Moscow Charging Ever More Youths with Political Crimes to Signal Its Ready to Repress Anyone who Opposes Putin, Memorial Expert Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 27 – There are now almost 300 young people in Russia known to be behind bars for political crimes, according to the Memorial human rights organization; and the actual number is almost certainly higher given the difficulties of gathering such information, Anna Karetnikova of that group says.

            She tells the Horizontal Russia portal that each of these cases is of course a profound human tragedy but that it is especially important to recognize what the Putin regime is doing by charging, convicting and then incarcerating young people in Russia today (semnasem.org/articles/2026/02/27/podrostki-politzeki).

            According to Karetnikova, “there is no need today for mass repressions like those of 1937 [because] Russians read the news and get scared. So to scare 100 million people, it’s enough to take ten doctors, ten teachers, ten women, ten youths, ten trans people, ten drivers and show society” what can happen if anyone steps out of line.

            “By locking up children along with everyone else,” she argues, “the authorities are showing that they don’t care whether you’re an adult or a child, a man or a woman. If you’re deemed to be an enemy, you’ll end up in prison.”

            But the incarceration of children for political crimes, Karetnikova continues, also shows that the state recognizes that it hasn’t been able to educate young Russians in ways that keep them obedient and that the only course open to the authorities is to bring political charges against them and put them in prison.

            Of course, she concludes, young people will leave prison and return to society; and tragically, the things they will have learned about the world while behind bars will make recidivism likely and infect the society in even more profound ways. If Russians tolerate such arrests, they may become so desensitized with time that might put up with executions as well.

Regions and Republics will Turn on Moscow if They Sense the Center is Weakening even More Rapidly Now than They Did in 1991 to Get More Autonomy or Even Independence, Gallyamov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 2 – As Putin’s popularity has declined, the Kremlin leader has increasingly turned to repression to keep himself in power and deployed propaganda to obscure this change in order to prevent the population of the Russian Federation from concluding that the power of the center, now based on repression alone, is weakening and decide to take action, Abbas Gallyamov says.

            If people in the federal subjects draw that conclusion, the former Kremlin speechwriter now classified as a foreign agent says, they will seek to gain more power for themselves, with some even pressing for independence (idelreal.org/a/habirov-vytaschit-kuchu-pretenziy-k-moskve-na-raz-abbas-gallyamov-o-regionalnyh-elitah-i-rossii-posle-putina/33688921.html).

            And as was the case in 1991, such a shift could happen very quickly. Then in a matter of months Ukrainians went from saying they supported the continued existence of the USSR to demanding independence for their republic. Today, Gallyamov says, there are reasons to think such a process would occur even more rapidly than it did in Gorbachev’s time.

            On the one hand, he says as he argued four years ago, the war in Ukraine is likely to have had the effect of weakening ethnic Russian national identity, even though he concedes that this has been obscured by patriotic propaganda and that it can’t currently be measured given the ways in which repression makes sociological studies extremely problematic.

            And on the other, in the regions and republics, anti-Moscow anger is growing, with ethnic Russians almost as likely to share it as non-Russians both in predominantly ethnic Russian oblasts and krays and in non-Russian republics where many ethnic Russians share the anti-Moscow feelings of the non-Russians they live amongst.

            Such anti-Moscow are feelings thus different and more powerful than what is usually described as nationalism, even though they typically receive less attention. Indeed, Gallyamov says, he prefers not to speak about nationalism at all because it conceals the hostility to the center which is broader and deeper than ethnic agendas of various national intelligentsias.

            According to him, anti-Moscow feelings may feed off and/or grow into nationalism, but in the initial stages, such concerns are likely to lead local elites who back Moscow lest they lose their jobs to change sides and thus speed up the devolution of power and even efforts to disintegrate the Russian Federation.

            In many ways, he concludes, the longer elites in the federal subjects remain dominated by anti-Moscow feelings rather than narrower ethno-nationalisms, the more success they are likely to have in gaining more autonomy or even independence because such a stance will make it harder for the Kremlin to mobilize against them.  

Armenian Border Guards Replace Russian Ones on Armenia’s Border with Turkey

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Mar. 1 – More than 34 years after gaining independence when the Soviet Union disintegrated, Armenia now has its own officers guarding all of that country’s borders, now that Russians who had been guarding Armenia’s border crossing with Turkey have turned over the operation of that site to the Armenians.

            This completes a process that began when Moscow handed over control of Armenian border crossings with Azerbaijan in 2024 and then transferred such control over Armenian border crossings with Iran and over border control points at the Yerevan International airport. (vpoanalytics.com/sobytiya-i-kommentarii/diversifikatsiya-po-armyanski-rossiyskie-pogranichniki-pokinuli-zastavu-akhurik-na-granitse-s-turtsi/).

            This represents a major expansion of one Armenia’s sovereignty and represents a significant decline in Russia’s influence there, although Moscow does maintain a 4,000-man military base at Gyumri in Armenia that Yerevan has announced that it does not plan to seek the closure of anytime soon.

            But it is even more important as an indication of just how long it has taken to dismantle Soviet-era arrangements in some cases – Tajikistan also retained Russian border guards until 2005, for example – and of how changes in that direction have accelerated since the start of Vladimir Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine.

Local and Regional Media in Russia Play Major Role in Promoting Putin’s War in Ukraine as ‘a Given’ and Entirely ‘Normal,’ ‘NeMoskva’ Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 26 – When people talk about propaganda on the war in Ukraine, they typically focus on outrageous statements of Moscow TV personalities; but the NeMoskva portal suggests that local and regional media play a major role in delivering the message that the Kremlin now wants, that the war is “a given” of Russian life and entirely “normal.”

            The portal examined more than 200 outlets in regions and localities across the country and spoke with numerous experts on the Russian media scene and said that the propaganda in this part of the Russian scene is less propagandistic and often isn’t even recognized as such by viewers and readers (nemoskva.net/2026/02/26/propaganda-dlya-normisov/).

            That is because local and regional media do not cover the war as such and seek to include stories about those from the region who have been touched by it within the normal flow of coverage about life more generally. That encourages Russians to think about the war as something “entirely normal” and more simply “a given.”

            In reporting the study and especially its conversations with media experts who appear to be in universal agreement, NeMoskva says there are a number of ways in which these outlets are promoting such a view: They talk about how the area is “making its own contribution;” their main hero is “the local soldier, ‘one of us;” they celebrate as “another hero the regional volunteer;” they “heroize those who have died” in the conflict; and they either “idealize” or at least minimize the problems of veterans coming home.

            Such messaging is calmer and more reassuring that the comments of Moscow figures like Vladimir Solovyev and thus corresponds to the way most Russians want to think about it: “They simply want to live their own lives” and see the war as something in the background, according to several commentators.

            One of these commentators pointedly notes that “the regional media do not ‘sell’ the war directly but ‘combine’ it with the whole information flow.” That gives the media at the local and regional levels a kind of “therapeutic effect,” one that makes the war something very much like the weather: it just is – and no one needs to do more than support it.

            And NeMoskva concludes: “Regional propaganda integrates into normalcy and creates a context that becomes acceptable to the audience. All of this, taken together, "holds together the social fabric" in the face of prolonged conflict and helps people feel at least some sense of support.”

As a result, for the consumers of this media, “the fighting becomes a backdrop and that helps the authorities achieve both of their goals: ensuring an influx of people and resources and preventing people from thinking that what is going on in Ukraine is an all-out war” that is going to radically change their lives or even force them to do more than they are doing now. 

Russia’s Far Right Using Denunciations as Primary Weapon to Attack Minorities, Memorial and ‘NeMoskva’ Portal Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 27 – The extreme right in Russia has begun using denunciations on the internet as its primary weapon to attack both migrant workers and ethnic minorities because by putting up charges online extremist groups are able to attract the attention of law enforcement personnel who then pick and choose among those against whom to bring charges.

            That trend has been documented by the NeMoskva portal which tracks developments outside of the Russian capital and by the Memorial human rights organization (nemoskva.net/2026/02/27/ohota-na-bryunetov/ and sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/2025/02/d47102/).

            Indeed, these two sources say, the far right and the police are working ever more closely together. The far right sees its attacks being confirmed by official action and has increased its chances of getting it by increasing adopting police language in the internet denunciations they issue. Indeed, it is clear that the police and not others are their intended audience, the two say.

            And the police are only too pleased to have the far right groups bring to their attention actions or reported actions by migrants and minorities so that police and prosecutors can choose among those denounced rather than having to engage in any investigations on their own especially when their political bosses point them in that direction.

            This convergence of the far right and police has been going on since the 1990s but the internet has only exacerbated that trend. Memorial’s Stefaniya Kulayeva in fact cites the words of prominent human rights activist Sergey Kovalyev that the Russian police “aren’t catching bandits but ‘brunettes,” a reference to the darker hair of many minorities.

            Among the extremist Russian nationalist groups which use this tactic the most often are the Russian Community and the less well-known Man’s State, which NeMoskva described as “an internet community based on misogynistic and nationalist discourse, “formally” in defense of traditional values but in fact oppression, women, journalists, LGBT people and migrants.

Could Russia ‘Repeat’ Equivalent of Khrushchev’s De-Stalinization after Putin Leaves the Scene?

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 25 – On the 70^th anniversary of Khrushchev’s secret speech to the 20^th CPSU Congress in 1956, a round date that has occasioned much commentary about what Khrushchev achieved and didn’t, Sergey Medvedev has asked the most important question: Could Russia “repeat” with something similar after Putin leaves the scene?

            The answer is not simple not only because Khrushchev’s attack on Stalin was strictly limited, did not last and now has been largely reversed by Putin, some of whose supporters want Khrushchev denounced for his attacks on Stalin, the Radio Liberty commentator says (svoboda.org/a/razoblachenie-kumira-povtoritsya-li-v-rossii-hh-sezd/33687275.html).

            At the end of a lengthy discussion with Russian historian Yury Pivovarov and Russian political scientist Aleksandr Morozov about Khrushchev’s secret speech, what it achieved and what it didn’t , Medvedev asks pointedly: “is a new 20^th Congress and a new thaw after Putin possible?”

            Morozov suggested that “the 20th Congress as such cannot be repeated, but some form of revision of Putinism's political legacy is inevitable. The question is what form it will take and in what direction it will develop.” But because elites in the 1950s and elites now benefited as well as suffered from what had happened, any changes are likely to be partial and even reversible.

            Putinism is likely to be revised in three main ways, the political scientist continues, including a further consolidation of the bureaucracy, a revision of past foreign policy choices, and a loosening of censorship which clearly has gone too far under Putin and offends even many of his otherwise unquestioning supporters.

            A more radical transformation would occur only if there is a serious domestic conflict, likely between civilian parts of the bureaucracy with access to the means of violence and the siloviki who dominate that area. Clashes between these two forces are conceivable, since they have resources and rely on resources. But will this happen? That's a completely open question.”

For Four Reasons, Putin’s ‘Insane’ War in Ukraine Now New Normal in International Affairs, Inozemtsev Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Feb. 25 – Few now have any doubt that Putin launched his expanded war against Ukraine in 2022 “not only as the result of the ideology of the new Russian fascism but also as a result of the phenomenal miscalculations of both the fuehrer himself and all his entourage,” Vladislav Inozemtsev says.

            But what needs to be confronted now, the Russian economist and commentator argues, is “why and to what extent this insane war in Europe now taking place at the beginning of the 21^st century has become something normal that the world has grown quite accustomed to” (ru.themoscowtimes.com/2026/02/25/bezumie-stavshee-normoi-a188010).

            According to Inozemtsev, there are four main reasons why “this insanity as become the norm” for so many. First of all, as the first proxy war in Europe, few if anyone can see the way clear for its end and thus believe that they must adapt themselves and their own behavior to what is going on because it is going to last for a long time to come.

            Second, Inozemtsev says, “too many beneficiaries have appeared over the course of the four years of this war,” including not only powers not directly involved but even in the two frontline states; and even including many Russians and Ukrainians who have fled abroad but live in a world in which the war forms an important part of their lives.

            Third, the war has now lasted so long that it has become background noise for almost everyone especially as the front doesn’t move very war in either direction and because Kremlin relied on paying men to fight rather than on any broader political reason and thus avoided having to mobilize massively, something that could have triggered resistance.

            And fourth, neither side is prepared or even able to defeat the other side completely. Russia can’t deploy sufficient resources to end all resistance, and “the West isn’t interested in escalation which could lead to a nuclear war” and recognizes that now it is “impossible” to defeat Russia as other aggressors in Europe were defeated in the past.

            According to Inozemtsev, the war can come to an end in only two ways, which in fact collapse into one: “the departure from the historical arena of the madman who initiated the war and subordinated Russia to its conduct.” The “more radical” option is to promote “some form of regime change in Russia.”

            The other “allows for an immediate end to the conflict on Russia’s terms, with the consolidation of Ukraine’s support system, the restoration of its economy and its incorporation into Western structures, with implicit non-recognition of new borders and boundaries … and the expectation of inevitable future changes in Russia after the natural death of the dictator.”

            Neither of these options, the Russian commentator continues, “should presuppose the restoration of relations with the aggressor country before a change of political regime as that would completely legitimize aggression” and even ensure that Putin would launch more wars in the future.

            But “the saddest circumstance” of this war as it enters its fifth year is not only the continued losses it entails but “also the continued coexistence of the ‘civilized’ world with this brutal reality, a coexistence which itself becomes an additional factor in the continuation of the war” and “widens the gap between what consumes us and what should be our moral compass.”