

Since 2022, Moscow has Sought to ‘Rebrand’ Jazz as an Authentic Part of Russian Tradition, Okhotenko Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 29 – As Putin increased repression in the years before he launched his expanded war in Ukraine, “music emerged as one of the few remaining areas for public dissent,” Yana Okhotenko says; but  after 2022, the Russian music scene was “transformed” both as an instrument of state ideology and a form of personal expression.”

            In a lengthy article, the Russian musician now living in emigration offers an intriguing answer to the question: “If the state turns music into a weapon of propaganda, can music in turn become a weapon of protest?” (posle.media/article/russian-music-after-2022-between-propaganda-and-protest).

            After the expanded war began, the Kremlin stepped up its “demands not just for passive patriotism from its citizens – the silent loyalty that had once been enough no longer was – and insisted on active allegiance,” thus forcing musicians who had tried to remain apolitical to choose between working for there regime, actively opposing it, or choosing to emigrate.

            She gives numerous examples of how various musicians have navigated this divide but provides an especially intriguing example in how the Russian authorities have shifted in their treatment of jazz. “From the early 2000s until 2022,” she writes, jazz in Russia “thrived as part of an independent club and festival scene” closely integrated with western artists.

            But following the invasion, she continues, the regime redefined jazz not as a recent import but “as an authentically Russian tradition, downplaying the repression the Russian and soviet authorities had inflicted on it and even making the claim that “Russia has the coolest jazz musicians.”

            That is just one of the changes since 2022, Okhotenko says. Since then, “the Russian state has not only worked to reengineer the cultural landscape but also to systematically purge independent voices.” And is has come up with as strategy that makes protest by many musicians extremely difficult.

            This tactic consists of allowing musicians with opposition views to continue to perform alongside artists that the state approves of but not advertising the participation of the former in any advertising of the shows they are part of. Consequently, many Russian artists now are in a limbo: they can continue to perform but can’t count on reaching new audiences.

            Nonetheless, many Russian musicians have left the country since the expanded war n Ukraine began. According to estimates at the end of 2022, approximately 30 percent of Russia’s professional musicians have emigrated, sometimes to halfway houses like Armenia and Georgia and increasingly often to western countries.

            These artists face many problems including making a living and maintaining a distinct national identity while integrating with the music scene in the countries they now live in. Many continue to protest but their voices are mostly heard only abroad and only by those who already share their views, limiting their impact however much Western coverage they receive.

Crimes against Women in North Caucasus Seldom Reported or Investigated, Rights Activists Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 29 – Crimes against women, including violence within the family, rapes and honor killings are seldom reported in the North Caucasus because of fears of conflicts with families and society and, when they are reported, they are seldom investigated because officials don’t want to call attention to the problem.

            That is the unanimous verdict of the most important human rights groups working in the area, as summarized by Kavkaz-Uzel; and it explains why statistics about these crimes are completely unreliable and even have the effect of distorting all-Russian figures (kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/425319).

            As a result, the claims of the republic governments and even of Moscow about progress against such crimes should be treated with extreme skepticism and even disbelief, the activists say, because both social norms in the population and the calculations of officials mean that neither regional nor all-Russian figures are credible.

Kazakhstan’s Executive Branch Already Mono-Ethnic Kazakh and Its Legislative One has been Moving in That Direction, Asylbekov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 20 – Even though people who are not ethnic Kazakhs still form a quarter of the country’s population, the composition of officials in the executive branch of its government at both the center and in the region’s has become almost exclusively ethnic Kazakh and that of the legislative branch has been moving in that direction, Zhandos Asylbekov says.

            Unless this trend changes, it could exacerbate tensions in society, the head of the statistics department of Kazakhstan’s Procuracy says; but in the run up to the elections to the new unicameral legislature, it isn’t being discussed apparently because of “an unspoken taboo” (spik.kz/2667-najdutsja-li-v-kurultae-mesta-dlja-deputatov-nekazahov-i-skolko.html).

            Even in areas where ethnic Kazakhs form less than half of the population – Northern Kazakhstan and Kustanay oblasts – the minority majority of ethnic Russians and others is largely unrepresented in regional or even local executive branch positions, something non-ethnic Kazakhs have complained out, Asylbekov says.

            In the national legislature in the past, the share of non-ethnic Kazakhs has been less than their share of the population, although this metric as bounced around depending on the use of single member districts or party lists to determine outcomes, between 14 percent at its lowest point and “almost 30 percent” at its highest.

            The composition of the new single-member parliament will be determined exclusively by party list voting rather than single-member district majority voting and so that makes the decisions of the parties to include or not include non-ethnic Kazakhs on their lists critical.

            At present, most of these are far more ethnically Kazakh than is the population; and so it is likely but not certain that the new single-house parliament will be even more ethnic Kazakh than the current two-house one is and than the population is as well, Asylbekov says, noting that this could cause problems if that turns out to be the case.

Kazakhstan President Offers New Model for Dealing with Moscow, ‘Partnership without Political Alignment,’ Toyekin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 29 – During his July 25 meeting with Vladimir Putin, Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev offered a new model for non-Russian leaders dealing with Moscow: committing his country to “partnership” with Russia but not promising “political alignment” on all questions, Almat Toyekin says.

            The Kazakhstan analyst focuses on the way in which Tokayev acted; but perhaps indicative of his real goals in writing this piece, he placed it in the Caspian Post, an outlet devoted to South Caucasus affairs where Azerbaijan President Ilham Alyev has moved in a similar question (caspianpost.com/opinion/kazakhstan-s-message-to-moscow-partnership-without-political-alignment).

            What both Tokayev and Aliyev now offer is a new model of how the governments of the countries that gained independence in 1991 when the USSR disintegrated, one that represents a kind of halfway house between continuing subservience to Moscow that the Kremlin wants and the complete break with Moscow that many see as the only or at least ultimate pattern.

            Obviously, the Russian government will seek to limit movement in these directions; but by offering commitment to partnership without agreeing to support Moscow on all questions, many of these countries may find a way to navigate through what is a political minefield and prevent the Kremlin from taking more radical actions.

            Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are perhaps best equipped to strike out in this direction. They have large oil reserves, occupy portions of the geopolitical map especially important to both Russia and outside powers, and have been building up both their diplomatic and military strength.

            But they are not alone, and many of the others in the region may see what Tokayev and Aliyev are doing as an attractive next stage in their national life, one that may allow them to expand their independence from Moscow in a safer way than a clearer break with the past might allow.

            At the very least, this possibility deserves both attention and understanding, as the demise of the Russocentric empire continues. 

Only Four Percent of Russians Charged with Espionage or Treason had Access to State Secrets, ‘Vyorstka’ Study Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 29 – Only one in every 25 of people who have been charged by Russian prosecutors with espionage or treason – a mere four percent in all -- had access to state secrets before their arrests, according to a comprehensive study by Vyorstka of these cases, an indication of how Moscow is using an elastic definition against its opponents.

            Since the beginning of 2022, it says, Russian prosecutors have brought charges of high treason, espionage and cooperate with foreign states against at least 1904 individuals, the independent portal says, even though most have no connection with state secrets. Two thirds of them are Russian citizens; the remainder, Ukrainian ones.

(For Vyorstka’s extremely detailed 10,000-word report, perhaps the most comprehensive in the public domain, see verstka.media/issledovanie-vyorstki-o-presledovanii-po-delam-svyazannym-s-gosbezopasnostyu; for its highlights, see nemoskva.net/2026/07/29/lish-4-figurantov-novyh-del-o-gosizmene-imeli-dostup-k-gostajne/.)

            Not only have the use of such charges increased over the past four years but the severity of punishments have as well. In 2022, the average sentence on conviction for such trumped up charges was 12 years. So far this year Vyorstka reports, the average sentences has increased from that level by more than four years to 16.

            According to the investigation, members of Russia’s scientific community are especially at risk of facing such charges. Since the start of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine, at least 15 of them have been accused of high treason. Two thirds of these were 60 or older at the time of their arrest.

Putin Restores Military Construction Battalions He Eliminated in 2006

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 28 – As part of his most recent expansion of the size of the Russian military, Putin has restored the military construction battalions (stroybats) he disbanded in 2006. These institutions were notorious in Soviet times for their involvement with corrupt schemes and as places to keep non-Russian draftees away from a more active military role.

            The need for some kind of construction capacity in the military, of course, never disappeared; and in 2019, Moscow restored stroybats in all but name and in the view of critics for much the same reasons they existed in the Soviet military (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/12/notorious-soviet-style-construction.html).

            But now the Kremlin leader has formally restored them, nominally in order to cope with war damages especially from drone attacks as well as to create a ready reserve to fill losses at the front, according to Vladimir Mukhin, an observer for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (ng.ru/armies/2026-07-28/1_9547_army.html).

            However, while Mukhin does not address this issue, the restoration of stroybats now may lead not only to a revival of the same abuses that happened before 1991 but also and perhaps more importantly to the creation of a new matrix for a broader militarization of Russian life.

            According to a recent Vyorstka analysis, such a militarization of what is now civilian life in the Russian Federation is one of the things many Russians now fear may take place following the Duma elections (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/07/russians-fear-kremlin-will-take-harsh.html).

Siberian Woman Says She and Her Neighbors Want Their Region to become Part of China

Paul Goble

              Staunton, July 25 – People living in Siberia doesn’t care about what is happening in Moscow, 6,000 km away from where they live, and would like to see their region become part of China, a Siberian woman told the NewsBoom channel on YouTube (youtube.com/shorts/68_rG_qdMmo).

              There is no indication of how many Siberian residents share her views or even if this is not some kind of provocation; but the fact that it has appeared at all is likely indicative of how angry many people beyond the capital’s ring road are o about what Moscow is doing to help itself but not them and others overcome the gas crisis.

              Obviously, the woman does not speak for all Siberians; but her willingness to see her region being absorbed by China as something more desirable than remaining under Moscow’s rule is intriguing given the often fraught relationship between Siberia and China in the past.  

              Most Siberian regionalists up to now have either demanded more autonomy from Moscow or independence rather than declaring themselves in favor of being absorbed by anyone let alone China. That some are now willing to consider that as a desirable option speaks volumes about how they view Moscow today. 

Estonians Debate Whether to Sell, Demolish, Leave Alone or Transform into a Museum Russian Orthodox Cathedral in the Center of Tallinn

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 28 – Estonian Interior Minister Igor Taro has called for an end to the lease that the Orthodox Church has on the Nevsky Cathedral in central Tallinn, triggering a  debate about what should happen to it. Some Estonians favor relocating it, others demolishing, and still others integrating in more closely with Estonian culture.

            There is no question that the cathedral, one of Tallinn’s most iconic monuments, belongs to the Estonian government which since 2001 has leased it to the Estonian Christian Orthodox Church as the Russian church in Estonia is now known (news.err.ee/1610088106/tallinn-s-nevsky-cathedral-may-be-sold-demolished-or-made-into-a-museum).

            The Estonian news agency presents a survey of opinion among experts and political figures in Tallinn. Most of the people think that Taro has provoked a discussion that could get out of hand given how difficult it would be to move the church and  how counterproductive it would be for Estonia to demolish it.

            As a result, while this discussion is taking place in the final months before the ECOC must break all ties with Moscow, it does not seem likely that the Estonian government will accept the most radical proposals. Instead, it will certainly seek to stay within the law and with an eye to how Russia and others would react if it went further. 

            Indeed, it seems likely that if the ECOC does take all the steps that Estonian law requires as far as breaking with the Moscow Patriarchate, that church will probably be able to continue using the facility on Toompea hill for some time to come, although possibly being compelled to share it with others and thus become “more Estonian.”

In New Independent States, Most People Clearly Distinguish a Rejection of Moscow’s Actions in Ukraine and a Dislike of Russia and Russians, Kazakh Political Scientists Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 28 – Many Russians see any criticism of what Moscow is doing as a manifestation of Russophobia, but that is wrong, two Kazakhstan political scientists say. In their country, as in other former Soviet republics,  not all of the many who reject Kremlin actions in Ukraine or elsewhere dislike Russia and Russians as such.

            That means, Gaziz Abishev says, that Russophobia isn’t on the rise in Kazakhstan or in the other countries.  Instead, “the war in Ukraine has had a negative impact on the international image of Russia and the Russians” but that alone is not Russophobia (spik.kz/2666-rusofobija-v-kazahstane-mif-realnost-ili-instrument-manipuljacij.html).

            His colleague, Talgat Ismagambetoc says that what is going on is often “not about Russophobia and its obsessions about the Russian people but rather a negative response to Kremlin policies.” Not surprisingly, Moscow’s moves against Ukraine led many in those countries to “distance themselves from the Russian authorities.”

            The appearance of Russophobia in the classical sense in Kazakhstan and the others, both suggest, reflects Russian commentaries which people in the former Soviet space can read because they share the Russian language. If Moscow had invaded a Spanish-speaking country, for example, that kind of influence would not exist.

Unfortunately, Isagambetov says, “the position of part of Russian politicians, including opponents of the existing power in the Russian Federation” has an unfortunate impact in Kazakhstan. It certainly appears that such Russians “often are not sufficiently sentives to the itnersts, culture and languages of the post-Soviet republics.”

And such attitudes, he says, leads some Kazakhs to extend their anger about Kremlin moves in Ukraine to the Russians as such, a development that could have the most negative impact on public life in Kazakhstan if that continues, a danger people in both countries should be alive to. 

Russians Overwhelmingly Believe Those in Power Pursue Their Interests rather than Those of the People, Moscow Institute of Sociology Study Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 28 – The Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, on the basis of polls taken between 2018 and 2022 says “the vast majority” of Russians believe those in power act in their own interests rather than those of the population, with many saying t protests are more effective than law in reining in the powerful.

            The text of the book, The Political Order as Understood by Russian Citizens (in Russian, Moscow: Academy of Sciences, 2026, 150 pp.), is available at isras.ru/files/File/publ/publ2026/Politichesky_poryadok_sbornik_2026_final.pdf). It has been discussed in detail by Club of the Regions experts at club-rf.ru/theme/715).

            The text provides the responses of Russians over those four years to important questions not often posed by mainline polling agencies. Among the most intriguing of these was “What limits those in power?” The top three answers were “nothing” (37 percent), “protests” (24 percent), and “the law” (19 percent).

Almost a Third of Tajiks Under 30 Doesn’t have a Job or Isn’t in School, Dushanbe Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 28 – Tajikistan’s State Statistical Agency reports that more than 700,000 young Tajiks aren’t employed or in school, 28,4 percent of that cohort, and a figure that could boost the country’s economy if they are used but is setting off alarm bells in Dushanbe because of the difficulties of keeping then in school or finding them jobs.

            The difficulties will only grow, sociologists in Tajikistan say, as migrant workers return from the Russian Federation and the population continues to grow, leading to the creation of a situation in which many young people may feel excluded and alienated and thus open to radicalism (asiaplus.news/2026/07/28/poteryannyj-potenczial-chem-strane-grozit-rost-chisla-molodyh-bez-raboty-i-professii/).

            Those are not the only reasons for concern, the specialists say. Another is that women form the overwhelming majority of young Tajiks not in school and without a job. Among women in this age group, 45 percent are women, while among men the figure is only 12 percent.

            Social norms, family restrictions, household responsibilities and taking care of children all push the share of women in the workforce down. Among all age groups, the statistical agency says, the share of women either employed or in school fell from 46.6 percent in 2004 to 34.6 percent in 2005.

            And yet another sign of difficulties ahead is that while the total number of crimes in Tajikistan continued to fall during the first half of 2026, the number committed by Tajiks under 30 increased.

Russians Fear Kremlin will Take Harsh Measures after the Duma Election Just as It did in the Past, ‘Vyorstka’ Editors Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 27 – Russians aren’t worried about the outcome of the upcoming Duma elections as far as the composition of the Duma is concerned. They know that the Kremlin will do whatever is necessary to ensure that the ruling United Russia remains overwhelmingly dominant there.

            But they are very much worried, the editors of the Vyorstka portal say, about what Putin will do after the election given that he has often imposed “unpopular measures” right after earlier votes, claiming a mandate to do so even and at a time when Russians again turn away from politics (verstka.media/chego-boyatsya-chinovniki-eksperty-i-naselenie-rossii).

            Many Russian officials, politicians, and ordinary Russians are now talking about a variety of measures that Putin may take after the Duma vote. Among those Vyorstka says are the most widespread are the following:

·       The introduction of one or another kind of military rule, with increasing restrictions on people and businesses throughout the Russian Federation, steps that the security services believe are needed because of the country’s current problems;
·       A new mobilization to raise more troops to fight in Ukraine, given the declining numbers of men who are signing up now to fight there;
·       De facto confiscation of the savings of Russians through their forcible replacement with long-term bonds so as to finance the war now;
·       The restoration of exit visas or at least an increase in the size of the categories of people who are banned from traveling abroad;
·       Sizeable increases in charges for electricity, water, sewer and gas; and
·       A new and larger number of repressive laws.

Government loyalists in the Duma and the administration say they haven’t heard anything but such moves; but that is no reassurance to Russians given that such people said exactly the same before earlier elections after which other dramatic steps were taken.

 

Moscow to Deploy Dirigibles to Better Defend Russia against Ukrainian Drones

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 27 – One of the reasons drones are so effective is that they fly so low that until they are very close to their targets, they are protected against detection by the curvature of the earth. Ever more countries, the US, Israel and China, have developed dirigibles to raise the  height of radar detectors and allow for the earlier detection of drones and their destruction.

            In the face of Ukrainian drone attacks ever deeper into the Russian Federation, Moscow has decided to join them and has now announced the development of airships with a carrying capacity of 30 to 50 tons, allowing them to serve in a military capacity against drones (versia.ru/rossiya-sozdayot-pvo-na-osnove-dirizhablej).

            How soon Russia will be able to produce such platforms in large numbers has not been announced and is not yet clear; but developments in this area could be a game changer that would blunt the current advantages those using drones to attack currently enjoy.

            Of course, Russian experts concede that dirigibles are not a complete solution. Slow moving, they are easy targets; of limited carrying capacity, they cannot lift large radar arrays and other equipment; and of light weight, they can be thrown off course or even destroyed by high winds.

            According to the Versiya news portal, all this means is that dirigibles will fill an important niche but only a niche: “AWACS will retain the role of mobile command posts and  satellites will continue to provide  widespread surveillance” while dirigibles “will serve as inexpensive extended duty platforms.”

            In other defense news, the Russian defense ministry has announced that it is postponing even the discussion about the construction of new aircraft carriers until the 2040s, thus pushing back an earlier deadline of 203 for the delivery of such ships (agents.media/rossiya-peredumala-stroit-avianostsy-do-2040-h-godov/).

Russia Doesn’t Have a Ministry for Nationality Affairs but Komi Republic Does

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 27 – Moscow has struggled to come up with an administrative structure to manage nationality policy, a structure that history has shown it can’t easily life with because to be effective it would have to have too much power but that it can’t live without because that would make it far more difficult to manage the multi-national population.

            As a result, since 1991, the Russian government has gone through a number of administrative arrangements, first with a ministry of nationality affairs and now settling on a Federal Agency for Nationality Affairs (FADN) (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/04/like-its-tsarist-and-soviet.html).  

            In Russia’s federal subjects, officials have had similar problems, setting up nationality affairs ministries in the 1990s, then abolishing them, and then reviving them alone. The nationality affairs ministry in the Komi Republic was typical in following that pattern (windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2008/01/window-on-eurasia-komis-get-nationality.html).  

            But unlike many that existed in the 1990s and then were abolished or marginalized, the Komi ministry has found a niche: the Komi ministry focuses not on the two largest nationalities of the republic, the ethnic Russians and the Komis but on indigenous peoples and to a lesser extent on minorities from other parts of the Russian Federation.

            That focus on indigenous peoples – the Nenets, Khanty, and Mani who together number only 260 people – is highlighted in the ministry’s latest policy program for the next three years (minnats.rkomi.ru/presscenter/news/84285/ and nazaccent.ru/content/45751-v-komi-utverdili-plan-razvitiya-korennyh-malochislennyh-narodov/).

            Such an institution and this focus are important in their own right; but they may matter even more because Moscow may view these things as a model for how it could not only organize but define minority nationalities, increasing putting the numerically small indigenous peoples at the center of nationality policy and leaving larger minorities out of this arrangement.

            Moscow appears to be moving in that direction already with the FADN which devotes more attention to the small indigenous peoples and far less to the larger nations than the size of either justifies. And what is happening in Komi could thus be a model for the redefinition not only of nationality policy but of the structures managing it. 

Tone Deaf to Language and History, Volodin Chants ‘Russia, Putin, Victory’ Five Times

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 27 – At the last session of this Duma, its speaker Vyacheslav Volodin chanted five times the words, “Russia, Putin, Victory,” something that shows that he has no sense that  after  the history of the Nazi slogan, “Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Fuhrer” is  dangerous, Abbas Gallyamov says.

            That is not only because, the former Putin speechwriter and now Putin critic says, that in an age after Nazi propagandists routinely used the slogan “Ein Reich, Ein Volk, Ein Fuhrer” making any three-part slogan now inherently problematic (t.me/abbasgallyamovpolitics/10873 reposted at hofm.online/opinions/rossiya-putin-pobeda-skandiruet-volodin).

            But it also the case, Gallyamov says, because it highlights for all to see just how much in harmony the ideology of the Putin regime is with the ideology of its Nazi predecessor. Only those deaf to language and to history can fail to feel that and draw the obvious conclusions after Volodin’s performance.

Russia Already has Far More Veterans of Ukraine War than Kremlin Admits, Danish Expert Says, and That Means Their Impact will Be Far Greater

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 27 – The Kremlin has not released timely and accurate figures about the number of veterans who have returned alive or returned dead from the war in Ukraine. Its one attempt to give a figure, last December, suggested that there were just over 400,000 living veterans now back in the Russian Federation.

            Russian specialists on military manpower tell Sonia Richter, a Danish journalist, that that number of certainly too low and that the total number of veterans now returning home may be as large as 800,000, with many of the 700,000 Russian soldiers still in Ukraine yet to come (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/07/27/nevidimye-veterany).

            That means that the impact of returning veterans on Russian social and political life will be far larger than almost anyone has suggested. Even if only a small percentage turn to a life of crime or join repressive agencies or groups, there will still be more of them doing so than most analysts have concluded up to now.

            That is because five percent of 800,000 or even 1.5 million is far larger than five percent of 400,000, the figure that Russian officials and propagandists routinely cite. As Russians face up to this enormous influx, they will be even more alarmed and angry about what Putin has wrought in Ukraine.

            Because in this way, even more than with the drone attacks, the Kremlin leader’s war will be coming home to them in spades, not only now but well into the future. Indeed, the figures Richter has assembled suggest that the impact of veterans may be comparable to that of veterans groups in other countries that have gone to war over an extended period.

Comparison with Central Asian Countries Shows Non-Russian Republics inside Russia ‘Price of Dependence,’ Kazakhstan Portal Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 25 – Since becoming independent in 1991, the former Soviet Union republics in Central Asia have their economies grow dramatically, while the former RSFSR autonomous republics that did not gain independence have seem their economic situation if anything deteriorate relative to that of Russia as a whole, Kazakhstan’s Altyn Orda says.

            The portal argues that this highlights “the price of dependence,” something that could trigger a political explosion in the latter if they choose to make that comparison instead (altyn-orda.kz/tsena-zavisimosti-pochemu-tsentralnaya-aziya-rastyot-i-bogateet-a-bashkortostan-nishhaet-i-bedneet/).

            While independence doesn’t guarantee success, Altyn Orda says, it gives those peoples who obtain it a far greater range of choices than is the case of the autonomous republics that remain under the control of a larger state. What is most important is that this “is not a dispute about the merits of peoples: it is a comparison of two political models.”

Russia Must Be Rebuilt from the Bottom Up with the Formation of Non-Ethnic Democratic Republics, Don Activist Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 26 – Most discussions about Russia’s future focus on who will replace Putin; but that is a profound mistake, Konstantin Kachalov says. For real progress to occur, Russia must be rebuilt not from the top down but from the bottom up with the formation of republics based not on ethnicity but on a shared commitment to democratic values.

            The émigré leader of the Don Republic movement, which Moscow has just declared a foreign agent (svoboda.org/a/ingushskiy-bloger-i-donskoe-respublikanskoe-dvizhenie-obyavleny-inoagentami/33812795.html), argues that  “there will not be any ‘reformation of Russia from above’” (wschody.net/volnyj-don-respublikanskij-proekt-vmesto-illyuzii-rossijskih-vyborov/).

            The centralist notion is “a myth for the naïve,” he continues; and the only positive solution to Russia’s longstanding and current problems is the development of regional republics based not on ethnicity but rather on the commitment of their residents to democratic values and a wiliness to live with others.

            Indeed, Konchalov continues, those who focus on “a nationalist path of development” for republics like the one he hopes to found in the Don region will destroy that possibility even before it begins. That is because the Don, like most regions, has “always been multi-ethnic and multi-confessional.”

            For more on Konchalov’s ideas and for his discussion of the conditions under which such republics will seek independence or cooperation and the formation of a new and genuine Russian Federation, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/04/putin-putting-survival-of-russian.html.

AI Translations Bringing Books Kremlin has Banned to Russian Readers

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 26 – As the Putin regime has increased censorship and confiscated an increasing number of books published in the West, some Russians are using artificial intelligence to translate such books into Russian and then disseminate them to those who want them as a kind of “pirated” editions and who do not have any other means of acquiring them.

            This effort so far only a few groups of activists and a limited number of titles, Vladimir Kharitonov, the technical director of Freedom Letters, says; but it helps those who need access to books and journals like The Economist the Kremlin doesn’t want them to have (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/07/26/piratskoe-prosveshchenie).

            He discusses in some detail one of these efforts, the Bookship project (t.me/bookship24), which emerged several years ago and has issued AI translations of 60 relatively new Western books and has so far operated below the radar screen of the Russian powers that be because its translations can be characterized as for personal use and thus do not violate copyright laws.

            Kharitonov suggests that such efforts will only expand, although he concedes that the AI translations are not as good as those made by humans and that this effort may have its greatest impact by serving as a kind of advertisement for books that should be given human translations by regular publishers.     

Bacteria and Viruses Released by Melting of Permafrost Unlikely to Trigger a Widespread Pandemic but Will Infect Northern Peoples, Sakha Scholar Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 22 – It has long been known that the melting of the permafrost is releasing into the atmosphere varieties of bacteria and viruses hitherto unknown in the modern world that would trigger a widespread pandemic because people today have no defenses against such organisms.

            Some Russian writers have even suggested that this process could lead to epidemics in Russia, given that permafrost underlies 65 percent of the territory of that country and ultimately lead to the extinction of human life on earth (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2019/04/the-ice-will-melt-and-we-will-all-die.html).

            But a specialist on permafrost from Sakha, unnamed because of the sensitivity of this issue, says that such outcomes are unlikely because if these bacteria and viruses had that capacity, they would already almost certainly have produced such outcomes in the past (kedr.media/stories/my-tolko-chut-chut-poskrebli-po-poverhnosti/).

            But if such apocalypses are unlikely, the Sakha permafrost specialist says, they are far more likely to affect local populations in the Russian north, a development that will require both intensify investigation and the expansion of medical facilities in that region or indeed many there will become sick and even die from the release of such bacteria and viruses.

            There is little evidence that Moscow is prepared to spend the money necessary; and so yet another threat to the survival of the numerically small peoples of the North and Far East is emerging, one from the very soil on which they and their ancestors have lived for many centuries.

Half of Tajiks Who’ve Returned Home from Russia Say They will Seek Work Abroad Again, IOM Study Finds

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 24 – Because economic conditions in Tajikistan are so dire, a third of those who have returned home from working abroad, mostly in the Russian Federation, say they will seek work abroad again, most likely in that country, according to the latest report by the International Organization for Migration.

            The IOM report, based on surveys of more than 2,000 returnees, found that the average income of returnees fell from over 900 US dollars a month when they were working abroad has fallen to just 309 US dollars a month since they returned (tajikistan.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl2216/files/documents/2026-07/iom-tajikistan-annual-report-2025.pdf).

            Those plans mean that many Tajiks who have left Russia often because of official pressure are going to try to come back, creating a serious problem for the Russian authorities and meaning that those Russians who have viewed expulsion as a solution are almost certainly going to be disabused of that idea.

            The income differences and the desire of Tajiks to return to the places of foreign employment, most prominently the Russian Federation, mean that there is no quick solution to this socio-political problem and that Tajiks are likely to find ways to return especially if Russian employers, including the state, need additional workers.