Russian Officials Clearly Worried People in Regions and Republics May Be First to Question Putin’s War Once It Ends, Latypova Says

Paul Goble

    Staunton, May 14 – The effort by officials in Russia’s regions and republics to link World War II and Putin’s war in Ukraine together than people there who have suffered disproportionately higher losses in the latter conflict than the country as a whole may begin to question what Putin has been doing in Ukraine, Leyla Latypova says.

    “As patriotic favor wanes and plus military payments evaporate from bank accounts,” the Moscow Times correspondent says, “more and more residents – especially indigenous ones – could start question the true meaning of the sacrifices made by their loved ones” (themoscowtimes.com/2025/05/14/the-kremlin-prepared-the-regions-for-peace-talks-but-few-took-notice-a89075).

    Linking the two wars together, Latypova suggests, “helps delay those questions;” and “it is no coincidence that authorities in ethnic republics – especially in Sakha and Tatarstan – splurged on military parades and accompanying celebrations while heath care, educational and vital infrastructure projects in these areas suffer from underfunding.”

    “Whether following Moscow’s orders or their own hunch as to what will please the Kremlin,” she continues, “Local officials bet that [such] propaganda can effectively prolong the life of the regime in Moscow and, by extension, their own.”

    This article is from Regions calling, a new weekly newsletter from The Moscow Times. It can be subscribed to online at mailchi.mp/moscowtimes/regions-calling.

Sale and Destruction of Building Used as Chechen Mosque in Dagestan Exacerbates Tensions There

Paul Goble

    Staunton, May 13 – The complexities of restoring buildings to their rightful owners after they have been used by more than one, the ways in which such disputes play into larger issues of the status of ethnic communities, and the impact of ethnic diversity in Dagestan on all issues are very much on public view in the pulling down of a building most recently used as a mosque.

    In Leninaul, a village in the Chechen portion of Dagestan which has been slated to get its own status as an official district later this year, officials sold off to the highest bidder a building that until a decade or so ago had been a store but more recently had been used as a mosque for the Chechen minority there (akcent.site/novosti/40875).

    The winning bidder who paid ten times the opening bid then announced he was tearing down the building in order to put up a new one. That outraged the Chechens who argued that he was destroying their mosque which they had been using since 2020 and thus not only attacking a religious facility but destabilizing the situation in the region.

    To outsiders, this may seem a small issue, especially as the authorities in Leninaul immediately offered the Chechens land for a new mosque. But that hasn’t calmed the situation, and it is quite likely that the dispute will escalate particularly if Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov chooses to support his co-ethnics in Dagestan as he has in the past.

    For background on the status of Chechens in Dagestan which this purchase puts at risk, see jamestown.org/program/groznys-support-for-ethnic-chechens-in-dagestan-destabilizing-north-caucasus/, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/10/plans-to-restore-chechen-district-in.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/10/banal-corruption-reason-dagestan.html.

Tashkent Worried about Treatment of Uzbeks in Russia Because It Fears They’ll Come Home, Russian Commentator Says

Paul Goble

    Staunton, May 13 – Tashkent has recently expressed concern about the treatment of ethnic Uzbek migrant workers in the Russian Federation not so much because it cares about what happens to them there but because it is worried about what their possible return home to Uzbekistan will mean, Aleksandr Shustov says.

    According to the Russian commentator, Tashkent fears losing the transfer payments such migrant workers send home now and about the challenges it will face in ensuring that returnees get jobs and are given the social services that they are entitled to (ritmeurasia.ru/news--2025-05-13--uzbekistan-bespokoit-vozmozhnoe-sokraschenie-chisla-trudovyh-migrantov-v-rossii-80284).

    Shustov is half right about Tashkent’s worries. Like other Central Asian governments, the Uzbek one has long been concerned about any rapid return home of Uzbek migrant workers; but at the same time, Uzbekistan has a remarkably good track record in caring for its citizens working abroad.

    For background on Central Asian concerns about returning migrant workers, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/05/moscows-plan-to-deport-illegal.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/11/one-million-migrant-workers-left-russia.html. For Tashkent’s approach, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/12/for-first-time-ever-uzbek-foreign.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/10/tashkent-wants-to-open-uzbek-schools.html.

Russians Seeking to Memorialize Stalin but Blocked by Officials Now Putting Statues on Private Land

Paul Goble

    Staunton, May 13 – Russian citizens who want to put up statues of Stalin but are blocked by local officials who fear that such a step is inappropriate or may spark unwanted controversy are doing what some activists in the United States have done regarding the erection of memorials to unpopular causes.

    Prevented from putting up memorials to Stalin on public squares, the Russians are erecting them on private land where at least in principle the authorities can’t block them from doing so (idelreal.org/a/narodnaya-restalinizatsiya-byusty-stalina-vozvraschayutsya-v-bashkortostan/33412512.html).

    The IdelReal portal describes such actions in a village in Bashkortostan where officials and local residents blocked a statue on public land and then Stalinists put one up on private land as a form of “popular re-Stalinization,” a trend likely to be picked up elsewhere and to spark more conflicts between supporters and opponents of the Soviet dictator.

Petition Opposing Restoring Name of Stalingrad to Volgograd Garners Nearly 2,000 Signatures in First 24 Hours

Paul Goble

    Staunton, May 13 – Now that Moscow has allowed Volgograd to be called Stalingrad during the VE commemorations and restored that name to the city’s airport on a permanent basis, many have assumed that the restoration of the name Staliningrad for the city itself has become almost inevitable.

    But not everyone wants to see that name change take place. On May 12, a group of activists launched a petition drive with 187 signatures against that idea, despite its apparent support from the Kremlin, and within 24 hours, it had attracted a total of 1876 signatures (kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/411267).

    On the one hand, that is not an enormous number of signatories; but on the other, it is an indication that far from all Russians want the return of the name of the Soviet dictator to maps of their country and that they are prepared to put their names down to that effect, even if doing so may put them at risk of repressive moves by the Putin regime.

Azerbaijan Expanding Naval Cooperation with NATO and Turkey

Paul Goble

    Staunton, May 13 – At the end of February, Azerbaijan became a member of MARSEC, the NATO Center for Naval Security, that is based in Turkey and will represented there by officers from its own navy initially for three years (casp-geo.ru/azerbajdzhan-stal-chlenom-tsentra-nato-po-morskoj-bezopasnosti/ and mod.gov.az/ru/news/azerbajdzhan-prinyat-v-chleny-centra-sovershenstvovaniya-morskoj-bezopasnosti-54060.html).

    Alongside these ties, Azerbaijan and Turkey have expanded their navy-to-navy contacts, most recently with the visit of Turkish naval officers to Baku this past week in which the sides discussed expanded cooperation (casp-geo.ru/azerbajdzhan-posetila-delegatsiya-vms-turetskoj-respubliki/).

    Turkey on its own has long been involved in the development of the Azerbaijani navy and its ships and personnel on the Caspian. Azerbaijan’s involvement in a NATO structure at the same time is sparking concerns among some Russian analysts about what this activity, which has generally passed below the radar screens of most, may mean.

    Azerbaijan’s navy on the Caspian has been growing and increasingly represents a potential challenge to Russia’s Caspian Flotilla as well as Iran’s navy (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/02/azerbaijani-navy-prepares-to-defend.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/03/birth-of-azerbaijani-navy-and-revival.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/07/azerbaijani-naval-exercises-highlight.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/05/kazakhstan-increasingly-preparing-its.html).

In Another Blow to Russia, Finland Planning to Change Its Railways to International Gauge

Paul Goble

    Staunton, May 13 – Lulu Ranne, Finland’s transportation minister says Helsinki will work with its NATO to transform its railways from the Russian gauge (1520 mm) to the narrower international gauge (1435 mm) and thereby strengthen its national security by linking it more closely with Europe.

    His announcement will boost support for RailBaltica, a plan to have an international age railway through the three Baltic countries, especially as Finland has already come out in support of a rail tunnel between Helsinki and Tallinn (ng.ru/news/816152.html). It will also likely give more impetus to China’s pressure on Russia to change the gauge of the latter in the Russian Far East (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2016/04/bowing-to-china-moscow-for-first-time.html).

    None of these plans will be realized immediately. It will take some time to find the money and then complete construction. But once it happens, these moves will further isolate Moscow and force it to choose between continuing with its current arrangement and bearing the costs that will entail or integrating with the rest of the world.