Sunday, October 6, 2024

Russia’s ‘Silent Majority’ Doesn’t Share Putin’s Traditional Values, El Murid Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 3 – A new survey says that “fewer than one percent” of Russians believe women should be restricted to the role of wife and mother while “more than 90 percent” believe women should be able to serve at any level of economic and political life, a finding that suggests Russia’s “silent majority” doesn’t share Putin’s much-ballyhooed “traditional values.”

            That is the judgment of Anatoly Nesmiyan who blogs under the screen name El Murid who argues further that only about five percent of the Russian people share the values the Kremlin leader calls traditional and that the other 95 percent aren’t prepared to accept them (t.me/anatoly_nesmiyan/20832 reposted at kasparov.ru/material.php?id=66FCF0ECCBC05).

            What that means, El Murid continues, is that as soon as the power of the state is removed from behind the promotion of these values, they will return to the marginal status they occupied in the past and the more tolerant and egalitarian values that Russians displayed in Soviet times and in post-Soviet times before Putin will return to dominate the scene.

            El Murid may be overly optimistic in that regard, but he makes an important point not only for Russia but elsewhere. Many who defer to political leaders who are prepared to use forceful measures to impose beliefs from the past aren’t so much committed to those values as they are willing to go along as long as the powers that be insist.

            Once these leaders pass from the scene, there is a good chance that the people will return to the values they had followed

            And once those officials pass from the scene, the population may return to what had become their real “traditions,” the more liberal and tolerant values that they used to manifest and support.   

 

Moscow Patriarchate Set to Follow Kremlin and Cut Off Its Believers from Western Christians

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 3 – The Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church is set to follow the Kremlin’s effort to isolate Russians from the West by circulating a proposal for a new church rule that would ban Russian Orthodox from any joint religious activity including prayer with Western Christians.

So far, the Patriarchate has only published the idea for discussion, but the Russian church’s slavish following of the Kremlin line almost certainly means that this ban will be approved and Russian believers will no longer be able even to pray together with Western Christians. (For the proposal, see mnenie.prichod.ru/opinions/46751/.)

Dissident churchman Andrey Kurayev says that such a move is absolutely “non-canonical,” but it is an example of the loyalty the patriarchate shows to Putin and a defense against charges, often made by some conservatives in the church that Patriarch Kirill has been too involved in ecumenical activities in the past (diak-kuraev.livejournal.com/4652920.html).

The proposed ban on even prayers with Western Christians is also fully consistent with what is taking place in Russia regarding those denominations already. Ever more criminal cases are being opened against the leaders of these groups and some of them have been forced to flee Russia altogether.

What makes this worrisome is that such an action by the patriarchate will deepen the divide between Russia and the West and make it far more difficult to overcome even when Putin  and his entourage leave the scene as actuarial tables mean will be the case in a decade or two. At the very least, this will be a brake on any reintegration. 

Saturday, October 5, 2024

Oppression of North Caucasian Women Now So Severe They’re Calling for Restoration of a Soviet-Era Law against Crimes Linked to ‘Survivals of Local Traditions’

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 3 – Crimes against North Caucasian women have become so frequent in recent years that they have launched a petition drive to restore a Soviet-era law, one dropped by the Russian Federation government, that punished certain actions linked to “survivals of local traditions” as crimes subject to punishment by the state.

            Activists among the women are circulating a petition (change.org/p/возвращение-в-ук-рф-статей-о-преступлениях-составляющих-пережитки-местных-обычаев) calling for the restoration of an updated version of the Soviet-era law because they are convinced that the lack of such a law has led to significantly more abuse of North Caucasian women in recent years.

            According to Anna Tularina, one of the drafters of the petition, “women of the North Caucasus are being subjected to the most varied kinds of violation of their human rights, discrimination and force” (change.org/p/возвращение-в-ук-рф-статей-о-преступлениях-составляющих-пережитки-местных-обычаев).

            Among the actions the Soviet law banned but that Russian law doesn’t categorize as specific crimes bride stealing, forced underage marriages, kidnaping of children by former husbands, female genital mutilation, forced conversation therapies, honor killings, and restrictions on travel without approval of husbands or fathers.

            Moscow officials argue that other parts of the criminal code address these issues, but the reality is that this opens the way to what Daptar commentator Markha Akhmadova says is “misogyny and nationalism under the sauce of tradition” with officials justifying what are real crimes as national traditions (daptar.ru/2024/10/02/prestupnye-perezhitki-kavkazskikh-obychaev-aktivistka-trebuet-vernut-v-ugolovnyi-kodeks-stati-o-pravakh-zhenshchin/).

            And because local officials do not view them as crimes and because Russian law doesn’t identify them as such, the number of such violations of the human rights and even lives of women in the North Caucasus has skyrocketed since Soviet times. Any declines that have been reported are the result of crimes not reported or misclassified not real improvements.

            Sadly, since this petition was launched in August, it as garnered only just over 300 signatures (of the 500 it seeks before presenting it to Russian lawmakers). And if it does not gain more, then only one thing is certain: crimes presented as manifestations of national traditions will continue to go up because most of the time they will remain unpunished. 

Putin’s New Governor General in the Urals Faces Fateful Political Choices, Shaburov Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 3 – Vladimir Putin has named Artyom Zhoga, a former military man in the DNR to be the plenipotentiary for the Urals federal district, an origin that has led many Russian observers to conclude the new appointee will serve as a kind of governor general and thus the harbinger of fundamental changes in the way the plenipotentiary system works.

            Aleksey Shaburov, the editor of Yekatrinburg’s Politsovet portal, argues that while it is clear that Putin wanted to send a message that those connected with the fighting in Ukraine will have unlimited political possibilities in Russia, it is far from certain what Zhoga’s reign will mean (politsovet.ru/82154-polpred-soldat-chto-zhdat-uralu-ot-artema-zhogi.html).

            “Commenting on his assignment,” the editor said, “Zhoga called himself ‘a soldier,’ giving everyone to understand that in his new post, he will in the first instance execute the orders of the president. But in the political plane, such a formulation is clearly insufficient: the position of plenipotentiary allows for a wider range of actions.”

Zhoga will have to decide what he wants and can do. For many, “the institute of plenipotentiaries is an unnecessary one” and those who lead them “in fact have no real power” over budgets and that power is the essential one in the regions. “But at the same time, one must not underrate the plenipotentiaries,” Shaburov says.

They control the channels of communication between the governors, on the one hand, and the Presidential Administration and force structures, on the other. Moreover, they oversee the collection and analysis of information about how well the governors implement central policies and thus play a key role in cadres selection and elections.

The plenipotentiaries also have the ability to intervene in conflicts between governors and mayors; and in the Urals FD, they have often gotten between the governors and the mayors of Yekaterinbur, where their intervention has proven “decisive” and determined “the new balance of forces” after the dust settled.

What that means is this, Shaburov continues. “In general, the plenipotentiary has enough leverage to either ruin the life of this or that governor or to make that life easier. And that is why officials in the Urals liked Zhoga’s predecessor, Vladimir Yakushev, so much. He didn’t get into conflicts with the governors but acted as ‘a senior comrade.’” That time is likely past.

In discussing Zhoga’s appointment, many in the Urals have recalled another of his predecessors, Igor Kholmanskikh who occupied that position between 2012 and 2018. “The parallels are obvious. The Uralvagonzadod official was installed to put down protests and that is what he did.

Zhoga is also about sending a message but a different one – the future veterans of the Ukraine war can have on their return. And there are other differences as well. Kholmanskikh had local support before his appointment; Zhoga doesn’t – although of course he could gain it over time. But until then, he will face a suspicious group of local grandees.

Although he served a full six-year term, Kholmanskikh was ultimately a failure. He antagonized so many regional officials that he lost rather than gained power over the course of his tenure. His successor, Nikolay Tsukanov, viewed as an arriviste from Kaliningrad, lasted only two years and then “his political career ended.”

While it is uncertain whether anyone has told Zhoga about the experiences of his predecessors, Shaburov says, their careers do suggest three scenarios for how the new plenipotentiary’s time in the Urals may develop.

First, there is the possibility that it will be “ideal and constructive” like that of Yakushev. “Theoretically, this variant would satisfy everyone. But realizing such a scenario will be difficult for several reasons.” Zhoga doesn’t have the local background he would need and can’t be certain of support for such an approach from either Moscow or his own staff.

The second scenario would be one in which Zhoga “will not aspire to the role of ‘the patriarch of Urals politics’ and ‘the all-seeing eye,’ but rather involve himself with his own political projects along the ‘military-patriotic line.” That may even be what he and Putin want, but the job makes this very difficult to sustain.

And the third possible scenario is that Zhoga will actively get into conflict with the governors to show who is boss. If he does that, he will have Moscow on his side perhaps but he will certainly face a regional political elite ready and able to resist what he might try to do. For a few weeks, Zhoga and that elite may experience a honeymoon but no longer than that.

Three Émigré ‘Corporations’ at Odds with Each Other and also with Challenges Ahead, Shtepa Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 3 – The three major émigré political “corporations” are not only at odds with each other about the future but are at odds with reality because each of them offers a vision of the future without having focused on how that future might be achieved, shortcomings that make it likely none of them will achieve their goals, Vadim Shtepa says.

            The editor of the Tallinn-based regionalist portal Region.Expert says that those grouped around the Forums of Free Russia talk about “a free Russia of the future” when power somehow magically drops into their hands (svoboda.org/a/ni-tam-ni-tut-vadim-shtepa-ob-oppozitsionnyh-korporatsiyah/33144349.html).

            He says that the Forum of Free States of PostRussia also talk about the future but not about how to get there, a particular failing since talking about disintegration, something very unpopular with most ethnic Russians and many non-Russians, makes the achievement of their goals particularly problematic.

            And Shtepa continues, the third corporation of the political emigration, Ilya Ponomaryev’s Congress of Peoples Deputies, continues to pass laws that it assumes will be put in force when its members somehow in an unspecified way return to Russia and come back to power.

            Both these factors are reflected in another commonality. None of these three “corporations” has any place for those who focus on regionalism and the complexities of the developments there and the possibilities for cooperation as well as conflict in the future, the regionalist specialist says.

            Shtepa points out that he and some colleagues launched Region.Expert in Estonia five years ago but have not been welcomed by these corporations each of which has a party line as it were or supported by Western grant-making institutions who appear to fear that talk about regionalism is necessarily about secession and instability, exactly what the Kremlin suggests.

            One of the most important themes the portal regularly explores is the link between genuine elections and decentralization, a focus reflecting both what happened in the lead up to 1991 and what may well represent a necessary way forward for those now living within the borders of the Russian Federation. 

            The project which remains a small and largely voluntary one supported by a small number of individuals, its editor says, has published “authors with a variety of points of view from radical supporters of the independence of their region to moderate federalists” and thereby helped promote discussion of all these things.           

            Region.Expert has  not lost hope and will continue to cooperate with free media and analytic institutions, Shtepa says, but it will do so “without joining any of the opposition corporations” which increasingly seem to “need only ‘correct’ conclusions.” He adds that he “didn’t leave Russian censorship in order to find some other émigré ‘party line.’”

Borders in Central Asia Not Only among Republics but Within Them have Been Changed Frequently, Ashimbayev Documents

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 3 – This month marks the centenary of the national delimitation of Central Asia during which Russian and non-Russian officials and experts not only divided up the region into national republics but divided each of the latter into new subdivisions, extending a process that began in tsarist times and continued until the end of Soviet ones.

            In a new article, Kazakh historian Daniyar Ashimbayev details the changes that were made in 1924, showing how they represented the continuation of earlier moves and also how they continued for decades thereafter and stressing that many of the conflicts in the region today reflect that tradition (nomad.su/?a=15-202410030035).

            If the changes in borders and status of union and autonomous republics is well known (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2021/05/borders-in-post-soviet-space-were.html), changes in the sub-republic units including oblasts, districts and the like is not. And Ashimbayev makes a signal contribution by detailing these across time throughout Central Asia.

            What makes his article so important is that these changes below the level of republic ones often have become the basis for subsequent disputes about the borders between the republics and even about the status of the republic, union or autonomous, that have continued to mar the landscape of the region.

            The specific changes he cites may be of interest only to specialists, but the totality of his article highlights something that still tends to be forgotten: borders in this region as in other parts of the former Soviet and Russian Empire were anything but eternal whatever any current politician or observers chooses to say.   

Chechnya Formally Establishes Palestinian National Cultural Autonomy in the Republic

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Oct. 3 – Some 250 Palestinians have arrived in Chechnya over the last year. In December 2023, Grozny announced its intention of creating a special national cultural autonomy for them.  Last month, the Chechen government formally established this unit to support the Palestinians and help them integrate into Chechen society.

            Under a Russian government program that allocates 13 US dollars a day per refugee, Chechnya agreed to take in 250 Palestinians and has done so as the conflict in the Middle East has intensified. On the occasion of the latest sharpening of that conflict, Grozny has sought to gain attention for its efforts in this regard by making this announcement.

            The creation of this new national cultural autonomy has attracted attention not only in Chechnya (chechnyatoday.com/news/378904) but also in portals which focus on nationality issues and the Caucasus (nazaccent.ru/content/42919-v-chechne-poyavilas-palestinskaya-nacionalno-kulturnaya-avtonomiya/ and kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/404233).

            Grozny is celebrating the fact that a Palestinian has now given birth to a child in Chechnya, something the Kadyrov regime sees as highlighting North Caucasian support for the Palestinians and solidifying Grozny’s role as Moscow’s chief representative to the Muslim nations of the Middle East (kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/393757).