Navalnaya’s Comments about Common Culture of Russians and Non-Russians Only Deepen Divide between Them, Radicalizing Both

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 7 – Speaking in Slovenia, Yuliya Navalnaya, the widow of the Russian opposition politician, suggested that those calling for the independence of the non-Russian republics of the Russian Federation were ignoring “the shared backgrounds and culture” of Russians and non-Russians alike.

            Her words which echo those of Kremlin propagandists have outraged non-Russians who see the world in an entirely different way and beyond question have deepened the divide between Russian liberals and non-Russian activists, Gulnara Shuraleyeva, one of the latter, says (themoscowtimes.com/2024/09/06/navalnayas-decolonization-critique-proves-that-russias-liberal-opposition-hasnt-been-listening-to-indigenous-voices-a86280).

            And that in turn has led to the radicalization of many who may have hoped for cooperation and the development of genuine federalism but see Navalnaya’s words as evidence that even if liberals like her came to power, the situation of the non-Russians would remain dire unless they are able to get out from under Moscow’s thumb by securing their own independence.

            (For examples of such commentaries, see idelreal.org/a/narody-uderzhivalis-v-imperskih-kleschah-siloy-ruslan-aysin-o-kritike-navalnoy-dekolonialnoy-povestki/33109265.html, t.me/League_FN/2081, indigenous-russia.com/archives/39545, indigenous-russia.com/archives/39541 and svoboda.org/a/razzhigaet-nenavistj-blogery-posporili-iz-za-slov-yulii-navaljnoy/33108644.html.)

            By backing the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation just as clearly and unqualifiedly as does the Kremlin, Navalnaya may have won plaudits from Russian nationalists and regime loyalists as well as from those in the West who oppose the disintegration of Russia just as they opposed the disintegration of the USSR thirty years ago.

            But gratuitous remarks like hers will do little to slow the coming apart of the Russian Federation just as similar ones at the end of Soviet times didn’t slow a similar process but in fact had the unintended consequence of accelerating its demise, however hard those who made such remarks then now try to take credit for exactly what happened.

Russia has Exhausted the Power Generating Capacity It Inherited from Soviet Union, Energy Minister Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 9 – Russia has exhausted the reserves of electric power generation left over from Soviet times, Energy Minister Sergey Tsivilyov says, and today it has little chance of replacing it given both Western sanctions that keep Moscow from acquiring needed spare parts and the absence of domestic spending in the sector.

            And despite Vladimir Putin’s assurances that Russia will overcome all problems in this area, the energy minister said the situation in the Russian Far East is now so bad that energy production there is at high risk of collapse (tass.ru/interviews/21798711 and moscowtimes.ru/2024/09/09/glava-minenergo-zayavil-ob-ischerpanii-ostavshihsya-ot-sssr-rezervov-energetiki-a141663).

            Tsivilyov’s pessimism in contrast to Putin’s upbeat optimism rests on the conclusions of Russian experts. According to them, even the Russian capital won’t be able to generate enough electricity in the future with shortfalls seriously restricting economic growth (so-ups.ru/future-planning/public-discussion-genshema/2042/).

            According to one expert, Oleg Shevtsov, head of Trans-Energy, half or more of Russia’s aging power plants and power distribution arrangements can’t be repaired let alone increased in capacity because of sanctions and the absence of domestic funding and supply (newizv.ru/news/2024-07-20/elektroseti-v-rossii-iznosheny-na-50-70-gde-zhdat-novyh-otklyucheniy-elektrichestva-432026).

            Unless something changes and quickly, Russia likely faces brownouts or worse, developments that will limit its ability to maintain existing levels of economic production even in key areas like the military-industrial sector. Putin clearly hopes for better; but as so often in Russia, the result is likely to be otherwise. 

Putin’s Speeches Now Resemble Those of CPSU General Secretaries, Pastukhov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 7 – There are many ways in which Russia increasingly resembles the Soviet past, but one of the most intriguing is the fact that Vladimir Putin’s speeches increasingly resemble stylistically and in terms of reaction those of CPSU general secretaries to plenums of the central committee.

            They are of little or no interest to anyone “except those who write them,” the London-based Russian analyst says; and no one listens to them “except those who have to do so because of their positions.” As a result, these public actions are of less moment than many think (t.me/v_pastukhov/1238 reposted at kasparov.ru/material.php?id=66DE94FA9C2B3).

            But even more important, “the vacuum of thought” that such speeches then and now display is unintentionally highlighted by “unnecessary details” that are intended to fill the time and distract attention from genuinely important and much larger issues while suggesting the man in power is really in charge.

            Putin’s latest speech in Vladivostok exemplifies this return to the past, Pastukhov continues. He said nothing about the war and maintained that “everything is calm, that we live as we did, and that we have grandiose plans,” although the specifics of even those were largely absent concealed behind a wave of meaningless newspeak.

            And as was so often the case in Soviet times, the leader’s speeches once again must be analyzed not so much by a consideration of what they contain but what they don’t and how the absence of comment about Ukraine, China or even Belarus is where the real story lies just as was true in Brezhnev’s time.

 

Russian Regions Not Coterminous with Federal Subjects and Must be Recognized, Mikhail Nemtsov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 9 – The federal subjects into which Moscow has divided the country are in almost all cases smaller than the regions which residents identify with, a fact of life that makes talking about regionalism difficult and the future of a genuine federal division of the country even more so, Mikhail Nemtsov says.

            The Russian poet and philosopher who comes from the Altai region gives as an example Siberia. That region “in fact does not exist; instead, there are two or three or even four Siberias,” with residents in one place defining their region one way and those in another in quite a different one (nemoskva.net/2024/09/09/pomozhet-li-nam-mestnaya-identichnost/).

            The federal subjects of which these mental regions are a part, such as Altay Kray or Kemerovo Oblast are too small to constitute the basis of a regional identity, all the more so because these were created from the outside by Moscow to address its needs rather than those of the peoples living in them.

            Nemtsov gives as an example the creation of Byransk Oblast in 1944. It was set up not because there was any natural Bryansk region but in order to simplify the coordination by Soviet officials of Moscow’s struggle against the large anti-Soviet underground that existed there at that time.

            Regional identities, he continues, involve larger territories that have become part of the mental maps of people over a long period of time. And despite Soviet and more recently Russian efforts at ethnic engineering and redivision of the administrative territorial map of the country, “these regions exist in the minds of the people there” and must be taken into account.

            Moscow typically divides the country into three levels, the federal, the regional and the local (municipal); but in addition to these, Nemtsov argues, “there is a fourth level, that of large regions” – and this level is “perfectly obvious and quite strong,” however much it is downplayed or ignored at the center.

            If Russia is to become a genuine federation, then it must take these regions into account rather than assuming that the existing divisions that Moscow has imposed are the only ones that matter. 

Another Signal of Moscow’s Intentions: Ethnic Buryat who Doesn’t Know Buryat Now Republic Head Replaced Ethnic Russians who Did Know that National Language

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 9 – It is common ground that the survival of minority languages depends not only on the availability of and access to instruction in them but also and in many ways even more on the use of those languages in public spheres. Where they are widely used, they will be respected and survive; where they are not, they almost certainly will disappear.

            One of the clearest signs of their likelihood of survival is when ethnic Russians who live in these areas and especially those who are sent in to occupy key positions feel that they must learn the non-Russian languages – and when they don’t feel such a need, then the future of those languages is at risk regardless of whether they are taught in schools or survive in homes.

            That makes a development Aleksandra Garmozhapova, the head of Free Buryatia  , points to especially significant. She points out that earlier Russian rulers of her homeland learned Russian but now an ethnic Buryat doesn’t even speak the language of his own people (nemoskva.net/2024/09/09/pomozhet-li-nam-mestnaya-identichnost/).

            When the head of the republic who is a member of the titular nationality doesn’t think he must know and use the language of the republic, that sends a powerful signal to his co-nationals that they don’t need to learn it and use it, she explains, a sharp contrast to the situation in which even ethnic Russians feel that it is important that they know and use the titular language.

            In the 1990s, the head of Buryatia was an ethnic Russian, Leonid Potapov, even though an ethnic Russian, spoke Buryat well; now, Aleksey Tsydenov, an ethnic Buryat who heads the republic, doesn’t, although some ethnic Russians in the republic leadership, including the speaker of its parliament, Vladimir Pavlov, do.

            This pattern undoubtedly extends to other non-Russian areas where Russians have been inserted as leaders such as Dagestan and signals in the clearest possible way Moscow’s real intentions for the non-Russian languages and their peoples. But in addition to that, it calls into question the approach of many analysts to ethnic issues in the Russian Federation.

            Many of them are inclined to count the number of non-Russians in top positions in the republics as an indication of Moscow’s tolerance for and support of the titular nationalities; but in fact, installing a member of the titular nationality who does not speak the national language is a much more serious attack on such nations than even having an ethnic Russian there who does.

 

To Compensate for Labor Shortages and to Meet War-Time Demand, More than Half of Russians are Working Overtime – and Many Aren’t Happy, Head Hunter Poll Finds

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 9 – One of the ways Russian employers are trying to compensate for the shortage of workers at a time of increasing demand for output to support Putin’s war in Ukraine is to force their employees to work overtime, a practice that is boosting incomes but isn’t especially welcome by many workers, a Head Hunter survey finds.

            Almost a third of all Russians of working age (29 percent) are working overtime every day or almost every day, the survey found, with another quarter (23 percent) doing so two to three days a week (rbc.ru/society/09/09/2024/66de514c9a794717bfac197a and moscowtimes.ru/2024/09/09/rossiyane-massovo-pozhalovalis-na-pererabotki-a141652).

            Among the others, 12 percent of workers say they are required to work overtime “not less than once a month,” and 17 percent say they work overtime twice a month. Only about one Russian employee in four – 23 percent – says that he or she has never had to work beyond the normal work week.

            Nearly half of those surveyed – 48 percent – said they weren’t adequately compensated for overtime, and almost the same share – 49 percent – said that overtime work was having a negative impact on their health, with 20 percent saying it has had a serious impact in that regard and leaving them with less time for family, friends and hobbies.

            If the Russian government drives out more migrant workers or if more Russians leave the country because of Putin’s war, pressure on employers to pressure their workers to put in overtime hours will likely increase, something that will undoubtedly anger many of them even if their incomes rise as a result.   

Muscovitism Must Be Rooted Out if Russia is to Cease to Be a Threat to Itself and Others, Eidman Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 7 – Those who believe in “a beautiful Russia of the future” often cite the case of Germany after 1945 when its defeat in war did not lead to its disappearance, Igor Eidman says. But they ignore that the allies liquidated the source of German militarism– Prussia – and that Russia which has its own Prussia – Muscovy – must undergo something similar.

            By eliminating Prussia, the Russian analyst now living in Beelin, the World War II allies also eliminated “the spirit of Prussianism: chauvinism, imperialism, militarism, and authoritarianism” and as a result the new Germany could become a democratic and genuinely federal state (t.me/igoreidman/1722 reposted at  charter97.org/ru/news/2024/9/8/609857/).

            Russia to this day has “its own Prussia and Prussianism: Muscovy and its spirit of Muscovitism,” a fact of life which reflects that Russia was formed around the Muscovite principality just as Germany was formed around Prussia in the 19^th century. As a result, Eidman says, “present-day Russia is a broadened variant of the Muscovite principality.”

            Muscovitism is “not the log of Muscovites alone, but rather of all those who associate themselves with the Moscow empire of the Russian Federation. In short, its entire ruling elite. Putin and most of his circle “aren’t Muscovites – just as Hitler was not a Prussian.” But they are “infected with the spirit of Muscovitism.”

            That set of ideas involves “imperial pride and unrestricted territorial expansion, contemptuous xenophobia, a primitive morality in which my seizure of the territory of others is good but their seizure of mine is evil, legal nihilism, contempt for human rights and freedoms, slavery from top to bottom, police brutality, systemic corruption and theft.”

            Eidmean concludes that “if the contemporary Moscow-centric empire and the spirit of Muscovitism aren’t destroyed along with the Putin regime, then, the global threat of Muscovite expansion will remain in place and Moscow will remain a source of war and aggression toward its neighbors.”