Better to Be a Live Foreign Agent than a Dead Hero of Russia, Some Russians Say

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Sept. 1 – As the numbers of their fellow citizens being named either foreign agents or Heroes of Russia have increased, some Russians are now observing that it is far more secure to be a foreign agent than to be a Hero of Russia because then at least there is a chance at remaining alive.

            That is one of the anecdotes Moscow journalist Tatyana Pushkaryova has collected and posted online (publizist.ru/blogs/107374/46691/-). Among the best of the rest are the following:

·       Moscow’s airports are no longer secure given drone attacks so officials in the Russian capital have suggested extending the city’s subway system to Turkey and Egypt.

·       Russian schoolchildren are being told that smartphones and laptops are contrary to Russia’s traditional values but teachers are careful to specify that the television isn’t. Consequently, children are told to put away their phones and computers and start learning from the letter A.

·       What a difference 18 months make! Then, Russians were told they’d be in Kyiv in three days; now, they are told that the Ukrainian advance against Russian forces is going “painfully slowly.”

·       The border between Lydia and Persia ran along the River Halys. When Lydian king Croesus decided to attack the Persians, he asked the Delphic oracle whether he should cross that river. The oracle replied: “If you cross that river, you will destroy a great kingdom.” Encouraged, Croesus invaded Persia and got just that result: his own kingdom was destroyed. Doesn’t that remind you of anything? Russians ask.

Since Ukraine Invasion Began, Russian Courts Letting Soldiers Guilty of Corruption and Theft Off Easy but Imposing Real Sentences on Those who Desert or Refuse to Obey Orders, New Study Finds

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 31 – Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Russian courts have considered hundreds of criminal cases involving corruption and property crimes. Most were dismissed, and almost none resulted in prison sentences. But the same courts regularly imposed often draconian sentences on those who deserted or refuse to fight.

            That is the conclusion of a new study of several thousand cases by The New Tab and A Continuation Follows (thenewtab.io/voruj-no-voyuj/ and prosleduet.media/syuzhety/voruj-no-voyuj/); and while it is perhaps not surprising, it helps to explain why corruption and theft in the Russian army remains widespread even as other forms of command and control have tightened.

            And in particular, it helps to explain why the Russian armed forces in Ukraine are guilty of so much theft. Russian soldiers and their commanders know that from the point of view of the powers that be in Russia, such “crimes” are not that serious and won’t be punished severely if they are even identified by commanders as such.

            Until this changes, the Russian forces in Ukraine will resemble a gang of marauders more than a serious military; and Ukrainians will be the victims of such illegal actions.

Moscow’s USA and Canada Institute Director Fired after Publishing Article Critical of Russia’s Foreign Policy

Paul Goble

              Staunton, Sept. 1 – Valery Garbuzov, who had headed the Institute of the USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences, has been fired two days after he published an article in Nezavisimaya Gazeta savagely critical of the concepts underlying the Kremlin’s approach to foreign affairs.

              Even the most superficial examination of his article (ng.ru/ideas/2023-08-29/7_8812_illusions.html) is sufficient to explain why he was fired (pln-pskov.ru/society/495520.html). Indeed, the sharpness of Garbuzov’s critique is such that it will be surprising if he does not suffer a worse fate unless he is able to move abroad.

              The Russian Americanist begins by observing that “often the ruling elites of authoritarian and totalitarian political regimes have deliberately formed utopian ideas and myths and intentionally spread them among the masses,” helping to unite the population behind their leaders and allowing leaders to retain power for long periods of time.

              “Russian history is no exception to this pattern,” Garbuzov says; and he examines the way in which this pattern shaped Moscow’s approach to both foreign policy and its messaging about it during the Cold War, before pointing out that the Soviet authorities were wrong both about the strength of their system and the weakness of capitalism.

              In fact, the Soviet system tried to maintain itself by not making any changes and thus failed, while the capitalist system proved adaptable and survived and even prospered by being open to change.

              Unfortunately, the Russian scholar continues, “on a wave of anti-Western sentiments … new myths are being created [in Moscow] and with them, a modern utopian consciousness is being formed” and it is being propagated around the clock by “a new generation of well-paid professional political manipulators and television talk show hosts.”

              “Under the conditions of the creeping restoration of Stalinism, they are introducing new dogmas about the crisis of globalization and the entire Anglo-Saxon world … about a new anti-colonial revolution even though there are only 17 colonies left, about the loss of American dominance … and about the decline of the West in general,” all echoes of the Soviet past.

              If one looks around honestly, one sees that none of these myths is supported by reality, just as was the case with Soviet myths of 50 years ago. “Today,” it must be recognized, “there are only two informal empires on the planet, the American and the Chinese. Russia is a former empire, the heir of the Soviet superpower which is experiencing the painful syndrome of the sudden loss of imperial greatness.”

              “That Russia today has an obvious post-imperial syndrome is more a tragic pattern than an historical anomaly.” It didn’t arise immediately after 1991 but only “much later with Putin coming to power.” But this “delayed syndrome” has since become “threatening” to Russia’s ability to navigate in the world.

              Despite its declining status, Russia “is also trying to form its own geopolitical program. But it is still too unsteady, unstable and eclectic,” combining elements of Eurasianism, the Russian world, aggressive anti-Americanism, belief in the decaying West and so on, Garbuzov says and recalling Uvarov’s trinity of more than a century and a half ago.

              The Kremlin’s ideological message has a “quite obvious” purpose, “plunging one’s own society into a world of illusions and accompanied by great power and patriotic rhetoric” all designed to maintain “the indefinite retention of power” by its current rulers, an ultimately impossible task in the information age.

              “Every nation, like every person, has its own biography,” Garbuzov says. “And the most valuable things is its unique character” because “only by knowing it is is possible to build a line of civilized and responsible international behavior, the lack of which is all too obvious in today’s world.”

              But even more than that, he concludes, “knowledge and not myths about others allows us to understand them but also ourselves and to form a comprehensive and at the same time critical view of our own country, its history and its difficult periods, even if these were joined together with illusions gripping society.”

              That is something Russia and its rulers need to recognize rather than deny. 

Moscow Still hasn’t Compensated for Ukrainian Resistance in Soviet Times to Developing Transportation Links between Russia and Crimea, Chichkin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 31 – In Soviet times, both when Crimea was part of the RSFSR and when it belonged to the Ukrainian SSR, Kyiv blocked efforts promoted by Moscow officials to develop transportation links between Russia and Crimea and did so with such success in these periods that Russia lacked adequate links with Crimea after it illegally annexed the Ukrainian peninsula.

            That is why Putin has been so obsessed with the Russian bridge to Crimea and why that bridge, especially when attacks against it have limited its functioning, highlights the absence of other routes, road, rail and ship that should have been developed earlier but that the Ukrainians blocked.

            In an important historical article, Stoletiye commentator Aleksey Chichkin describes the way in which Moscow officials beginning in the 1930s tried to promote the development of these various routes to Crimea and how effectively Ukrainian officials blocked them (stoletie.ru/ekonomika/skolko_dorog_nuzhno_krymu_733.htm).

            What is particularly striking in his account is the ways in which the arguments of Ukrainian officials, even during periods when the peninsula was part of the RSFSR, were picked up by some in Moscow and became the basis for decisions there not to develop the infrastructure that the Soviet leadership said it was for.

            That Ukraine was successful in blocking Russian efforts when Crimea was part of the Ukrainian SSR is not a surprise, Chichkin says, especially since Soviet leaders from Khrushchev through Brezhnev had such close ties with Ukraine. But that Kyiv was effective even in Stalin’s time is something few have attended to.

Moscow Should Copy Chinese Plan to Save Villages Especially in Border Regions, Kapustin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 31 – Since the 1980s, the number of villages in the Russian Federation has declined dramatically, with 25,000 disappearing entirely and another 35,000 on their way to such a fate as they have fewer than ten residents each. As a result, vast swaths of the country are unpopulated, and rural Russia now has a total population barely equal to that of the largest cities.

            This has enormous socio-cultural, economic and security issues, given that the decline has been greatest in predominantly ethnic Russian regions near the center and much less in non-Russian areas, commentator Dmitry Kapustin says. And its impact is especially great in border areas other countries may be interested in (svpressa.ru/world/article/385508/).

            Russian officials have treated this development as both natural and inevitable and even exacerbated it via various “optimization” campaigns that have destroyed many of the institutions that are the anchors of remaining villages. And by doing so, the commentator argues, they are putting the country’s territorial integrity at risk.

            The fact is, he argues, the disappearance of villages is neither natural nor inevitable; and governments in other countries have shown what can be done to keep people in the villages, especially when these population centers are in strategically important border regions. One country that has been especially effective in that regard is China.

            In its northern regions, China faced problems in its villages similar to those in many parts of Russia, Kapustin says. But instead of concluding that nothing could be done about it, Beijing has launched a major program to save these villages and keep people from migrating to major cities and putting more pressure on the infrastructure of urban centers.

            Moscow should find the money to do the same because only by copying what China has done with success will Russia be able to ensure that its border regions and others beside retain a Russian population and remain within the existing borders of the Russian Federation. Kapustin does not say where the Russian authorities will get the money needed for such a policy. 

Moscow Finally Reacts to New Chinese Maps but May have Made Its Own Position Worse

 Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 31 – When the Chinese government published new official maps showing parts of India and the Russian Federation being within the borders of China, New Delhi reacted immediately; but Moscow didn’t (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/08/india-has-protested-but-russia-hasnt.html).

            Now, Russian foreign ministry spokesperson Mariya Zakharova has reacted; but she has done so by denying the obvious, claiming that the maps, even though they were officially approved by the Chinese government, don’t reflect the reality of the situation (mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1902282/).

            According to her, “the Russian and Chinese sides adhere to a common position regarding the fact that the border issue between our two countries has been finally resolves … The delimitation and demarcation of our common border has been completed along its entire length, including on the Bolshoy Ussuriysky Island.”

            This was achieved after “many years of effort by both sides, a reflection of the high level of relations between the two countries,” Zakharova said; and represents “an important contribution to ensuring security and stability in the region and a successful example of resolving border disputes for all countries in the world.”

            That some maps published in one or the other country do not reflect this reality only shows that those who prepare them don’t know what the real conditions are like. And many ordinary Russians will view this failure to condemn the Chinese maps as Russian kowtowing to China and fear that Moscow in fact is selling out the Far East.

‘The Further One is from Moscow, the More Freedom One Feels,’ Russian Commentator Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, Aug. 31 – Oleg Bondarenko, the director of the Progressive Politics Foundation, on his return from a visit to Siberia says that “the further one is from Moscow, the more freedom one feels,” a conclusion that challenges the widespread assumption that just the reverse is the case.

            In an article for Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Bondarenko draws five conclusions on the basis of his trip that support this view (ng.ru/kartblansh/2023-08-31/3_8815_kb.html):

 

·       First, in Siberia, “political competition is alive. Democratic traditions among the Siberians are strong.” There are numerous opposition figures, and even the election commissions are freer than in the capitals.

·       Second, the people are “brave, up to date, and principled” – in contrast to the people in the capitals who have none of these qualities.

·       Third, “Siberia remains a reserve of political competition and therefore a guarantee of the country’s development.

·       Fourth, the basic divide is not between donor regions and recipient ones but between officials who look only to Moscow and businesses and politicians who look to their own areas and think long term.

·       And fifth, environmental issues are increasingly dominating the political agenda in the region.

 

“With each passing year,” Bondarenko says,  “the budget for development will only decrease and thus the importance of public-private partnerships will grow. Initiative will pass into the hands of the regions … and the role of the federal center will objectively begin to decline, as local competition increases.”

The Moscow writer doesn’t mention yet another factor which all those who passed through the events of the late 1980s and 1991 will certainly recall: The union republics of the USSR grew in power precisely because they had elections that mattered while the president of the Soviet Union refused to subject himself to any real poll.