Wednesday, January 22, 2020

Gorbachev, Black January in Baku, and the End of the Soviet Union -- Lessons Unlearned and Mislearned


Paul Goble

            Staunton, January 20 – Vladimir Putin and his supporters blame Mikhail Gorbachev for the disintegration of the USSR, arguing that his liberalization allowed the non-Russians to escape from Moscow. But in this, as in so many other things, the Putinists get it wrong – and there is no better evidence of that than the tragic events that took place in Baku 30 years ago today.

            The Soviet Union in fact fell apart not because Gorbachev offered reforms and liberalization but because, having offered them, he showed he didn’t really mean it and tried to take them back by using force rather than persuasion and the same divide-and-rule tactics and violence that his Soviet predecessors had.

             As the Azerbaijani foreign ministry said yesterday, “after January 21, 1990, Azerbaijan was a different place” than it had been only two days earlier. It became “finally anti-Soviet” and its people recognized that they had to go their own way because they could not trust Msocow too live up to its promises (kavkaz-uzel.eu/blogs/83772/posts/41371).

                Baku today, 30 years after the event, stresses the ways in which Moscow promoted the Armenian secessionists in Karabakh and started the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan which continues now a generation later. But at the time, Azerbaijanis were more horrified by the introduction of Soviet troops who indiscriminately killed and wounded several hundred people.

            The behavior of the Soviet forces who acted under Gorbachev’s authority can only be described as a form of state terrorism just as when these forces were deployed against the Georgians, the Lithuanians, the Latvians and others.  But it was more than that: it was a signal that Gorbachev, for all his talk of “new thinking” wasn’t prepared to change.

            And because Gorbachev and his minions weren’t prepared to change, peoples and leaders across the USSR showed that they were more than ready to do so, precisely because of the Kremlin leader’s willingness to engage in this kind of violence and duplicity, and to seek a new future for themselves independent of the Soviet system.

            A year ago, I argued in a Window on Eurasia that Black January in Baku was the time and place when the Soviet Union died.  I see no reason to change anything I wrote at that time and so append that essay to this one. But there is one point that I do not think I made strongly enough and that matters profoundly for the future of the Russian Federation.

            That is this: empires do not die because rulers make concessions to those they rule over or because they make no concessions at all. Rather they die because their leaders are ultimately compelled to make concessions as Gorbachev and others have been but then decide they can take everything back by means of violence and duplicity.  

            Such rulers do not understand that violence and duplicity can transform people who are prepared to cooperate into a nation irreconcilably opposed to any form of cooperation with their oppressors.  They become almost instantly, a new and different people, as the Azerbaijani foreign ministry has pointed out.

            It is bad enough that Gorbachev never learned this lesson. It is worse that Putin has not only not learned it but has drawn exactly the opposite and wrong conclusion. Consequently, the current ruler in the Kremlin appears likely to act in ways that will cause him to lose even more of his country than his predecessor did of his.  

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Black January in Baku – the Time and Place the Soviet Union Died


            Staunton, January 20 [2019] – Twenty-nine years ago today, Soviet forces attacked the people of Baku, killing and wounding hundreds and illegally arresting many more. That date remembered in Azerbaijan to this day as Black January is less well-known to many now than the events in Vilnius and Riga a year later or in Moscow in August 1991.

            Soviet and Russian apologists have with more or less success sought to justify what Moscow did by pointing to the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Karabakh, but in fact, Moscow sent in forces to try to block the Azerbaijani people from overthrowing the communist authorities and installing a government responsive to the population.

            As such, it deserves to take its place as the time and the place the Soviet Union died because the powers that be in Moscow in effect invaded a territory the rulers claimed was their own and thus snapped any remaining ties of loyalty between the population and the Soviet imperial center.

            That is because, in trying to save that empire, Moscow showed that it had been reduced to relying on the use of massive and murderous force alone and thus it might act against other nations within the borders of the USSR in much the same way as it had done against the Azerbaijanis.

            For that reason alone, Black January should be better known. The chronology is complicated. In the weeks before Moscow invaded, Azerbaijanis tore down the border fences dividing them from the much larger community of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran, and the Popular Front of Azerbaijan took over many government offices around the republic.

            Then, on January 9, ten days before Moscow moved, the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR voted to make Nagorno-Karabakh, the predominantly ethnically Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan, de facto part of Armenia by including it within the Armenian SSR budget and allowing residents of Karabakh to vote in Armenian elections.

            That outraged many Azerbaijanis, but they were especially angry Moscow did not respond to the Armenian action. And often employing “heavily anti-Armenian rhetoric,” according to Human Rights Watch, Azerbaijanis then called for full independence from the USSR and prompted the Popular Front to set up committees for defense of the nation.

            Azerbaijani officials were unable to gain control of the situation, and Baku directed the 12,000 troops of the Interior Ministry to stay in their barracks lest their appearance spark violence in the city. That led to a breakdown in public order in parts of Azerbaijan and to attacks on Armenians, many of whom appealed to the Soviet government to help them leave.

            The Azerbaijan Popular Front took control in many regions of the republic, and on January 18, it called on residents of Baku to block the main access routes into the Azerbaijani capital in order to block any Soviet forces that might be sent against them and its activists surrounded Soviet interior force barracks there as well.

            That led the Soviet officials on the ground to pull back to the outskirts of the city where they established a new command post to direct the Soviet response. That response was not long in coming. On January19, Mikhail Gorbachev signed a decree calling for the introduction of forces to restore order, block the actions of the Peoples Front, and prevent anti-Armenian pogroms.

            Almost immediately an estimated 26,000 Soviet troops entered the Azerbaijani capital. To justify their acts of violence which claimed at least 100 lives and perhaps as many as 300, Moscow propagandists claimed that Azerbaijanis had fired on them. But a subsequent investigation by a Russian human rights group found no evidence of that.

            Moscow worked hard to block information about what was going on from reaching the West or even reaching Azerbaijanis. It blocked power to Azerbaijani state radio and television and banned all Azerbaijani print media.  As a result, the main source of news as the violence continued became the Azerbaijani Service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

            Soviet forces occupied the city, but they did not break the Azerbaijanis’ drive for independence. Hundreds of Azerbaijanis turned in their communist party cards, and on January 22, after the Soviet violence had died down, the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR met and condemned the actions of the Soviet forces, hardly the response Moscow hoped for.

            Moscow’s Memorial Human Rights Society and Helsinki Watch were among the organizations which denounced these Soviet attacks against unarmed civilians and even ambulances. And with time, the world came to know what had happened in Baku, although these events never received the attention the far less murderous attacks in Lithuania and Latvia did.

            After Azerbaijan succeeded in restoring its independence at the end of 1991, Azerbaijani officials called for bringing charges against Gorbachev for his actions in January 1990, appeals that continue to be heard in Baku.  And Azerbaijanis since that time have marked January 20th as the day of martyrs.

            Black January may seem a long time ago to many, but it continues to reverberate for Azerbaijanis and it provides some important lessons for all concerned, lessons that some have learned but that others for various reasons have refused to accept.  Three seem especially important now: 

            First, even Russian leaders who some see as reformers have not been shy about playing the worst kinds of ethnic politics or using massive violence against non-Russians in pursuit of their own interest. In the years since Black January, Gorbachev did so in the Baltics, Yeltsin did in Chechnya, and Putin is doing the same in Ukraine.

            Second, Moscow has invariably tried to control the media environment in order to muddy the waters about what it is doing and to shift the blame away from its own repressive policies to the actions of others.  That did not start with Putin’s “hybrid war” against Ukraine, however much some want to insist on that idea.

            And third – and this is especially important for Azerbaijanis to remember now given recent government actions against independent media outlets and human rights activists – it is precisely media outlets like Radio Liberty and independent organizations like Human Rights Watch that from the start have defended the Azerbaijani people.

Kremlin Pressure on Minsk for ‘Deeper Integration’ Won’t Ease, Sivitsky Says


Paul Goble

            Staunton, January 20 – The ongoing discussion about transition in the Russian Federation is not going to lead to any lessening of Moscow’s pressure on Minsk for “deeper integration,” Arsensy Sivitsky says, something Vladimir Putin has signaled by not saying anything about Belarus in his recent speeches.

            Instead, the director of Minsk’s Center for Strategic and Foreign Policy Research says, precisely because Putin did not say anything about foreign policy issues, the Kremlin leader sent a clear message that he does not plan any changes in them. “I am certain that this does not mean that the integration issue is closed” (thinktanks.by/publication/2020/01/20/arseniy-sivitskiy-nikakoy-peredyshki-v-uglublenii-integratsii-kreml-minsku-ne-predlozhit.html).

            “From the very beginning,” Savitsky continues, “the issue of deepened integration was scarcely affected by Putin’s 2024 problem when his current term will run out. [The Kremlin leader’s] integration ultimatum was motivated by strategic fears that he would lose influence in Belarus in the medium term.”

            Given Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s approaches to the West and to China could mean that “in the next five to ten years, the influence of Russia in Belarus could be reduced or lost altogether. And in this connection, in Moscow’s opinion, it was necessary to take definite steps to hold Belarus still more strongly in the Russian geopolitical orbit.”

            “Technical changes” in the Russian constitution “will not solve the main issue – that of the legitimacy of the Russian authorities,” Savitsky says. “Even more, the transit of power will occur in the context of an economic crisis which neither the past nor present Russian government can solve.”

            “Therefore,” he says, “the only source for confirming the legitimacy of this power remains geopolitics;” and “the Kremlin very often turns to various geopolitical adventures in order to find there a source of legitimacy and distract the attention of the population from current problems.”

            Expanded integration of Belarus with Russia is one of these geopolitical avenues, Savitsky says; “and this means that the conflicts between Minsk and Moscow will only intensify and that sooner or later the situation will develop to the point that Moscow will be forced to resolve these contradictions by greater interference in the internal affairs of Belarus.”

            Indeed, he argues, “any step or any move in a western direction, for example, or a rejection from the integrative agenda will lead to even greater pressure from Moscow” to “more tightly embed Minsk into Russia’s geopolitical orbit.”

            This isn’t because of any Slavic brotherhood or “Russian world,” Savitsky continues. “Belarus is an important territory from a military-strategic point of view. It is a buffer that Russia seeks to control. It is the shortest route to Kaliningrad if a crisis or conflict arises between Russia and NATO. And it is a transit country.”

            For Russia, Savitsky argues, establishing control over Belarus is also important from an economic point of view … And it is important symbolically. The Crimean and Syrian successes no longer work. A demonstration of a new geopolitical success would undoubtedly allow for a boost in the rating of the master of the Kremlin.”

Human Rights Watch Misses One of Main Problems in Ingushetia, Portal Six Says


Paul Goble

            Staunton, January 20 – In its annual report, US-based Human Rights Watch focuses on two of the three main problems in Ingushetia, Portal Six says. It describes the persecution of activists and restrictions on the media, but if fails to discuss the pressure on regional NGOs (6portal.ru/posts/human-rights-watch-отметила-факт-репрессий-против-ак/).

            The independent portal says that it has in its possession “numerous documents” about this pressure which it suggests those concerned with human rights should be concerned, given that many demonstrators are dependent on these NGOs and private organizations for their livelihood and even survival.

            Meanwhile, lawyers for Malsag Uzhakhov say that their client has been charged with organizing an extremist community because prosecutors have been unable to produce evidence for the other charges they have brought against him and hope this more serious charge – it carries a ten-year jail term – may prompt him to confess to the others (doshdu.com/protiv-ingushskogo-aktivista-malsaga-uzhahova-vozbudili-trete-ugolovnoe-delo/).

            Among those declared “heroes of civil society in Ingushetia” this year, the ninth such competition, its organizers say, are Uzhakhov, Boris Kodzoyev of the First Aid organization, blogger Artem Plato, the only woman Ingush activist in detention Zarifa Sautiyeva, and Nikolay Rybakov of Yabloko (kavkaz-uzel.eu/blogs/342/posts/41383).

            And in a reminder of another problem facing Ingushetia, the Kavkazr portal has published a story about the hundreds of Ingush who had to flee from Chechnya when the two Vaynakh peoples separated and still have not found permanent homes or much support from the authorities in Moscow and Magas (kavkazr.com/a/30387008.html).