If Ukraine in ‘an Invented Country,’ So Too is Russian Federation, Telegram Channel Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 7 – Russian media outlets have picked up American reports that Vladimir Putin told Donald Trump that Ukraine is not a real but only an “invented” country; but while some accept that idea, the SerpomPo telegram channel says that if Ukraine is indeed “an invented country, then so too is “the new Russia.”

            Both countries, the telegram channel says, “were born in 1991. Period; and therefore if Ukraine is ‘a fiction,’ then so too is Russia as both fell out of the cradle of that ‘great geopolitical catastrophe’ and both are now only 33 years old” (t.me/SerpomPo/26594 reposted at charter97.org/ru/news/2024/10/7/613572/).

            This observation of SerpomPo is important to remember because all too many people in Russia, in some of the other former Soviet republics, and in the West continue to think that the Russian Federation is a real historical country and the non-Russian republics are somehow invented and thus less equal.

Threat of North Ossetian Annexation of Ingush Territory, Despite being Denied, May Yet Lead to Protests and Even a War

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 4 – Last month, the independent Fortanga news agency of Ingushetia reported that North Ossetia has decided to redraw the border between the two republics, sparking concerns that Ingushetia would lose still more territory in the Prigorodny District which Moscow did not return to Ingushetia in the 1950s when the Ingush people returned from deportation.

            The situation sparked anger in Ingushetia, the threat of mass protests like those which roiled that republic after Magas gave up 10 percent of the republic’s territory to Chechnya in 2019, and even the possibility of armed clashes between people in the two republics  (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/09/ingush-outraged-by-vladikavkaz-plan-to.html).

            The situation was calmed somewhat by reassuring words from Ingush officials that no border changes were in the offing, although the failure of Moscow and its installed leader in Magas to say anything about this has left people there worried about the future (themoscowtimes.com/2024/10/04/in-russias-caucasus-a-tentative-border-redraw-edges-republics-closer-to-instability-a86571).

            One Ingush activist speaking to The Moscow Times on condition of anonymity, said that he is “convicted that the Kremlin deliberately keeps this issue unresolved like a trump card up its sleeve” so as to “allow it to destabilize the situation here and start a war when they deem it beneficial for one reason or another.”

            It is thus “only a matter of time without a doubt” when the Ingush will go to war for this land given that “100 percent of the Ingush people are raised with the firm belief in the inevitable return of these territories by any means” lest their republic be destroyed step by step with its neighbors taking ever more of its land.

A Putin Declaration of Victory in Ukraine will Entail Even Worse Consequences for Russia than His Decision to Invade It, Chernyshov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 5 – Because he has never specified exactly what a Russian victory in Ukraine would look like, Putin can at almost any point declare victory, Sergey Chernyshov says; and his doing so will have even worse and more fateful consequences for Russia than would a genuine Russian loss.

            If Putin does make such a declaration, the Radio Liberty commentator says, the Russian people will see themselves as victors and be even less willing to demand any changes from the leader who was responsible for this “victory” (sibreal.org/a/sergey-chernyshov-o-tom-chto-delat-esli-putin-pobedit-v-voyne/33146353.html).

            And consequently, “the day when Putin declares his victory will become much more tragic for the future of Russia but not Ukraine than was February 24” when he announced his expanded invasion. If Russia loses and admits as much, then change will come; but if Russia claims victory, change becomes much less likely.

            What is important here, Chernyshov stresses, is that “Russian society and the Russian state having come to believe in its victory will not even degrade. Not, both will return to their normal state, which arose as a result of the selective policy of the Bolsheviks during the 20^th century.”

            And that means this: “If anyone ever believed that a genuine democratization and liberalization of the country took place in the 1990s, that will be exclusively his problem and not a problem for Russia which essentialy as remained exactly as it was fifty and even eighty years ago.”

            After such a declaration of victory, it won’t be plausible to divide the regime and the population because the people like the powers will “with joy believe that it has won.” Those who oppose Putin and his war need to recognize this and recognize that when Putin does declare victory they will be truly isolated.

            Unfortunately, Chernyshov says, the Russian opposition has thought a lot about what to do if Russia loses and is forced to admit that it has; but it has done little or nothing to think about what it must do if Putin declares a victory however fraudulent that claim is.  And yet the opposition and Russia needs just such a plan.

            The commentator suggests that what may be required is to come to view the Russian diaspora as a saving remnant that will be able to keep alive the best in the nation’s traditions until a time will come when the aftermath of such a Putin declaration of “victory” may pass and new possibilities will open up once again.

Moscow isn’t Russifying Occupied Ukrainian Territories but ‘De-Europeanizing’ Them, Yakovenko Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 5 – Speaking at the 13^th Forum of Free Russia in Vilnius, Igor Yakovenko says that what is occurring on the Ukrainian territories now occupied by Russian forces is not Russification as many think but rather “de-Europeanization because Ukraine is a European country” unlike Putin’s Russia which isn’t.

            The Russian journalist now in emigration says that “centrifugal tendencies have always been a feature of Russia; and when the central powers will be weakened as a result of military defeat, these tendencies will renew and the disintegration of Russia will be inevitable” (ehorussia.com/new/node/31667).

            Consequently, Yakovenko continues, “the task of the opponents of Putinism is to do everything so that Russia will suffer defeat in this war. After that, it will be possible for part of Russia to enter Europe because Russia as a whole will never fit into Europe,” something many even in the opposition are unwilling to acknowledge.

            The coming apart of the Russian Federation will not be bloodless; but it is likely that the faster the disintegration takes place, the less likely it will be bloody. And it is also necessary to recognize that to avoid disaster, those who favor disintegration will have to work with many they do not approve of.

            When the USSR collapsed, Yakovenko argues, “the main beneficiaries were the powers that be in the union republics who tried to take control of all of this. And despite our disgust with the current regional authorities, I think that their attempts at controlling similar processes during the upcoming collapse is the only positive way forward.”

            While the first secretaries of the communist parties in the union republics were “to put it mildly not the most sympathetic people, nevertheless, it was they who were most interested in the collapse and it was they who made it the least bloody.” There is no perfect and entirely peaceful way forward now either.

Russian Opposition Tearing Itself Apart rather than Focusing on Common Enemy, Gozman Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 5 – A civil war is going on among Russians but it is the wrong one as it involves conflicts among those who oppose Vladimir Putin rather than between themselves as a group and the Kremlin leader who is the cause of their and their country’s common misfortunes, Leonid Gozman says.

            A very large share of political emigres, the Russian politician who now lives abroad as well, “hates not so much those who have plunged them [into their misfortunes] but instead others just like themselves,” something that distracts them from fighting their real enemy, the Putin regime (novayagazeta.eu/articles/2024/10/05/idet-voina-grazhdanskaia).

            Many of these people like to hate others like themselves because it justifies their inaction and makes them feel important, Gozman says, and thus they fail to recognize how this hatred, often over entirely invented things, works against what they say they are for and for what they say they are against.

            But this pattern has profound consequences for the future, he continues. “If you consider only those who stood next to you on the picket line, were in prison or helped the Ukrainian army as you own and the rest as enemies, then you will ultimately have to establish an occupation regime – and its result will be no better than what we have now.”

            Civil wars, Gozman points out, “end not with the military victory of one of the sides but with national reconciliation.” And Russia’s ongoing civil war shows no signs of ending either for its immediate participants or the country as a whole. As a result, disasters will pile on disasters with all involved assuming that it is someone else’s fault.

            What is needed, he continues, is a recognition that all Russians are in this together and that except for those who have committed real crimes like Putin, they are not enemies but allies. If the Russian opposition in emigration can’t do that, it should “forget Russia” and join some other nation.

Nations in the Russian Federation who Want Independence Must Seek and Be Allowed a Velvet Divorce, Inozemtsev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 4 – The Russian Federation remains an empire, and those of its component nations who want independence must seek a velvet divorce much like the one that led to the separation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia rather than pursue it via revolt, Vladislav Inozemtsev says.

            Otherwise, they will be opposed by the military power of the large portions of the country that do not want to leave even if they themselves would be better off if those who want to become independent would succeed, the Russian economist says (idelreal.org/a/vladislav-inozemtsev-o-posledstviyah-voyny-dlya-ekonomiki-rossii-ustoychivost-est-a-razvitiya-net-/33137738.html).

            Consequently, he suggests, the major task ahead is two-fold, a radical decentralization of the country so that as few parts of it will want to leave, something very difficult in wartime when centralization is increasing, and a willingness to allow those parts that do want to leave to do so without opposition in a gradual and peaceful way.

            And that in turn requires that the ethnic Russians who became an empire without ever having established for themselves a nation state move in that direction. Otherwise, they will continue to view the defense of the empire as a defense of themselves and won’t be willing to allow its colonial possessions to leave if they want to.

            Russia today remains an empire with two basic parts, one in which ethnic Russians or at least Slavs moved into and dominated areas that had relatively small populations to begin with and a second in which the Russians never formed a majority or even in most cases a sizeable minority. The first is like the US; the second like the European empires.

            Inozemtsev continues: “the disintegration of the USSR really was the destruction of the empire, but it took place on the basis of very artificially established borders. The North Caucasus where the Russian population forms only a few percent couldn’t remain within the Russian Federation because this is a territory that was only occupied by military conquest.”

            Had Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan in the early 1990s either received independence or had been elevated to the status of union republics and gotten out on that basis, “this would have been an enormous good thing.” But that didn’t happen, and Russia instead began a war to keep them in, an enormously expensive conflict that hasn’t solved the underlying problem.

            As far as non-Russian areas elsewhere, Inozemtsev says, “I am a total supporter of the idea that the Russian Federation in its current form must be destroyed and restructured.” These non-Russians and Russian regions as well must be given more rights, and those who still want to leave must be allowed to do so.

            Otherwise, Inozemtsev argues, the Russian Federation will remain what it is now: “an imperial structure” that will not only continue to avoid the loss of Chechnya but see no reason why it should not retake areas like Ukraine that once were ruled from Moscow – something that would be a disaster for all concerned, including the Russians.

            But the exit of those who want to leave must not take place via revolt as the Chechens tried, he says. “It must be a completely civilized divorce” on the basis of a referendum and a transition period of perhaps ten years that will allow both sides the opportunity to consider what needs to be separated and what does not.

             In conclusion, Inozemtsev argues that “Russia’s problem is that the Russians themselves never had a nation state. They always were an imperial nation which from the outset has been concerned about territory and then about historical memory, about its own self-determination, national elements and so on.”

            And because that is so, there is little recognition of the reality that “a Russian nation state alongside Tatar, Bashkir and Sakha nation state would represent a better future for the Russian Federation and for the world than that which we have today.”

If Kyiv Can Force Moscow to Pursue Total Mobilization, Russia will Collapse and Ukraine will Win the War, Eidman Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 4 – Kyiv does not need to retake all the territory currently occupied by Russian forces to defeat Moscow, Igor Eidman says. It need only force Moscow to pursue total mobilization, something the Putin regime is incapable of carrying out and then Russia will collapse and Ukraine will win the war.

            Pro-Kremlin figures like Aleksey Chadayev and Ruslan Pukhov are already making what may seem this counter-intuitive argument (discred.ru/2024/10/01/aleksej-chadaev-kak-povysit-uroven-grazhdanskoj-mobilizatsii/ and opinions.glavred.info/chem-opasen-zahvat-rossiyanami-ugledara-rossiyanami-10601951.html), the Berlin-based Russian analyst points out (t.me/igoreidman/1758 reposted at charter97.org/ru/news/2024/10/5/613374/).

            In the words of Chadayev, “both the Romanov and the Soviet systems looked as if they were much stronger and more balanced than the current post-perestroika Russian Federation, knit together on a living thread, and yet both loudly collapsed. What makes us consider the current one more stable than both of them” if it tries to mobilize fully?

            And in those of Pukhov, “excessive mobilization of the population can lead to an increase in socio-economic tension, which can undermine internal political stability, which in turn poses a threat to the unity of the country and its integrity.” To avoid this, Putin has not taken that step and instead has tried to convince Russians that their normal lives can continue without interruption.

            But as Eidman observes, “the continuation of military operations makes the mobilization of society necessary and its full involvement in the war.” As Chadayev adds, “an excessive level of civic mobilization will not allow us to win the war and even to simply allow us to continue to carry it out.”

            The Kremlin finds itself in a zugzwang, a chess term which means that any move the Putin regime makes is almost certain to make things worse, with the further mobilization of the population being one of the worst but most likely choices the Kremlin leader may ultimately be forced to make if Ukraine understands the nature of the situation.

            The Russian people, Eidman argues, are “not ready to leave ‘the warm bath of complacency for the cold trench of the stress of war, and the ruling elite is not ready to sacrifice its interests for the sake of war, such as giving up the opportunity to continue to steal as much as it is now.”

            Putin recognizes this. After all, as Eidman notes, “the first wave of mobilization and the traumatic war stress in 2022-23 almost ended with the collapse of the system during the Priogozhin putsch. Since that time, the population and elite have calmed down and relaxed again. Any new wave of mobilization and stress will have larger and more dangerous consequences.”

            The question has to be asked: “How will the Kremlin pass between the Scylla of total war which it is not ready to conduct and the Charybdis of defeat?” One piece of evidence pointing to this is that “it is becoming increasingly difficult and expensive to buy contract workers.” Another is that the military industrial complex can’t find enough workers at any price.

“The X hour, when you will inevitably have to make a choice in favor of the mobilization model or abandon the specter of victory, and therefore suffer defeat, is approaching,” Eidman argues. “Depending on the intensity of hostilities, it may occur either next year, or even at the end of this year.”

According to the Berlin-based Russian analyst, “the Kremlin is urgently trying to get away from this losing choice; and being unable to mobilize his society, it is trying to demobilize the Ukrainian one” by exploiting “the natural fatigue of Ukrainians” by suggesting Putin is ready for compromise.

            Ukrainians must not fall for this nonsense, Eidman concludes. Instead, they must take steps so that Putin will make the mistake that will bring down his regime and his country and allow Ukraine to win.