Paul
Goble
Staunton, October 26 – Pictures of several
young Belarusian military cadets wearing T-shirts with pictures of the mounted
knight, a symbol that many Belarusian nationalists identify with but one that
Russians view as fascist or at least Russophobic, went viral on the Russian
Internet last week.
And the attention these pictures
have received in Russia has only increased now that it has become obvious that
the Belarusian authorities have no intention of punishing the cadets – after all,
this symbol is not illegal even under Alyaksandr Lukashenka but will only
tighten discipline in the military academy involved.
One of the most interesting
commentaries has been offered by Alla Bron, who argues that the behavior of the
students and even more the response of the authorities show that Russia is
losing the youth of Belarus and hence Russia’s future there and will unless
something changes radically continue to do so with or without Lukashenka (regnum.ru/news/polit/1998019.html).
What makes Bron’s comments so
intriguing is that her diagnosis of what is wrong in Belarus from her
perspective – the absence of a vision of the future among that country’s elites
-- could be applied with equal force to
the Russian Federation itself, a possibility that she even alludes to in the
closing passage of her essay.
Bron notes that
the cadets really weren’t taking any real risks and that the celebration by
some Belarusian nationalists of their actions exaggerates its meaning. But if
their actions are not that significant, she suggests, the failure of the authorities
not to do anything in response is very much so because it shows how Mensk is
trying to position itself at home and abroad.
Imagine, she says, what would have
happened if cadets at Moscow’s Suvorov Academy in the 1950s or so had been
photographed with T-shirts showing a swastika.
The authorities would have moved swiftly against all of them because
those in power had “complete confidence in their own correctness and the
population understood this.”
But “today, in a completely
analogous situation, the Belarusian authorities showed themselves to be worried
about their image in the eyes of liberal society” both within the country and
especially in Europe. Consequently, they imposed no sanctions, and the cadets
involved will continue their studies possibly sometime becoming officers of the
Belarusian armed forces.
“As we know from parasitology,” Bron
continues, where you can see one spider or insect, there are dozens more which
you can’t see. “This is also true of the Belarusian opposition.” There may be
only a few who will display such symbols, but there are dozens more who think
the same way but are afraid to show their true colors.
Bron asks rhetorically: “Why is
Russia losing Belarusian youth?” That
may seem hard for Russians who remember the positive aspects of the Soviet
past, but it reflects an important reality.
Young people in Belarus – and by implication Russia as well – “do not
remember this.” Instead, they focus on “the here and now.”
What that means is that in Belarus
at least, the situation can be described as “’frozen perestroika,’” Bron
argues, a situation in which everything bad about the Soviet past is constantly
discussed and in which the West is viewed in an entirely positive light as a
model for emulation.
Although perestroika went in a more “sluggish”
fashion in Belarus than elsewhere because in Bron’s view, Belarusians are part
of the Russian nation, the Belarusian bureaucracy used nationalism to justify
having an independent state they could control in much the same way as did
nationalists elsewhere.
“Then came Lukashenka who for a
certain time considered Belarus only as a jumping off point for the Kremlin and
stopped [this kind of] ‘nation building,’” Bron suggests. As a result, “Belarus as it were became ‘stuck
in perestroia,’” in a double sense.
On the one hand, many of the worst
features of the Soviet past that people everywhere wanted to give up, including
bureaucratism, social apathy, and the lack of belief in the future. But on the
other, Belarusians continued to consider the West as a model for them even when
others in the post-Soviet space gave up on that idea.
“All this in contemporary Belarus
was made even worse by the lack of a state ideology, by an image of the future.
One can argue for a long time whether Communism was possible or about how many people
at the end of the USSR still believed in it, but one must admit that at least
the USSR had a model of the future.”
“Belarusian officialdom doesn’t. Not
at all,” Bron says.
Mensk constantly talks about the
future but it presents it as “only a continuation of a rotting present, which
is something strange in the stormily changing world of the beginning of the 21st
century, the Regnum commentator says. But “in contrast to the authorities, the pro-Western opposition has an
ideology,” one that “synthesizes” Russophobia and more food.
Young
Belarusians see the wealth of the West “and want to live the same way. [They]
are told that for this they must hate Russians and all that is connected with
the USSR? No problem! Lukashenka in their consciousness is also connected with
the USSR? Then do away with him as well!”
“As
a result,” Bron says, “Lukashenka has finally lost the information war for the
minds of young people. But he is a smart man. He knows how to turn to his
advantage even what would see a dead end situation.” Exploiting tensions
between Russia and the West, he simply begins to sound something like the
Russophobes in his own population.
What
is at work is the old principle that “if you can’t defeat the mafia, then you
must head it,” the commentator says. And
in this way, Bron continues, Lukashenka “is becoming for the Russophobes if not
a friend then at least a lesser evil in comparison with a hypothetic ‘Russian
Vanya on a tank.’ And in this way, nothing threatens the person power of Batka.”
“Unfortunately,”
she says, “Russia isn’t doing anything to block these negative tendencies in
Belarusian society. Russian patriots simply can’t agree among themselves … and
officials work only with the authorities and not with society.” And the results
are now clear for all to see.
And
they are these: “Regardless of whether Lukashenka holds onto power or not,
Russia is losing Belarus” – and if one applies her logic to the Russian
Federation as well, Moscow, without a compelling vision of the future beyond
keeping Putin in power for life, is losing Russia as well.
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