Central Asian Countries Must Focus on Modernizing Infrastructure to Address Growing Water Crisis, Kazakh Expert Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 2 – Central Asian countries can do little on their own to combat the impact of climate change on the availability of water and cannot get more water from each other or their neighbors all of whom are suffering from shortages and so must focus their efforts on modernizing pipeline and irrigation infrastructure, Azamat Kausov says.

            A specialist on water issues at Kazakhstan’s Regional Environmental Center for Central Asia, he says that this will be enormously expensive but is absolutely necessary to avert a crisis that will otherwise become a humanitarian disaster and a threat to national security (time.kz/articles/territory/2026/07/02/nado-lezt-v-butylku).

            Up to now, Kausov says, the countries of Central Asia have sought to blame climate change because that is beyond their ability to change or to engage in constant negotiations on the sharing of water from one to another. But now the situation has deteriorated to the point that neither strategy will work.

            Instead, they must modernize their national pipeline and irrigation systems, many of which date to Soviet times, so that their countries That will be expensive; and it means that the cost of water will have to rise as well as regulation of how water is used not only in agriculture and industry but by the population.

            Right now, he continues, some in these countries are opposing such steps on populist grounds and because the melting of glaciers means that water flows have increased in some places in recent years. But those increases are temporary. When the glaciers disappear, the flows of the rivers they feed will collapse and do so suddenly.

            If Central Asia is not to avoid such disasters, its governments and peoples must face up both to the problems in the water supply and their own need to invest in projects to solve those problems before they get worse. If they don’t, the disasters ahead will spring on them in ways that they are unlikely to be able to cope with.  

Gas Crisis in Russia Triggering Beginnings of a ‘New Parade of Sovereignties’ There, Kazakh Portal Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 4 – Voronezh Oblast is restricting the sale of gasoline in large containers to prevent its export to other regions, Kazakhstan’s Altyn Orda portal says, a sign that Russia’s regions “are beginning to defend their resources from each other” and one that may lead to an updated version of “the parade of sovereignties” which weakened Russia decades ago.

            “As long as there were enough resources,” the portal continues, “the regions can and do live within a common system; but when there is a threat of a shortage, everyone begins to ask a simple question: why should we give up our own to others if tomorrow there may not be enough left for us?” (altyn-orda.kz/novyj-parad-suverenitetov-nachinaetsya-s-benzina/).

            Limiting the sale of gasoline in large quantities can lead to limiting the sale of all kinds of other things that may be in short supply; and “that ishow an economic crisis gradually turns into a political one” and thus recalls what happened at the end of Soviet times and the beginning of post-Soviet ones in Russia.

            Forty years ago, Altyn Orda points out, “the parade of sovereignties began not with the one-time collapse of a huge country. At first, the republics and autonomy began to speak of the priority of their laws, their resources and their interests with each wanting to dispose of what was on its territory.”

            But as that pattern spread, what “at first looked like a struggle for economic rights gradually became a political distancing from the center” and thus marked “the beginning of the end of the Soviet vertical” and a threat to the Russian successor state that Putin has worked so hard to reverse.

            Voronezh Oblast has “not declared sovereignty,” of course; but its actions point to something that must be of concern to Moscow, the desire of each region, at a time of economic crisis to “keep what resources it has for itself.” Today, this resource is gasoline; tomorrow, it may be many others.

            Consequently, what is happening in Voronezh is “not necessarily the disintegration of the state; but it is how the loss of trust in a single system begins,” something that Putin and others in the Kremlin certainly have not forgotten and that they will necessarily see as a dangerous development they must counter before it is too late.  

Russian Entrepreneurs and Activists Working to Ensure Books Banned by Moscow Reach Readers

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 3 – Like so many other cases of Kremlin actions, Moscow’s book bans are not working nearly as effectively as the authorities would like thanks to the work of underground entrepreneurs and activists who are selling originals or copies online, according to Ivan Smurov.

            The Vyorstka journalist says some of those involved in reselling texts taken off the shelves of bookdealers are doing it for the money while others are people committed to ensuring that Russian readers can get what they want (verstka.media/kak-iz-za-zapretov-v-rossii-poyavilas-industriya-podpolnoj-literatury).

            In a 5500-word article, Smurov says that some of the books offered are given new titles at least in the ads and at high prices which make those who engage in such practices reaping high incomes with little effort; and he notes that reprints and copies typed into internet formats are often filled with errors. Others are involved because they believe people should have the right to read what they want.  

            In some ways, this new market builds on the traditions of samizdat and especially tamizdat and even intersects with the latter; but in others, it is simply an example of the way in which clever entrepreneurs and activists can outwit the authorities, who often believe that banning the sale of books in bookstores is sufficient.

            It isn’t. While many Russians now can’t get the books they want easily, Smurov shows in case after case how those who are interested and committed to doing so can continue to do so – and are thus influenced by the reading of works the powers that be in Putin’s Russia  don’t want them to be.

To Deal with Gas Crisis, Moscow Approves Production and Sale of Dirtier Gasoline, a Move that will Harm Machinery, the Environment and Public Health

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 3 – To try to get more gasoline to consumers and stem popular outrage, the Russian government has approved the production and sale of dirtier gasoline of a kind it had banned since the 1990s, something that will harm machinery and the environment and threaten public health both immediately and over the longer term.

            Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin has issued a decree allowing Russian firms to sell gasoline with a far higher sulfur content until the end of this year in the hopes of increasing the amount of gas consumers can buy (meduza.io/en/news/2026/07/03/russia-permits-sale-of-downgraded-gasoline-as-fuel-crisis-drags-on and readovka.news/news/245108/).

            Such dirty gasoline is already banned by the EU and most countries, including the Russian Federation up to now, and means that Moscow won’t be able to sell any of it except to the few countries that don’t have such standards in place. But the real negative impact will be elsewhere.

            Such sulfur-rich fuel will harm the machinery in which it is used and the environment in which such cars and trucks operate and overtime will compromise public health, with experts saying that Russia will see “a sharp increase” in mortality in seven to nine years novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/07/03/cherez-7-9-let-my-uvidim-rezkii-rost-smertnosti).

            In sum, this decision shows that the Russian government is so desperate to end the current gas crisis with its long lines at gas stations and rising anger among the population that it is more than ready to compromise not only machinery and the environment but the health of the peoples of the Russian Federation.

Despite Moscow’s Spending, Freight Traffic on Russia’s Rivers and Even the Length of Navigable Sections of These Waterways have Fallen Dramatically since 2022, Accounting Chamber Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 2 – Moscow has spent 190 billion rubles since 2022 to eliminate bottlenecks in its Unified Deep-Water System in the European Portion of Russia; but instead of achieving anything, it has seen riverine freight there decline by 28 percent and the total length of navigable routes by 5600 km, according to the Accounting Chamber.

            The worst situation is to be found along the Volga-Caspian canal where the movement of export-import cargo has become “virtually paralyzed,” the Russian government’s auditing agency says, a key part of Russia’s north-south trade corridor (ng.ru/economics/2026-07-02/1_9529_cargo.html ).

            That suggests that Russia’s rivers and the country’s reliance on them for the movement of freight both within the country and between Russia and foreign states have become yet another casualty of Putin’s shift in spending and attention away from the rivers in order to be able to finance his expanded war in Ukraine. 

            The government is currently scrambling to try to overcome problems there, the chamber continues; but a harbinger of worse to come is that the authorities have removed from the UDWS list major portions of rivers, an indication that Moscow has effectively decided that it can’t dredge them enough anytime soon to make them navigable.

            Officials had reported earlier that as a result of the silting up of rivers and the reduction in water flows as a result of global warming and increased use by people along the course of the country’s rivers that the total length of navigable rivers within Russia had fallen to 50,000 km (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/04/russia-now-has-only-50000-km-of-fully.html).

            The Accounting Chamber study suggests that that figure must now be reduced still further, an indication that riverine freight transport will not meet Putin’s targets in the next few years at least and that some riverine routes and the industries and populations that rely on them are going to be sacrificed instead.

            For background on how serious this is and how Putin’s policies have failed to stop the decline of riverine traffic, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2026/02/following-protests-budget-cuts-and.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/04/russia-now-has-only-50000-km-of-fully.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/01/moscow-may-finally-be-about-to-confront.html.

Lukashenka’s Repression Extends Far Beyond Political Groups and Means Victims of Domestic Abuse No Longer Getting Help They Need

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 1 -  After the Belarusian political crisis of 2020, Alyaksandr Lukashenka liquidated not only public organizations devoted to political issues but also those which were helping Belarusians with other problems. Among those suppressed were groups that had been helping victims of domestic abuse.

            As a result, researcher Tatyana Handel says, many of those suffering from this widespread plague no longer can get the help they need and had been receiving from NGOs because they are reluctant to turn to government agencies (dekoder.org/ru/article/belarus_zhenschiny_nasilie_pomosch/).

            Some Belarusian activists whose NGOs Lukashenka has suppressed have created online resources, but these often lack the kind of direct human support that the NGOs had provided and thus do not represent an adequate replacement, despite the claims of the supporters of the Lukashenka regime.

            Since 2020, the Belarusian dictator has closed more than 2,000 NGOs of all kinds, including shelters  and counseling centers for women.  Those who evaluate Lukashenka’s regime and focus on the release of political prisoners alone typically fail to take this broader impact of his repressions into account.  

             His repressive moves hit far more than just those suffering abuse in the home, but this is a group of people who seldom attract the attention political prisoners do and yet whose victimization is equally worthy of attention and condemnation. That seldom happens, but it very much should.   

Tokayev Disbands Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 1 – Reflecting the increasing dominance of the ethnic Kazakhs in Kazakhstan’s population and Astana’s commitment to building a unified civic society, Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has disbanded the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan.

            That body, which provided official representation of the country’s ethnic minorities, worked to prevent ethnic conflicts, and promoted a civic identity was set up in the early 1990s when the ethnic mix of Kazakhstan was very different and its possibilities for forming a nation state far less (spik.kz/2647-ank-bolshe-net-pochemu-ona-stala-lishnej-v-novom-kazahstane.html).

            At the end of Soviet times, ethnic Kazakhs formed only 39.7 percent of the population, barely more than the share of ethnic Russians who had been a plurality and then continued 37.8 percent. Now, ethnic Kazakhs represent 71 percent of the population with ethnic Russians forming only 14.4 percent and other ethnic groups even fewer.

            The Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, originally called the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan, was quite active in the 1990s but has been less so in the last decade. Consequently, most Kazakhstan residents have not been all that concerned by its demise, seeing it as a structure that has already done all that it could.

            Indeed, it is striking that many analysts in Kazakhstan welcomed the demise of the Assembly, arguing that its continued existence could do more harm than good by encouraging smaller ethnic groups to mobilize against the ethnic Kazakhs and slowing the process of forming a Kazakh-informed civic nation.

Uzbekistan’s Population has Nearly Doubled Since 1989, First Post-Soviet Census There Shows

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 1 – Since the end of Soviet times, the population of Uzbekistan has nearly doubled from 19.98 million in 1989 to 39 million now, according to the results of the first, much-delayed and just-completed post-Soviet census, allowing Astana to correct upward by more than 200,000 the figures it had been using.

            Over the intervening years, the share of ethnic Uzbeks in the population of that Central Asian country has risen from 71 percent to 89.4 percent, with 91.3 percent now saying that Uzbek is their native language (podrobno.uz/cat/obchestvo/v-uzbekistane-oglasili-pervye-itogi-perepisi-naseleniya-zhiteley-strany-stalo-bolee-39-millionov/).

            Other figures of particular importance include that more than 38 percent of that country’s population is under the age of 30 and that there are slightly more men than women, an unusual pattern in the post-Soviet space and that more than half of its residents now live in cities.  

            More details are slated to be released soon, but even these permit three important conclusions: first, Uzbekistan’s population will continue to grow rapidly despite a small decline in fertility; second, that country will be increasingly monoethnic, with the role of minorities ever smaller; and third, it will have to deal with rapid urbanization.

Even Before Putin’s War in Ukraine, Young Men in Russia were Dying Far More Often than in Any Other Former Soviet Republic

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 1 – Even before Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine, young men in Russia were dying at rates far higher than their counterparts in any other former Soviet republic, costing the country numerous workers and reducing male life expectancy overall by almost a year, according to Yevgeny Chernyshov.

            The Nakanune analyst says that despite efforts to address this problem, the situation hasn’t improved in the last five years, that a third of men now do not live to retirement age, and that this pattern makes it all but impossible for Russian men to have a life expectancy of 78 years by 2030 as Vladimir Putin has decreed (nakanune.ru/articles/124799/).

            Deaths from illnesses, alcohol consumption, accidents, suicides and now combat among young men mean that Russia is losing tens of thousands of workers every year, whose places must be filled by immigrants unless the economy of the Russian Federation is to stagnate or decline.

            And it also means, Chernyshov continues, that Russia has been able to do little or nothing to reduce the longstanding gap in life expectancy between men and women, a gap that now stands at 11 years and is currently among the highest of any country on earth.

            Given that the Kremlin has stopped publishing much demographic data over the leans ast several years to hide what is happening in this and other areas, Chernyshov’s essay is a model of what can be gleaned from a variety of sources, direct and indirect, and a sign that the problems Putin is trying to conceal can’t be hidden completely.

Ivanov’s Death Highlights that the Putin Generation is Dying Off Much as the Brezhnev One Did a Half Century Ago, Russian Bloggers Point Out

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 1 – For some time, many have been speculating about how long Putin will remain alive and in power; but the death at the end of June of his close friend and aide, who was roughly the same age as the Kremlin leader, has prompted Russian bloggers to speak about the passing of an entire generation of leaders.

            Mark Krutov of Radio Liberty has assembled some of their comments which reflect both hopes and fears about the way in which the aging of the current leaders who had seemed eternal in both cases changes things (svoboda.org/a/okruzhenie-putina-redeet-sotsseti-o-smerti-sergeya-ivanova/33792113.html).

            Two of the commentaries on Ivanov’s passing seem especially prescient. Yanuta Laiminga says that his death shows that “Putin’s entourage is thinning” and that “soon the country will enter into a period with a series of magnificent funerals,” something that will highlight “the very fragility of the system.”

            And Artem Izgagin says that Ivanov’s demise has “something very Brezhnev-like in it. Then, a half century ago, “it also seemed that the leaders of the country were as much part of the permanent landscape as the Kremlin wall; but then it turned out that they were mortals” and so too was the system they had led for so long.

Moscow Stock Market Offers Better Indication of Public Sentiment than Any Poll or Focus Group, Rybakova Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 1 – “Russia’s stock market is the best measure of Russia’s problems,” far better than any poll or focus group, Tatyana Rybakova says, because it speaks “with absolute honest about what it thinks of the economy and the ways that economy is being managed or mismanaged.

            Writing in The Moscow Times, the Russian commentator points out that the stock market is “the most honest and fastest public opinion poll because it takes place in real time and aggregates the views of thousands of participants” (themoscowtimes.com/2026/07/01/russias-stock-market-is-the-best-measure-of-russias-problems-the-signs-arent-good-a93139).

            And it is more accurate than these other measures because those participating in the stock market, while they may be wrong on occasion, are voicing opinions that reflect the fact that they have money in the game and stand to gain or lose depending on how right they are. Moreover, these assessments are “cynical and not held back by moral qualms.”

            What the Russian stock market shows now is that Russians have lost confidence in the country’s economy and those who run it. They no longer think firms will generate profits. They see that the government lacks any means of controlling inflation other than raising interest rates. And they recognize that the powers still think in Soviet terms.

            Rybakova acknowledges that the market is “a little slow, not from stupidity but because ‘the whales’ – large pools of capital concentrated in investment firms – control such a large share of the Russian market that they can turn the index in any direction they want.” But this ability is limited and can’t last for very long in any particular case.

            Consequently, the Russian commentator concludes, watching changes in market averages week by week if not day by day is the best way to know what Russians really think not just about the economy but about also the Kremlin that likes to claim it is controlling its direction. 

Anti-Western and Pro-War Attitudes ‘Much More Pronounced’ in Moscow than Beyond the Ring Road, Gudkov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 1 – Like most people, Lev Gudkov says that until recently he had been accustomed to thinking about Moscow as being at the center of Russian protests; but now the situation had changed and its residents are far more aggressive and anti-Russian than are those in the federal subjects beyond the ring road.

            The Levada Center sociologist says that this reflects both the departure of many opponents of the war from the capital and the fact that Moscow residents are doing relatively well while most people in the regions and republics are suffering. As always, those who are poor “don’t really want to fight” (theins.ru/podkasty/294289).

            Residents of the regions, Gudkov continues, “believe that the war isn’t needed and that too much money is being spent on it. They think it would be better for that money to be spent on them … as a result of these differences, “anti-war sentiment is more common in the provinces for these reasons.”

            Muscovites in contrast are “very loyal to the authorities and very aggressive towards the West … despite the fact that they live in a more informed and more educated environment,” he says. Those who used to speak out against Kremlin policies have left and thus do not have the impact they once did.

            Another reason for this divide, Gudkov argues, is that Muscovites have been less affected by the war than have people in the regions and republics. As a result of Kremlin policies, Moscow has provided fewer soldiers and continues to act as if the war is something that doesn’t matter to them personally. Those in the provinces know otherwise.

Drones Also Dropping Delayed Action Mines, Further Complicating De-Mining Operations

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 30 – Media attention to Ukrainian drone attacks on Russia and Russian drone attacks on Ukraine have largely focused on their immediate impact, explosions, fires, and the killing and wounding of people; but they have longer term consequences as well because drones from the two countries are laying mines in unexpected places.

            That danger has been pointed out by a Russian military analyst speaking on condition of anonymity of Novaya Gazeta Europe who says that will affect residents for many years by making demining efforts even more difficult than they already are (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/06/30/my-dolgoe-ekho-drug-druga).

            And cleaning up mines laid during the conflict will take years if not decades because maps of mines laid are notoriously unreliable – too many different military units are involved – and mean that even more Russians and Ukrainians will be injured or killed when they unwittingly step on mines laid earlier. 

Riga Says Probability of Russian Attack on Baltic States ‘Very Low’

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 29 – At a time when many Western analysts are suggesting that Putin may launch an attack on NATO by invading the Baltic countries, Latvia’s Bureau for the Protection of the Constitution says that the likelihood of a large-scale Russian attack on the Baltic countries is “extremely low.”

            What is likely, the Bureau says, is continued and even expanded Russian hybrid attacks and provocations against the three Baltic countries to put pressure on NATO and the West with regard to Putin’s war in Ukraine and other issues (leta.lv/rus/home/important/B6B7347C-0E97-4E70-BCE8-43630A82BA22/).

            This announcement thus is not only part of an effort to calm a population that has been bombarded with suggestions that a Russian attack is imminent but also to suggest that Russia’s hybrid war against the Balts will continue but is less about them than about other matters of concern to the major powers.

For Putin, Elections Remain Important as Means of ‘Testing the Waters’ as Far as What the Elites and Population Now Think, Chernozub Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 30 – For Putin, elections remain critically important even though their results are pre-ordained because they serve as a means of “testing the waters” as to what the elites and the population are prepared to put up with, according to Vsevolod Chernozub. 

            The Russian commentator who now lives in Lithuania argues that election campaigns act “as the ultimate political tool, as a way to gauge their standing, approval rating and distance from the public as well as to assess external influences” on political processes (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/06/30/iznos-elektorata).

            These “external influences” are not radicals now in emigration, Chernozub continues. Rather “the KPRF in recent years has become a factor of external influence” given its continued support by part of the Russian population and the support that party’s leadership gives to the Chinese government as an alternative model of rule.

            This year, he says, “this ‘testing of the waters’ appears to have shown if not the complete rupture of the social contract between the authorities and the people at least a total breakdown in communication between them, with implications ranging from the metaphorical to the literal.”

            According to Chernozub, the situation has deteriorated to the point that some in the United Russia Party are “claiming that the party has nothing to do with bans now being imposed in Russia” by the government and that these are “merely the machinations of political rivals.”

            Such claims are patently absurd, but they are a clear indivation that the popularity of United Russia or even the powers that be in general are hardly as high as they were and that the results of primaries and the party’s convention show that “the Kremlin recognized this” and is modifying its message if not yet its action.

            The real campaign which is yet to begin will continue this process of “testing the waters,” Chernozub says; but as of now, it is “a big question as to what will come of this second phase or even if anything will come of it at all.” But it may prompt the Kremlin to make adjustments so that its standing with elites and the people won’t continue to fall.

Human Use, Not Climate Change Behind Falling Water Levels in Amu-Darya River System, New Research Shows

Paul Goble

            Staunton, June 30 – Many blame climate change for the decline in the flow of water in Central Asia’s Amu-Darya river system; but in fact, if that were the only factor driving change, water flows there would have increased slightly over the last century, according to new research published by Science Direct.

            Instead, the research suggests, it is expanded human use, especially for agricultural 14 to purposes, that is responsible for the decline because the impact of such consumption more than compensates for what should be an increase (asiaplus.news/2026/06/30/vody-v-amudare-stalo-namnogo-menshe-uchenye-obyasnili-glavnuyu-prichinu/).

            That reality should guide the governments of the region and those who hope to help Central Asia rather than the false assumption that climate change rather than human activity is responsible. This false belief is nothing more than an attempt to shift responsibility away from human agency.

            The investigation compared temperature and rainfall in the region of the Amu-Darya basin between the 1930s and now. Temperatures have indeed risen by 0.52 to 0.83 degrees centigrade and rainfall has increased by 14 percent, tends that should have increased the flow of the river by 14 to 20 percent.

            But that vector has been overwhelmed by increased human consumption, especially for agriculture, and so the amount of water passing through this river system has fallen by 22 percent or more, with some portions of the watershed seeing far greater declines.

            Only more efficient use of water and a shift away from agricultural crops that require vast amounts of water have any chance of changing this situation before the declines in flow force the hand of officials and the population when these decline even more in the coming years.