Movements of Indigenous Peoples in Russian Federation Expand Cooperation

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 11 – The leaders of the movements of the indigenous peoples in the Russian Federation have met to expand cooperation among them both to limit the possibility that Moscow will play them off against one another and to allow them to negotiate as a group with Russian opposition groups.

            At the end of last week, representatives of these groups most now in emigration held a conference in Berlin on “Indigenous Vision: Centering Our Voices, Resilience and Knowledge” (themoscowtimes.com/2025/07/11/conference-seeks-solidarity-among-indigenous-peoples-of-russia-ukraine-and-central-asia-a89789).

            Three of the leaders, Buryat activist and Indigenous Peoples of Russia leader Viktoriya Maladayeva, Buryat opposition and co-founder of the Nomads Indigenous Collective Seseg Jigitova, and Sakha activist Vilyuya Choinova outlined the purposes of the meeting at a press conference.

            Choinova said that one of the chief goals of the meeting and indeed of indigenous activism now is to “create a platform for Indigenous voices so we can start a dialogue on equal terms with the Russian opposition,” a group that was not represented at the Berlin meeting and that remains divided as far as its identity is concerned.

            Maladyaeva said that the Russian intelligentsia and the current Russian opposition has suffered from an identity crisis “for many centuries. They don’t know who they are” in that regard. The situation of the indigenous populations is different: “we know who we are [and] we know what we want.”

            And Jigitova specified what most of the indigenous believe: “the hyper-centralized, Moscow-centric system is incompatible with decolonization, as it creates projects where indigenous people are invited” to participate but marginalized and not put at the center of what is going on.

            All three stressed that their cooperation is at “the dialogue stage,” one designed to “find ways to build solidarity and amplify their voices” rather than laying down any “shared vision for the future” given that “every region” in the Russian Federation is “different and [has[ different issues.”

            What they do hope for is that their group will gain “institutional representation in institutions like the United Nations and the Council of Europe” because that would give them added weight in talks with both the Russian state and the Russian opposition.

Putin’s War in Ukraine Far from Only Reason Russia’s Prison Population is Declining and Penal Institutions are Closing, ‘Important Stories’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 9 – It is widely believed that the number of those incarcerated for crimes in Russia has fallen because inmates have been given the opportunity to fight in Putin’s war in Ukraine and that their departure is why almost 90 penal institutions have been closed since February 2022.

            That is part of the explanation, Important Stories journalist Alina Danilina says; but it is only part of it. Other reasons include a growing shortage of guards who may very well have gone to war as a better alternative to their jobs and the sentencing of those convicted not to prison (istories.media/stories/2025/07/08/v-rossii-za-35-goda-zakrili-pochti-90-kolonii-i-sizo-eto-iz-za-voini/).

            She acknowledges that fulling proving her argument is impossible because Moscow has stopped publishing reliable data on the number of convicts and the shortages of guards, although there have been enough statements by officials and analyses by experts to show that the war itself is not the only cause.

            In support of her own argument, Danilina points out that slightly more Russian penal institutions were closed in the three and a half years before Putin launched his expanded invasion of Ukraine than in the three and a half since and that the challenge of trying to hire more guards has become ever more lively.

            She also points out that the system is not becoming more humane and that the shortage of guards almost certainly means that in many cases, Russian prisoners who remain behind bars or in the camps are being treated even worse than they were before 2022 given that the remaining guards are more likely to use force than when there was a larger number of them. 

Dissident Orthodox Priest in Kazakhstan Moves to Create Alternative to Moscow Church There

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 10 – Father Iakov Vorontsov, defrocked by the Moscow Patriarchate and subject to criminal charges for his call to create an autocephalous Orthodox church in Kazakhstan subordinate to any larger patriarchate except Moscow, has now resumed his campaign following the dismissal of those charges.

            Vorontsov attracted public attention first for his efforts in 2023 to create a rival Orthodox church in Kazakhstan and then for the criminal charges the Kazakhstan authorities brought against him. (For his earlier efforts, see windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/12/seeking-autocephaly-church-dissident-in.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/12/some-orthodox-in-kazakhstan-seek.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/07/orthodox-leaders-in-kazakhstan-now-say.html; and for the case against him which arose from a Facebook post in which he called the Russian authorities fascist, see https://orda.kz/ugolovnoe-delo-protiv-svjaschennika-s-iakova-voroncova-snjali-obvinenija-401445/.).

            Since the case was dismissed in May, Vorontsov has resumed his efforts to create an alternative Orthodox church in Kazakhstan. He now insists he isn’t trying to replace one Orthodox church with another but to give believers in that country a choice (orda.kz/byvshij-svjaschennik-rpc-hochet-otkryt-novuju-pravoslavnuju-cerkov-v-kazahstane-404122/).

            He says that many Orthodox Christians are unhappy with the Moscow Patriarchate’s position on Putin’s war in Ukraine and are now worshipping in the Uniate congregations there. But the establishment of a new Orthodox church in that country, possibly subordinate to the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople will give them more options.

            The Moscow Patriarchate for its part is unlikely to see Vorontsov’s new position as acceptable. Instead, the ROC MP is certain to view what the dissident priest is now doing as another effort to break the Orthodox Christians away from the Moscow Patriarchate and thus to weaken Russia.

            That the Kazakhstan authorities have dismissed the case against him and that he is resuming his activities suggests, however, that Vorontsov enjoys some support within the Kazakhstan government and is likely to become even more active than he was before government charges were brought against him. 

Russia’s Only Aircraft Carrier Under Repair Since 2017 May Finally Be Scrapped

Paul Goble

Staunton, July 11 – The Admiral Kuznetsov, Russia’s only aircraft carrier that suffered many embarrassments while at sea and has been under repair since 2017 may now be scrapped, Izvestiya says, a development that if true is likely to spark renewed debate in Moscow on whether Russia needs or can afford a replacement.

            For the Izvestiya report and a discussion of its implications, see iz.ru/1918884/2025-07-11/remont-i-modernizatciia-kreisera-admiral-kuznetcov-priostanovleny and thebarentsobserver.com/security/repairs-on-russias-admiral-kuznetsov-halted-decommissioning-possible/433308; for the sad history of this ship both on the seas and in drydock, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/11/for-sixth-time-completion-of-repairs-to.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/07/projected-return-of-ill-fated-russian.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/09/the-kuznetsov-almost-died-in-2018-when.html, windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/07/fsb-raids-shipyards-where-russias-only.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/01/kremlin-claims-to-contrary-russias-only.html.

            According to the Russian government newspaper, all work on the Admiral Kuznetsov has been suspended; and a decision whether to renew that at some point in the future or scrap the ship will be made soon by the Navy and the United Shipbuilding Corporation “in the near future.”

            Many Russian analysts have suggested in the past that the ship will be scrapped especially as costs of repairing it rise at a time of budgetary stringency brought on by Putin’s war in Ukraine. And some Moscow commentators have sought to make a virtue out of this necessity by arguing the age of aircraft carriers is over and that Russia shouldn’t waste money on them.

            But others argue that aircraft carriers still have a place and that Russia can afford one or more in the future even if it can’t afford to refit the Admiral Kuznetsov. That suggests that a debate will now open that took place in 2021 but was closed down by the beginning of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2022/01/debate-about-possible-construction-of.html).

Since Putin Came to Power, 32 Governors have Been Charged with Crimes

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 10 – Becoming the head of a federal subject in the Russian Federation is a high-risk step. As Kommersant reports, since 2000, 32 governors have been charged with crimes, 21 while still in office, and 19 were brought to trial. The rest had their cases dismissed, often because of the statute of limitations (kommersant.ru/doc/7659367).

            The Horizontal Russia portal has now analyzed these cases in detail and highlighted that Moscow has brought charges both against those who are most loyal to it and those who are not (semnasem.org/articles/2025/07/10/bystro-zhestko-i-bez-lishnih-santimentov-kak-ustroeno-presledovanie-gubernatorov-i-drugih-upravlencev-v-rossii).

            Such moves against governors, the portal suggests are designed to reenforce the popular view that those involved in politics are bribetakers or otherwise corrupt, a stereotype which “reduces the motivation to take part in elections” and even to follow what is going on in the political system below the level of the president.

            Moscow divides regional heads “into two categories,” Horizontal Russia says, those who are loyal to the central authorities and those who oppose or have offended them. The Kremlin treats them differently: charging the former only when the crimes can’t be ignored but feeling free to bring charges for lesser crimes in the case of the latter.

            “Since his first term,” the portal continues, “Vladimir Putin has sought to limit the influence of mayors and governors because he understands that … they can be independent of the Kremlin even if they show complete support for the federal authorities.” Moscow has the same view of business leaders in the regions.

            To limit its problems with such people, the Kremlin has eliminated genuine elections for governors and created a governors’ school to weed out those who might become problematic. But criminal charges remain the last line of defense, one the Kremlin is quite prepared to use. And governors understand this implicitly.

            To ensure that they do, the Horizontal Russia portal says, Moscow will continue to bring criminal charges against governors on a regular basis, no matter how loyal such people may appear to be.

Domestic Policy Failures Not Just Foreign Influence Behind Many of Russia’s Nationality Problems, Duma Deputy Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 9 – The new draft Russian government nationality policy document specifies that the main threats to ethnic peace in the Russian Federation are the result of attempts by hostile foreign powers to influence the situation there (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/06/new-draft-nationality-strategy-focuses.html).

            But Duma deputy Nikolay Doluda says “in fact, there are also internation shortcomings such as social-economic problems, insufficient amounts of information, and the lack of leaders of public opinon which are having no less a negative impact on the situation” (business-gazeta.ru/article/677077).

            The ethnic Ukrainian who earlier served as a Cossack ataman but has been a member of the Russian Duma since 2021 made that remark in the course of a session of the Russian parliament’s nationalities committee devoted to a discussion of the new nationality policy document.

            While most of the participants in this discussion lined up behind the government draft, others dissented in ways like Doluda and argued that Moscow needs to take positive steps to attract non-Russians to its side, including the construction of new mosques for Muslims in major cities.  

            These divisions in fact represent a step forward in that they highlight the fundamental differences within the Russian political class about what to do with the “nationality question.” And they may be a harbinger of real debates in the future about domestic policy as a whole and not just discussions on the margins.

Moscow Now Feels It can Again Make Changes in Russian Regions without Risk to Itself, Kynyev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, July 9 – During covid pandemic and in the run-up to the presidential elections, the Kremlin slowed making changes in the leadership of Russian regions fearing that any such moves during a period of potential turbulence was dangerous. But now, Aleksandr Kynyev says, it believes such limiting factors are behind it and that it is free to make more changes.

            As a result, the HSE political scientist says the Kremlin is likely to increase still further the percentage of outsiders in charge of regions – that figure now stands at 60 percent – and will further destroy anything worthy of the name of a regional elite (semnasem.org/articles/2024/08/07/kto-upravlyaet-regionami-kynev).

            Last year, Kynyev published a study of how the leadership of political and business institutions in predominantly ethnic Russian regions has changed over the last 30 years (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/08/no-ethnic-russian-region-has-elite.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/12/putin-has-gelded-regional-elites-but.html).

            He repeats the arguments he made then that there are no elites in the regions of the kind that existed in the 1990s and that no predominantly ethnically Russian oblast or kray is currently capable of pursuing independence. Those who think otherwise are basing their arguments on a situation that existed in the 1990s but no longer does.

            There are no real regional political elites because those the Kremlin has installed no longer identify with or care about the future of their areas of responsibility because they won’t be living there in the future, Kynyev continues; and something similar has happened to leaders of businesses in the regions: they increasingly head branches of federal companies.

            “If there is turbulence in Moscow, then the rules of the game could change … and its control over the regions would weaken,” he says. If that happens, then regional challenges could emerge. But “until that control weakens, there won’t be any such ‘fermentation.’ This system is stable … and it can exist for a very long time.”