The Death of Rural Russia Reflects Both Natural Shifts and Political Decisions, Trifonov Says

Paul Goble

Staunton, May 17 – Over the last 30 years, more than 34,000 villages have disappeared from the map of Russia; and more are doing so at the rate of approximately one ever day. Since 2000, 28,000 schools of have closed, many in rural areas, leaving the country with only 40,000 a trend that has accelerated this process, according to government data.

Of course, Dmitry Trifonov of the Versiya news portal says, this process began long ago in Soviet times and is not uniquely the produce of post-Soviet rule. But it has been exacerbated since then, especially as there is now more support for having villages disappear (versia.ru/po-kakim-prichinam-proisxodit-depopulyaciya-rossijskix-dereven-i-chto-zhdet-rossiyu-bez-sela).

In the 1960s and 1970s, Soviet officials identified “villages without prospects” and planned of their closure. But the policy was unpopular and in 1980, it was officially suspended. But Trifonov says, there are still many officials who are promoting that idea to improve efficiency and save money.

“Certain experts consider that behind the withering away of villages stand not only objective causes but definite interests,” he continues. Among the most prominent of these are agro-industrial concerns which want to do away with the villages so that they can farm regions without any restrictions the population may require.

That combing villages and moving people into larger district centers is more economically efficient, Trifonov says, is beyond question more efficient. But it ignores the feelings of the populations involved and even if looked at more generally the broader interests of the state as a whole.

Supporters of consolidation argue that a village is like an organism and say that “sometimes amputation of a gangrenous extremity will save the rest of the body.” But, and this is critical, the journalist continues, “behind each such ‘amputated’ settlement are people who live on the land of the ancestors” and are deeply attached to it.

To move them is to “destroy part of their identity. Besides, a massive resettlement into cities intensifies the burden on the infrastructure of the latter” and may end by costing more than any of the much-ballyhooed savings from taking that step. Moreover, doing it in some places will alienate Russians in other places where this process has not yet occurred.

            Trifonov is clearly an opponent of untrammeled consolidation. And he suggests there are compelling reasons for viewing any such plans with skepticism. They may lead to a reduction of agricultural production and make Russia more dependent on imports, they may cost the country the unique culture villages provide, and they put the people involved at risk.

            If this process takes place gradually and with the full consultation of all involved, then it is probably inevitable and can be a positive thing. But if it is pushed through by officials in Moscow who don’t understand what is at stake in the regions, then there is a high probability of disaster, he suggests. 

Russians Support Idea of Replacing at Least Some Officials with AI, SuperJob Poll Finds

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 17 – Asked whether they would favor replacing officials with artificial intelligence algorithms, nineteen percent of Russians say they support such a change completely while another 35 percent say that they are more inclined to support it than oppose it, according to a new SuperJob poll.

            Exactly which officials might be replaced and how such a system would work are far from clear, but this majority may give Putin yet another means to save money by getting rid of some officials by arguing artificial intelligence will do a better job than humans (superjob.ru/research/articles/115309/k-perspektive-zameny-chinovnikov-i-deputatov-na-ii-kazhdyj-vtoroj-rossiyanin-otnositsya-polozhitelno/).

            One of its attractions to the population, of course, is that the algorithms will supposedly generate the same outcomes to the same problems, a sharp contrast to the current situation where officials are often influenced by a variety of things irrelevant to their tasks, including but not limited to corruption. 

Activists Protest Decision to Combine Ethnic Studies Section with Russian History Chair at Kabardino-Balkar University

Paul Goble     

            Staunton, May 17 – Officials in Kabardino-Balkaria have decided to fold the chairs devoted to ethnology and history of the peoples of the KBR into the chair for Russian history, thus downgrading one of the centers that since its creation in 1995 helped provide the intellectual basis for the revival of Circassian and Balkar identity in that North Caucasus republic.

            Not surprisingly, this move has provoked an open letter of protest by activists who say that this “most crude mistake” will “inevitably mean a weakening of the stable reproduction of the ethno-cultural identity of Kabardins and Balkars and their gradual assimilation” (zapravakbr.ru/index.php/30-uncategorised/1974-kabardino-balkarskij-universitet-likvidiroval-kafedru-etnologii-istorii-narodov-kbr).

            This move by officials is noteworthy because it is yet another confirmation of Putin’s decision to undermine ethnic identities other than Russian in the Russian Federation and to do so in what may appear small ways but that together will threaten the survival of many nations within the current borders of that country. 

Russia’s Statistical Agency Stops Publishing Most Demographic Data

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 17 – Reflecting what independent demographer Aleksey Raksha describes as Moscow’s “demographic hysteria” (t.me/RakshaDemography/4990), the Russian government’s state statistical arm has stopped publishing almost all demographic data which shows the country in crisis and not on the mend as Vladimir Putin insists.

            In its latest monthly report, Rosstat drops all data on births and deaths, marriages and divorces and statistics for developments in the regions, Raksha says and The Moscow Times reports (t.me/RakshaDemography/4984 and moscowtimes.ru/2025/05/17/rosstat-zasekretil-statistiku-podemografii-posle-obvala-rozhdaemosti-dominimuma-za200-let-a163629

Since the start of Putin’s expanded war in Ukraine in February 2022, Rosstat has become increasingly chary about releasing data that analysts could use to determine Russian losses in that war and that call into question Putin’s upbeat claims about increases in births and life expectancy.

But this month’s cutback in the data Rosstat releases is the largest so far and will seriously compromise efforts to accurately report what is happening to the Russian population. Putin may not care about that but even he should care about the fact that this absence of data will make it ever more difficult to design and implement his policies.

As far as independent and foreign analysts are concerned, some data will be available from other Russian government offices such as registration centers and regional governments, but gathering it will be much more difficult and time-consuming and so the amount of demographic information readily available will decline to far less than it was in Soviet times. 

Kyiv Gains a Small but Important Victory in Istanbul: Its Delegation Brings a Translator

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 17 – Journalists from around the world have been trying to find clues as to what actually happened at the meeting of the Russian and Ukrainian delegations in Istanbul. But in their rush to give one or another side points on this or that question of how to end the war in Ukraine, overwhelmingly they have missed what may be the most important development.

            And that is this: the Ukrainian side brought a translator to the meeting, a clear diplomatic signal that from Kyiv’s point of view, its negotiating team was meeting with a foreign, even alien power and not a fellow member of the Russian-language community Putin talks so much about and that if accepted gives the Kremlin yet another undeserved victory from the outset.

            Nadezhda Pototskaya, a Ukrainian consultant on strategic communications and the head of the Kyiv Center for Economic Recovery, explains what the Ukrainian action matters and why it should be the model for the future (nv.ua/opinion/russkiy-ukrainskiy-o-chem-govorit-perevodchik-na-peregovorah-s-rossiey-v-stambule-50514731.html).

            Her words are so important that below is a translation into English of her article:

Although these negotiations did not end with concrete peace agreements, there was a small victory for Ukraine: our delegation invited an interpreter. The negotiations were conducted with his participation.

We do not know the exact details of this decision, the conversations, or what languages ​​were spoken there, but the effect is powerful.

Ukrainian negotiators not only distanced themselves from the language of the aggressor for protocol's sake but also demonstrated to all participants in the process — including international ones — that they were not dealing with a "single people." In fact, they were dealing with two different countries: the dictatorship and tyranny of the Russian Federation on the one hand, and a free and independent Ukraine, on the other.

A specific message was conveyed: we are different, Russian has long ceased to be a “common and unified language,” and we even need a translator. We have different values, different futures, different states.

This is an important statement not only for Russia, which still fantasizes about Ukraine as part of itself. This act is important for us as well.

The gesture in which we emphasize our own subjectivity works for the future. Language is not only a means of communication. It is an indicator of belonging, position, values.

Language is not only a means of communication. It is an indicator of belonging, position, and values.

That is why empires begin with language - as a carrier of power, influence, control.

In the occupied territories, the Russians first of all change the signs to Russian and introduce the Russian language and history in schools and kindergartens. Then they destroy those who resist. The first step of the Russian occupation - after the physical seizure of territory and freedom - is language. It becomes a tool for imposing informational and mental occupation.

No matter how much we talk about democracy and free choice, choosing Russian in 2025 is voluntary support for Russia (its present and future). You can speak Ukrainian, English, French, or freely choose hundreds of languages, but there is a specific language that helps the enemy - Russian. After all, the language children speak is the language they will think in, receive information in, and be influenced by.

In international diplomacy, symbols are no less important than statements. An interpreter at negotiations is a demonstration: we are not adapting but forming new rules. This is a gesture not only against Russia. This is another reminder to our partners that Ukraine is not just geographically but mentally and culturally not part of the "post-Soviet space."

That every "let's do it without a translator, we all understand" is a trap in which boundaries are erased. Because that's exactly how Russification has been going on for centuries: "it's easier that way", "everyone understands everything", "don't get political", "don't complicate things".

Ukrainians should not use Russian. We are no longer obliged to “politely” accept it in our lives: neither at the everyday nor at the diplomatic level. We should not “switch” — even for the sake of convenience or diplomacy. On the contrary — the diplomacy of the future should be built on principle and clear cultural boundaries.

A translator is a tool that makes our border visible. The border is not only geographical, but also linguistic, mental, and value-based.

Even if each participant in the negotiations understands Russian well, using Ukrainian or English with translation is not a loss of efficiency. This is a clear framework. We are the subject.

While children are forced to sing the Russian anthem in temporarily occupied territories, while they are kidnapped and killed for speaking Ukrainian, every diplomatic gesture in favor of the Ukrainian language is an act of dignity. Every “please translate,” “give me English” is a reminder: we are not brothers. We are not “almost agreed.” We are negotiating with an aggressor, not a partner.

Therefore, any official conversation, any document, any public statement should sound in Ukrainian or internationally — in English. Because the language is Ukraine. And every time it sounds in an international context — we become visible, understandable, heard. On our own terms.

 

New Study of Russian Attitudes on War in Ukraine Suggests Kremlin Hopes to Reach Out Even to Those Not Enthusiastic about Conflict, Bulatov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 15 – Three years into the war in Ukraine and less than two years until the next Duma election, the Kremlin is seeking ways to develop messages that will mobilize support for itself in that vote beyond the current systemic parties which all support the war, Moscow commentator Andrey Bulatov says.

            Clear evidence for that conclusion, he suggests, is the conducting and then publication of a study jointly carried out by Minchenko Consulting which helped organize the New People party and VTsIOM, a polling agency known to be close to the Kremlin (antifashist.com/item/ot-voyuyushhih-do-uehavshih-chetyre-mira-sovremennoj-rossii.html).

            On the basis of a country-wide poll based on a representative sample of 1600 Russians, the two organizers said they had identified four groups of people in the country and the messages that each wants to hear from the Kremlin about the future:

·       Russia of the Capitals, 25 to 29 percent of the population, who aren’t supporters of the war in Ukraine but aren’t active opponents either. Instead, they are focused on their own well-being and want to hear from the country’s leadership what it will do to help them improve their personal lives.

·       Deep Russia, 37-41 percent of the population, older, employed by the state, who “accept the special military operation as something inevitable” over which they have no control. They are loyal and patriotic.

·       Fighting Russia, 17 to 19 percent of the population, also mostly older or volunteers who have taken part in the conflict and actively support. They oppose any criticism of Russian policy there and their values are “victory, security, and a willingness to sacrifice.”

·       Departing Russia, 12 to 15 percent of the population, mostly young, highly educated and fro the major cities. Their “key values” are human rights, freedom, globalism and tolerance.” They don’t protest lest they be arrested and have left or plan to move abroad.

According to Bulatov, the fact that this research was carried out by institutions close to the Kremlin and then published is “an important signal that in the Russian political system has taken shape a demand for work with a variety of opinions even if they do not conform to the harsh official agenda.”

This has happened, he continues, because the Kremlin wants to legitimize itself with a victory in the 2026 elections. And the fact that the survey found that almost half of the population consists of people who oppose or at least don’t support Moscow’s policies in Ukraine suggests that the Kremlin may change course to do so sooner rather than later.

In Russian Federation, Miscarriages Still Counted as Abortions

Paul Goble

            Staunton, May 14 – There are many reasons why Moscow’s reports on the number of abortions are problematic: The government keeps changing reporting requirements; private clinics don’t provide complete data; and in particular, as in Soviet times, the authorities count miscarriages as abortions.

            As a result, Russian data on abortions are not comparable over time or with data sets from most other countries, according to Aby Shukyurov and Ilya Klimkin, two demographers writing on the To Be Precise portal (tochno.st/materials/skolko-abortov-delaiut-v-rossii-oficialno-468-tysiac-v-god-no-est-niuansy-razbiraemsia-kak-ustroena-eta-statistika).

            The Soviet Union was the world leader in abortions primarily because other forms of family planning were not available, they say; and it is certainly the case that the number of abortions in the Russian Federation has fallen dramatically since 1991. But specifying exactly how large the decline has been is impossible.

            In 2023, Rosstat reported that the number of abortions had declined to 468,000; but that figure may overstate the number by as much s 20 percent because it still includes miscarriages while understating it because of under-reporting by private clinics and the lack of any good way to specify the number of illegal abortions.

            According to the two demographers, private clinics now carry out 20 percent of all abortions in the Russian Federation “but to calculate them exactly is impossible,” given the uncertainties of reporting. Moreover, the number of illegal abortions may be on the rise given restrictions on offering abortions in state clinics and their ban in 20 percent of private clinics.