Paul Goble
Staunton,
May 5 – There has been much speculation as to whether Vladimir Putin will declare
a full-scale mobilization in order to improve Russia’s chances in its war in
Ukraine although the Kremlin says he has no intention of doing so, but there
has been remarkably little discussion of exactly what such a mobilization would
mean.
Pavel
Chikov, head of the Agora human rights group, is a welcome exception. In
Meduza, he discusses both what mobilization means in Russian law and
also what shape it would likely take if Putin does eventually declare it (meduza.io/feature/2022/05/05/esli-putin-vse-taki-ob-yavit-mobilizatsiyu-menya-otpravyat-v-ukrainu-a-chto-budet-esli-ya-otkazhus-voevat).
The picture
he describes is anything but straightforward with a large number of issues left
open even if mobilization is declared. Mobilization
was defined in Russian law in 1997 (consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_13454/), he says; but as it has never been fully declared,
there are many uncertainties about how it would actually work.
“The law allows mobilization in the
event of aggression or armed attack against Russia. Declaring mobilization
legally recognizes that Russia is at a state of war with another country. If
the war is not on Russian soil, however, the law does not permit the
declaration of a mobilization because aggression and wars of aggression are
prohibited by international law,” he continues.
For that reason, Chikov says, “mobilization is
possible only in the event of aggression from another state.” Moscow might claim
that Ukrainian counterattacks constitute aggression even though they all are on
Ukrainian territory. It could also make it countrywide or limit it to specific
regions within the country.
In general, he continues, “Generally
speaking, mobilization concerns men and women in the reserve. Women with
specific skills, like doctors, would be subject to conscription. Russia’s
reserves include discharged veterans, graduates of military schools, men older
than 27 who never served in the military despite being eligible, men older than
27 whose service was deferred, men who did not serve due to physical
limitations or other temporary conditions.”
Chikov continues: “Mobilization would
not apply to individuals with the right to deferment from conscription during
mobilization. And in addition, “citizens younger than 27 who did not serve as
conscripts but were never actually exempted from the draft would not be subject
to conscription under mobilization because they’re not technically ‘in the
reserve.’”
But “those who served in Russia’s
alternative civilian service would be subject to recruitment since mobilization
is not limited strictly to combat roles. The armed forces can conscript these
people as civilian personnel, for example, to serve as medical workers at
hospitals.”
“There is no profession that
releases people from mobilization, but the list of codified exemptions is broad and includes conditions
like illness, disability, and serious health problems suffered by a close
relative” (consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_18260/).
But whether the authorities would observe these limitations is uncertain.
“Anyone drafted in a mobilization could
lose their right to leave the country, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that
all conscripts would face this restriction,” Chikov says; and “0nce
mobilization has been announced, the authorities would begin issuing
draft-board summons and detaining potential conscripts in the street.”
“Anyone who receives mobilization
orders is required to appear at the military barracks or recruitment office
designated in the summons. This obligation exists only after the summons is
physically delivered, however, meaning that Russians located abroad, beyond the
reach of the state’s subpoenas, can evade conscription by staying away.”
The mobilization law specifies that “under
conditions of mobilization, citizens considered to be “in the reserve” could be
sent directly into battle, given the assumption that they’ve already received
all the necessary basic training. Fresh conscripts, on the other hand, would
first have to first undergo at least four months of training.”
According to Chikov,
Putin “also has the power to declare a military emergency simultaneously with
mobilization. For example, an emergency could be declared in specific areas of
Russia near the border with Ukraine, but this is a different legal condition
regulated under a separate federal law” (consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_35227/).
But in this case as
well, there is no precedent, so it is impossible to say precisely what the
Kremlin would do, the Agora rights activist says.