Putin Will Launch New Offensives in 2020 to Recover His Standing at Home, Shelin Says

Paul Goble

            Staunton, November 29 – In the course of 2019, Vladimir Putin has been in a holding action, a position that has cost him support because nothing he has done has inspired the Russian population, Sergey Shelin says. As a result, he and his entourage are deciding where they will in fact go over to “the attack” in the coming year.

            From Putin’s perspective, the Rosbalt commentator says, simply maintaining the current situation into 2020 is “clearly undesirable;” and therefore, “the probability that those at the top will come up with some great actions is growing. It is only necessary for [Putin] to choose the scenario” he will pursue (rosbalt.ru/blogs/2019/11/29/1815863.html).

            Shelin suggests that Putin will seek a foreign policy triumph, the victory of United Russia in next fall’s elections, or the recovery of the affection of the Russian people he enjoyed earlier – or some combination of the three.

            Next week, there are two events which could give Putin a foreign policy triumph, the possibility of a real union state between Russia and Belarus and the inclusion of the ORDLO (the DNR and LNR) within Ukraine on the Kremlin leader’s terms. To be sure, “there are few chances for the success of these measures,” at least complete success.

            But “to make a solid PR product out of them is something that can be achieved. Lukashenka “for a good subsidy” will be ready to give his “latest solemn promise to integrate,” and Zelensky “wants and can agree to a certain program minimum: a cease fire, the exchange of prisoners and hostages, a freezing of the war, and a resolution of the gas conflict in Kyiv’s favor.

            In that event, such an accord “will not bring ‘Crimean-style’ bonuses, but undoubtedly it will please out citizens who are tired of conflicts with those near and far,” Shelin continues. And that will be especially the case if an accord on Ukraine leads to a reduction in international tension, something France’s Macron wants as well.

            But at the same time, the commentator says, “such half-victories will be too little to win 2020.”

            The second area in which Putin may attack to win support will be to secure an electoral triumph for United Russia in the September 2020 votes. At present, that seems improbable except under one condition: “the final sovietization of election procedures” so that United Russia doesn’t face any opposition. How Russians would react to that remains uncertain.

            And the third area in which Putin is likely to make new moves involves steps that will win him back the love of the population. These may be small; but if Russians read them as a revival of his good will toward them, they may pay big dividends. 

            But one thing is very clear, Shelin concludes. “The system does not have any more time to sit in the trenches. It is preparing to stand up to its full height and move toward meeting the citizens, to speak with them in ways they will find understandable.” It is quite possible Putin doesn’t want to do that, “but he understands that it’s time” to do so.

            That could change the image of the Russian political system without changing its essence at least initially; but in an outcome Shelin doesn’t address here, any concessions could lead to a revolution in rising expectations in which small concessions will lead not to passivity but to larger demands, a development that will put the Putin regime in an ever more awkward position.