Moscow Wrestling with Multiple Dimensions of Global Warming Especially in the Far North

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 9 – Like people elsewhere, most Russians have accepted the fact that global warming is occurring; but like others, they remain divided and are only beginning to recognize that this trend does not mean that there will be an even warming of all regions but rather introduce “climate chaos” across the board.

            Not only will some regions grow warmer while others remain or even grow colder but there may be wild “swings” in temperature and precipitation both within one region and between it and its neighbors, a pattern that makes predicting what will happen increasingly difficult if not impossible, experts say (akcent.site/novosti/44822).

            In some places, warming may make some kind of agricultural activity more possible but in others, the warming trend may lead to too much rain or too little for that to take place.  And in others, the warming trend may destroy infrastructure or even lead to forest fires and desertification.

            Officials are now being forced to try to predict what they should prepare for in a situation where predictions are far more difficult to make and where errors are likely to exacerbate problems, something that will provoke anger in populations affected who do not yet understand fully how diverse the impact of global warming actually is turning out to be.

Most Expressions of Russian Discontent Still of Loyalist Variety, Dubrovsky Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 9 – The message most Russians now openly expressing discontent remains of a loyalist nature, Dmitry Dubrovsky says, a sign that most still have faith in Putin but not his officials, “although we are beginning to have our doubts” given Internet shutoffs and Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian cities.

            The Russian sociologist now at Prague’s Charles University says that the Kremlin and the population of Russia have long operated under an unspoken contract in which the regime promises stability and growth and the latter agrees to stay out of politics (svoboda.org/a/armiya-poklonnikov-siljnoy-vlasti-ustala/33752858.html).

            But that contract has “cracked” at least a little because it “never anticipated a scenario where the internet would be cut off, cities subjected to regular shelling or people would be unable to pay for things simply by using a bank card,” the Russian sociologist continues.

            Many Russians are upset about these developments, but they don’t have either leaders or the experience of acting collectively that allow them to protest in anything like the traditional ways. And that is why some public figures with “absolutely no  connection to political life” have stepped in.

            That has gotten the attention of the Kremlin and analysts in Russia and abroad, who are very much aware that “an authoritarian regime operates under conditions of a severe deficit of reliable information [because] everyone lies to it.” As a result, “it fears everyone, everyone fears it, and thus everyone lies to everyone else.”

            In this situation, Dubrovsky continues, it is important to remember that only “a limited number of people” in Russia love Putin. Most who support him do so for cultural, ideological or completely practical reasons. Their lack of alternatives mean that they have not turned on him because they do not yet have anyone to turn to.

            Moreover, Russians lack solidarity because, as a result of government efforts, people believe that they do not bear responsibility for anyone “because there is an authority – the government – that is responsible for everything.” Solidarity doesn’t simply exist. It is a skill that requires practice and must be learned.

            Putin and his regime have done and will do everything possible to prevent Russians from acquiring that skill. But until Russians learn it, they may be angry about what is going on but they won’t present the kind of challenge to Putin that some imagine, although their anger may be a precondition for the rise of just such a threat.

Russia Now Reversing Earlier Draining of Swamps to Combat Forest Fires, Air Pollution and Global Warming

Paul Goble

              Staunton, May 9 – Thirty years ago, Russian officials launched a campaign to drain swamplands around the country in order to prevent drownings and to open the way to the harvesting of peat; but as the Province portal says, “they tried to do what was bt but in the end things turned out just as they always do.”

              The number of lives saved by the draining of swamps was microscopically small, and the destruction of these areas did not result in any major increase in the use of peat as a fuel (province.ru/society/4495414-opasno-bez-tryasiny-v-rossii-nachali-vosstanavlivat-bolota/).

              Instead, the destruction of the swamps released dangerous gases into the atmosphere, sparked more and larger forest fires than Russia had ever seen before, and contributed to global warming not only inside the RussianP Federation but everywhere else as well.

              Last year, officials decided to “rewet” the swamplands beginning first in Tver and then in other hard-hit federal subjects (iz.ru/2092251/sergei-gurianov/opasno-bez-triasiny-zachem-v-rossii-vosstanavlivaiut-bolota), a program that is now spreading to other  regions as well.

Moscow Responds to Growing Income Inequality by Changing How It is Measured

Paul Goble

              Staunton, May 5 – Instead of taking measures that will actually reduce growing income inequality among Russians, Moscow has responded in the first instance by changing the way statistics about that are gathered and presented to make comparisons more difficult and the situation look better than it is, Maksim Blant says.

              In 2025, income inequality in the Russian Federation rose to the highest level it has been since 2007. Putin promised to change that, but the greatest change his government has made is to modify the way his government processes data about that, the Radio Liberty analyst says (svoboda.org/a/zagnatj-dzhini-v-butylku-kak-vlasti-boryutsya-s-neravenstvom/33750448.html).

              It has redefined the Gini coefficient in ways that make comparisons with the past in Russia more difficult and at the same time make it far more difficult to compare with the situation in other countries, Blant says.  And he suggests that if Russia doesn’t meet the income equalization goals it has announced, Moscow will do the same again.

              Consequently, he continues, however defensible the changes in how the Gini coefficient is calculated in Russia may be – and there are reasons to see the new method as improved on a standalone basis – the ways this change will hide what is really going on are likely to be far more important at least politically.

Ukrainian Society Now Fundamentally Different than When Putin Began His Expanded War in 2022 and Won’t Revert to What It was Before, Minakov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 6 – Ukrainian society has changed significantly since Russia began its expanded war in 2022 and will not simply revert to what it was before that date, according to Mikhail Minakhov who as surveyed senior Ukrainian social scientists who have remained in their positions since the war began on what has changed and what won’t change back.

            The Ukrainian political scientist who now works at the Kennan Institute in Washington, D.C. makes the following points (sapere.online/chto-proishodit-s-ukrainskim-obshhestvom-na-pyatom-godu-vojny/):

·       First, the Ukrainian population has declined by 20 to 35 percent as a result of emigration and deaths in combat. It will not immediately return to what it was even if a sizeable portion of those who left return and change Ukrainnian life as a result of their experiences abroad.

·       Second, the country’s economy will depend on older workers than ever before and on different regions than it did earlier.

·       Third,  those serving in the military now are “the main middle class in Ukraine, the country’s class structure has changed, and the average income is now defined by those in the army. Around them has arisen a service sector.”

·       Fourth, “the state now is the main source for the redistribution of means as more than 90 percent of them passes through the budget and those who had been at most risk, the precariat, have moved into the bureaucracy.”

·       Fifth, the territorial structure of the population has changed, with young men dominating front areas, the elderly behind them, and others having moved further back or emigrated.

·       Sixth, social solidarity has changed. Both vertical and horizonal solidarity were strong, but now the former has strengthened at the expense of the latter. People still trust volunteers but the amount of funds they control has declined precipitously.

·       Seventh, society is now divided between fighters and non-combatants, something that affects both local and regional divisions. All other divisions have become relatively less important.

·       Eighth, attitudes toward the state have changed. On the one hand, Ukrainians view it with greater detachment; but on the other, they see it as a key defender of their country. Anarchic attitudes have declined precipitously.

·       Ninth, the war years have seen a rollercoaster development in popular attitudes from optimism to pessimism and back again among others, something that may continue and create a society very different from the one that displayed less turbulence than before the war.

·       And tenth, for Ukrainians, the war has become routine but not as the norm. They think of their future not as one of permanent conflict but as peaceful and look forward to a future without fighting all the time.

Kazakhstan will Soon Again have a Vice President, a Position It Dispensed with in 1996

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 8 – Kazakhstan soon will again have a vice president, a position which it dispensed with in 1996 but which is mandated by recent constitutional changes and is now being defined more precisely by a bill that that country’s parliament has already passed its first reading (eurasiatoday.ru/v-kazahstane-vnov-poyavitsya-dolzhnost-vitse-prezidenta-podrobnosti/).

            Like the Russian Federation which dispensed with a vice presidency after the October 1993 clash between him and Boris Yeltsin, Kazakhstan first introduced that position to make transitions easier and divide power but then eliminated it to avoid the creation of any alternative power to the president.

            Because the new position in Kazakhstan will be filled directly by that country’s president, the government of that Central Asian country hopes to avoid the basis of any such clashes in the future; but if remains unclear whether the position can fill a real political niche or will remain vestigial except in the case of the death or incapacity of the president.

            Some in Kazakhstan think that this new post will transform Kazakh politics, but others are less certain. What is beyond question is that it will be closely watched not only there but in other post-Soviet states that currently lack vice presidencies and may bring them back or introduce them if the Kazakhstan revival works in a positive way.

Kursk Oblast Makes Plans to Erect Memorial to Leonid Brezhnev

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 8 – Officials and activists in Kursk Oblast have formed a regional committee to plan the commemoration of the 120^th anniversary of the birth of Leonid Brezhnev in December of this year, an action that likely enjoys Putin’s backing and may spread to other locations in the Russian Federation in the months ahead.

            The organizing committee wants to establish a memorial to the former Soviet dictator in the center of the regional capital of Kursk and includes among its members the father of one of Putin’s assistants (echofm.online/news/vlasti-kurskoj-oblasti-ponjdderzhali-ustanovku-pamyatnika-brezhnevu-s-inicziativoj-vystupil-otecz-pomoshhnika-putina).

            Lt.Gen. Gennady Dyumin says that he will bear all the costs of the erection of such a monument and stresses that while Brezhnev was not born in Kursk, he lived and worked there in the first years of his life. Consequently, it is important that the city and region take the lead in memorializing him.

            Brezhnev today has neither the large number of supporters or large number of opponents among Russians. Instead, most have mixed feelings about him, as someone whose rule was generally quiet for most of them but who behaved in ways that made him the subject of some of the best Soviet anecdotes.

            Dealing with the Brezhnev period is especially hard for Putin now given that like the late Soviet dictator, the current Russian one is aging and has both supporters and opponents who back Putin in much the same way they earlier backed Brezhnev with mixed feelings.

            Calling attention to Brezhnev by putting up memorials will only increase the number of those on both sides who will draw parallels between Putin and the former CPSU leader.