Paul Goble
Staunton, Oct. 3 – Vladimir Putin
has named Artyom Zhoga, a former military man in the DNR to be the
plenipotentiary for the Urals federal district, an origin that has led many
Russian observers to conclude the new appointee will serve as a kind of
governor general and thus the harbinger of fundamental changes in the way the
plenipotentiary system works.
Aleksey Shaburov, the editor of
Yekatrinburg’s Politsovet portal, argues that while it is clear that
Putin wanted to send a message that those connected with the fighting in
Ukraine will have unlimited political possibilities in Russia, it is far from
certain what Zhoga’s reign will mean (politsovet.ru/82154-polpred-soldat-chto-zhdat-uralu-ot-artema-zhogi.html).
“Commenting on his assignment,” the
editor said, “Zhoga called himself ‘a soldier,’ giving everyone to understand
that in his new post, he will in the first instance execute the orders of the
president. But in the political plane, such a formulation is clearly
insufficient: the position of plenipotentiary allows for a wider range of
actions.”
Zhoga
will have to decide what he wants and can do. For many, “the institute of
plenipotentiaries is an unnecessary one” and those who lead them “in fact have
no real power” over budgets and that power is the essential one in the regions.
“But at the same time, one must not underrate the plenipotentiaries,” Shaburov
says.
They
control the channels of communication between the governors, on the one hand, and
the Presidential Administration and force structures, on the other. Moreover,
they oversee the collection and analysis of information about how well the governors
implement central policies and thus play a key role in cadres selection and
elections.
The
plenipotentiaries also have the ability to intervene in conflicts between
governors and mayors; and in the Urals FD, they have often gotten between the
governors and the mayors of Yekaterinbur, where their intervention has proven “decisive”
and determined “the new balance of forces” after the dust settled.
What
that means is this, Shaburov continues. “In general, the plenipotentiary has
enough leverage to either ruin the life of this or that governor or to make
that life easier. And that is why officials in the Urals liked Zhoga’s
predecessor, Vladimir Yakushev, so much. He didn’t get into conflicts with the governors
but acted as ‘a senior comrade.’” That time is likely past.
In
discussing Zhoga’s appointment, many in the Urals have recalled another of his
predecessors, Igor Kholmanskikh who occupied that position between 2012 and
2018. “The parallels are obvious. The Uralvagonzadod official was installed to
put down protests and that is what he did.
Zhoga
is also about sending a message but a different one – the future veterans of
the Ukraine war can have on their return. And there are other differences as
well. Kholmanskikh had local support before his appointment; Zhoga doesn’t – although
of course he could gain it over time. But until then, he will face a suspicious
group of local grandees.
Although
he served a full six-year term, Kholmanskikh was ultimately a failure. He
antagonized so many regional officials that he lost rather than gained power
over the course of his tenure. His successor, Nikolay Tsukanov, viewed as an
arriviste from Kaliningrad, lasted only two years and then “his political
career ended.”
While
it is uncertain whether anyone has told Zhoga about the experiences of his
predecessors, Shaburov says, their careers do suggest three scenarios for how
the new plenipotentiary’s time in the Urals may develop.
First,
there is the possibility that it will be “ideal and constructive” like that of
Yakushev. “Theoretically, this variant would satisfy everyone. But realizing
such a scenario will be difficult for several reasons.” Zhoga doesn’t have the
local background he would need and can’t be certain of support for such an
approach from either Moscow or his own staff.
The
second scenario would be one in which Zhoga “will not aspire to the role of ‘the
patriarch of Urals politics’ and ‘the all-seeing eye,’ but rather involve
himself with his own political projects along the ‘military-patriotic line.”
That may even be what he and Putin want, but the job makes this very difficult
to sustain.
And
the third possible scenario is that Zhoga will actively get into conflict with
the governors to show who is boss. If he does that, he will have Moscow on his
side perhaps but he will certainly face a regional political elite ready and
able to resist what he might try to do. For a few weeks, Zhoga and that elite
may experience a honeymoon but no longer than that.
